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TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING WITH MEMBERS
OF THE
WEU ASSEMBLY DEFENCE COMMITTEE AND
INTERPARLIAMENTARY EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE ASSEMBLY
JUNE 29, 2005 9:00-11:00 am
at the Stewart Mott House in Washington, D.C.
Alistair Millar,
Fourth Freedom Forum: tactical nuclear weapons and transatlantic
security
Previous:
Dr. Chantal de
Jonge Oudraat, Center for Transatlantic Relations: NATO,
UN and peace operations
Introduction
Alistair Millar: Thank you, Chris
and thank you to BASIC for putting this briefing and meeting
together this morning.
I am going to keep my talk fairly brief because a lot of
what I outline is included in your packets in a piece that
I wrote for the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs
[see Tactical Nuclear
Weapons].
I am going to discuss the issue of tactical nuclear weapons
- those weapons that are deployed in NATO Europe and those
that remain in the former Soviet Union, what I class as the
old tactical nuclear weapons and then also talk a little bit
about developments that are occurring at the moment with regard
to trying to develop new tactical nuclear weapons, and then
end with a few recommendations that really put Europe at the
heart of an effort to try to solve this problem of tactical
nuclear weapons proliferation in the context of terrorism
rather than in the context of the Cold War when these weapons
were first developed and deployed.
First, I want to talk about what a tactical nuclear weapon
is -very often this discussion of tactical and strategic nuclear
weapons. Strategic nuclear weapons are usually defined as
larger weapons with a longer range that are used for strategic
purposes and tactical nuclear weapons, although this isn't
always the case, are generally smaller, have a lower yield,
have a lower range, and are used for battlefield purposes,
taking out battlefield installations, troops, and are often
seen as a midpoint in the escalation ladder between the use
of strategic nuclear forces and conventional warfare.
A more useful way to look at the definition, in my view,
between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons though and
this highlights a problem that I will discuss, -- is to distinguish
between those nuclear weapons that are covered under strategic
nuclear weapons treaties, the START treaties, earlier but
failed attempts at the SALT Treaty, and those weapons that
are not covered by the treaty. Those uncovered weapons would
be the tactical nuclear weapons in my view. Those that have
been discussed between Russia and the United States but have
never found their way into a formal treaty.
What's the problem here? Why am I discussing this point when
the Cold War has been over for over fifteen years? Why do
tactical nuclear weapons, which were designed in the Cold
War-context, have any bearing and importance for what we are
doing now in an entirely different security environment?
The problem really is with regard to the security of these
weapons and their portability. Tactical nuclear weapons, as
I mentioned, are smaller and more portable and generally easier
for a rogue group or terrorist to procure and remove from
a location. And in the former Soviet Union there is a great
deal of concern, particularly in the United States, but also
in Europe, that the facilities in which these weapons are
stored, there are still thousands of them left after the Cold
War, estimates range from something like 3,000 all the way
up to about 15,000 or 18,000, no one really knows. And the
main point that I am driving at here is not to say definitively
that these weapons are loose and that anyone can get a hold
of them, but more that reassurances by the establishment in
Russia are needed to show the rest of the world that they
have these weapons under control. And really this is where
the connection with Europe comes in.
One argument that is often offered by the Russians in terms
of why they are not going to disclose the numbers of the weapons
and show Americans and Europeans the security that they have
in place in storage facilities is that the Russians often
say, "well there are US tactical nuclear weapons deployed
on European soil. There are about 500 of them and we don't
know yours are safe either until you do something about yours
and show us the safety of your storage facilities, we are
not going to do anything about ours." And for years and years,
even starting in the mid-1980s, but all the way through the
1990s, this refrain, this mantra, has continued in a sort
of stalemate between NATO and the US on one side and Russia
on the other, where they never agreed to include control of
these weapons in a formal treaty.
And my argument here today is that the time has come for
this stalemate and this bickering to be over because of the
security threat that we face. It is incumbent on NATO and
the Europeans to try and use venues where they have interaction
with the Russians to encourage them to disclose data about
their weapons just purely from a security standpoint. They
don't have to publicize it in a newspaper but they need to
make assurances that these weapons are safe.
How can that pressure be applied? Well, there is one useful
forum in the NATO-Russia Council. The NATO-Russia Council
sprung out of the permanent Joint Council established in 1997.
There have been studies done saying clearly that we need to
pay more attention to these weapons. There have been studies
done saying that we need to work with Russia, but they have
all been on paper -- confidence-building measures, what have
you -- but nothing has really happened in the context of the
post- 9/11, post-March 11 world that we live in.
