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TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING WITH MEMBERS
OF THE
WEU ASSEMBLY DEFENCE COMMITTEE AND
INTERPARLIAMENTARY EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE ASSEMBLY
JUNE 29, 2005 9:00-11:00 am
at the Stewart Mott House in Washington, D.C.
Discussion with WEU Assembly Defence
Committee
See also: Select Reports, Assembly
of the WEU/The Interparliamentary European Security and Defence
Assembly
Previous:
David Isenberg,
BASIC: biological weapons security
Matt Martin, BASIC:
missile defense, nuclear security
Alistair Millar,
Fourth Freedom Forum: tactical nuclear weapons and transatlantic
security
Dr. Chantal de
Jonge Oudraat, Center for Transatlantic Relations: NATO,
UN and peace operations
Introduction
John Wilkinson: Mrs. Jane
Griffiths from the United Kingdom
Jane Griffiths, UK: Thank you. Thanks to all of you
for the really interesting presentations. My question, I think,
is to Alistair Millar. We had a briefing yesterday, which
included a briefing on a reconstruction of the battles in
Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom.
And what struck me was a quote from General Tommy Franks during
that, which I haven't picked up the time, where he said the
battles of Mazar-e-Sharif were very important because it opened
up a land bridge to Central Asia. And my question in relation
to that is - it is of course absolutely right for NATO-Europe-Russia,
to talk to each other and to try to institute disclosure on
where the weapons are. That has to be good for promoting peace
and security, but we don't really know what there is in Central
Asia and a lot of Central Asia presumably, and I am not even
sure how much the Russians know. So I wonder what take you
might have on that.
Alistair Millar: Yes, that is a good question and
that is an interesting quote, which I will use from Tommy
Franks. I think we are actually pretty confident that a lot
of the weapons that were deployed in the former Soviet Union
- and this is actually thanks to coordination of President
Bush's father when he was President and Presidents Gorbachev
and Yeltsin. This was in 1991, when there was a great deal
of concern from the American side, that these tactical nuclear
weapons scattered all over the place could fall into the wrong
hands, particularly after the coup that occurred in Moscow.
So a presidential nuclear initiative was enacted. I
discussed this a little in the paper that's in the folder
there. Where the United States and Russia agreed, not with
any formal agreement, but just as a reciprocal unilateral
agreement, to move all of the weapons they had on foreign
territory -- of course the great exception is in Europe and
with the US side -- but move all of those weapons back from
their forward deployed positions back into Russia proper.
The great concern though was that this was done very, very
quickly. And while there is a high degree of confidence that
the weapons were moved, the accounting process used while
they were moving those weapons closer really left a lot of
doubts as to whether they might have lost count of a few.
And I have heard reports that not in Central Asia, but in
Central and Eastern Europe, that in places like Bulgaria,
that there are still some nuclear artillery shells and things
that may have been misplaced. But I think what you are raising
here gets to the heart of a problem that we need to discuss
with the Russians and create an environment where we can discuss
this with them and get them to disclose this information.
I am not sure the struggle that Rudyard Kipling and others
foresaw many, many years ago in Central Asia isn't going to
complicate this, where the West and Russia are having tensions
with regards to strategic assets, oil, and forward deployed
bases and other things. And I hope that this doesn't create
a further obstacle to discussions that I talked about on tactical
nuclear weapons. Thank you.
John Wilkinson: Stef Goris, the President of the Assembly
of the WEU.
Stef Goris: Thank you to the Chair. First of all I
believe that the presentations were absolutely interesting
and I want to start with a question about NATO. Don't you
believe that all partners need some more clarification about
how to work together within NATO? For instance, I remember
well that it's within the NATO Treaty to consult with the
United Nations, where NATO should have a mandate from the
UN when NATO wants to go out of area. But on Monday, having
had a meeting with senior officials at the State Department,
it was stated very clearly that NATO is NATO and that if NATO
feels the need to do something that they agree on this, then
they should do it, without any reference to the UN. Some of
the Maximalists and Minimalists, who are within the 26 member
states, they read the Treaty in a different way. So is there
not first of all a need to sit together to clarify it without
telling each other our own story?
