Transatlantic Security
Back to the main
page on Transatlantic Security
Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management
Coverage of the Kosovo Crisis, 1999-2000
Kosovo: The Long Road to War
A Chronology 1998
199830
January-February - The KLA increases its road blocks and
harassment of Serbian drivers and stages a series of attacks
on police stations, patrols, and residences. Attacks are also
directed against Serbian villagers, and against a Serbian
Ministry of Internal Affairs helicopter. Meanwhile, Serbia
is increasing its forces in the Province in preparation for
a major strike against the KLA. The forces include 15,000
regular Yugoslav Army (VJ) troops and an assortment of 15,000
personnel from multiple sources, including Special Anti-Terror
Units (SAJ), Special Police Units (PJM), and Special Purpose
Police Units (Red Berets, or JPNP). Mobile components of the
Serbian force include 140 tanks and 150 armoured vehicles.
The KLA, for their part, number approximately 350-1500 fighters
in January.
23 February - Special US Envoy to the Balkans Robert Gelbard
gives what many have since interpreted as a green light to
Belgrade to go after the rebel bands by announcing in Pristina
that the KLA "is without any question a terrorist group" and
that the US "condemns very strongly terrorist activities in
Kosovo."
28 February-7 March 1998 - On 28 February, Serbian special
forces units with helicopter gunships and armored personnel
carriers engage KLA fighters near the Drenica village of Likosan,
ostensibly in response to the killing a few days earlier of
four Serbian police officers in KLA ambushes. On 4-7 March,
to destroy the leading KLA Jashari clan, the Serbian forces
turn their headquarters, the towns of Prekaz and Lausa, into
smoldering ruins with 20 mm antiaircraft cannons. Extended
families and clans are purposely and systematically rooted
out and executed following the artillery barrage, resulting
ultimately in about 80 additional deaths, including 25 women
and children. This would become known as the "Drenica massacre"
and would ignite a full uprising, with thousands of young
disaffected Kosovar Albanians enlisting in the KLA.
As a response to the Drenica massacre, US officials rule
out unilateral military strikes, the very response former-President
Bush had promised in his 1992 Christmas Threat. If anything
would be done, it would be in concert with the NATO allies,
who along with America have troops on the ground as part of
the international peace implementation force in Bosnia.31
9 March - The six-power Contact Group meets to forge a consensus
on the proper reaction to Milosevic's offensive. The US and
UK recommend swift and harsh reaction; France, Italy and Russia
refuse to consider a military reaction; and Germany acts a
"mediator" between the groups. Italy especially is loath to
undertake actions that would hurt Italian companies with extensive
trade and production contracts in the FRY. In the end, the
meeting results in a "comprehensive arms embargo against the
FRY, including Kosovo, a refusal to supply equipment to the
FRY which might be used for internal repression or for terrorism,
the denial of visas for senior FRY and Serbian representatives
responsible for repressive action by FRY security forces in
Kosovo, and a moratorium on government-financed credit support
for trade and investment, including government financing for
privatisation, in Serbia." Russia refuses to associate itself
with the denial of visas or moratorium on credit support.
By offering some concessions, Milosevic succeeds in getting
the Contact Group to agree to a 10 day (rather than 5 day)
period in which he "was to take specific steps to stop the
violence as well as engage in a commitment to find a political
solution through dialogue."
23 March - The 33 mediation group finally reaches an agreement
on measures to implement the 1 September 1996 Education Agreement
brokered by Communita di Sant'Egidio. The agreement
is immediately followed by fierce protests by Serb nationalists
in Belgrade.32 Later
in April-May, attempts to implement some of the measures (such
as turning over of school buildings in the afternoon to Kosovar
Albanian direction) lead to petty violence and vandalism by
Serbs, and the effort is dropped by June 1998 due to the escalating
civil war.
24 March - A new Serbian revenge attack on three villages
near the town of Decani on the border with Albania results
in the death of over 40 Kosovar Albanians.
25 March - The Contact Group meets again in Bonn. The 10-day
deadline for Serbian compliance, which has now expired, is
extended another four weeks.
Mid-April - Clashes take place between Yugoslav border guards
and KLA fighters crossing into Kosovo from Albania.
23-24 April - Roughly 200 KLA guerrillas and Yugoslav troops
clash, leading to 23 more Albanian deaths. In following days,
VJ army units would be brought in to shell the villages with
artillery and tanks. In another region to the south of Decani,
KLA fighters attack police posts.
