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NATO
BASIC'S NATO E-MAIL SERIES
FALL 2002/PRAGUE SUMMIT
NATO'S DEFENSE GAP: MORE THAN JUST CAPABILITIES
By Chris Lindborg and Ian Davis
November 2002
With the expansion of NATO verging on a near-big bang, aspirant
countries and member states are asking: how can allies avoid
increasing the defense capabilities gap? While some European
leaders of NATO, including Secretary-General Lord Robertson,
repeatedly play the role of self-deprecators, other European
leaders are more concerned about the underlying reasons for
coordinating and improving capabilities.
The original Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) set out
at NATO's 1999 Summit in Washington recommended 58 areas where
the allies needed to improve their capabilities in the Post-Cold
War world. Now, in this post-September 11, 2001 world, NATO
is narrowing its focus for the near future to four key areas:
communication and information systems; ability to move forces
quickly and to sustain those forces for long periods of time;
interoperability; and defenses against chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. While the defense
capabilities issue is high on the agenda at the Prague Summit,
there are deeper policy issues that will surely surface as
well.
THE GAP: IS IT GAPING?
At NATO's informal Defense Ministers' meeting in June, it
was decided that the alliance needs more capabilities in strategic
airlift, precision-guided munitions, signals intelligence,
unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicles, command and control
satellites and ground stations. Both sides of the Atlantic
agree that Europe lacks capabilities that include joint direct
attack munitions (JDAMS), air launched cruise missiles (although
Europe may have some in service by 2004), and has, compared
to the United States, a "low" supply of laser-guided bombs
(LGBs).(1) Europe has merely one-tenth
of the in-flight refueling (IFRF) aircraft that the United
States owns.(2)
An initial look at national levels of defense spending makes
the United States and European countries appear as if they
were not even in the same alliance. The United States' increase
in defense spending of $48 billion for 2003 will be larger
than any individual European country's total defense budget
for that year.(3) The United States accounts for 40 percent of total global defense
spending.(4) U.S. arms procurement and
research and development budgets in 2002 have increased to
$109 billion, which is 5.4 percent over the previous year.(5)
Europe spent $10 billion on military research and development
while the United States spent $50 billion in Fiscal Year (FY)
2003.(6) In response to the growing capabilities
gap between the United States and Europe, one German official
has said, "At this rate, we won't be able to communicate with
you [the United States], much less fight alongside you."(7)
If long-term members are having a hard time keeping up with
the United States, how can new members even hope to come close?
Estonia has a GDP of $5 billion, whereas Germany, for instance,
has a GDP of $1.9 trillion.(8) Obviously,
2 percent of Germany's GDP could go much further in upgrading
military equipment and restructuring forces than would Estonia's
2 percent. The other candidates, including Latvia, Lithuania,
Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the outsider group
of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, will find themselves with
the same overwhelming challenge of trying to fit into NATO's
strenuous agenda.
Although the members for this next round of expansion cannot
be expected to meet the kinds of defense capabilities improvements
originally envisioned in the first DCI anytime soon, it is
useful to briefly reflect on the progress of the alliance's
three newest members: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.
In all of these countries, the modernization of their militaries
has been slower than had been hoped, especially because they
have been paying for most of this modernization on their own.(9)
Poland's parliament passed a $26 billion spending package
that sets aside a little under 2 percent of its GDP for defense
spending through 2006, as it did in 2000.(10)
Hungary spends about 1.75 percent of its GDP on defense(11) and the Czech Republic spends 2.1 percent of its GDP on defense.(12)
So far, the Czech Republic has succeeded in reducing its forces
from 93,000 in 1993 to about 53,000 in 2001, but this number
would need to be reduced further to meet NATO standards.(13)
This means reintegrating soldiers into civilian society, which
will have additional costs to a country with an unemployment
rate of 8.5 percent.(14)
Overall, the inclusion of seven new NATO members is likely
to have a marginal impact on the alliance's military capabilities.
The U.S. Congress has approved millions of dollars in funding
for these seven countries, but most are simply too small to
take on all of the improvements that have been recommended.
Moreover, measuring defense capabilities by total defense
spending is an inadequate measure. Latvia, for instance, spends
0.9 percent of its GDP on defense, but its experience in dealing
with Russia, and its contributions to NATO and U.S. efforts
in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Kyrgyzstan have apparently bolstered
its value in the eyes of NATO decision makers.(15)
Other countries will be looking to fill "niche" capabilities
in conjunction with the Prague Capabilities Commitment.