At the moment, you still get different opinions and then
you get this sort of crisis that we had two or three years
ago. About the NATO Response Force, I posed the question two
days ago also. It is not very clear who can go where on any
immediate operation. When the Commander in Chief decides I
need those troops tomorrow to send somewhere and at the same
time there are 26 flags going within because it is a NATO
force going there. So is there a decision needed by the NATO
Council? Is there a debate before? So how does it work? Again,
we heard from senior American officials, and they say "no,"
when the Commander in Chief thinks there's a need, there's
a need. So this was decided at the Prague Summit. We read
it sometimes in a different way. So shouldn't we first of
all sit together and clarify for each other how we proceed
in these kinds of situations?
Chantal de Jonge Oudraat: Thank you very much for
those questions. You raise two questions. One is the issue
of primacy, can organizations intervene without a UN mandate?
And of course we all think about Kosovo, but I would argue
that Kosovo is really the exception rather than the rule.
The problem that we are facing today is not that there is
too much willingness by organizations, be it NATO or the EU
to intervene, the problem is that there is too little enthusiasm
to intervene. This brings me to the second point and your
second question, and that is the deployment of troops. I think
unless we, and you politicians, explain that it is in our
enlightened self-interest, to intervene in cases like Darfur,
we will not have the support of the public to deploy the troops.
If we want these organizations to work, we have to convince
our public opinion that these tasks are vital for our own
security. And I think once we do that, then we can go back
to decision-making procedures. To make the NRF more effective,
the decision-making process will have to be changed within
NATO. But the more crucial problem is convincing your publics
that these are problems that are security problems that we
have to deal with. Most European countries have troops on
a standby basis. They have committed troops in principle to
the NRF, but the actual decision to deploy troops is made
on a case-by-case basis. Often it might also entail parliamentary
approval and becomes a very political decision.
John Wilkinson: Thank you very much indeed. Mr. Gubert
of Italy.
Renzo Gubert: Yes, the same problem, I am very interested
in this solution for NATO because we have been meeting with
NATO and so on, and there are no problems, all is clear, we
have defense problems, but no problems with the changes in
thinking, no problems at all, but I think it is an illusion,
and that there are problems, eh? But I am not well-convinced
of the solution - why you see that NATO can be a sort of agency
of the United Nations organization and I think that this is
as true as it can be in some cases, but is not an official
orientation and are machinations. Why, NATO has always been
an alliance of Europe and the United States of America [editors
insert: and Canada]. It is only a little part of the world.
There is China, Russia, India, and Japan. All is possible,
that the body of NATO recognizes all of the people around
the world and the Security Council of the United Nations,
but we are reminded, to think that we might change radically
the situation, to create one agency or to get several continental
agencies as NATO, that NATO remains central to the European
and the transatlantic areas, not in other areas. What do you
think about the difficulties in the long-term to make from
NATO a security agency of the United Nations?
Chantal de Jonge Oudraat: I think NATO has already
decided to go global and there seems to be consensus among
NATO members to go global. Ultimately I would say NATO's "globalness"
will also include expansion of membership and further expansion
of NATO membership is a logical next step. One of the reasons
why I said that when NATO starts to work more closely with
the UN on these peacekeeping operations, that it has to be
very transparent, is because you do not want the developing
world to see this as a takeover by the Western European countries
or by the US. This should not become an "us" vs. "them" issue.
NATO has proven to be effective in these peacekeeping operations
and we should take advantage of that.
John Wilkinson: Thank you very much. Robert Walter
of the UK.
Robert Walter: Yes, I would like to extend that particular
point , or continue on that point and also ask a question
of Matt Martin as well, and it's really a political point.
We can see NATO playing this role in the United States, but
there is a phenomenal skepticism on the value of the United
Nations here in Washington, and I just wonder what sort of
constituency there is for the ideas you are putting forward
because it seems in the last few years that both the Administration
and Congress seem to have little time for the United Nations
and agree with Washington's lines.
