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Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management
Coverage of the Kosovo Crisis, 1999-2000
Kosovo: The Long Road to War
A Chronology 1999
199950
January - The commander of the main FRY military unit in
Kosovo, Lieutenant-General Dusan Smardzic, tells local reporters
that they can look forward to a "hot spring" in which the
problems in the Province will finally be resolved.
16 January - The bodies of at least 45 peasant farmers and
their children are found on hillsides and courtyards in the
village of Racak. The "Racak massacre" is regarded as a turning
point by Albright and the Clinton Administration. The killings
galvanize public opinion in Europe as well.
19 January
-President Clinton's top aides meet in the Situation Room
in the White House basement to hear a new plan for an autonomous
Kosovo from Madeleine Albright. Again, NATO bombing is threatened.
For the first time, however, it demands that Serbia accept
NATO troops in Kosovo to enforce a deal under which Serbia
would withdraw almost all its security forces and grant Kosovo
broad autonomy. The plan goes significantly beyond the provision
of armed protection for OSCE observers. However, Secretary
of Defense William Cohen and General Hugh Shelton, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are critical of a plan that
would require American troops deployed in a militarily and
politically unstable area.
-In Belgrade, General Wesley K. Clark and Chairman of the
NATO Military Council General Klaus Naumann present the new
threats of NATO air strikes.
21 January
-President Clinton describes to Prime Minister Tony Blair
of Britain the new Western approach. The two leaders agree
that the West is constrained to two options: initiating an
immediate bombing campaign in reprisal for Racak massacres,
or fashioning a diplomatic solution that includes ground troops
as peacekeepers in Kosovo. Blair argues that ground troops
cannot be used to fight a war, but only as part of a comprehensive
political strategy. President Clinton agrees.
-Two State Department veterans of the Dayton talks, James
Pardew and Christopher Hill, deliver renewed threats of Western
retaliation for Racak unless Serbia comes to the bargaining
table.
28 January - The NATO allies announce that they are ready
to use force immediately, and Britain and France say they
are prepared to send in ground troops to enforce a peace settlement.
30 January - Kofi Annan, the United Nations Secretary General,
announces that the threat of force is justified to bring the
Serbs to the bargaining table. The allies decide they now
have justification under international law to authorize air
strikes against Yugoslavia if it does not agree to negotiate
a settlement.
February - George J. Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence,
predicts in Congressional testimony that there will be a major
spring offensive by the Serbs in Kosovo and huge refugee flows.
4 February - Secretary of State Madeleine Albright delivers
a lecture and statement of US policy at a forum assembled
by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), a federally
funded think-tank. In the presentation, Secretary Albright
outlines "the lessons of Bosnia":
Kosovo is not Bosnia because we have learned the lessons
of Bosnia-and we are determined to apply them here and now.
We know . . . that the only reward for tolerating atrocities
is more of the same. We know that the longer we delay in
exercising our leadership, the dearer it will eventually
be-in dollars lost, in lost credibility and in human lives.
. . .Finally, we learned in Bosnia, and we have seen in
Kosovo, that President Milosevic understands only the language
of force. Nothing less than strong engagement from NATO
will focus the attention of both sides; and nothing less
than firm American leadership will ensure decisive action.51
6-20 February - Talks towards a peaceful interim settlement
and political framework for Kosovo take place in Rambouillet,
France. The Americans approach the negotiations hoping to
impose a solution on the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians, but
the attempt quickly breaks down. Slobodan Milosevic does not
attend the meetings, concluding that there is not enough of
an incentive for him to deal, given the initial text of the
agreement. The draft document provides for full Kosovar Albanian
autonomy in police, education, military, and social affairs
and the deployment of NATO ground troops in Kosovo to enforce
the interim agreement. It stipulates further that Kosovo's
status would be decided after three years based partially
"on the will of the people," implying the possibility of a
referendum for independence. Likewise, the Albanians, influenced
heavily by the growth and military successes of the KLA, refuse
to accept a three-year autonomy deal without an ironclad guarantee
of eventual independence. Secretary Albright implores the
Albanian delegations to sign near the end of the two-week
negotiating period, but she fails to convince the hard-liners,
the representatives of the Kosovo Liberation Army, who insist
on inserting language promising a referendum on independence
after three years of autonomy. However, the KLA negotiators
agree to a two week period to present the plan to their supporters.