29 April - The Contact Group establishes that the "crucial
requirements" of its earlier statements had not been met by
Serbia. A freeze is instituted for Serbian funds held abroad,
but the Group states that it will "immediately reverse this
decision" if the KLA and Serbia set up a "framework for dialogue"
and adopt a "stabilization package" by 9 May. The Group threatens
to stop new investment in Serbia by that date if the recommended
actions are not taken.
Early May onwards - The KLA expands its attacks against police
posts into central Kosovo, in attempts to interrupt the region's
main traffic artery from Pristina to Pec.
Early May - In US Administration meetings, Ambassador Gelbard
argues strenuously for air strikes, saying that he has identified
initial bombing targets with NATO Supreme Allied Commander
General Wesley Clark. National Security Advisor Sandy Berger
rejects the plan, as do all others at the time. Instead, the
Administration relies on Ambassador Holbrooke, who pressures
Ibrahim Rugova to meet with Milosevic in an attempt to capitalize
on the increase in KLA strength (this exploitation of the
KLA is used to convince both sides that flexibility
is needed in bargaining, not just Milosevic. The West and
Russia still do not support the pro-independence goals of
the LDK and Rugova).33
15 May - Milosevic receives Rugova in Belgrade for a first
round of what is hoped to be an institutionalization of bilateral
dialogue. No real results are produced except for the further
de-legitimation of Rugova, who is accused of treason by some
other Albanian leaders.
23 May - Milosevic is rewarded for his meeting with Rugova
by a suspension of the Western threat to ban all investment
in the FRY.
24 May - Milosevic orders an offensive in the Decani region
to destroy the new base of KLA operations out of Albania.
Supply routes across the border are attacked by tanks and
artillery using "scorched earth" tactics. 20,000 inhabitants
of border villages are forced to flee.
27 May - Rugova's cooperation with Holbrooke is rewarded
by a meeting with President Clinton in the Oval Office. As
one NYT reporter later summarizes the meeting's content, "Mr.
Rugova warned that without direct American intervention, Kosovo
was headed for all-out war. He pleaded for urgent American
action and an increased American presence to halt the escalating
violence." The President replied, "We will not allow another
Bosnia to happen in Kosovo," but nothing concrete was promised.
The meeting received little press coverage in the United States.34
Late May - Western disappointment and frustration with both
Milosevic and Russian obstructionism in the Contact Group
cause the UK (now holding the Presidency of the European Union)
and the US to shift focus from the Contact Group and UN to
Western institutions such as the EU and NATO.
May-June - By late spring and early summer, the KLA's
ranks have risen to at least 5,000 people, and perhaps as
high as 30,000.
June-July - NATO's military planners begin weighing their
options, ranging from an attack involving only the firing
of cruise missiles, to a phased air campaign, to deployment
of peacekeeping troops as part of a negotiated or imposed
settlement. The planners also look at what it would take to
invade Yugoslavia. It is concluded that as many as 200,000
soldiers would be needed for a ground war under standard assumptions
about required NATO-to-Serb force ratios and acceptable Western
casualties. In addition to this problem, NATO officials worry
about imposing a peace without UN Security Council approval,
including China and Russia.35
5 June - The village of Junik, the KLA stronghold, is bombed
by four Serbian military aircraft, killing 100 Kosovar Albanians
and four Serbian policemen. Tens of thousands of civilians
flee into neighboring regions, with some 20,000 more trapped
between the battle lines. According to one article in the
International Herald Tribune, the aim of the offensive
is "to have an eight to 10 kilometre-wide stretch where no
neutral people live." Landmines are planted to mark and enforce
this stretch of territory.
9 June - The EU bans new investments in Serbia, with most
of the burden falling on Italy and Greece.
11 June - NATO steps up its military presence in Albania
and Macedonia, based on a decision of the Defence Ministers
Session of the North Atlantic Council. Flights of combat aircraft
are announced as a threat to Milosevic.
June - The Contact Group on the Balkans warns Milosevic that
he cannot count on allied disunity as in Bosnia, and NATO
is ordered to create plans for military action, after which
Milosevic promises concessions. However, at the same time,
the Albanian KLA uses the period May-June to take control
of 40% of Kosovo territory.
13 June - 9000-11,000 Yugoslav troops and 7000-10,000 police
and paramilitary troops enter Kosovo Province, reinforced
by 175 tanks, 200 armoured personnel carriers, and 120 artillery
batteries. These forces immediately attack west of Djakovica,
where tens of thousands of refugees have already sought shelter
and shell Djakovica itself.