My second point is for Matt Martin and his questioning about
the replacement for the Trident program in the United Kingdom
and it's really super. And it's just what is it that the United
Kingdom should do? And my second question is that he never
mentioned France and I wonder whether you have a perspective
on that?
Chantal de Jonge Oudraat: Maybe just on your first
question regarding the skepticism here in Washington, D.C.
vis-à-vis multilateral organizations and the UN in particular,
yes, absolutely. I would also refer you to the recent bipartisan
report that was commissioned by Congress and published by
the US Institute of Peace. Multilateralism and the UN are
not priority items on the policy agenda in Washington, D.C.
That being said, it was the US that wanted Iraq to be placed
on the UN agenda. It is the US that is very interested in
having NATO engage in Africa. The opposition here actually
comes from the European states. So the message from D.C. is
a mixed message. The US has a very instrumental view of international
organizations and in that sense the US is not that much different
from other big European states, like the UK, France, and Germany.
If the organization is a good instrument to promote your policy,
then it will be used. If it isn't, then you find other ways.
The US is interested in using multilateral organizations,
particularly for peacekeeping and stabilization-type of operations
in places like Iraq and Africa.
Matt Martin: Thank you for the question about Trident.
Well, I'm an American. I won't presume to give recommendations
specifically, but I would just say to raise questions on the
replacement of the Trident. And then take that for what you
will. And that is, first of all in the context of the strategic
situation of the day, what is the strategic advantage of the
Trident or a follow on to Trident, be it a cruise missile,
or what not, that is the overriding or the key consideration
and is that something which can be dealt with sufficiently
or not with conventional weapons? Are there political advantages
that the UK gains by continuing on with the Trident or a follow
on, which it would lose if it decided to forego that and move
to a conventional capability or not?
I do think that we are in a larger-, longer-term sense at
one of several crossroads of looking to the future of nuclear
weapons and nuclear weapons policies in the United States,
among certainly the nuclear weapons states as well as others.
I do believe there are ramifications for the actions that
countries take, whether positively or negatively, actively
or inactively and that if we would like to make progress on
nonproliferation, I think it strengthens our hand the more
that we can lower the level of our own nuclear activities
and to the extent that activities are seen as aggressive and
out of line with the rest of the globe, it makes things more
difficult on other objectives that we would like to achieve.
Regarding France, I haven't mentioned France simply because
as far as I know they are not actively considering replacing
their nuclear systems at the moment. There is not this sense
of urgency that I understand from the British Defence White
Paper, but maybe Alistair …
Alistair Millar: Can I just make two quick points
on the question you raised there? The first one is with regard
to the British Trident replacement program. I am on a fence
as to whether there is a real problem with replacing the Trident
there. But I want to urge that the potential problem on the
lack of transparency with regards to the systems deployed.
If you look at the conversions that have taken place so far
with several US Trident boats, it has been very unclear as
to what kind of cruise missile they will deploy and with very,
very few technical modifications they could actually deploy
a nuclear-tipped Tomahawk Cruise missile. This causes all
kinds of problems in terms of first of all, knowing what sort
of stockpile the United States and the United Kingdom have
deployed. Since the defense review that the Labour Government
conducted in the late 1990s, we have the advantage of knowing
how many boats are on patrol and knowing how many nuclear
weapons they have on them. And if this new conversion takes
place, I think it is incumbent upon the government that is
in charge during that conversion, to say what is on those
boats and not to blur this line between nuclear and conventional
weapons.
And then just finally on the French point. The French have
criticized the United States for developing new nuclear weapons,
but several defense analysts have produced papers, on behalf
in my belief of the government in France, saying that they
would entertain and are willing to look at the development
of small nuclear weapons as well as new types of nuclear weapons.
Whether this is a backlash because of the United States doing
it, like we've seen in Russia where they say they are going
to do it just because the United States is going first, or
whether it is a national defensive program, it still raises
the concern about the backlash and an arms race that might
be created as a result of the United States developing new
nuclear weapons.