By refusing to sign the deal, the Kosovo Albanians take the
pressure off the Serbs, leaving NATO with no legitimate rationale
(under international law) to order air strikes at that point.
"If this fails because both sides say 'No,' there will be
no bombing of Serbia," Secretary Albright said on February
21, as the Rambouillet talks wound down.
26 February - The Pentagon tells the media that the Yugoslav
Army has massed 4,500 heavily armored troops on the Kosovo
border.52
14-18 March - As a follow-up to the first Rambouillet proceedings,
another session is convened in Rambouillet. On 18 March, four
ethnic Albanian delegates sign a peace plan that would give
their people broad autonomy for a three-year interim period,
with possible independence at the end of the term. Unknown
to the media or many Western political leaders, language has
also been inserted in the Appendix that allows NATO troops
to bivouac and travel unimpeded on Serbian Republican territory.
Partly due to this provision, and partly to the revised language
on a Kosovar referendum, the Serbs do not sign. According
to Secretary Albright, "Signing Rambouillet was crucial in
getting the Europeans. . . .to agree to the use of force."
She argued that the Serbs had already begun their offensive,
and without the explicit consent of the Albanians to the peace
agreement, "we would be negotiating while they were carrying
out their 'village a day keeps NATO away.'"
19 March - Rambouillet conference co-chairmen Hubert Vedrine
(Foreign Minister of France) and Robin Cook (Foreign Minister
of Britian) release a joint statement saying:
1) The Rambouillet Accords are the only peaceful solution
to the Kosovo problem; 2) In Paris, the Kosova delegation
seized this opportunity . . . 3) Far from seizing this opportunity,
the Yugoslav delegation has tried to unravel the Rambouillet
Accords; 4) Therefore, after consultation with our partners
in the Contact Group . . . we consider there is no purpose
in extending the talks any further. The negotiations are
adjourned. The talks will not resume unless the Serbs express
their acceptance of the accords; 5) We will immediately
engage in consultations with our partners and allies to
be ready to act. We will be in contact with the Secretary
General of NATO.53
However, even though the United States and its NATO allies
are now committed to war, Robin Cook, Hubert Vedrine, and
Joschka Fischer of Germany want to fly to Belgrade to give
Milosevic one last chance to sign the accords. Secretary Albright
persuades them to allow Ambassador Holbrooke to go instead.
22 March - Slobodan Milosevic accuses the Americans of "sitting
at the Albanian side of the table" at Rambouillet, and refuses
to make any compromises.
22-24 March - OSCE observers are extracted from Kosovo Province,
and bombing begins on 24 March.
__________________
Endnotes
1 All entries for 1988-1989 are excerpted
from Noel Malcom, "Kosovo after the death of Tito: 1981-1997,"
pp. 335-427, A Short History of Kosovo, New York: NY
University Press, 1998, with amendments and additions by Louis
Sell, a former US State Department Balkan Specialist. Mr.
Sell is an advisor to BASIC for this project.
2 Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe,
New York: Times Books - Random House, 1996 p. 18.
3 Ibid
4 Ibid., 15-16.
5 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
6 Ibid., p. 47-48.
7 Ibid., p. 52.; Susan Woodward, Balkan
Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, Washington
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995, p. 115.
8 Susan Woodward, Ibid.
9 Unless otherwise specified, source material
on events and dates are taken from "Yugoslav Crisis and the
World - Chronology of Events (The Year 1990)," Serbian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
10 Zimmerman, op cit., pp. 58-60.
11 Ibid., pp. 60-64.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., p. 102.
14 Ibid., pp. 102-103.
15 Ibid., p. 123.
16 Ibid., pp. 133-136; Susan Woodward,
op cit.
17 Dusko Doder & Louise Branson, Milosevic.
Portrait of a Tyrant, NY: The Free Press, 1999, pp. 147-165.
18 U.S. Department of
State Bureau of Public Affairs, "Fact Sheet: Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)," Dispatch Magazine,
vol. 5 n. 50, 12 December 1994.
