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NATO
News from the 1999 NATO Summit
No Leadership in NATO's
Confused Concept
Minor Changes, Recognition of Alliance
Limits
By recognizing the primacy of the UN and limits to its geographical
reach, NATO's new Strategic Concept shows that the Allies
have begun to learn the lessons of the mishandling of the
Kosovo crisis and reasserted the Alliance's traditional relationship
to the UN enshrined in the NATO Treaty.
At the same time, the Alliance is continuing its military
attacks against Milosevic and his military apparatus. On the
other hand, despite NATO's claim to defend freedom, the Alliance
was noticeably silent on NATO member Turkey's ongoing military
action and forced resettlement of Kurds in SE Turkey. NATO
has also initiated a program of military support for the authoritarian
regime in Croatia, which has previously been refused assistance
because of its undemocratic nature.
NATO began the process of updating the Concept, last revised
in 1991, at its 1997 Summit in Madrid. The 1991 version was
badly outdated. For example, it still included references
to the Soviet Union. Last fall, Germany led a public debate
on NATO's nuclear policy in the Concept. German Foreign Minister
Joschka Fischer promoted the idea that NATO adopt a no first
use policy for nuclear weapons. The United States adamantly
opposed such a change, and attempted to prevent even debate
on the issue. However, other countries, particularly Canada,
soon joined Germany in calling for a debate on NATO's nuclear
policies.
In its final version, over strong US opposition, the Concept's
description of the circumstances in which NATO would use nuclear
weapons was slightly changed. It now says that the circumstances
in which NATO might have to consider using nuclear weapons
are "extremely remote." Yet nuclear weapons are still considered
the "supreme guarantee" of Alliance security, and are still
fulfill an "essential role".
Because these changes were so modest, Germany demanded and
got agreement to a study on nuclear policy. This study will
also include the development by NATO of a new process for
arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, to replace
the concept dating from 1989. Proposals for this study will
be laid out in December.
NATO Allows Yugoslav Air
Force to Bomb Kosovo Freely
24 April 1999
WASHINGTON, DC. 24 APRIL 1999 - NATO rules of engagement
forbid NATO aircraft from attacking Yugoslav aircraft below
5,000 metres, according to press reports in the French and
US media, confirmed by the French Ministry of Defense. NATO
pilots may also engage Yugoslav planes if they threaten NATO
forces. The exact engagement height limit varies, but is around
5000 metres.
According to the reports, on several occasions Yugoslav forces
including planes and helicopters have been able to attack
KLA positions or Kosovan villages, and NATO forces have been
prevented from engaging them by the rules of engagement.
French Defense Ministry sources reportedly told journalists
that NATO has restricted the activities of fighter aircraft
to protection of NATO's own bombing forces. French newspaper
Liberation and Air and Cosmos magazine have also reported
that Mig-29s have been observed over Kosovo without being
engaged on at least three occasions. These reports were sourced
to NATO pilots and confirmed by the French Defense Ministry.
At the NATO Summit a spokesman for the British government
was given the chance to deny these reports, but would not
address the question.
"NATO says it wants to protect Kosovar Albanians, and yet
it allows the Yugoslav airforce to attack them with impunity.
This is a bizarre way to wage war or help the refugees", said
Martin Butcher, a Senior Visiting Fellow with BASIC.
Will NATO Defend Montenegro?
24 April 1999
Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania, have all received
security guarantees from NATO in return for providing their
territory and/or airspace for NATO operations. Montenegro
is likely to become the next addition. Is NATO committing
itself to defend most of the Balkan nations regardless of
whether they are members of the Alliance or not?
"We will not tolerate threats by the Belgrade regime to the
security of its neighbours. We will respond to such challenges
by Belgrade to its neighbours resulting from the presence
of NATO forces or their activities on their territory during
the crisis. We reaffirm our support for the territorial integrity
and sovereignty of all countries in the region. We reaffirm
our strong support for the democratically elected government
of Montenegro. Any move by Belgrade to undermine the government
of President Djukanovic will have grave consequences", said
the NATO statement on Kosovo, issued yesterday at the Alliance's
Summit in Washington.
