Dr. Alessandro Politi, Independent Strategic
and OSINT [Open Source Intelligence] Analyst - Italy
(brief biography)
Washington, D.C., October 30, 2001
I would like to devise my contribution around
two parts: one respondens, answering the questions
posed by the organizers in their topics list, and one costruens,
building upon the latest debates within the Italian governmental
bodies concerning this subject in view of possible peacekeeping
operations in Afghanistan. I owe some of the suggestions
and insights to a brilliant Italian Defense Staff superior
officer and to a very senior Air Force general.
Structure - when do leaders know who to
send in: policemen or observers?
The structure itself of the civilian crisis management unit
should be relatively free. The COPS study provides an excellent
basis for the most common traits between different instruments,
but there are two points I would like to stress. Civilian
units as a whole will never have the characteristics of
military units, because their inherent goals are very different:
this means that structures must be allowed to adapt to the
leader. I have the distinct impression that, behind each
success in civilian crisis management, the leader's character
was a very important factor.
The second one is that the unit must have
a situation center where the nature of the evolving situation
can be assessed in the light of available information, knowledge
management, OSINT and, possibly, intelligence. This center
would be one of the key staff components to assist the leader's
judgment. It might be worthwhile exploring a warning and
indicators matrix to assist evaluation in detecting a negative
spiraling of a situation.
The European Union and the Organizations
for Security and Cooperation in Europe in preventive crisis
handling.
I do not know if anybody could have done more in FYROM [the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]. If one compares
it with the disasters in the Middle East, in the Great Lakes
region or in Bosnia, one can see the remarkable progress
achieved. Probably the next improvement hinges on a vastly
improved intelligence exchange, especially at the European
level, because preventive diplomacy depends on early warning
and early political realization that something is afoot.
Europe and the bulk of crisis management:
Europe-alone or Africa and elsewhere?
Surely Europe has to strive to manage crises well beyond
Europe for three simple reasons. The EU's political and
economic interests are world-wide. The EU's security interests
span at least from the Nordkapp to the Hormuz Strait and
from Nigeria to Madagascar. Second, the interdependency
in a globalized world makes it impossible for the EU to
isolate itself even from very distant crises. Third, the
European continent remains an obvious priority, but the
Balkans are slowly becoming more of an integration issue
than a crisis management one.
What can the United States do to help the
EU's civilian crisis management capabilities?
I have the impression that, regarding these capabilities,
the main ingredient is reciprocal help without prejudices
and hidden agenda. No one has these capabilities at a satisfactory
level and we both have to learn from each other. Some think
that there should be a sort of division of labor between
one side doing the war-fighting and the other the peacekeeping.
This has not worked in the past, is a constant source of
friction, misunderstanding and frustration, and will not
work in the future. If one side becomes too much identified
with the bombing, this will not increase her security and
consensus-building at all.
Limits of civilian intervention, when does
one need military means?
This is unfortunately one of the most difficult questions.
The main problem lies not so much in recognizing per se
when the situation needs a military intervention, but when
the danger might be averted by not calling in the military.
This is compounded by the fact that, while security and
strategic analysis might offer a reasonable prediction about
the moment when the armed force is needed, political and
social perception might be at odds. Political violence can
be deterred by other means, unless the violent actors do
not resort systematically to lethal force and heavy weapons
do not come into play. These two could be adopted as a rule
of thumb, but real cases show that there are significant
exceptions. European leaders have the disadvantage of each
having to cope with its own national dimension, something
which does not ensure either operational effectiveness or
deep political impact.
The pars costruens revolves around
the same reflection regarding the post-Afghanistan phase.
Much of it is necessarily speculative because the war has
not ended and because the participating countries still
do not have a developed policy.
Let me dispose quickly of a recent and often
repeated mantra: the 11th of September is an historic day
that changed all and marked the end or the beginning of
an era. I understand that the emotion surrounding the victims
and their beloved ones is immense, and world-wide and strong
has been the sorrow and the solidarity after such an unprecedented
terrorist attack, which I fully share. Yet my roots as a
historian make me wary of media and politicians crying for
the "historic day." Most historic days were not recognized
as such and even more have entered history books only to
be forgotten. How many remember the Lisbon earthquake? It
razed a whole capital in nine minutes and was perceived
as the end of the Enlightenment Era, but it was not.