15 June - 80 aircraft from 15 NATO countries embark on exercise
"Determined Falcon," a five-hour show of force in Albania
and Macedonia at a distance of 20 km from the border of the
FRY. Milosevic counters this with an increase of troops, artillery,
and anti-aircraft missiles near the border of Albania, as
well as with a visit to Moscow, which is already criticizing
Western tactics.
16 June - In an apparent turnabout (with Russian diplomatic
pressure) Milosevic announces that diplomats and humanitarian
and medical NGOs are to be given unimpeded access to Kosovo.
Additionally, he promises not to hinder refugees fleeing the
conflict and to order the armed forces to avoid hurting civilians.
Finally, he promises to continue political talks with Rugova.
Mid-June - The KLA attempts to cut off the main Serbian supply
route from Pristina to the Western border region, while Serbian
forces respond by attempting to choke off the Pristina-Pec
KLA supply route. After 16 June, when the threat of Western
airstrikes is momentarily delayed by Milosevic's compromises,
Serbian forces initiate battles against KLA forces that are
overstretched across these supply routes.
24 June - The KLA refuse a regional ceasefire agreement offered
by Special Envoy Holbrooke, instead initiating an ethnic cleansing
campaign against Serbian villages in central Kosovo, stepping
up attacks on the primary Serbian supply route, and staging
a surprise attack on the strategically important open-pit
coal mine of Belacevac near Pristina. Milosevic regains diplomatic
leverage vis-à-vis NATO, which is taken by surprise
by the KLA offensives, and NATO decreases its pressure on
Milosevic.
6 July - A Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) is launched
by Russia and the US. It soon reaches 200 personnel, under
the supervision of Contact Group representatives in Belgrade
as well as Austria (holder of the EU Presidency) and Poland
(the OSCE Chairman-in-Office). Official monitoring of the
conflict continues from this day forward.
Mid-July - Serbian forces are being heavily attacked by the
KLA, leading to fits of action and counteraction. Serbian
forces regain the region of Orahovac in fighting with the
KLA that causes 25,000 inhabitants to flee, and 34 KLA guerrillas
and 76 citizens are killed. Milosevic goes ahead with plans
to sever KLA communications and supply lines completely while
restoring Serbian lines. KLA posts along the two separate
supply routes are destroyed.
28 July - As summarized by Balkan expert Dr. Stefan Troebst,
"Serbian forces marched from three different directions into
the town of Malisevo, where the KLA supreme command was located.
The KLA did not make a serious attempt to defend the town
but retreated in disarray together with several tens of thousands
of inhabitants and refugees. In military as well as political
terms, this was the turning point of the conflict. The myth
of the KLA as a modern, omnipresent and ultimately superior
force and as such the nucleus of a new nation-state of Kosovar
Albanians was seriously damaged."
7 August - Alexander Vershbow, the United States representative
to NATO and a former National Security Council aide who had
been deeply involved in Bosnia policy during Dayton, sends
a classified cable to Washington titled "Kosovo: Time for
Another Endgame Strategy." It outlines a political settlement
in Kosovo with the cooperation of the Russians, and with full
US-Russian unity on the Security Council. According to one
NYT article written half a year later, "The proposed deal
called for creation of an international protectorate in Kosovo.
The settlement would be policed by an international military
presence, or ground force. If a peace settlement was negotiated
in advance, as many as 30,000 troops might be required to
enforce it. But Mr. Vershbow also left open the possibility
that NATO might have to impose a settlement without Belgrade's
consent, requiring 60,000 troops." Also in the cable, Vershbow
argues that "Sooner or later we are going to face the issue
of deploying ground forces in Kosovo. We have too much at
stake in the political stability of the south Balkans to permit
the conflict to fester much longer."Although the plan generates
some interest among midlevel officials in Washington, and
senior officials agree that it underscores the need to come
up with a comprehensive strategy, the plan is never adopted.36
1-15 August - During the first half of August, Serbian forces
succeed in crushing the remaining KLA strongholds in Drenica
and in the west.
13 August - Respected Kosovar Albanian leader Adem Demaci,
a proponent of increased (but nonviolent) resistance in 1997,
and opponent of Rugova since fall 1997, takes over the function
of political representative of the KLA. He immediately declares
that the KLA attempt to defend all liberated territories against
counterattacks by Serbian forces was a "fatal mistake" and
announces instead a return to "classic guerrilla warfare tactics."
16 August-4 October - After the re-taking of the strategic
town and KLA stronghold of Junik on 15 August, Milosevic orders
the military to eliminate the last pockets of resistance in
the regions around Pristina as well as the western border
with Albania. At the same time, the Serbian judiciary is utilized
to repress politically active Kosovar Albanians. By the time
of a Serbian military stand-down on 4 October, 1242 ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo had been charged with "terrorist acts."