NATO's security guarantees are seen as being at the core
of the advantages of becoming an Alliance member and the main
reason why NATO enjoys substantial interest in membership
from most of the Central and South-Eastern European countries.
"NATO makes no clear-cut distinction between the security
guarantees given to Serbia's neighbors and those issued to
the Alliances' members", says Otfried Nassauer, Director of
the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security.
"The Alliance might have to live up to those guarantees to
non-members. In these days this has a higher probability than
NATO having to defend one of its members".
"Parliaments in Europe as well as the US-Congress will be
very concerned about these de-facto guarantees", says Karel
Koster, a Dutch security analyst working with the Project
on European Nuclear Nonproliferation. "They did not agree
to any NATO enlargement through the backdoor."
Indeed, even at the highest levels within NATO there seems
to be some confusion about whether there is any difference
between the guarantees given to member states and those issued
to Belgrade's neighbours. Javier Solana, the NATO Secretary
General said recently: "...of course the security guarantee
will be exactly the same as the guarantee that the NATO countries
do have, but the difference will be very slight. Any problem
that those countries may have stemming from the presence of
NATO troops on the ground will be taken with the utmost concern
by the Alliance and therefore the response will be very strong
and very rapid but of course, they are not members of NATO
and article 5 would not apply to them but very close to that."
(Transcript, Solana Briefing Following the NAC-Meeting April
12, 1999.)
Strategic Concept Unfinished
24 April 1999
As of Saturday morning, the update of the Strategic Concept
- NATO's mission statement - is unfinished despite promises
from a NATO official that it would be completed by Friday
night. Government sources indicate that several issues - including
the "mandate" question - are unresolved. One official said,
with a bit of a twinkle, that, if it's not finished by 2PM
today, "that would be quite a crisis, wouldn't it?"
The mandate question is a critical part of the "out of area"
question, and revolves around whether NATO should require
a UN mandate for out of area action. Highlighted by the controversy
in Kosovo, the mandate question has been widely viewed as
the most critical controversy in the Concept. The fact that
several other issues also remain unresolved indicates that
NATO is perhaps not as unified as it has repeatedly stated
at this Summit.
NATO: No Plans to Change Strategy
In Kosovo, but Forced to Act To Contain Conflict
23 April 1998
NATO leaders in Washington DC held an emergency Summit session
on Kosovo Friday morning, but came up with no initiatives
to end the war against former Yugoslavia. A "Statement on
Kosovo" was issued following the meeting, but despite the
evident lack of success in the bombing campaign for the last
five weeks, NATO offered only more of the same. Furthermore,
in a dramatic sign that NATO's failure in Serbia is destabilizing
the region, NATO has been obliged to extend Article V-style
security guarantees to all of Serbia's neighbors in an attempt
to contain the conflict.
Beyond this, the Statement simply reaffirms the conditions
previously laid out for an end to the bombing campaign. The
one positive note on the peace process is the recognition
of the important role that Russia could play in the United
Nations to help bring about a settlement.
Speaking earlier at a press conference at the NATO summit
in Washington this morning, NATO spokesperson Jamie Shea confirmed
NATO's belief that there is "no need to change strategy" concerning
the current air campaign in Kosovo. For NATO, the "winning
strategy is the air campaign." Shea repeatedly stated that
the current strategy is working and outlined three courses
of action that NATO still needs to undertake: 1) increase
NATO's capabilities to strike Kosovo 2) strike directly at
the nerve centers of Slobodan Milosevic's regime; and, 3)
strengthen the isolation of Milosevic in the world community,
through, for example cutting off supplies of refined oil and
through screening deliveries of humanitarian aid.
