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Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management
BERLIN INFORMATION-CENTER FOR TRANSATLANTIC
SECURITY
European Security:
Sharks and Minnows Off Helsinki
2 December 1999
By Peter Cross & Otfried Nassauer
The European Union, an organisation that has to date managed
to peacefully unite 15 nations through non-military means
is now threatening to adopt military crisis management capacities
at the expense of non-military alternatives. The EU's involvement
in crisis management was first introduced in the Amsterdam
Treaty in the framework of the Petersberg Tasks.1
The speed at which the EU has forged ahead with its military
ambitions has been surprising for this notoriously slow organisation
and it does not seem about to let up.
When the European Council meet in Helsinki next week
military crisis management capabilities will come up against
non-military capabilities as the Union determines its priorities
in this field. In the one corner, the Finnish Presidency has
prepared, alongside its draft presidency progress report on
CFSP, a Draft for the Presidency Report on Non-Military
Crisis Management of the European Union which places the
emphasis on the development of effective non-military crisis
response tools within the European Union. In the opposite
corner, Europe's big guns - France, Germany, Great Britain
and Italy - who, meeting in Paris on Tuesday, 30 November,
have agreed on a joint proposal to the Helsinki European Council
stressing a military plan of action for European Union crisis
response.2 The document covering
military bodies, military planning and operational command
to date remains classified.
There is a very real danger that the four big guns
will ride roughshod over the non-military proposals and force
through a military dominated European Union crisis management
policy - a situation that BITS has warned against from the
start of this debate. An autonomous European crisis management
capacity that places an equal priority on both a capable military
structure and on non-military capacities would be provide
a crisis management structure that would not only be a valuable
alternative to NATO, but also a valuable supplement. A European
crisis management capacity focusing purely on military instruments
would be particularly unfortunate as the EU, to date a purely
civilian organisation, has been in a far stronger position
to undertake non-military crisis management than NATO - an
organisation whose thinking often seems totally confined to
its military toolbox. Focusing EU crisis management on military
instruments would do little more than poorly duplicate NATO.
The European Union, as indicated by the Finnish Presidencies
draft report, has already developed an impressive array of
non-military crisis management and conflict prevention tools,
which with the support and guidance proposed by the Finns,
could be transformed into an effective and constructive mechanism.
The Union, on the other hand, never having been a military
organisation is poorly equipped in this regard, and is going
to need substantial investment before it can make a military
machine of its own operational. The big guns are determined
to develop an autonomous European military capacity that can
operate independently of NATO and intervene in conflicts where
NATO (read USA) either fears to tread, or is not interested
in intervening. This determination isn't making the Alliance's
big brother, the United States, particularly happy. Former
US National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft levelled stern
criticism against the development of an autonomous European
military capacity, saying that Europe is wasting money because
a strong military capacity is already in available under NATO.3
Following the war in Kosovo the US has criticised the Europeans
for failing to pull their weight in the NATO military operation.
NATO's military chief during the Kosovo war, Gen. Wesley Clark,
addressed this issue saying that alliance solidarity was being
challenged because the notion of shared burden was not being
met. Clark said that in Yugoslavia the United State's had
carried far too heavy a burden and were leagues ahead of the
other alliance members in all fields, including intelligence.
The Americans sent around 800 Aircraft to fight the Kosovo
war, double the amount sent by the rest of the NATO states
combined4 and US aircraft are
reported to have flown over 70% of the missions.5 The Americans believe that Europe should concentrate
on becoming more effective partners within the alliance, spending
more for the Alliance, before concentrating on what they perceive
to be the development of structures that are direct competition
to NATO. At the core of the US expectations the European members
of NATO are required to spend on NATO controlled capabilities,
not on capabilities they control themselves. The emerging
European consensus however envisages these future strategic
capabilities to come under the control of the European Union,
thus developing them into a bargaining-chip whenever Europe
has to negotiate the strategies and tactics for future military
crisis-management with its transatlantic partners. This reflects
the different lessons learned from Kosovo.