Thus, while the defense capability gaps appear large, defense
spending for European countries on the United States' scale
would seem unnecessary for two reasons. First, it would probably
produce setbacks for democratic and economic development if
new and potential members were to try to keep pace with the
United States. Second, as discussed in more detail below in
the context of a growing transatlantic gap in security perceptions,
the need for European states to spend more on defense has
yet to be adequately demonstrated. Clearly, European forces
need to be restructured and re-equipped, but this should largely
be possible through changing priorities within existing budgets.
Instead of asking whether European NATO should be spending
more, perhaps it would be useful to consider whether the United
States (and NATO collectively) should be spending less. NATO
collectively accounts for over 60 percent of global defense
spending. This level of military supremacy appears difficult
to justify even in a post-September 11 world of growing uncertainties,
and where an interventionist role for NATO in future civil
conflicts and disruption of terrorist activities in "failed"
or "rogue" states is accepted.
If all NATO member states were to agree to move toward a
defense spending ceiling of 2 percent of GDP, for example,
this would alleviate concerns about burden sharing and the
negative impact of excessive defense spending. It would also
free up resources for other non-military approaches to combating
and preventing terrorism. The 55-nation Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), for example, has unique
capabilities to prevent conflict and deal with post-conflict
situations, yet unlike NATO, operates at a fraction of its
cost. In the coming decade, the combination of organized crime,
religious extremism, economic collapse and terrorism will
create a need for the OSCE to play a greater role, especially
in the volatile former Soviet republics of Central Asia bordering
Afghanistan.
The OSCE, which should be the instrument of choice for dealing
with these problems, particularly in Central Asia, is underutilized
and has been relegated to the margins by policymakers. NATO
expansion and increased defense spending within the alliance
is likely to exacerbate the marginalization of the OSCE.(16)
EFFORTS TO BRIDGE THE GAPS
Realizing that new NATO members could not possibly take on
the breadth and depth of defense procurement that the United
States has done, and that older members have not been able
or have not wanted to, NATO has been looking for other ways
to ensure that allied forces can remain interoperable.
Increasing Defense Spending
One approach is to increase national defense expenditure
to create a larger or more targeted "bang for your buck."
Britain, for example, recently faced the biggest spending
increase in its defense budget since the end of the Cold War.(17) Similarly, new member Romania recently increased its defense
spending by 20 percent for a total of $1.2 billion in 2003.(18)
As mentioned earlier, however, this approach is not without
difficulties, especially for decision makers in new member
states faced with restrictive budgetary options.
Moving to Professional Armed Forces
Another option is to create more professional and well-equipped
armed forces. France, for example, has scaled back its massive
troop numbers from 293,000 conscripts in 1989 to 136,000 professionals
a little over a decade later.(19) Similarly,
of the new members, Bulgaria has been receiving kudos from
NATO for downsizing its armed forces from 100,000 to 45,000
and should become fully professional by 2010.(20) Of course, there has been a price to pay. Layoffs in the military
sector have contributed to an increase in Bulgaria's unemployment
rate to almost 20 percent.(21)
Asset Sharing
In addition to increasing spending and streamlining force
structures, allies are looking at other ways to improve their
capabilities. NATO has a "Codification System," which tracks
the equipment of all member countries. If one member is low
on certain supplies, this system enables the country to check
with other members to see whether an ally has that equipment
in ample stock.(22) Furthermore, concern over intelligence and reconnaissance
led NATO to develop STANAG 4586 (Standardization Agreement
document), which specifies common ground stations for Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAV's) used by NATO forces and will enable
the sharing of information from national UAV's.
Joint Procurement
Cooperative procurement has been another method for European
states to seek to meet NATO standards. The Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are participating in a joint
upgrade of the Mi-24D/V ('Hind') combat helicopters.(23)
Eurofighter collaboration in Western Europe is another example
of joint procurement, but is considered to be less advanced
than the U.S.-originated Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
These efforts to bridge the defense capabilities gap have
not been without their drawbacks. The difficulties of cooperative
procurement have been revealed with the Airbus 400 program,
in which Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
Portugal, Spain and Turkey are trying to improve their heavy
airlift capabilities. Because partner countries were slow
to commit funding, the project fell behind schedule. NATO's
European members now seem likely to lease military cargo aircraft
from the United States or Ukraine until the Airbus 400s are
ready in 2009.