This is a necessary, and sometimes painful
step. If we want to avoid being caught in a headless frenzy
where one believes that all must change, only to discover
that so much change was unhelpful. Consider that this war
is actually fought on our side 90% with ideas, tactics and
weapons decades-old, whereas on the Afghan side at least
50% is centuries old.
The ideas emerging in my country are that
the organizational arrangements existing are deemed insufficient
vis-a-vis new risks and threats. I will discuss them briefly
with the double caveat that they are not yet a policy and
that I do not agree with some of them.
Probably following the example of the establishment
of the Office of Homeland Security, headed by former Pennsylvania
governor Tom Ridge, in Italy the concept of civil defense
has been resurrected. We already have a department of the
Presidency of the Council of Ministers that is responsible
for Civil Protection, but of course the different name implies
different aims. Civil protection tackles the natural and
man-made accidental disasters, whereas civil defense has
to monitor, prevent and prepare for the management of intentional
catastrophes. Civil defense was a fashionable concept in
the early decades of the Cold War for obvious reasons and
it could be associated with measures against subversion,
(terrorism) and sabotage, especially in the French variant
DOT (Defense Operationnelle du Territoire).
Civil defense is being associated with the
protection of the internal front and thus also to PSYOPS
[psychological operations] directed against terrorist propaganda.
The elaboration of this concept is still ongoing and by
far
incomplete, but it appears evident that, depending on political
choice, one can consider civil defense temporarily necessary,
or necessary as a coordinating body to ensure the protection
of critical infrastructures and of the population against
WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and radiological attacks,
or indispensable in its more intrusive and muscular form.
The next probable step in Italy will be the creation of
some inter-ministerial committee to develop a policy.
Before I show what could be the relationship
between civil defense and civilian crisis management, I
would like to go back to the consequences of the 11th of
September (or 9/11 as you call it here). A type of international
terrorism has struck with utmost savagery in this country,
but we should not overstep from legitimate, sensible and
necessary security concerns into the error of organizing
our security, which means a significant portion of our politics
and society, around this risk. The tragedies in this city
and in New York are not only the result of criminal ingenuity,
they derive also from complacency, lack of intelligence,
lack of investigation and, you know it best, a too complex
and layered bureaucracy. How we respond to this threat is
only partially determined by it and a lot from our own political
decisions.
In short, I will avoid the easy quip against
"militarizing our civil security," but I have seen several
times that it was easier to set up a new machinery than
solving long standing problems, without necessarily getting
more results. And, despite risking being unpopular, I doubt
that the war on terrorism will achieve more results than
the ongoing war on drugs. It is true that the wars against
piracy have been a recurring success, but probably terrorism
is a different type of risk, where in the end precise political
responses are decisive and military ones ancillary.
The idea of civil defense could influence
the way peacekeeping would be run. In a nutshell, civil
defense would have a dimension projectable abroad. In a
post-Afghan scenario, civil defense would, on one hand,
continue to retain a link with the motherland to sustain
the internal front in the nation- rebuilding effort of that
wretched country. On the other, civil defense would be the
security and military tool to organize the reconstruction
work in co-operation with NGOs. NGOs in turn would probably,
in the aftermath of some unpleasant experience with certain
confessional and non-confessional charities, become more
regulated than in the past and in some cases be induced
to stronger governmental links.
I do not agree with these solutions, but I
do agree with the underlying concerns that prompt them.
I believe that post-war reconstruction needs a clear framework
where a civil intergovernmental authority directs the rebuilding
framework, disposes of the military and gendarmerie units,
works together with the local political authorities (because
the Balkan "protectorates'" experience is not convincing),
and co-ordinates transparently the work of NGOs. I think
also that NGOs are best suited to reform themselves, but
they must act against unambiguous standards, which they
cannot set by themselves. The standards concern mainly transparency
(both financial and decisional), accountability, and responsibility.
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