The Hardware
The guiding principles of the EU summit in Cologne called
for the creation of an EU capacity for autonomous action backed
up by credible military capabilities and appropriate decision-making
bodies. The focus of the debate has to date been on the development
of these military capabilities. The European Union has been
preparing itself for a military role for some time now, adopting
an ever closer relationship with the Western European Union
(WEU), Europe's security organisation. The Amsterdam Treaty
provided the EU with access to this organisation's capacities
and capabilities in order to act within the realm of the Petersberg
Tasks. The Amsterdam Treaty introduced the possibility of
integrating the WEU into the European Union, should the European
Council so decide.6 During the past 12 months this option has been explored,
and the Cologne summit declaration set a date of the end of
2000 to finally take these decisions. The WEU seems, however,
to have jumped the gun, and following its Luxembourg Council
of Ministers in November, has now already been de facto
integrated into the European Union. In the declaration the
WEU Ministers declared their willingness to allow bodies of
the Council of the European Union direct access, as required,
to the expertise of the Organisation's operational structures,
including the WEU Secretariat, the Military Staff, the Satellite
Centre and the Institute for Security Studies.7
The result being that the EU member states now have full and
equal access to the WEU without first having settled all the
problems that were associated with the WEU's integration into
the EU - particularly a role for the WEU's associate members
and observers.
To crown this development the European Union's High
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier
Solana, was also appointed Secretary General of the WEU. More
than issuing a second hat to Mr. Solana, it brings CFSP and
the WEU together under Mr Solana's burgeoning hat. Mr Solana
is the first to hold this position and is therefore free to
mould it. His role contains both, facets of a Foreign Minister
and facets of a Defence Minister. By placing Solana in charge
of both the WEU and the CFSP, effectively overseeing the EU's
military and foreign policy developments, the position is
already somewhat heavily leaning in the direction of that
of a Defence Minister.
The Luxembourg WEU Council of Ministers also presented
the results of an Audit of Assets and Capabilities for
European Crisis Management Operations8
that was initiated following the WEU Ministers meeting in
Rome in November 1998. The results of the audit show that
Europeans, in principle, have the available force levels and
resources needed to prepare and implement military operations
over the whole range of Petersberg tasks. It identified
a number of gaps and deficiencies, however, where these
European assets and capabilities should be strengthened to
attain a higher level of operational effectiveness in crisis
management. The report identified the most urgent efforts
to be focused on:
- With regard to collective capabilities:
- Strategic intelligence;
- Strategic planning
- With regard to forces and operation capabilities:
- Availability, deployability, strategic mobility,
sustainability, survivability and interoperability and
operational effectiveness;
- Multinational, joint Operation and Force HQs,
with particular reference to C3 (command, control and
communications) capabilities and deployability of Force
HQs.
The European Union's big guns are already one step
ahead in this capacity build-up. At the first joint meeting
of the EU's Foreign and Defence Ministers the German Defence
Minister Rudolf Scharping expressed the hope that the process
of integrating a security policy dimension into the EU be
completed by 2002 or 2003.9 For
Scharping and his colleagues in Britain, France and Italy,
the quicker an EU security policy becomes operational, the
better. The UK has already suggested a "headline goal" to
reorganize the European crisis reaction forces into a corps
which, by 2003, could begin crisis operations within 60 days.
The Eurocorps is also on the road to change with the participating
nations agreeing to transform it into a European rapid reaction
corps. This corps, to be restructured over four years, foresees
the establishment of a European army with 50.000 to 60.000
soldiers, that can be mobilised within 60 days and be operational
in a crisis region for at least one year. France and Germany
already have more in store for the Eurocorps: They suggest
the Eurocorps to assume command of the KFOR troops currently
stationed in Kosovo already in the coming year.10 Again it is France and Germany who also suggested the
creation of a European Air Transport Command.
Decisions on how to finance these developments have
not yet been taken. The Amsterdam Treaty does not allows the
EU members to jointly procure military hardware from EU resources.
Defense procurement has to come from national defense budgets.
However, obviously some Defense Ministers already have targeted
the EU for future R&D projects and procurement programs,
which can be labelled "dual use".
Decisive Alternatives
In Helsinki the European Union will take more steps towards
developing a military capacity for crisis management than
most observers expected. The Finnish Presidency must be careful
to push forward its proposal for developing parallel non-military
crisis management structures that are given equal importance.