When asked if striking the "nerve centers of Milosevic's
regime" would increase the likelihood of injuring or killing
civilians, Shea responded, "We don't target civilians, we
target the instruments of repression." NATO's recent direct
strike on a Yugoslav television station was explained as a
hit on Milosevic's instrument of war. However, Shea did not
explain how the bombing campaign would eliminate Milosevic's
primary instrument of war: the expulsion of ethnic Albanians
from Kosovo. Furthermore, Shea reiterated that NATO is not
targeting Milosevic himself, but his instruments of war.
Martin Butcher, Tanya Padberg, and Julie Smith
No NATO Decision on Ground
Troops at Summit
22 April 1999
Speaking on background, a NATO official stated that no decision
on ground troops will be taken at the NATO summit. The official
confirmed that the issue would be discussed at the Summit,
but that it is not even on the agenda of the heads of state
meeting on Kosovo scheduled for Satuday morning.
"This is not going to be a summit to decide on the ground
troops," said the NATO official.
The official also confirmed that the heads of
state would task the NATO council with undertaking a study
on nuclear policy. The study would look at "what we can to
do to further reduce still further the dangers from nuclear
weapons, even if we cannot eliminate them." This will include
looking at what more NATO can do in the area of nuclear disarmament,
confidence and security building measures, and verification.
Greek Defense Minister Accuses
NATO over Kosovo Peace Plan Failure
Greek Defense Minister Akis Tsohatzopoulos told a conference
in Washington, DC today that NATO bears some responsibility
the lack of success in finding a political solution for the
Kosovo war. The Minister said that NATO had failed to understand
the difference between a political process and making ultimatums.
The Minister also said that the search for a political solution
to the crisis is not being pursued sufficiently.
Speaking at a conference Securing Peace in Europe, the Minister
said, "I am afraid that through the overemphasis on the military
threat, and the direct recourse to bombing, the result has
been that the policy of military power seems to prevail without
the parallel intensive and flexible attempt at a political
solution. The initial attempt by Russia, as well as the second
one by Germany were not sufficiently supported and the difference
between a political process of solution and an inflexible
ultimatum was not understood. The result was the strengthening
not only of Belgrade's intransigence, but also the coming
together of the Serbs around Milosevic's leadership, who chose
to disregard the bombing, militarize Kosovo, and at the same
time practice ethnic cleansing against the Albanian population
of Kosovo."
Questioned about NATO bombing tactics the Minister added
that there could only be a political, not a military solution
in the province. He said that Greece has "... the position
that, in the Kosovo problem, a political solution is necessary
and a military solution is not possible."
The Minister also spoke on the need for a UN mandate for
NATO out of area operations, saying that NATO should not act
without the authority of the UN Security Council behind it.
Minister Tsohatzopoulos said "NATO should incorporate the
international legality, not replace it. It is therefore imperative
that NATO's actions be based on UN principles and decisions.
It is imperative that NATO's wider activities be based on
a mandate by the Security Council."
German Peace Plan 'Still Alive,'
Say Officials
German Embassy officers confirmed today that the German "peace plan," is still on the
table for discussion among allies and in Moscow. Its "main
aim," according to one, is to bring Russia into the process.
Hence the idea of taking it up in the G-8 context. The plan
has received support from the EU. However, the Russians remain
"reluctant" or, at least, are still considering the basic
conditions and, presumably, whether they feel confident about
discussing them with Milosevic. The plan is meant to be a
first step to be followed by the effort described in the "stability
pact," introduced by the Germans and agreed in principle,
at least, by the EU.
The plan, which the German diplomats insisted was a discussion
paper, not a formal proposal, got a poor reception in the
US because it was "misrepresented." Its ideas are "not unusual"
and not much different from a number of other suggestions
in circulation.
The diplomats did not know whether the plan itself would
receive attention at the NATO Summit but said that ideas to
resolve the Kosovo crisis are being intensively discussed
every day. The ultimate fate of the plan, they thought, would
depend on circumstances and, in the first instance on the
Russians and, then, on Milosevic and his willingness to accept
the basic conditions, e.g. cease-fire and withdrawal, international
peace force, transitional administration, and so forth.
