Getting to Zero

U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: What Next?

On October 1, 2008 the U.S. Congress passed the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. The long anticipated agreement would allow U.S. companies to trade nuclear technology, information, and material to India. It has faced several hurdles, including first passing the U.S. Congress in 2006, the Indian Parliament in July, the IAEA Board of Governors in August, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group in September. Controversy surrounds the agreement because, India is not an established member of the nonproliferation regime and it detonated nuclear devices in 1998. India has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Despite the resistance, the agreement passed, and now is in its final stages of negotiations in India. The question now is, what next?

Several questions need to be asked when trying to figure out what is next. How does the United States bring India closer into the nonproliferation regime, when they did not require India to join the NPT or sign the CTBT in the negotiations for the agreement? Also, how does the United States ensure that India does not use the deal to further their weapons program? Finally, how could this agreement fit into the goal of getting to zero?

How could the United States bring India further into the nonproliferation regime? India has long talked about disarming and seeking a global nuclear free world, but could this agreement open the door for the U.S. to gain more influence in India to try and move toward the goal? Could the next U.S. leadership use the deal as an opening to say to India that they need to shift towards signing the CTBT or NPT in the future? Contrary to what some may be saying, the NPT regime may not be dead, but the U.S. must use the new relationship to try and push India closer to the regime.

Next, how could the U.S. ensure that India does not further their weapons program? On the floor of the Senate, both Senator Dodd and Senator Lugar noted that if India tested a new device, the agreement is off. The U.S. should make that explicit to India that they cannot test any new devices. Also, the U.S. should go a step further and insist that if any new weapons are built, that the U.S. can review the deal, for fear of a possible violation of Article I of the NPT. This deal hinges on the fact that India needs nuclear material. However, if they produce new devices, then the deal should be terminated.

Finally, can this actually help in the long road in getting to zero? It is possible, in that it could provide an opening to western countries to try and reign in the Indian program. It could allow India to be a member of the discussion, not fully, but a member. Perhaps, this could lead to a more open discussion on India’s nuclear program.  It is true that only some of India’s facilities will be safeguarded, but it is better than nothing.

The agreement is flawed, and is not what the nonproliferation community desired, but it is the new reality. Now, the question is how does the community react, and how can they shift the focus toward getting to zero? The key is to ensure that India lives up to the agreement, and is on board with the global disarmament movement. It is paramount that this does not live up to be a nonproliferation disaster.

Philip Maxon

Russian Resurgence and Diplomacy

Whether the Russian operation against Georgia was premeditated or not, the leadership has used it effectively to strengthen nationalistic support within the country, and to challenge the view domestically and internationally of expanding, unbridled US dominance.

The economic context: The view amongst many western analysts is that high oil and gas prices mask a continuing decline in the capacity of the Russian economy, caused by severe social and structural weaknesses. The global economic whirlwind of recent weeks, with falling prices and emerging recession, has exposed these weaknesses and led to drastic economic policy responses in Russia.

Already before the current financial crisis, the Russian political response to its weaknesses was to build a more cohesive domestic political support by a direct challenge to Western hegemony. Although their economic capacity to continue this policy will be weakened by recent events, the political motivation to do so will have strengthened. It appears the leadership is prepared to take the long-term risk of another collapse in the belief that the alternative, existing as a compliant third-rate power whose influence continues to decline, is unacceptable.

The diplomatic context must take account of the fact that Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council, has working relations with regimes hostile to the West, and is a major supplier of nuclear and military technology. While Russia was willing to support the latest UN Security Council holding resolution on Iran at the end of September, it is clearly now far less willing to contemplate further action, and more likely to hurry with their delivery of the latest generation S-300 air defence system, that could prove challenging for all but the most sophisticated air assault on Iran’s defences. Some within Moscow may even now be willing to risk a nuclear armed Iran if it weakened western hegemony. Without Russia alongside, international action that attempts to isolate the Iranian regime is even less likely to succeed (the possibilities before were low). If the West is serious about halting Iran’s race to acquire a nuclear weapon capability, it will need to make up with Russia, or find some other strategy that genuinely accommodates Iran’s desire for a nuclear fuel cycle independent of western or Russian veto.