Joint Forces
The most recent attempt to alleviate the capabilities gap
is the proposed NATO Response Force. The force, comprised
of 21,000 troops, would be equipped with weapons and defenses
against WMD, and is expected to be deployable within 7 to
30 days. Unlike the European Union's Rapid Reaction Force
(RRF), this NATO force would be used for high-intensity conflict.
This is mostly a U.S.-inspired effort to get European leaders
to cooperate with the new U.S. security strategy of pre-emption,
while simultaneously encouraging an improvement in European
military capabilities and preparedness. If all goes as planned,
this new NATO force would be operational by 2004 and would
work in tandem with the Prague Capabilities Commitment.(24)
Like the EU's RRF, there is likely to be ongoing controversy
over the level of political agreement that would be required
before the forces are "rapidly" deployed. On the one hand
decisions will need to be made quickly, while on the other
hand politicians will want time for debate before sending
their armed forces into conflict. Issues of national sovereignty
in defense matters will not go away anytime soon.
SUPPLY PUSH - THE ROLE OF DEFENSE MANUFACTURERS
Some suspicion remains that the United States is pushing
European countries to increase their defense spending not
only for security reasons, but also as a way to boost the
revenue of the U.S. defense industry, which dominates the
transatlantic defense market. In October, for example, the
U.S. Congress approved a loan for Poland to buy up to 48 F-16C/D
Block 50/52 fighter aircraft manufactured by the U.S. company
Lockheed Martin and other weapons.(25)
Once Poland buys into this program, it will be dependent on
Lockeed Martin for follow-on supplies well into the future.
In addition, the consolidation of the transatlantic defense
market has continued apace, with buyouts of European contractors
by U.S. firms being the norm. For example, General Dynamics
recently purchased Spain's Santa Barbara and United Defense
bought Bofors Defense.(26) Europeans fear
that they will become too dependent on the U.S. defense industry,
and will lose the ability to make independent procurement
and upgrade decisions. On the other hand, Lord Robertson has
repeatedly chastised the United States for its unwillingness
to transfer technology that would supposedly help European
militaries improve their capabilities.
SURPLUS ARMS
Another problem with countries frantically trying to upgrade
their capabilities is the cascade effect, whereby countries
within NATO, and NATO aspirant countries, sell off their old
military supplies and excess weapons--sometimes to dubious
regimes--in order to produce cash for the purchase of upgrades
or new weapons.(27) Bulgaria, for example, was caught in a recent illegal export
of military hardware to Syria - with some allegations that
the materiel was destined for Iraq.(28) Although such arms transfers are not necessarily sanctioned by
the governments, their cash-strapped defense industries and
weak export controls contribute to this problem.
It is in the interest of NATO countries to prevent weapons
from 'cascading' into potential conflict zones. This becomes
especially true if a NATO Response Force eventually will be
deployed to these areas on military or peacekeeping missions.
Destruction or buy-back programs for surplus weapons in new
member states would prevent the supply of such weapons to
conflict zones.
DEEPER CHASMS
As a way of encouraging NATO members to increase defense
spending and cooperation, Lord Robertson devoted a major speech
in October to predicting what the world would be like in 2015.
He suggested that the world will be full of "more instability,"
"more terrorism," "more failed states," and "more proliferation."(29) This may be so, but Robertson appears to be trumpeting a U.S.
rather than European security perspective. In short, Europeans
tend to see the world as less threatening and view military
solutions as lower down the chain of options for confronting
such threats. A deeper chasm lies beneath the defense capability
gap.
According to a recent poll conducted by the Chicago Council
on Foreign Relations and the German Marshall Fund of the United
States, about 90 percent of those polled in the United States
see international terrorism as the biggest threat to security,
but only about 65 percent of Europeans who were polled agreed.(30) Of course, the wariness of U.S. policy over Iraq among European
allies, except for Britain, is another reflection of these
sentiments. Germany has so far expressed its unwillingness
to send troops into battle alongside a U.S.-led invasion of
Iraq. Other European governments may be more willing to participate,
but this kind of division between the United States and one
of Europe's biggest players does not bode well for future
NATO endeavors, such as agreement on when to use the alliance's
Response Force.
U.S. leaders have been frustrated for many years with the
reluctance of Europeans to increase defense spending, and
the present administration in Washington is even more disenchanted
with their reluctance to jump on the U.S. policy bandwagon.