No action has resulted stemming from the reality that more
pressure needs to be put on NATO and Russia to do two specific
things:
One is to revisit the study that they did in the year
2000, before 9/11 occurred, on confidence-building and
security measures; how can they work with the Russians
to help them produce the data and convince NATO and the
United States that their weapons are safe and how can
NATO and the US do the same to convince Russia that they
are willing to cooperate and allow site visits? ·
The second thing that needs to be done is look at the
wider relationship that Europeans have with Russia on
an economic front and on an environmental front. The relationship
since the end of the Cold War has flourished. Yes there
are difficulties and yes there is room for growth, but
there is an inexorable link now between Russia and the
European Union and wherever possible, if pressure could
be put on the Russians in the context of these economic
relationships, for example, to say we are really uncomfortable
with the fact that we do not have a disclosed number and
a confidence in the security of your weapons and this
is affecting our relationship and what can we do and how
can we help you? This would be very helpful indeed.
The second and final issue I want to discuss is the development
of new nuclear weapons -- new tactical nuclear weapons. As
many of you, all of you are well aware, there has been an
effort, a real push, since the Bush Administration came into
the White House in the year 2001, to develop new nuclear weapons
-- two types of new nuclear weapons. One is a bunker buster
weapon, which is generally a larger weapon that would be used
to get very deeply underground, to get so-called stockpiles
of chemical and biological weapons, and perhaps David will
discuss that a little bit.
But the other is a low-yield nuclear weapon, which is used,
though not stated explicitly, to try and convince folks that
nuclear weapons are still useful and that the strategic deterrent
that we had in the Cold War will be enhanced if we have a
lower-yield nuclear weapon that we feel less concerned about
deploying and using if necessary in an environment where we
need to go after a rogue state. This argument, of course,
is fraught with problems in that how do you use a deterrent
argument against people who are willing to strap weapons to
their chests and commit suicide? But it does create a lot
of problems, because this is something that the defense establishment
in this country is convinced of, and they are seeking money
to develop these new nuclear weapons. It creates a problem
in connection to what I told you about earlier with existing
Cold War nuclear weapons because it is encouraging a new type
of thinking and an arms race that is burgeoning between Russia
and the United States about the development of new nuclear
weapons and as long as the new nuclear weapons are being built,
it really sidetracks any efforts to deal with these existing
old ones that may be scattered around in large numbers in
Russia.
So two things in my view really need to be done: ·
One -- from a European perspective -- is to try and to pressure
the United States to consider the consequences of developing
new nuclear weapons and to ask them, to plead with them, to
control the existing stockpile that we have leftover from
the Cold War -- weapons that President Bush himself has said
are relics of the Cold War -- before any plans are put forward
to develop new nuclear weapons. ·
And the second goes to the heart of the old nuclear arsenals
that are deployed in Europe. The United States has 500 weapons,
as I said, deployed on European soil. Why do we have these
old weapons anymore? And what is the purpose of these? As
I said, deterrence is a weak argument these days and it really
causes more of a security problem because it provides Russia
with the opportunity to say we will not do anything about
our weapons unless we do something about yours.
And it also is a security threat. We already know in Belgium
there was an effort by a terrorist to try to get into a base
in Belgium that has nuclear weapons, Kleine Brogel. So I do
urge the Western European Union, the European Union, and NATO
to really consider and encourage NATO to have a review of
its nuclear weapons posture and consider whether there is
really any security benefit to having those weapons based
in Europe.
And just finally I might note that the establishment here
who are in charge of nuclear weapons in an operational sense
in Omaha, Nebraska are convinced that they don't need these
nuclear weapons deployed in Europe either, that they no longer
serve a purpose, that submarine-based weapons for now can
do a better job than those sitting ducks -- those weapons
on European soil.
So it's really just the Europeans and those based in NATO
that are holding onto a relic of the Cold war that has no
security benefit. And I urge all of you to try to revisit
that issue with NATO and within the Western European Union.
And I think I will conclude there.
Chris Lindborg: Okay, thank you Alistair. I will hand
it over to Matt, who will discuss missile defense and he may
talk a little bit about nuclear issues as well. So I will
leave that up to Matt.
Next:
Matt Martin,
BASIC: missile defense, nuclear security
David Isenberg,
BASIC: biological weapons security
Discussion, including
WEU Assembly Defence Committee
Previous:
Dr. Chantal de
Jonge Oudraat, Center for Transatlantic Relations: NATO,
UN and peace operations
Introduction
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