Comment: The Russians will hardly act in earnest unless they
feel confident Milosevic is looking for an "out.". The plan
could also apply if, as so far seems unlikely, Milosevic were
gone and some other
Yugoslav representative came forward, but that also seems
unlikely at this point. As a general prescription, the plan
lays out a reasonable outline for resolution of the crisis
once the time is right It asserts a UN role and calls for
an "international peace force," as opposed to a NATO one,
both of which may still be hard for the US to accept, but
it generally outlines the kind of things that may have to
be undertaken to deal with Kosovo no matter how the immediate
crisis ends.
Jack Seymour
US Agrees to Limit Future
NATO Interventions to the 'Periphery of NATO Territory'
NATO has agreed "in principle" to limit out of area missions,
such as the current bombardment of Yugoslavia, to the "periphery
of Europe", according to a letter released to the Dutch Parliament
by Foreign Minister van Aartsen on 19 April.
The letter from Minister van Aartsen says that "Regarding
the geographical reach of possible peace operations : these
will in principle cover crisis management operations in the
periphery of NATO territory. Not a single NATO ally, including
the US, is arguing for a NATO role as 'worldwide policeman'.
There is a basic agreement on the formulation that crisis
management operations can in principle take place wherever
'the security of the Euro-Atlantic area ' is at issue."*
The debate within NATO on the NATO's reach has been one of
the most controversial in the process of agreeing the new
Strategic Concept. The US has been pressing for the Alliance
to become, as US Secretary of State Madeleine Allbright said
last year "a force for peace from the Middle East to Central
Africa". Most European NATO nations have been opposed to extending
the Alliance's remit out of Europe.
Unofficial translation of
excerpts from Minister van Aartsen's letter on all aspects
of the NATO Strategic Concept
Dutch Parliament Resolution,
proposed 21 April 1999
NATO to Agree Additional
Summit Documents
According to diplomatic sources further information has become
clear about NATO's summit decisions. In addition to the original
six documents planned for the summit there will be additional
documents on NATO-Russian relations, the Balkans and Kosovo.
The Strategic Concept is close to agreement. The out of area
issue appears to be resolved by agreeing a geographical limit
to NATO's area of interest and a compromise of language in
referring to the UN.
On NATO enlargement, there is expected to be the announcement
of an orderly queue, first in line being Slovenia and Romania,
a second group of the Baltics and a third tier of Balkan states.
Dan Plesch
US-Russian Relations in
'Dangerous Crisis' Due to Kosovo Conflict
In a chilling assessment of the "U-Turn" in US-Russian relations,
Duma defense committee deputy chairman Alexei Arbatov termed
the downturn over Kosovo the most dangerous crisis in US-Russian
relations since the days of Berlin and the Cuban missile crisis
in the early sixties. Speaking to a group at the Atlantic
Council on April 20, Arbatov blamed chiefly what the Russians
see as a blunt, indiscriminate intervention against a small
nation in violation of international norms, the UN Charter,
the Helsinki Final Act, and the US-Russian Founding Act, which
he said is now a dead letter. Arbatov said Russia could try
to help mediate and end to the conflict but its diplomatic
leverage is undermined by the bombing and by Western positions.
Arbatov acknowledged that a series of blunders on everyone's
part has contributed to the current situation. Milosevic,
while he had a right to respond to "an armed rebellion," did
so with typical Serbian "savagery." Russia itself had blundered
in Afghanistan and Chechnya. But the NATO bombing campaign
was a "major blunder." in his view.
It was as though the CIS had decided to attack Turkey because
of its treatment of the Kurds, according to Arbatov.. The
NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia was "counterproductive
in all respects: Besides its effect in strengthening Milosevic
and provoking Serb resistance, the decision to launch NATO
planes showed "outrageous disregard" for Russian interests.
It also violated NATO promises to consult (and presumably
in his view to consider) Russian concerns on European security
questions. Moreover, the NATO attack against Yugoslavia teaches
Russians that:
- the weak do not count,
- a "monopoly of power" provides incentive for arbitrary
decisions in disregard of international law, and
- the democratic nature of states is no guarantee against
such violations.