Whilst Russia’s behaviour demands a clear response from the international community, targeting agreements that are clearly in our own interests is a grave error. Arms control, weakened by a sceptical Administration in Washington these last eight years, is all the more important if relationships are strained. Russia is already upgrading its nuclear arsenal to penetrate the yet-to-be-installed missile defense system in eastern Europe, and decisions look likely to be made to expand their tactical nuclear deployments in western Russia, unless new diplomatic initiatives are opened up.

Paul Ingram

Tribute to Des Browne - UK Defence Secretary (no more)

Reading the initial news chatter suggesting Des Browne is to be replaced at the Ministry of Defence with John Hutton I am filled with dismay. Des Browne is famous within our arms control community for the speech he gave at the Conference on Disarmament earlier this year and referenced earlier in this blog, at which he proposed a technical disarmament conference of the P5. As a defense secretary Des has been uniquely sympathetic to the more holsitic, global perspective, whilst also winning the support of the military (when initially they were suspicious). His speech was indicative of the changed attitude at the ministry and the leading role it took on much of this agenda, previously a preserve of the Foreign Office. Des will be greatly missed.

Two missed opportunities for GTZ during the Presidential debate

The first U.S. Presidential debate between Senators John McCain and Barack Obama was supposed to be the big chance for the candidates to showcase their foreign policy visions and differences.  Unfortunately, both candidates missed two opportunities within the debate to mention their vision for a world without nuclear weapons. It’s actually one issue that both of them seem to agree on, at least in a general way. Moreover, large cuts in the U.S. nuclear arsenal could reap economic and foreign policy benefits.

First missed opportunity: The growing financial crisis overtook the first part of the debate. When moderator Jim Lehrer repeatedly asked the candidates what policy priorities they would change in order for the nation to cover the $700 billion financial bailout, both of them sounded reluctant to put any of their existing plans on the chopping block.

The candidates could have mentioned their interest in cutting back the U.S. nuclear arsenal and could have offered to eliminate plans for a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) to save money.  Recent estimates put U.S. spending on nuclear-related forces and activities at $54 billion annually. While we talk about coping with the billions lost in the current financial crisis and discuss ways to cut back government spending in the future, we should remember that from 1940 to 2005, the United States spent $7.5 trillion in developing, producing, deploying and maintaining its nuclear weapons (2006 dollars).*

We don’t want to go down that route again. Maybe we won’t have another Cold War, but the next Administration could take on unnecessary financial burdens if it pursues a RRW program and forgoes the chance to make large reductions in the arsenal.  For example, following a scenario put forward by Miriam Pemberton and Lawrence Korb, the United States could save $13.5 billion annually by reducing the nuclear arsenal to the minimum level needed for “a credible deterrent.”

Second missed opportunity: Later in the debate, Mr. Lehrer asked the candidates how they would handle the nuclear crisis over Iran. Both candidates responded with how they would manage negotiations and sanctions. They also mentioned, to a varying extent, their support for Cooperative Threat Reduction, and military options, including missile defense. Neither candidate, however, mentioned the connection between the large U.S. arsenal and how its existence may actually encourage other countries to acquire nuclear weapons programs or further develop their arsenals. A Harris Interactive poll conducted in August found that two-thirds of adult Americans understand that the possession of nuclear weapons by some countries encourages other countries to obtain them.

If the United States were to further reduce the number and role of its nuclear weapons, it would improve efforts to restrain future proliferation. Reducing the nuclear arsenal will show that the United States is committed to Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is considered part of a ‘grand bargain” in which other countries forego nuclear weapons in exchange for the NPT nuclear weapons states to work toward nuclear disarmament.

So far, the regime has helped to keep the number of nuclear weapons states to fewer than 10. Therefore, the next President must work to strengthen the NPT. If more countries take on nuclear weapons, the opportunities for accidents or nuclear war will increase. Moreover, as the candidates clearly understand (as evidenced by their support for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs), the widespread proliferation of fissile material could increase the chances that it will fall into the hands of terrorists.