Sweden may prove to be the Presidency's strongest ally. Stockholm
will agree the establishment of a permanent Military Committee
within the EU only on the condition, that in parallel a Permanent
Committee on non-military crisis management will be established.
The risk is that the big guns, with their emphasis on military
proposals, will pull the EU away from the Union's non-military
alternatives, wherein lie its greatest possible strengths,
and the very qualities that have united the Union internally.
A European Union crisis management capacity that contains
a good balance of military and non-military crisis management
structures will provide Europe with an instrument that can
truly live up to its potential. Non-military structures, like
military ones, can only be effective if they are taken seriously
and are invested in with sufficient resources, something that
has to date not yet happened in Europe. A situation where
the European Union finances post-conflict conflict prevention,
such as the Stability Pact, from its normal budget - while
allocating additional funds to the development of military
crises management, is sending the wrong signal.
The challenge that lies ahead for the European Council
in Helsinki is to develop an autonomous European security
capacity that can operate effectively in crisis management
situations. An effective capacity needs to be well balanced,
giving the military and non-military components equal priority
and resources. A European security capacity that leans too
heavily towards its military components will sacrifice its
comparative advantage contained in its non-military structures
and capacities and go into direct competition with as well
as duplication of NATO, while a European security that leans
too heavily in the direction of non-military crisis management
will remain forever dominated by the military Alliance.
In addition the European Union is facing some more
far reaching alternatives. While taking on autonomous crisis
management tasks European nations will have to take a clear
stand on whether they will clearly bind their crisis management
operations to mandates issued by either the United Nations
Security Council or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation
in Europe. This would significantly re-strengthen the role
of both international organisations and signal an approach
different from both the US and NATO's policy. NATO during
the Kosovo crisis and the Washington Summit resisted to accept
such a linkage.
Finally, the decision-making process of the European
nations on these alternatives will strongly influence future
relation between the EU and Russia. During the Cologne Summit
the EU agreed its first "Joint Strategy" for the CFSP. It
dealt with EU-Russia relations and envisages far ranging co-operation
projects, which need to be implemented. One visionary aim
"would be to work with Russia to develop joint foreign policy
initiatives with regard to specific third countries and regions,
to conflict prevention and to crisis management especially
in areas adjacent to Russia, on the Balkans and the Middle
East.11 Within the document the EU also promises to consider "Facilitating
the participation of Russia, when the EU avails itself of
the WEU for missions within the range of the Petersberg tasks.12
It is hard to imagine that these far reaching initiatives
will lead to success unless the EU's crisis management approach
is clearly different from NATO's.
____________________
Endnotes
1 These include humanitarian and
rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces
in crisis management, including peacemaking.
2 Berlin, Paris, London und
Rom einig über EU-Militärstrukturen, AFP, 30
November 1999.
3 Schlagabtausch zwischen Frankreich
und USA zu Verteidigung in Europa, DPA, 04.11.1999.
4 Walker, David Standing on
our own feet, found at http://www.guardianunlimted.co.uk 14 May,
1999.
5 Sands, David R. Talbot scolds
European on their role in NATO The Washington Times, 8
October, 1999.
6 Article 17 (ex Article J7) of
the Amsterdam Treaty on European Union.
7 WEU Ministerial Council Luxembourg
Declaration, Luxembourg, 23 November 1999 http://www.weu.int/eng/
comm/99-luxembourg.htm
8 http://www.weu.int/eng/mini/99luxembourg/recommendations.htm
9 EU will sich in drei Jahren
zum Krisenmanager mausern, AP news wire, 15.11.1999
10 Berlin, Paris, London un Rom
einig über EU-Militärstrukturen, AFP, 30.1.1999.
11 European Council, Common Strategy
of the European Union on Russia, Cologne, ¾.6.1999,
p.26
12 op. cit., p. 21
Peter Cross is researcher and Otfried Nassauer is director
of the
Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BITS).
BITS
10405 Berlin
Tel 030/442-6042
Fax 030/4410-221
[Draft] Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security
and Defence: First Steps and Guidance for Further Work
(PDF format only)
[Draft] Presidency Report
on Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union
(PDF format only)
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