Despite NATO denials, he claimed the bombing had worsened
the humanitarian crisis. Many Albanians have fled because
they fear the bombing as well as Serb repression, and about
a 100,000 Serbs, largely unnoticed in the West, have fled
Kosovo as well, Arbatov noted.
The effects on Russian politics and perceptions have been
many and profound, Arbatov warned; NATO's action has caused
in Russia:
- revised thinking about national security--now the West
is again seen as a major threat, and the south and east
are viewed more as sources of possible support;
- the sense of threat from the West now rivals concerns
for internal political and economic weakness as a danger
to Russia;
- military strategy is again emphasizing the need for air
defense and de-emphasizing talk of no first use;
- START II is "dead;"
- Russian cooperation with NATO is "frozen;"
- ditto cooperation on nonproliferation;
- anti-American sentiment is now "genuine," which it never
was during the Cold War;
- there is enormous and growing pressure to help Russia's
"Serbian brothers" -- volunteers are already going to Serbia,
there is talk of providing arms to Serbia, and the Duma
has just voted overwhelmingly to approve Serbia's incorporation
in the alliance with Belarus;
- the positions of the communists and the militant nationalists
in Russia have been strengthened and those of the democratic,
reformist parties undermined, just as new elections are
approaching;
- many young people are turning to the ideals of Russian
nationalism and links with Serbia and against the West--this
will be for the long-term, Arbatov thought.
Arbatov claimed that the support for Serbia was real. As
the spheres of influence between the West and Russia are not
so clearly defined as during the crisis days of the Cold War,
Serbia apprears as the "last line" of the defense of Russian
interests. Russia's current economic and political weakness
exacerbates these feelings, he continued, suggesting that
the pressure to stand up to the Western threat is all the
greater.
As the bombing continues, all these pressures mount, Arbatov
insisted. He said Russia had three choices. The first is to
intervene actively which it could do, among other things,
by helping to arm the Serbs with conveys escorted by Russian
naval vessels, thus putting on NATO the onus of "starting
a Third World War." Second would be to remain passive, applying
diplomatic pressure where it could, but Arbatov implied that
this would become politically untenable if the NATO attacks
continue and, especially, if a ground assault were launched.
Finally, Russia could try to mediate, which Arbatov seemed
to believe was the best couse.
Russia's diplomatic leverage was undermined by the continued
bombing, however. Arbatov argued that Russia could only play
an effective diplomatic role if the bombing stops, NATO ceases
talk about arming the KLA, and the notion of secession of
Kosovo were removed from the table.
Arbatov's was at turns stern, heartfelt, and emotional. Observing
that he had devoted his life to managing or improving US-Russian
relations, Arbatov emphasized that he had a stake in that.
He spoke honestly and directly as a "friend," he said, but
he was insistent and adamant about what he described.
Jack Seymour
NATO Officials Unlikely
to Finish Strategic Concept Before Saturday Summit, Out of
Area Missions Major Obstacle
WASHINGTON DC, APRIL 20. A reliable US government source
confirmed to BASIC this afternoon that the NATO Strategic
Concept document likely will not be completed in Brussels.
Officials there have only one more negotiating day before
decamping for Washington. Asked what issues are holding it
up, the source replied only that it is the "usual concerns,"
the same line that the source stuck to when questioned last
week. Handling the out-of-area question is one and cost implications
of force modernization another, the source conceded grudgingly,
adding that there is an expectation that there would be agreement
on a document but not until perhaps Saturday morning.
US Secretary of State Madeleine Allbright told a Washington
Press Conference earlier in the day that the question of out
of area operations with or without UN mandate was the chief
obstacle in approving documents for the Summit.
NB. Some European nations have been insisting that NATO documents
should refer to the Euro-Atlantic area, a geographical limitation.
The US wishes no such limitation to be included in any documentation.