In a recent interview with the Guardian, Richard Perle said
"I think Europe has lost its moral compass. Many Europeans
have become so obsessed by the prospect of violence that they
have failed to notice who [implying Saddam Hussein] we are
dealing with."(31) However, complex historical and political reasons exist for these
differing perceptions of security threats and how to handle
them, and these will be difficult to bridge, particularly
in an expanded NATO. Of course, Western Europe maintained
defense forces and collaborated closely with the United States
during the Cold War, but forces were meant for deterrence,
not for the type of pre-emptive tactics the United States
is now advocating. Moreover, part of the reason for the design
of Europe's militaries was related to its geographic position
relative to the largest perceived threat of the day, which
was the Soviet Bloc. This threat required large ground forces
for the defense of European territory. The U.S. military was
designed for expectations of an air and ground war with the
Soviet Union over Europe. Consequently, the United States
had already developed the types of air transport and mobility
that Europe did not require at the time. After the Cold War,
Western Europe sought to focus on national issues and to further
economic and political integration, rather than to spend more
money on a threat that no longer existed.
Whereas some U.S. leaders may see Europe as repeating "appeasement"
by being less willing to take military action against Iraq,
many Europeans worry that hasty U.S. action may cause greater
conflicts and long-term instability that could be avoided
if allies took more time to use diplomatic channels and carefully
planned their coordination before taking full-scale military
action. The French President, Jacques Chirac, believes that,
"…[T]he international community must not provide cover
for any 'automaticity' of intervention against Iraq …"(32) Even if Europe reaches the capabilities level it wants for its
own purposes, the United States will not necessarily have
a blank check to access these capabilities through NATO. Similarly,
when the United States decides to take action without NATO,
but wants European assistance, it will still need to go through
some modicum of diplomacy.
Likewise, U.S. and European leaders who advocate a radical
and rapid increase in defense spending to match U.S. capabilities
should realize that the present state of Europe is partly
a result of long-reasoned policy drawn from dramatic historical
experience. Consequently, Europe cannot be expected to catch
up with the United States overnight. Moreover, it may not
be desirable that they even try to do so, since better results
may be achieved from improving conflict prevention approaches
within the OSCE and the EU. The challenges and questions on
improving defense capabilities within Europe will continue
well after the Prague Summit.
ENDNOTES
(1) Heisbourg, F. L. J., "Europe's Military
Revolution," Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly,"
September 30, 2002.
(2) Heisbourg, F. L. J., (note 1).
(3) Gordon, P. H., "Reforging the Atlantic
Alliance," The National Interest, Fall 2002, p. 92.
(4) Evans, G.,"Iraq and the U.N. Security
Council," International Herald Tribune, February 28,
2002, URL http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/2002/0228iraqsc.htm,
version current on November 20, 2002.
(5) Burger, K.; Koch, A.; Mulholland, D.;
and Sirak, M., "Defence Industry U.S.A.," Jane's Defence
Weekly, June 19, 2002, pp. 62 - 73.
(6) Heisbourg, F. L. J., (note1).
(7) Fitchett, J., "Pentagon in a League
of Its Own," International Herald Tribune, February
4, 2002, p. 1.
(8) The World Bank Data and Statistics,
Estonia Data Profile and Germany Data Profile, GDP values
for 2000. The International Monetary Fund has said the Baltic
States are financially ready to enter the EU and NATO.
(9) Terlinden, U. and Nassauer, O., "'Stability
Enlargement:' A Win-Win Solution for Enlarging NATO and the
EU," BITS Policy Note 01.4, Berlin Information Center
for Transatlantic Security, June 2001, p. 7.
(10) Anderson, R.; Eddy, K.; and Reed,
J., "NATO's Newest Members Battle to Upgrade Their Military
Punch," The Financial Times, July 10, 2001, URL
http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=FT30PA3WZOC&live=
true&tagid=ZZZAFZAVA0C&subheading=europe, version
current on April 18, 2002.
(11) U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,
"Hungary," The World Factbook 2002, URL http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/hu.html,
version current as of November 19, 2002 (FY02 est.).
(12) U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,
"Czech Republic," The World Factbook 2002, URL http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ez.html,
version current on November 19, 2002 (FY01).
