Transatlantic Security
Back to the main
page on Transatlantic Security
NATO
Germany Calls for No First Use
(Reprinted from PENN Newsletter No.7,
February 1999)
By Otfried Nassauer,
Berlin Information-Centre on Transatlantic Security (BITS)
After an initial heated exchange of arguments
over the no first use proposal made by the German Foreign
Minister, Joschka Fischer, the debate on it began to calm
down. There was a lot of speculation that there would be no
follow-up. However, the Fischer/Scharping paper (see quote
below) distributed to NATO in December made it clear that
the new German government wished to discuss all aspects of
NATO's nuclear strategy, without solely sticking to the no
first use proposal. This initiative continues to exist.
"The government is in favor of a step-by-step approach. It
is our intermediate goal for the Strategic Concept to further
reduce the importance of nuclear weapons as a military means,
as compared with 1991. We will favor giving the relevant institution
a mandate to deliberate - with the participation of France
- the following subjects on the basis of the government's
platform: confidence and security building mechanisms non-proliferation
nuclear consultations with Russia in the framework of the
Founding Act nuclear disarmament nuclear strategy. In this
framework the pros and cons of all strategic options on the
way to further nuclear disarmament will have to be evaluated."
At the annual Conference on Security Policy in Munich, 5-7
February 1999, despite strong US criticism both Chancellor
Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Fischer insisted
on discussing NATO nuclear strategy. Fischer suggested that
during its April 1999 Summit (at which NATO's new strategy
will be announced) NATO should begin a review of its nuclear
strategy and thus take the initiative for future steps in
nuclear and conventional disarmament as well as strengthening
weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-non-proliferation. He did
not suggest a specific format for such a review, however he
demanded that it should be "open and unprejudiced". Chancellor
Schröder gave the debate his support, while at the same
time saying it was not the German intention to make this a
major dispute at the Washington Summit. Schröder's and
Fischer's remarks came despite a Washington intervention in
the Bonn Chancellory warning that a public debate on first
use was seen by the US "with substantial concern" and would
"prove non-productive and damaging". The intervention came
as a reaction to Schröder indicating to the Canadian
Prime Minister Chretien that he was backing Fischer's proposal
to discuss no first use.
Washington circulated its intervention among Brussels-based
NATO diplomats. The paper repeated the US stand and the diplomats
were told: "The revised strategic concept should not change
the nuclear doctrine. We hope you agree". It warned that there
is "strong opposition to re-open NATO nuclear policy".
US Secretary of Defense Cohen used the Munich conference
to sharply reject any calls for a discussion. He stipulated
that the German proposal was a "serious mistake", endangering
the security of the Alliance. Furthermore he repeated his
call to widen the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy
by saying, "It is my firm belief that the best hope for protecting
ourselves against those who would unleash weapons of mass
destruction, be they nuclear, biological or chemical, is to
reserve the right to respond to such attacks with any means
at our disposal". Cohen also said, "Any question about that
policy undermines our deterrent capability. I think we have
to make that very clear to all who would contemplate unleashing
any sort of a weapon of mass destruction on the alliance."
Cohen again did not mention that NATO has not yet specified
a role for nuclear weapons in offensive counterproliferation.
As recently as the December 1998 Defense Ministerials, when
NATO discussed the ministerial guidance for NATO's future
force goals, the task of countering the threat of WMD was
expected to be met by developing conventional force capabilities,
not nuclear forces. According to NATO officials, no requirement
was agreed that could be interpreted as encouraging the development
of a role for nuclear weapons in counterproliferation.
Back to Summit Updates
Back to Trans-atlantic
Security Home Page
|