19 U.S. Department of
State Bureau of Public Affairs, "Secretary Eagleburger Meets
With Kosovo Leader: Statement by Department Spokesman Richard
Boucher, Brussels, Belgium, December 17, 1992," Dispatch
Magazine, vol. 4 n. 1, 4 January 1993.
20 United States Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), "KOSOVO," Report
on The U.S. Helsinki Commission Delegation to Romania, Macedonia,
Kosovo (Serbia) and Vienna (Austria), April 1993. For
the full text, see CSCE Publication List, section
titled "COMMISSION REPORTS."
21 U.S. Department of
State Bureau of Public Affairs, "Fact Sheet: CSCE," op
cit.
22 U.S. Department of
State Bureau of Public Affairs, "Group of Seven (G-7) 1993
Economic Summit, Tokyo, Japan, July 7-9," Dispatch Magazine,
Supplemental Edition, vol. 4 n. 3, August 1993.
23 U.S. Department of
State Bureau of Public Affairs, "Strengthening American Security
Through World Leadership: Bosnia and Beyond,' Remarks by Deputy
Secretary Talbott at State Department Town Meeting, Washington,
DC, November 1, 1995," Dispatch Magazine, vol. 6 no.
45, 6 November 1995.
24 U.S. Department of
State Bureau of Public Affairs, "Opening remarks at a press
conference by Secretary Christopher February 4, 1996," Dispatch
Magazine, vol. 7, no. 7, 12 February 1996.
25 Stefan Troebst, "Conflict in Kosovo:
Failure of Prevention? An Analytical Documentation, 1992-1998,"
European Centre for Minority Issues Working Paper #1,
May 1998, pp. 76-8.
26 BASIC interview with Martin Sletzinger,
Director for Eastern European Studies at the Woodrow Wilson
Center, Washington, DC; BASIC telephone discussion with Vladimir
Matic, Visiting Professor at Clemson University, South Carolina.
27 Testimony before the US Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Hearing "Political Turmoil
in Serbia," 10 December 1998, One Hundred Fifth Congress (Second
Session), US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC. For
the full text, see CSCE
website.
28 Troebst, Working Paper #1, op
cit., p. 91.
29 Ibid., pp. 76-78.
30 Unless otherwise specified, all entries
for 1998 are excerpted and condensed from Stefan Troebst,
"Appendix 1-C," The Kosovo Conflict.
31 Elaine Sciolino and Ethan Bronner, "Crisis
in the Balkans: the Road to War-A special report. How a President,
Distracted by Scandal, Entered Balkan War," New York Times
Sunday Foreign Desk, 18 April 1999.
32 Stefan Troebst, Working Paper #1,
op cit.p. 78.
33 Elaine Sciolino and Ethan Bronner, op
cit.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Tanjug and Serbian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, "Serbian Government Endorses Accord Reached by President
Milosevic," 13 October 1998.
42 Elaine Sciolino and Ethan Bronner, op
cit.
43 Ibid.
44Ibid.
45Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Steven Erlanger, "US Hardens Stance on
Yugoslav Leader," New York Times Sunday Foreign Desk,
13 December 1998.
48 Testimony before the US Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Hearing "The Milosevic
Regime versus Serbian Democracy and Balkan Stability," 10
December 1998, US Congress, Washington, DC. For the full text,
see CSCE website at http://www.house.gov/csce/publist.htm.
49 Steven Erlanger, op cit.
50 Unless otherwise stated in footnotes,
all quotations and events for 1999 are from a story in the
New York Times: "Crisis in the Balkans: the Road to War-A
special report. How a President, Distracted by Scandal, Entered
Balkan War," by Elaine Sciolino and Ethan Bronner, Sunday,
18 April 1999.
51 United States Department of State, Office
of the Spokesman, "Remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright at U.S. Institute of Peace," 4 February 1999; see
also the US Institute of Peace website.
52 Eric Schmitt, "Serb Army Masses 4,500
Armored Troops," New York Times (Foreign Desk), Friday,
26 February 1999.
53 Declaration of the CoChairmen Hubert
Vedrine and Robin Cook (19 March 1999), on French
Ministere des Affaires Entrangeres website, Kosovo
Meeting.
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