John Wilkinson: Can I just say, I don't think it's
likely, right, that the United Kingdom will forego a successor
to Trident. I can't see a British government that would forego
a United Kingdom nuclear capability. The United Kingdom regards
its nuclear capability as something absolutely crucial to
its national security. It wouldn't wish, as much as it respects
France, it wouldn't wish that France be the only Western European
nuclear power. Nor would we want the United Kingdom to be
the only nuclear power in Western Europe. With proliferation
clearly happening in Iran and maybe other places as well,
I think the British Government would think it is premature
for the United Kingdom to relinquish its ultimate deterrent.
When people talk about the cause of the United Nations as
well, something in this regard, it is also something that
is considered a prerequisite for permanent membership of the
Security Council. It is very hard to see Europe giving-up,
with what conversations I have had anyway, giving-up a nuclear
deterrent. Blair isn't capable of doing it. The Conservatives
wouldn't do it. I doubt whether even a Liberal Democrat would
do it, given the present circumstances. So, there we are.
Alistair Millar: May I say that I absolutely agree
with you and I think that is the current sense of thinking.
And I can't see a time when the United Kingdom would give
up its nuclear deterrent. What I was suggesting, though, was
that the land-based weapons, actually they're gravity bombs
deployed in Europe, those are the ones I am calling attention
to and that we need to question because they create a sticking
[point] within NATO-Russian relations. An independent deterrent
force that the UK and France have is not part of what I am
recommending to get rid of. It's a different subject entirely
and I don't expect that will happen anytime in the near future.
John Wilkinson: And the UK has already given up a
stockpile. It has already gotten rid of [WE177] free-fall
bombs.
Matt Martin: I'm sorry, just one concluding remark
on that. The only thing I would ask on the Trident replacement
debate or question, is that here in the United States, when
we were reviewing our own nuclear weapons, the question of
the bunker busters or the advanced concepts, a reliable replacement
warhead, all of these various programs, is that it get debated.
We had a very open and robust discussion and debate in Congress,
within the Administration, the public, and the press on these
issues, and it's not by any means a decided issue. Congress
last year, as you probably know, surprisingly decided to cut
funds for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrators, the bunker
busters, even though it was quite deeply wanted by the Administration
in its request. So these outcomes are not necessarily predetermined
in toto, I would say. And I would encourage a sort of full,
robust discussion that is as open and as transparent as possible
in the United Kingdom.
Kevin McNamara: "Well, you won't get it!" [Laughter]
Baroness Knight, UK: My question is for Dr. Chantal
because of her expertise in the United Nations area and because
she mentioned peacekeeping specifically and what she said
about the possibility of change in that organization.
What depresses me so much about the United Nations is how
often it fails. I mean, I can think immediately of three instances:
Taiwan, Kashmir, and Cyprus. Now, I don't know whether it's
because the United Nations doesn't feel like acting unless
the whole world is involved in the outcome of what they are
doing or whether it's some other principle.
The first of these instances that come instantly to mind
is Taiwan. Now there are Chinese weapons facing Taiwan across
the Taiwan/Formosa Straits, everyday, there have been threats
and there has been a lot of saber rattling and nothing seems
to be done.
And then in Kashmir, it has gone on now for nearly - what
is it - 50 years? Now I went to talk to the people in the
refugee camps, and I saw what happened regularly. Everyday,
people get killed; everyday, women get raped. And because
it's a small area, I don't know whether that's why the United
Nations has done nothing about that.
And then Cyprus, a year ago, a whole year ago, Kofi Annan
brought forward a plan about Cyprus. And the Turkish Cypriots
voted for it, although it wasn't altogether to their advantage,
and the Greeks didn't, and nothing happened and a whole year
has gone by and the people in that little island suffer all
of the time because of that. Now I mean there are three areas
where surely if the United Nations were capable and determined,
even if it is nervous of big China or something of that matter,
they don't seem to be able to act.
In the changes that Dr. Chantal envisions, does she think
we shall see a better result?
Chantal de Jonge Oudraat: I must say I am sort of
surprised by those three examples of UN failures. I see failures
as well, but those three examples would not be on my list
of examples of UN failures. My list would start with Rwanda,
Yugoslavia and Sudan. Those are the abysmal failures of the
UN.
