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NATO
Few periods in the life of an institution are
as critical as the one the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) is facing now. The 26-member alliance is simultaneously
engaged in the most difficult military mission it has ever
undertaken (in Afghanistan) while also undergoing pressure
to transform itself in an uncertain world. It is clear that
the 21st century security environment requires the Alliance
to transform, but the organisational discussions at the 2006
Riga Summit were too narrowly focused on force modernisation,
interoperability and membership.
BASIC made a detailed submission in December
2007 to the UK House of Commons Defence Committee inquiry
into the 'Future of NATO and European Defence'. We argued
that, in addition to carrying out a much-needed debate on
how to stabilise Afghanistan, given the enormous changes that
have taken place since the 1999 Strategic Concept was agreed,
NATO should initiate a review process with the aim of agreeing
a new Strategic Concept in 2009. Three goals should be fundamental
to such a review:
- Affirming collective defence, disaster relief, conflict
prevention, counter-and non-proliferation and peacekeeping
missions as the primary purpose of NATO;
- Eliminating battlefield nuclear weapons from Europe and
the adoption of a non-nuclear weapon security doctrine for
the Alliance (including, as interim goals, withdrawal of
the 480 US tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe
and the withdrawal of Russian tactical weapons from operational
deployment to secure storage); and
- Improving transparency, accountability and value for money
within NATO, especially with regard to defence planning
and procurement.
Goal 1: BASIC recommends that NATO should focus on:
(a) Collective defence of the transatlantic area with selective
humanitarian/ disaster relief, conflict prevention, counter-
and non-proliferation and peacekeeping missions 'out of area'
where appropriately mandated and in accordance with international
law. For the present, NATO does not need to become a global
membership organisation, but as in Afghanistan (where 15 per
cent of the troops are provided by non-NATO countries), the
Alliance could facilitate and oversee 'coalitions of the willing'
in support of these missions;
(b) Reshaping the NRF for peacekeeping and disaster response
capabilities, and developing limited counter-insurgency and
counter-intelligence capabilities, with clear rules of deployment;
and
(c) Strengthening its cooperative threat reduction, weapons
collection and destruction, and counter-proliferation capabilities,
with a special emphasis on maritime interdiction under the
Proliferation Security Initiative.
Goal 2: In the fullest recent statement of Government
policy on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the then
Foreign Secretary, Margaret Becket, made it clear that the
UK endorsed the appeal from Shultz/Kissinger/Perry /Nunn et
al for a new initiative towards the global elimination of
nuclear weapons. In particular, it believed that in combination
with non-proliferation, the nuclear weapons states must take
their nuclear disarmament responsibilities seriously, in order
both to strengthen the arms control regime and to directly
reduce risks (See Getting to Zero). As part of this policy
the Government is sponsoring a research project on the practicality
of ultimately attaining a nuclear weapons free world. In pursuit
of such policies the Government should consider the following
proposals:
(a) In the process of negotiating a new strategic concept,
NATO should reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in strategic
planning, with a view to moving progressively towards the
adoption of a non-nuclear weapon security doctrine;
(b) NATO open negotiations with Russia to create an international
treaty to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons; and
(c) Two interim goals should be: withdrawal of the 480 US
tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and the withdrawal
of Russian tactical weapons from operational deployment to
secure storage.
Goal 3: The lack of attention paid to the costs and
the technical merit of the missile defence program is symbolic
of a democratic deficit at the heart of the Alliance. Another
example of failed transparency and accountability is the eight-year
delay in NATO telling the Serbian government where thousands
of cluster bombs were dropped during the 1999 Kosovo campaign.
Throughout NATO's history, MPs in their national parliaments
when asking questions about NATO decisions have invariably
been told that such decisions are confidential. When the same
questions were put to the Secretary General, he invariably
replied that NATO was but an alliance of sovereign states.
This Catch 22 situation may have served a purpose during the
Cold War, but is no longer appropriate today. Adequate mechanisms
for parliamentary accountability within NATO are urgently
required. BASIC recommends that NATO's secrecy rules should
be reviewed as part of the larger review of the Alliance's
Strategic Concept.
Missile Defences: An Expensive Distraction
from Real Security Needs
Also at Riga, NATO leaders agreed to establish
a theatre missile defence system that is intended to provide
NATO forces with protection from ballistic missiles with "an
initial operational capability by 2010". NATO has agreed to
assess by February 2008 the political and military implications
of the planned missile defence systems in Europe, including
the possibility of "bolting" NATO and US missile defence systems
together. We lament the lack of any public debate in Britain
(or any other Member State) about the desirability, or workability
of missile defence, let alone about the strategic assumptions
that underpin it. The British Parliament has a duty to question
whether such assumptions are compatible with British national
interests and our collective interests within NATO. Going
ahead with the BMD proposal in Central Europe regardless of
Russian opinion would be a huge mistake. More substantive
US, Russian and NATO dialogue, within the NATO-Russia Council
on BMD and other mutual security concerns is necessary to
avoid further divisions in Europe. BASIC recommends that:
(a) any proposed bilateral or multilateral missile
defence agreements involving the UK should be made available
for prior parliamentary scrutiny (i.e. before being signed);
and
(b) the numerous UK and NATO ballistic missile
threat assessments and industrial studies should be declassified
and placed in the public domain.
