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TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING WITH MEMBERS
OF THE
WEU ASSEMBLY DEFENCE COMMITTEE AND
INTERPARLIAMENTARY EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE ASSEMBLY
JUNE 29, 2005 9:00-11:00 am
at the Stewart Mott House in Washington, D.C.
Matt Martin,
BASIC: missile defense, nuclear security
Previous:
Alistair Millar, Fourth
Freedom Forum: tactical nuclear weapons and transatlantic
security
Dr. Chantal de
Jonge Oudraat, Center for Transatlantic Relations: NATO,
UN and peace operations
Introduction
Matt Martin: Thank you Chris,
and thank you again everyone for coming. I would just note
that doing a little research for today, that this year is
the 50th Anniversary of the WEU forum, so I would say congratulations!
That's a wonderful achievement. Another 50 years!
I'll just speak about a few specific programs dealing with
missile defense and nuclear weapons issues pertaining to Europe
in particular and try to leave most of the implications and
recommendations for the conversation and I look forward to
your comments and questions afterwards.
On missile defense, I would just like to talk about two different
programs. First of all, MEADS, which I am sure you are all
familiar with and then also the European components of the
ground-based missile defense system that the United States
is deploying.
On MEADS, just to review, that's the Medium-Extended Air
Defense System (MEADS). That's a joint project with Italy,
Germany and the United States. It's based on the Patriot 3
interceptor for the moment with associated radars and command
and control systems that just in the last six months or so
both Italy and Germany of course have agreed to move forward
with developing these programs. It's scheduled for a final
decision in Germany, I believe in 2008, and they're hoping
to have a command and control system up in The Hague in 2010.
The questions it seems to me that are interesting and should
be discussed on the MEADS issue is that of participation:
what is the connection between technology transfer and cooperation
between the US and the European states involved in MEADS and
how will that relationship go? What is the cost? It seems
as though costs have been escalating with the MEADS program
as it often does for the other missile defense programs here
in the United States. And also what is the political environment,
which I understand has been quite interesting, particularly
in Germany in the last election cycle?
To speak about the US GMD system, the ground-based missile
defense system, as I'm sure you know, President Bush has decided
to begin to deploy a system in Alaska and California, which
is using ground-based interceptors for long-term strategic
interception of ballistic missiles. There is a large command
and control radar system surrounding that and there's also
being developed and deployed - some of it already up. There
are some European components that are being discussed in this.
The United Kingdom, of course, has already agreed to upgrade
its radars at Fylingdales and Menwith Hill. And there has
been the question raised at least as to whether there may
be interceptors placed on the ground in the United Kingdom.
I think this raises questions on several points. What would
be the political ramifications of this and what would be the
strategic implications for this? It is not at all clear to
me that, for instance, the UK is the most suitable location
if this were to go forward as it is.
The alternative to that in the European frame is to look
toward Eastern Europe. All of these scenarios are to look
at a Middle East scenario, likely Iran or Syria, of course,
is often given. The states that are most commonly talked about
are Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, either for the
basing of simply radars to help with the identification of
cueing of interceptors or for interceptors themselves. I understand
that these decisions have not been made yet, but I notice
there have been active negotiations back and forth with the
Pentagon and I'm sure the State Department, so that would
be something to discuss as time goes on as well.
Just to briefly talk about a few nuclear issues, I would
like to mention the NATO nuclear sharing arrangement, the
question of UK Trident replacement and to touch upon a little
bit more on the new nuclear weapons situations here in the
United States as they might impact the European environment.
On nuclear sharing with NATO, there are five non-nuclear
states that participate in this arrangement: Belgium, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The question of legality
of NATO nuclear sharing has been raised most prominently in
the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference process, but
then in other forums as well, NATO for instance, based on
non-nuclear states having control over nuclear weapons in
times of conflict or war.
There are two arguments that are usually used to rebut this.
One is that the NATO nuclear sharing arrangement preceded
the passage and entry into force of the NPT as well as that
the NPT would not be governing in a time of war. But it still
is a contentious issue and it is something that is raised
often and I would urge you to look at a paper
that BASIC has written on this issue [along with the Oxford Research Group]. It is a short
two or three-page item that should be in your packets and
it is on the Web site also.
On the issue of UK Trident replacement, it was written in
a Defence White Paper in 2003
that the UK would need to re-examine its Trident system this
Parliament, and as I understand it, negotiations and discussions
are ongoing on this. There actually was one article that I
saw that was written in The Independent in May and
you can take that for what you will that the decision had
already been made in secret. The word is out, but as negotiations
are ongoing on the future of Trident, whether that would be
a follow on system, which is a cruise missile system, which
may be the preferred option at the moment or some strategic
follow on Trident, or even the potentiality of a non-strategic
conventional replacement to Trident, that the conversation
happen in a transparent and as open a manner as possible.
I would point out that last year the US and the UK agreed
to extend the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA), which was
the underpinning for the nuclear sharing arrangement between
the two countries. And this presumably would extend it for
ten years, and would allow for cooperation on technology and
information transfers regardless of what the UK decides to
do.
And speaking about US-nuclear weapons development, as Alistair
mentioned, there are several programs in development and I
think the question on this - so that I don't repeat what Alistair
has already spoken about -- how will the US developments,
for instance, impact the UK's decisions on Trident replacement
and vice versa? And will there be coordination there and what
will the tenor of that coordination be?
Another impact of that, as I mentioned, there may be complicating
efforts in the area of nonproliferation with the question
of new nuclear weapons in the United States, depending also
on what the UK decides to do.
I would also mention that these lines become blurry very
quickly. It's difficult to draw a sharp bright line between
a variety of programs and activities that various countries
have undertaken along the nuclear line, whether it's the US
and its efforts, including also things like enhanced test
readiness and modern pit facility of this Administration,
which it is also pursuing in its efforts on nuclear weapons
and also are other countries, or Brazil, Japan, South Korea,
and their various nuclear activities. I am just raising these
issues for discussion. I'll leave my remarks there. I would
be happy to talk about nuclear weapons, or missile defense,
or nonproliferation further during this discussion. Thank
you.
Chris Lindborg: Thank you very much Matt. David will
discuss Biological Weapons issues, so David, if you would
please go ahead.
Next:
David Isenberg,
BASIC: biological weapons security
Discussion, including
WEU Assembly Defence Committee
Previous:
Alistair Millar, Fourth
Freedom Forum: tactical nuclear weapons and transatlantic
security
Dr. Chantal de
Jonge Oudraat, Center for Transatlantic Relations: NATO,
UN and peace operations
Introduction
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