September - The internal displacement of 200,000 Albanians,
including 50,000 "forest people" in the hills, keeps the international
community concerned about humanitarian issues in Kosovo Province,
even as organized KLA activity temporarily abates.
23 September - With Russian support, but with China abstaining,
the UN Security Council passes Resolution 1199. This Resolution
would constitute the primary foundation for an upcoming Serbian
agreement with US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke in October.
The Resolution requires the FRY to implement a ceasefire,
withdraw forces deployed in Kosovo during the war and return
those already in the Province to their garrisons, allow unfettered
access for humanitarian workers, and offer full cooperation
with the UN tribunal to investigate war crimes.
23 September - NATO finally agrees on a strategy at a meeting
in Vilamoura, Portugal. At the private meeting, William S.
Cohen challenges his colleagues to embrace a new role for
the alliance. However, his commitment is only to air power,
not ground troops.37
24 September - Based on the decision at Vilamoura, Portugal,
on the previous day, NATO issues an Activation Warning for
both a limited air option and a phased air campaign.38
25 September - 16 ethnic Albanian civilians are killed at
Fornje Obrinje in the Drenica region. This human rights violation
serves as a "last straw" for the international community,
leading to increased Western pressure for an agreement on
a political process for Kosovo's status, as well as concrete
moves towards Kosovar autonomy. Also, there is pressure for
an immediate cease-fire owing to fears of an impending humanitarian
catastrophe with the onset of winter.
8 October - US Special Envoy Holbrooke travels to Belgrade
"with the full authority of the Contact Group" to demand complieance
with UN Resolution 1199. His mission is paralleled by a renewed
threat by NATO and by Russian approval of a planned OSCE verification
force on the ground. The combination of Russian and NATO pressure
convinces Milosevic to accept mediation.
12 October - At the peak of a visible and unprecedented build-up
of NATO forces for potential airstrikes, Milosevic agrees
to a cease-fire, to an OSCE presence of 2000 unarmed verifiers
in Kosovo, and NATO aerial reconnaissance. The Serbian leader
agrees to withdraw some of his forces from Kosovo, and promises
to exchange a token number of Yugoslav and NATO military officers
between the NATO air base at Vicenza, Italy, and Serbia's
Defense Ministry in Belgrade. Perhaps most significantly,
he also promises to produce plans for a political solution
of the conflict, including an increased degree of internal
self-determination for Kosovo [see 13 October entry below].
However, Kosovo would still remain under Serbian (FRY) sovereignty,
and to defend against KLA "terrorist attacks," Serbia would
be allowed to keep 15,000 VJ troops and 10,000 Ministry of
Interior Affairs (MUP) forces in the Province.
To seal the deal, Milosevic wants the lifting of the NATO
Activation Warning that gives authority to launch strikes
immediately.39 Holbrooke
makes no promises and heads to Brussels on the evening of
12 October to meet with NATO representatives.
13 October - NATO headquarters agree to suspend, but not
remove, the Activation Warning, reducing it to an Activation
Order. Under the newly-amended Activation Order (at Holbrooke's
request), the North Atlantic Council extends the deadline
for Milosevic's execution of the agreements to 96 rather than
48 hours, bringing it into agreement with the cease-fire timeline
requested by Milosevic during the talks in Belgrade. Despite
this concession, Milosevic is furious with Holbrooke about
the refusal to remove the Activation Order for strikes, considering
it a declaration of war.
In Washington, DC, President Clinton declares that Milosevic
"agreed to internationally supervised democratic elections
in Kosovo, substantial self-government and a local police-in
short, rights the Kosovars have been demanding since Mr. Milosevic
stripped their autonomy a decade ago."40
13 October - The Serbian government newspaper Tanjug prints,
in full, the unilateral Serbian version of the Holbrooke-Milosevic
agreement on Kosovo's future status. The document is an outline
for a committed political process, specifying a succinct and
precise timetable, including referenda and moves towards Kosovar
Albanian autonomy.41
15 October - General Wesley Clark and VJ Chief of Staff General
Momcilo Perisic sign an agreement establishing a NATO Air
Verification Mission over Kosovo, titled "Operation Eagle
Eye." The agreement provides for a "Mutual Safety Zone" extending
25 km around the borders of Kosovo Province. In response to
Milosevic's partial implementation of the October agreements,
NATO extends its previous 96-hour Activation Order deadline
by another 10 days on 16 October.