Cyprus? The UN is actually doing some good--active fighting
has stopped. This is not a violent conflict and peacekeepers
have been able to do their job. One could say Cyprus is actually
a very cost effective operation.
As far as China and Taiwan, the UN was never intended to
deal with these types of problems-that is, problems that involve
the great powers. That is why the great powers have veto power
in the UN Security Council. Veto power can never become an
instrument against them. Many people here in the US think
that Kofi Annan has great powers and even a fleet of black
helicopters. We know this is not true. We also know that the
US, like the UK, like France, like Russia, like China, have
veto power and that they will stop any kind of action by the
UN they would consider unfriendly. The UN is an organization
of member states and it is only as strong as its member states
allow it to be.
Allow me one word on the UN Summit in September 2005 and
the reform proposals tabled by Kofi Annan. The European reaction
to these proposals has been extremely weak. I would even argue
that the Europeans have dropped the ball-particularly on Security
Council reform. The path to any kind of UN reform goes through
Security Council reform. The small European countries, including
my own country [The Netherlands] have been very violently
opposed to a Security Council seat for Germany, and have stopped
any kind of Common EU position on this issue. Because the
EU could not come to a common agreement, I'm afraid that we
won't see a lot of success at the September summit, much to
my chagrin.
John Wilkinson: [Inaudible]
Defence Committee Member question: [Inaudible] My
question concerns the Chinese and the nuclear weapons, just
getting back on that issue. Because we have, as you know,
much of our interest is to see what is going on with Chinese
defense and I think that this sector of nuclear weapons is
already of great interest in the Chinese department. [Inaudible]
I saw yesterday on CNN a United States senator or congressman.
He promptly reacted against [inaudible] because they support
an English company, Westinghouse, which, in turn, was supporting
a nuclear plan in China. I don't know whether it is true or
not. But it seems the public interest regarding nuclear build
up of weapons in China is very much happening? So this is
my question.
Alistair Millar: I will take one shot at it. When
the Bush Administration came in the year 2001, there was great
hope and discussion amongst defense contractors, and I am
sure that you have met with some of them the last few days,
that this was before September 11 occurred of course, that
China was going to be the next big rival that would stoke
the defense industry again after sort of falling short of
its goals after the Cold War and this peace dividend that
was supposed to emerge during the Clinton Administration.
And there still is a great deal of effort, and I think you
may have come across this during your meetings, to ramp up,
really call people's attention to a "looming threat" from
China. And I'm very, very concerned about this on the nuclear
front because if we look at the weapons, China has very, very
few weapons compared to the United States. In fact, they have
got less than the UK and they are quite old systems. They
have very out-of-date fueling mechanisms, for example, for
their missiles and what have you, and I think they're fine
with that because they've got a minimum deterrent and they
are more concerned about economic issues at the moment. And
I'm very concerned that if the United States keeps ramping
up this call to arms and developing new nuclear weapons on
their side and saying that China is the boogey man, that it
will encourage China to revisit a redevelopment of its nuclear
weapons program.
The point you're getting to, though, is more from the standpoint
of proliferation, reactor technology and things. There has
been very little discussion of this point in this country.
But the Chinese are developing their own version, a reactor
technology called pebble bed reactor technology, which is
basically a quite sophisticated system of developing prefabricated
reactors that can be sold. Their goal is to sell them to 30
developed countries over the next 20 or 30 years I think.
There is a lot of concern in this country that they're going
to be active proliferators of this technology, but really
the experts say that this pebble bed technology is actually
much harder, near impossible some say , to turn into highly
enriched weaponized uranium and I'm not sure why the United
States hasn't considered this option, or the European Union,
with regard to Iran and North Korea. They could develop this
pebble bed technology, and I won't go into a lot of detail,
but it essentially creates fuel for the reactors that is encased
in carbon - it is very difficult to convert, and it has to
go back to the original country for reprocessing. So I think
just to be clear and to conclude that the threat from China
is a self-fulfilling prophecy and it is being overstated in
this country and I urge you to take that briefing with a big
dose of salt.