BASIC will be expanding on some of these themes
as part of a review of NATO's Strategic Concept that we plan
to undertake in 2008.
NATO Update
To Subscribe to the BASIC's NATO Update, please send an email
to clindborg at basicint.org.
BASIC's Monthly
Update on NATO. To mark the Riga Summit, BASIC will
produce a monthly update on the transatlantic Alliance. See
this first edition that covers Afghanistan, capabilities,
peace operations, and other issues facing NATO, 27 November
2006.
BASIC Calls for
Declassification of NATO's Missile Defence Study,
BASIC Media Advisory, 31 May 2006.
BASIC'S NATO
E-mail Update, Defence Ministers Meeting 9-10 June:
Nuclear Arrangements, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Iraq, 9 June
2005
NATO Defence Ministers
Meeting, 9 June, Call for NATO to withdraw all tactical
nukes from Europe, BASIC Media Advisory, 7 June 2005
NATO
Nuclear Sharing or Proliferation? presentation by
BASIC Consultant Carol Naughton, to the NPT Review Conference,
11 May 2005
How Deep and How
Long Will NATO Go in Afghanistan and Iraq? by Chris
Lindborg, BASIC's NATO E-mail Series, 9 December 2004
NATO's Nuclear Posture:
What's Next? by Alistair Millar and Jason Ipe, BASIC's
NATO E-mail Series, 8 December 2004
NATO-EU Relations
State of Play as the EU Takes Over in Bosnia: Organisations
Face a Crucial Window of Opportunity, by Annalisa Monaco,
BASIC's NATO E-mail Series, 7 December 2004
NATO and Missile
Defence: Stay Tuned This Could Get Interesting, BASIC
Note, 30 June 2004.
NATO
Nuclear Doctrine and the NPT, BASIC Briefing, 29 June
2004
The Problems Preventing NATO
from Taking on a Larger Role in Iraq, BASIC Note,
28 June 2004
NATO Ministerial Meetings
in Brussels: Looking Ahead to the Istanbul Summit in 2004,
BASIC Briefing, 3 December 2003
NATO's
Angry Sponsors: The View From Capitol Hill BASIC Note
and 3rd Installment of NATO E-mail Series, 13 June 2003
Is NATO Coming
Under Pressure to Amend Its Nuclear Policy? BASIC
Note and 2nd Installment of NATO E-mail Series, 2 June 2003
A Tumultuous Time
Since the Last Soiree Introduction to NATO E-mail
Series, 2 June 2003
Senate
Hearings on NATO Expansion: Key Issues of Concern
BASIC Note, 28 April 2003
Time for
a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in Europe? BASIC Note,
27 February 2003
Rapid
Reaction Forces: More Questions Than Answers BASIC
Note, 25 January 2003
The Results of the
Prague Summit and the Challenges Ahead
Third Installment of NATO E-mail Series, 3 December 2002
NATO's Defense Gap: More
Than Just Capabilities
Second Installment of NATO E-mail Series, 21 November 2002
As NATO Gets Bigger,
Can It Downsize Nuclear Risks?
First Installment of NATO E-mail Series, 20 November
2002
Prospects
for Prague BASIC Press Release on the upcoming NATO
Summit, 19 November 2002
Publications
- Assessing ISAF: A Baseline
Study of NATO's Role in Afghanistan, by Cameron
Scott. This BASIC Report provides an overview of ISAF's
activities in countering the insurgent threat and bringing
security to Afghanistan. March 2007.
- NATO and Missile
Defence: Stay Tuned This Could Get Interesting,
BASIC Note, 30 June 2004
- NATO Nuclear Doctrine and the
NPT, BASIC Briefing, 29 June 2004
- The Problems Preventing
NATO from Taking on a Larger Role in Iraq, BASIC
Note, 28 June 2004
- NATO Ministerial
Meetings in Brussels: Looking Ahead to the Istanbul Summit
in 2004, BASIC Briefing, 3 December 2003.
- NATO's Angry Sponsors: The View
From Capitol Hill BASIC Note, 13 June 2003.
- Is NATO
Coming Under Pressure to Amend Its Nuclear Policy?
BASIC Note, 2 June 2003.
- Senate Hearings on NATO Expansion: Key
Issues of Concern BASIC Note, 28 April 2003.
- Rapid
Reaction Forces: More Questions Than Answers BASIC
Note, 25 January 2003.
- Military Intervention
in Afghanistan: Implications for British Foreign and Defence
Policy BASIC Paper #40, September 2002.
- 'NATO Obviously
Has to Move Ahead'
BASIC Reports #80, April 2002
- Yugoslavia's
National Healing Yet to Begin
BASIC Reports #80, April 2002
- Kosovo: The
Long Road to War, A Chronology 1988-1999
A detailed timeline on the escalation of the Kosovo crisis
with insights on the major political and military events.
March 2000
- BASIC former director Daniel Plesch's testimony before the Senate
Armed Services Committee on NATO expansion, 5 November 1997,
BASIC Paper #23 UK
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