16 October - OSCE Chairman-in-Office Bronislaw Geremek of
Poland signs an agreement in Belgrade on an OSCE Kosovo Verification
Mission (KVM). The Mission is meant to "verify compliance
of all parties in Kosovo with UN Security Council Resolution
1199," including regular reports to the OSCE Permanent Council,
the UN Security Council, the Ministries of State in Europe,
the US State Department, and appropriate EU bodies. The KVM
would have "full freedom of movement," with headquarters in
Pristina.
24 October - The UN Security Council endorses the KVM through
Resolution 1203, demanding that the FRY abide by its agreements
concerning the OSCE presence in Kosovo and reminding the FRY
of its "primary responsibility for the safety and security
of all diplomatic personnel."
Late October - The Serbs begin infiltrating reinforcements
and equipment in violation of the October verbal agreements.
Serbian officers bluntly tell General Clark in October that
they are just two weeks away from eliminating the Kosovo Liberation
Army.42
October-November - Despite NATO's continued assurances to
Serbia that it does not want to become the KLA's "air force,"
the rebels quickly reclaim territory abandoned by the required
withdrawal of Serbian forces and mount a continuous series
of small-scale attacks.43
November - A highly classified US National Intelligence Estimate
concludes that Milosevic would only accept a more autonomous
status for Kosovo "if he thinks he is in danger because the
West is threatening to use sustained and decisive military
power against his forces."44
November - NATO intelligence detects signs of a Serbian military
buildup around Kosovo. Western intelligence officials, particularly
the Germans, believe that these troops could form the backbone
of a military operation to push hundreds of thousands of Albanians
out of Kosovo.45
26 November - To coordinate the operations of the KVM with
NATO Air Verification Mission, NATO inaugurates a Coordination
Center in the Macedonian town of Kumanovo on the FRY-Macedonian
border.
November-December - The KLA take advantage of the
cease-fire by buying weapons, improving their training, and
becoming a more formidable force.46
2-5 December - The Macedonian Government approves the stationing
in Kumanovo of a French-led NATO Extraction Force of 1700
personnel from several NATO countries, dubbed "Operation Joint
Guarantor" (XFOR). The Activation Order for XFOR is issued
on 5 December. Its mandate is to extract members of the KVM
or other designated persons from Kosovo in an emergency.
December - High US Administration officials are abandoning
the long-held policy of relying on Milosevic as a "deal maker"
for stability in the Balkans. The US is searching for a new
"endgame strategy" that includes the purposeful undermining
of President Milosevic's Regime. In Brussels on 8 December,
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright calls on the NATO alliance
to find "an appropriate way to support the democratic aspirations
of the Serb people," who "have been silenced and shackled
far too long." Her spokesman, James Rubin, also gives the
statement "Milosevic has been at the center of every crisis
in the former Yugoslavia over the last decade. He is not simply
part of the problem-Milosevic is the problem." According to
one participant in ongoing policy discussions, "There is a
generalized feeling now throughout the Administration that
Milosevic is the problem in the Balkans, and less vital for
the solutions."47
The Brussels meeting is soon followed on 10 December by a
hearing in Washington, DC, by the US Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Through the CSCE, the US
Congress invites independent media figures and Serbian opposition
leaders to testify against Milosevic. Participants argue that
there can be no stability either within the FRY or within
the larger region until Serbia democratizes under a regime
with a different definition of Serbian nationalism. They argue
that the US does not lend enough political or financial aid
to opposition media and political groups, and also that the
US has provided lackluster support for initiatives for dialogue
between the LDK and Serbian democratic opposition in the FRY.48
As part of evolving US strategy, officials from the highest
levels of the State Department meet with the Serbian opposition
after their testimony before the CSCE. According to the New
York Times, "The Administration hopes to roll out an explicit
program at the beginning of the year . . . which will include
aid to independent news organizations, academic institutions
and civic organizations, many of which Milosevic has been
trying to repress in Serbia. Washington will also direct further
support to Montenegro, whose President, Milo Djukanovic, has
been diverging from Belgrade . . . and providing safe haven
for a number of the news organizations and academic institutions
shut down [by Milosevic]."49
13 October-14 December - During the first two months of the
cease-fire, 170 instances of armed violence involving the
KLA and/or Serbian forces have resulted in the deaths of about
200 people.
14 December - A clash between Yugoslav border guards and
KLA fighters crossing the border from Albania (near Prizren)
results in the death of 37 Kosovar Albanians. Six Serbs are
assassinated by the KLA in the town of Pec in revenge attacks.
A new period of low-level warfare begins despite the presence
of the KVM.
Go to Kosovo Chronology, 1999
Back to Trans-atlantic
Security Home Page
|