David Isenberg: If I could also just add on to that,
with regard to the contingent here in the United States to
try to present China as the next clear and present danger,
the Pentagon within the next couple weeks should be releasing
its annual assessment, mandated by Congress, on the military
power of China and the leaks that have come out about it to
date, notably in the Washington Times, which always
has a special ingress with the Pentagon. It will be more of
the same, that China's military spending is going stratospherically
through the roof, that they are buying lots of new weapons,
and making great progress on strategic stockpiles. So it will
be more doom and gloom, portraying China's vast military potential
as they see it, even if that is not actually in accord with
the facts.
John Wilkinson: Thank you, thank you very much. Mr.
Schneider of France.
André Schneider: [through interpreter] I just wanted
to follow up and have your reaction to what I have heard at
meetings here and elsewhere. Often, France is sort of put
up as being in matters of its nuclear capacities and I just
wanted to ask people to share the same understanding vis-à-vis
France, as vis-à-vis Britain. The Chairman presented the rationale
for the nuclear weapons in Britain and the same rationale
applies to France, so I just require understanding.
Alistair Millar: I would just say that it is worth
emphasizing that the Strategic Defence Review that was undertaken
by the United Kingdom and the reductions that have taken place
in the French nuclear forces are commendable and they should
be observed and taken with a great deal of seriousness by
both the United States and Russia as examples to follow. I
think it is fair to say, and I will pick up on your point
to say that France is moving in the right direction as is
the UK in terms of reductions of forces, but I hope that they
don't try to go to the lower common denominator and try to
follow the United States on the development of robust and
new nuclear weapons.
John Wilkinson: Tom Cox of the UK.
Tom Cox: Going back to the earlier remarks of Alistair,
I'm sure he is aware that the Western European Union has had
some time in building up friendly relationships with Russia.
And he may also be aware that some years ago a member of the
French delegation to the Western European Union, Madame Durrieu,
who is still a member of the Assembly, did in fact prepare
a report that was discussed on the problems, and they may
still have them, of decommissioned nuclear submarines. And
they obviously, the Russians, didn't have even the money nor
even the skills to handle these and we were asked to become
involved in the middle and our French colleague, who is a
very distinguished member, did this report. And I would hope,
and the Chairman of our Committee and the Secretariat of our
Committee are here, we now have the Russians come to our meetings
in Paris, and my understanding is that it may possibly be
in the course of this year, this Committee will in fact be
visiting Moscow and I would hope that possibly when our next
meeting of our Committee, possibly in September, that one
of the items on our agenda, and there are a lot of the members
of the Committee here, one of the items on the agenda: discussions
with Russia on nuclear issues. Something such as that because
we are talking to them, there is this relationship, and we
do, in my view, have an opportunity to develop this.
Alistair Millar: I'll just make two quick points on
that. First of all, it's in Russia's economic interest as
well. It's interesting to note that the former head of the
nuclear weapons directorate in Russia, Yevgeny Maslin, a general,
has now taken as a sideline venture after he retired, taking
up the issue of scrap metal and decommissioning of submarines.
And has become quite a wealthy man in doing so and there are
quite a lot of people around him making a profit out of dismantling
things that they were once deploying in order to operate.
So there is an economic interest there. Also it is important
to point out the environmental impact of this and cooperation
between the United States, Norway, and Russia in a program
called AMEC, which has sought to look at the environmental
impact of decommissioned submarines in the Barents Sea is
a good avenue from which to bring this back on the agenda
with the Russians. We have a lot of discussion between the
European Union and the Russians on environmental issues and
this is a huge environmental issue.
John Wilkinson: Thank you. Mr. McNamara, UK.
Kevin McNamara: Thank you Mr. Chairman. I would like
to make one observation first on the post-Trident replacement.
Whatever happens over that, there will not be independent
nuclear weapons control by Britain because it is dependent
upon US systems in order to be able to be put them into use.
And unless the US agrees to its being used, it won't be used.
In my mind, this is the strongest reason why we shouldn't
go ahead with it. To create a weapon at great expense that
you can't use unless another ally says so does seem to me
to lack logic and I would hope Mr. Brown, our Chancellor of
the Exchequer, would see the wisdom of that. However, I wouldn't
hold my breath there. But I will live in hope because that
is what politicians must do.