(13) Anderson, R.; Eddy, K.; and Reed,
J., "NATO's Newest Members Battle to Upgrade Their Military
Punch," The Financial Times, July 10, 2001, URL
http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=
FT30PA3WZOC&live=true&tagid=ZZZAFZAVA0C&subheading=europe,
version current on April 18, 2002.
(14) U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,
"Czech Republic," (note 12).
(15) "Country Profile: Latvia," NATO
Notes, Center for European Security and Disarmament (CESD),
October 4, 2002.
(16) See Barry, R., "The OSCE: A Forgotten
Transatlantic Security Organization?" BASIC Research Report
2002.3, July 2002, by URL ../pubs/Research/2002osce.pdf, version
current on November 20, 2002.
(17) Blitz, J. and Newman, C., "Defence
Budget Set to Receive Big Increase," FT.Com (Financial
Times), July 11, 2002.
(18) "Romania Boosts Defence Spending,"
Jane's Defence Weekly, October 2, 2002, p. 9.
(19) Heisbourg, F. L. J., (note 1).
(20) Kralev, N., "Bulgaria Credits Hard
Work for NATO Prospects," The Washington Times, November
9, 2002, p. 1.
(21) Kralev, N., (note 20).
(22) Aguera, M., "NATO Summit to Urge
Procurement Consolidation," Jane's Defence Weekly,"
June 17-23, 2002, pp. 8, 10.
(23) Holdanowicz, G. "Visegrad Four Sign
'Hind' Upgrade MOU," Jane's Defence Weekly, June 5,
2002, p. 3.
(24) "NATO Response Force: Is NATO Going
Global?" NATO Notes, CESD, October 4, 2002, p. 1.
(25) Holdanowicz, G., "Washington Approves
Fighter Loan for Poland," Jane's Defence Weekly, October
30, 2002, p. 5.
(26) Chuter, A., "Armor Mergers Ahead?"
Defense News, June 24-30, 2002, pp. 1-4.
(27) For more information, see Human Rights
Watch, "The NATO Summit and Arms Trade Controls in Central
and Eastern Europe, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper,
November 15, 2002, URL http://hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/nato1115-bck.htm,
version current on November 20, 2002. Bulgaria and Romania
have been noted for the transferring of weapons to war-torn
Angola (in violation of a U.N. embargo). Human Rights Watch,
"No Questions Asked: The Eastern Europe Arms Pipeline to Liberia,"
November 15, 2001, URL http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/liberia1115.htm,
version current on November 20, 2002.
(28) "Bulgarian Defmin Willing to Quit
Over Arms Scandal," AP, November 15, 2002, NATO Enlargement
Daily Brief (NEDB), URL
http://www.topica.com/lists/nato1/read/message.html?sort=d&mid=
905815070&start=376, version current on November 15,
2002.
(29) Robertson, Lord George, "The World
in 2015 - Predicting the Unpredictable," speech delivered
at the Defence Industry Conference in London, October 14,
2002, URL http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021014a.htm,
version current on November 19, 2002.
(30) Kennedy, C. and Bouton, M., "The
Real Transatlantic Gap," Foreign Policy, November/December
2002. Some of the differences among European government policy
toward increasing defense spending appear to be reflected
in these findings. Whereas 90 percent of French polled supported
EU super-power status, 48 percent of Germans polled thought
the EU should have superpower status. France has dedicated
a greater percentage of its GDP to defense spending. The effort
to do this, however, is not to placate the United States or
NATO's Secretary General. France has long exhibited a desire
to have independence from U.S. policy and to have the ability
to exert its own power. For example, France had suggested
that the EU take over the peacekeeping mission in Macedonia
without NATO collaboration. However, Britain and Germany have
voiced their opposition to such a plan because it could result
in the expensive duplication of forces. However, Turkey and
Greece have held up agreements on the sharing of assets between
the two organizations, so fears about duplication remain.
(31) Pilkington, E. and MacAskill, E.,
"Europe Lacks Moral Fibre, Says U.S. Hawk," London Guardian,
November 13, 2002.
(32) Amalric, J., "France is Defending
Global Order," The Guardian, October 31, 2002, URL
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,822874,00.html,
version current on November 20, 2002.
Chris Lindborg, Analyst
Contact: clindborg@basicint.org
Phone: 1 202 347-8340, x102
Dr. Ian Davis, Director
Contact: idavis@basicint.org
Phone: 44-207-407-2977
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