Jack Seymour
US Diplomats Prepare Kosovo
Package for NATO Summit
BASIC has learned that US diplomats are preparing a three-point
statement on Kosovo to be approved by the NATO Summit this
weekend. At the time of writing, this document had not yet
been circulated to other NATO nations, although they were
aware that the statement was being prepared.
The statement will address Kosovo in the context of wider
security in South-East Europe, and in economic as well as
military terms.
The first point will be an elaboration for the public of
the reasons behind the war on Yugoslavia, and the necessity
of the intervention in Kosovo.
The second point will address the need for long term security
in the Balkans, examining the military and economic contribution
to the problems of the region. These different areas of security
will be addressed using the US State Department's 'Triple
Crown' concept for Europe's institutions. Under this concept
NATO deals with military security, the European Union (EU)
with economic security and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with civil society initiatives,
conflict prevention and post-conflict reconciliation.
In the case of Kosovo there would be a NATO-led international
security force, with Russian participation. The EU would pay
for and manage reconstruction and the economic integration
of the region as a whole into Europe. The EU has already proposed
a South East Europe Stability Pact for integration of the
region and eventual EU membership for countries there. The
OSCE would set up civil administrations, oversee elections
and contribute to civil reconstruction of Kosovo.
The third point of the document will be a Vision Statement
for South-East Europe. At the time of writing, no details
were available about this part of the proposal.
Martin Butcher
NATO Strategy Fails Test
in Kosovo
Even Before its Adoption
NATO is set to unveil a new Strategic Concept at the Summit,
which begins in Washington DC on April 23. The Concept, last
updated in 1991, sets out the aims of the Alliance and ways
it will achieve those aims. The major change, promoted heavily
by the US Administration, will see NATO preparing for military
missions beyond its borders without receiving authority from
the United Nations. Alliance leaders have argued this is necessary
as the UN acts too slowly, or if blocked by Russia and China,
not at all.
However, before the Concept is even approved, NATO is failing
the test in Kosovo. NATO began bombing four weeks ago to force
Serb leader Milosevic to allow an international force into
Kosovo, granting autonomy to the majority Albanian province.
UN Security Council approval was could not be obtained, but
NATO began its action anyway.
Now the war has seen a humanitarian drama in the province
become a catastrophe. Yugoslav soldiers have expelled three-quarters
of all ethnic Albanians from the province and destroyed many
towns. NATO has bombed much of Yugoslavia's infrastructure,
with no sign that Milosevic will back down. Indeed Serb soldiers
are digging in ready to resist any NATO ground force which
may attack.
Incredibly, NATO had no Plan B. No ideas for how to bring
about a political solution if Milosevic doesn't surrender,
no idea how to actually win the war. Even worse, they had
no plans for dealing with hundreds of thousands of refugees.
NATO leaders have assured the world that all they need is
a free hand, and Europe's security problems can be resolved.
Now with a war in progress and Russia alienated from the West,
that is exposed as a hollow boast.
The strategy discussions at NATO are now bogged down. Some
nations would like to see the new documents postponed. Others
are happy to have them watered down. The strategy itself will
be a compromise, containing much unspecific language that
gives no direction, but equally offends no-one either. Similarly,
other aspects of the new Strategy are lacking. NATO has no
plans to support a professional civilian force that could
intervene early before a conflict degenerates into a shooting
war, nor political conflict prevention tools to support such
a force.
NATO plans to continue its expensive and irrelevant nuclear
policies, unchanged since the days of the Soviet Union. Calls
for reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, and further moves
to arms control and disarmament in line with NATO members'
international treaty obligations have been ignored.
Another US backed policy, the Defense Capabilities Initiative,
is opposed by many European NATO members. The DCI would see
European nations upgrading their military equipment to US
high-tech standards, entailing a vast increase in defense
budgets and a primarily 'Buy American' procurement strategy.
European nations resist this initiative for three main reasons.
It is unnecessary in a world where NATO is militarily far
superior to any potential enemy without equipment upgrades.
The reliance on US technology the policy would bring would
undermine Europe's own high-tech industries. Finally, the
defense budget increases are simply not politically feasible
at present.
Martin Butcher
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