Senators McCain and Obama had to cover an incredible amount of policy ground in a short period of time, and the financial crisis has understandably grabbed everyone’s attention for the moment. However, this should serve as a reminder how reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal could help the next Administration save money and improve security.

*Figure from: Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: the History and Future of Nuclear Weapons, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p. 77.

Chris Lindborg, BASIC

Launch of Adelphi 396: Abolishing Nuclear Weapons

George Perkovich is the leading author of a new Adelphi paper, commissioned in part by the UK Foreign Office and trailed by Margaret Beckett in a speech at the Carnegie Conference in 2007 whilst Foreign Secretary, about the technical and political aspects around moves towards a world free of nuclear weapons. The paper was launched in Washington on 16th September at the Carnegie Endowment.

Perkovich began by emphasizing the need for cooperation between nuclear weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS). He criticized NWS for frequently paying “lip service” to disarmament and anti-proliferation efforts, but acting slowly and reluctantly. He was also critical of NNWS which don’t regard such programs as “their problem” but rather something that the NWS should “report on when they are done with it.”

In response to the common claim against “getting to zero” (GTZ) nuclear weapons that such weapons “can’t be disinvented,” Perkovich drew a comparison between nuclear arms and Nazi gas chambers. The gas chambers, he said, had not been disinvented either, but rather eliminated because they were deemed too dangerous and inhumane for use. (However, this comparison is dubious given that nuclear weapons have deep political and defense functions not attributable to gas chambers.)

Perkovich also stressed the importance of making total nuclear disarmament a “viable option for leaders,” by improving international relations and strengthening anti-proliferation safeguard mechanisms, particularly in terms of enforcement. He also questioned the efficacy of automatic sanctions for violators of proliferation rules. Applying such rules to states with major international economic and political weight, particularly the US, would prove extremely costly and dangerous and as a result, such rules were unlikely to be followed, even if agreed.

In response to inquiries about the stability of a nuclear free world, Perkovich said, “You won’t eliminate the last nuclear weapons without addressing underlying security issues,” and that merely making GTZ a goal was a positive step. Sir Michael Quinlan, who provided additional remarks, noted that, “If I had a magic wand and could eliminate nuclear weapons, I wouldn’t do it,” because, “a lot else has to change,” to ensure stability in a nuclear free world. Further questioning about the usefulness of making nuclear weapons illegal prior to their abolition led Quinlan to dismiss the idea: “Nuclear weapons are for extreme circumstances, in which case prohibition would be for the birds.” Quinlan took a similar stance on No First Use policies, calling them “nonsense,” and saying that, “to refuse a No First Use promise is not to therefore have a policy of first use.”

Perkovich indicated his surprise at US presidential candidate John McCain’s willingness to agree with rival Barack Obama on the desirability of a nuclear weapons free world. He said that he had expected that if one candidate showed support for GTZ, the other would take the opportunity to call him “weak” on security measures, and advocate sustaining the US nuclear posture. Nevertheless, when it was noted that nuclear issues rarely made campaign headlines, Perkovich said that he still hoped it would remain so as such exposure would likely lead one candidate or another to become “more hawkish” in the pre-election frenzy. He also remained pessimistic about the issue’s prominence on the agenda of the next president after the campaign, as it must compete with the emerging economic crisis, Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, etc.

Perkovich said that the military effectiveness of nuclear weapons was severely limited by intelligence capabilities, noting the failure of coalition forces in Iraq to find their “top 50” insurgent targets even with a full scale conventional force, and asking how the use of nuclear weapons on such targets would be authorized or effective.

Further doubts were raised by questioners about the advisability of pursuing GTZ given the obstacles and the risk that the process itself could be destabilizing. Perkovich pointed out that the status quo might seem acceptable to the NWS but was unstable, because others saw nuclear armaments as dangerous, immoral, and represented outmoded and undesirable political structures.

Simon Fuchs, BASIC