But more particularly -- if I could turn to this almost dismissal
of the European Union and its role in the United Nations --
perhaps I think because of this failure in approach to have
a unified [inaudible] about the role of NATO, I can see that
one can build on paper all sorts of roles for NATO, but there
is first, as you pointed out, a reluctance of member countries
of NATO or of the EU to take action outside. Certainly, I
thought that you tended to be underestimating, in what you
were saying, the actual approach of other regional areas and
regional organizations, the extreme reluctance of the African
Union, for example, to allow an EU operation and it was basically
forced upon them by necessity and pressure of the fact that
they didn't have the logistical ability. Also the attitudes
that one would take in the near or Middle East towards that
and India as well as China are going to have with regard to
developments within the United Nations and the degree to which
even if they are able to enlarge NATO, the degree of suspicion
that will always be there -- that this is in fact Western
Imperialism in another guise. I personally would like to see
the development of UN forces, if that is possible, with all
the difficulties I see with that, but the countries that it
can bring in on a qualitative basis, rather than using an
existing force in NATO, which is not created specifically
for that purpose.
Chantal de Jonge Oudraat: Very briefly, I think the
EU's support for the UN is mostly rhetorical. It talks about
effective multilateralism. It talks about how the UN must
be a priority for the EU but if you look at what the EU is
doing to make the UN more effective, particularly in the peacekeeping
field, it is very little. What you see is that the EU wants
to mount its own operations under its own ESDP flag. There
are very few European soldiers in UN operations and this is
something that the Secretary General has deplored time and
time again, but there just is no willingness on the part of
European member states to participate in UN operations. And
the few European states that have a willingness and the capabilities
to engage in these types of operations want to do it under
the umbrella of the ESDP. Despite the rhetoric there is actually
a lot of competition going on between the UN on the one hand
and the EU on the other. It's unfortunate, but it's the reality.
I think we don't have that type of competition problem with
NATO. On the regional organizations, yes, everybody turns
to regional organizations and why do we turn to the regional
organizations? Because of the lack of performance at the global
level.
Now we have one organization, and that is NATO, that is very
capable in this field and I would argue why not expand its
responsibilities, and give NATO a new rationale, a new raison
d'être? And this would be it. As you say, there is a lot of
suspicion about expansion of NATO's responsibilities in the
peacekeeping field, particularly in the developing world.
That is why we have to be very careful and open and transparent
about strengthening NATO's responsibilities in this area and
make sure that other countries, including countries such as
India, can participate in these types of NATO-supported operations.
There are ways to overcome these accusations of Western Imperialism.
As far as the other regional organizations, I think we have
to recognize that there is very little capacity within those
organizations. We-that is North America and Europe-should
help build up capacity. But we should do so in a coordinated
fashion. In Africa, many countries, including the US, are
running all sorts of training programs in Africa but sometimes
these training programs are developed at cross-purposes. We
have limited means and capabilities. Instead of each of us
doing our own thing, let's try to coordinate through an organization
that has expertise and the capacity to do so. If the European
Union wants to do this, fine, but right now the European Union
has no capacity for this. ESDP is still very much in an embryonic
stage. That's why I say NATO should reach out to the UN and
the UN should reach out to NATO. By working together, they
can become stronger and make the world a better place.
John Wilkinson: Thank you very much. Stef Goris, the
President of the Assembly.
Stef Goris: Yes, colleagues, I see there are no more
speakers on the list. And by concluding, because I see I have
to leave now, because I have to get back to Belgium because
there is an important vote coming up tomorrow, as we all know
that our parliamentary delegations are there. I would like
to conclude by thanking the Chairman, Mr. Wilkinson and my
colleagues that I believe we had some very interesting days
together here in Washington. Meeting first of all at the Pentagon
and then at the State Department on Monday, where we had some
very impressive addresses and we learned a lot. And we had
a very good exchange of views between them and Europeans.
At the GAO, I was absolutely nicely surprised, Mr. Chairman,
by the excellent [inaudible] on their knowledge of the technical
issues about the FA-22 Raptor, about JSF and so on and so
on. I think this was also for American colleagues also a surprise.
I think they are really a very good, a very strong Committee.
I myself have been a member of the Assembly for many years
before becoming the President of the Assembly, but I really
believe that this is one of the top committees of our Assembly.
Also at the IDA yesterday afternoon we had some exchange of
views and today at BASIC here, I believe once again, it was
very good to have some views of your office, the British American
Security Information Council. I am very happy also with this
document that you produced and your colleagues because it's
about the B61 gravity bombs and we also had this question
put forward yesterday and the day before and your conclusions
-- I like them very much -- and I will take this document
[NATO: Nuclear
Sharing or Proliferation?] with me to Belgium. So my country
is also concerned about this.
But I would now like to conclude by, first of all, thanking
my colleagues for your very good company and the very good
work you have achieved here in the United States. I wish you
a very good stay at Norfolk, Virginia, where I was myself
two years ago [inaudible] it was a carrier for amphibious
operations. I heard that you will visit the nuclear Air Force
carrier, so it will be absolutely interesting to be there.
If you will allow me, I would like to thank the Chairman of
your committee for having chaired this in the most impressive
way. John, thank you very much. [Inaudible], but thank you
very much for this [inaudible]. And as I believe the work
of the Assembly is important and the Assembly's work is only
as good as the work that has been done with the [inaudible]
that Chairman.
John Wilkinson: Thank you very much indeed. It was
a great thing for us that we had President Stef Goris with
us. It was indeed a fantastic two and a half days in Washington.
I'm sad to say that I've got to go back to the UK. [Inaudible]
Mr. McNamara, who will be talking over the chairmanship.
And this meeting here with BASIC I think has showed how interested
we are in a whole range of issues, and this central view of
our institution. We could debate nuclear strategy for many
a long day, but in a short time, I think you have encapsulated
the main issues for us, and thinking about the roles of NATO
in this changing world and of the United Nations, and how
the European Union could and should perhaps do more and be
more effective in the security field. This is our task, the
organization, which has by treaty, by virtue of the Brussels
Treaty, an obligation to provide the parliamentary oversight
of European defense. We are engaged in this as our central
and very fundamental role.
So we had a stimulating morning and also thank you for the
breakfast. It was all the more welcome for those people who
had problems with the bus and had to walk a long way. I thought
your hospitality was admirable, we greatly enjoyed the presentations,
and we thoroughly appreciate this opportunity to discuss and
debate freely these issues in an open and stimulating manner.
Thanks to you one and all. Thank you [inaudible].
If I could hand this book as a token of our appreciation
to the appropriate representative of BASIC? Who is the appropriate
person to receive the book?
Chris Lindborg: That would be Matt Martin, our Deputy
Director.
John Wilkinson: It is duly inscribed by me and our
President, Stef Goris. And it traces the work of the Assembly
for the first 50 years. We celebrated our 50th Anniversary
of the inaugural sitting, which actually took place in Strasbourg.
We celebrated it last Thursday with a speech from the Secretary
General of NATO at a session of our own and of course we feel
that we have a lot of good work to do in the future and you
provided the material for us to do just that. Thank you so
very much.
[Matt Martin receives book commemorating the 50th Anniversary
of the Assembly of the WEU.]
Chris Lindborg: I would just like to thank everyone
for your time and your effort for coming here. It was wonderful
hearing your views and questions. I hope that you will stay
in touch with BASIC. Please approach us if you would like
more information and also I would also like to thank our guest
experts, Chantal and Alistair, and I am sure that they would
be open to be in touch with all of you on these issues as
well. Again, thank you very much.
Previous:
David Isenberg,
BASIC: biological weapons security
Matt Martin, BASIC:
missile defense, nuclear security
Alistair Millar, Fourth
Freedom Forum: tactical nuclear weapons and transatlantic
security
Dr. Chantal de
Jonge Oudraat, Center for Transatlantic Relations: NATO,
UN and peace operations
Introduction
Select Reports, Assembly of the
WEU/The Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly
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