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NATO
Preparing for Future Nuclear Disarmament -
The NATO Summit And the Steps Ahead
(Reprinted from PENN Newsletter No. 7, February
1999)
By Daniel Plesch, Director, BASIC and Otfried
Nassauer, Director, BITS
Throughout 1999 and early 2000 nuclear disarmament
and non-proliferation will be at a crossroads. Until the 2000
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, the world
faces crucial decisions on both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation,
with these areas closely interlocking. If the wrong decisions
are made, the existing non-proliferation regime will be substantially
weakened, additional nuclear armed powers are likely to emerge,
and nuclear weapons will be assigned new tasks within NATO.
If the right decisions are made, great opportunities for nuclear
disarmament and strengthening the NPT will open up, and nuclear
weapons will be devalued as a means of national power.
Throughout 1998 steps were taken in a destabilizing
direction. India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons, and
began the process of integrating them into their military
arsenals. Russia has not ratified START II, while the US bombed
the chance that this would happen in late 1998 with its strikes
against Iraq. Both Russia and NATO are independently discussing
an increased role for their nuclear weapons. The fate of START
II is unsure again, in both Russia and also the US, where
the Senate must reexamine the Treaty. Russia considers making
first use a part of her military doctrine and argues that
her nuclear weapons are needed to outbalance NATO's conventional
superiority. The US is pushing NATO into considering whether
nuclear weapons should have a role in deterring and fighting
all weapons of mass destruction, whether owned by states or
non-state actors. NATO has engaged in this debate in the midst
of its first real post-cold war strategy review.
While the general objective is to move towards
global nuclear disarmament by the shortest and quickest route
possible, the current situation is that progress is made glacially
slow - with the prospect that the pace of 1987-1992 cannot
be resumed. The initiative needs to be taken primarily by
the US and in addition by its allies. All other parties are
in relatively weak positions and have comparably little room
to maneuver.
In general the three Western nuclear weapon
states (NWS) - France, the US and the UK - have cared and
continue to care little for the UN disarmament fora and the
disarmament provisions of the NPT. Instead, they continue
to regard decisions on nuclear weapons as central to their
role in the world. NATO's decisions on nuclear weapons are
important to US and UK geo-political strategies. In international
fora these NWS are mainly supported by their allies in Europe.
However, a gradual erosion of allied support for these NWS
in NATO has recently become visible in UN votes, the independent
action of some non-nuclear NATO countries in the Conference
on Disarmament, and during the German initiated debate on
NATO reviewing its first use policy.
However, both NATO and Russia are also facing
strong incentives to take new initiatives on nuclear disarmament
and safeguarding the NPT. Russia can no longer finance her
nuclear arsenal, neither her strategic weapons nor her tactical
ones. Neither the current posture nor the ones envisaged under
START II and START III can be maintained, without investing
huge resources into their maintenance and modernization. However,
Russia is interested in maintaining parity with the US. Deep
cuts into both sides' arsenals are the only way to accomplish
Russian aims. The US also has a serious interest in cutting
strategic forces to much lower levels for costsaving reasons.
In addition, NATO and the US share a strong interest in making
Russian tactical nuclear weapons disarmament a treaty obligation
and reducing proliferation risks.
While Russia is not in a good position to take
the initiative, the US and its Western Allies are. The ongoing
NATO strategy review is a key opportunity to discuss and agree
change for the better among Western nations. NATO can make
use of existing opportunities to dramatically reduce the numbers
of existing nuclear weapons and help safeguard the NPT. Key
decisions should be taken by NATO's April Summit, including
on the following issues.
1. NATO's strategy review should contain a statement
that the fundamental purpose of nuclear weapons in the Alliance
is to provide a last resort for deterrence purposes. NATO
should explain that "last resort" covers only the one case
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) did not rule out
as illegal, i.e. if the very existence of one or several member
states is at stake. The role of NATO's nuclear weapons would
be greatly reduced.
2. NATO should eliminate all language on substrategic
nuclear weapons in its new strategy. (This opens the option
to take a decision on eliminating this category of weapons
after the Summit, maybe unilaterally by the US.)
3. The US and Russia should conclude work on
a politically binding framework (such as the Helsinki framework
agreement) for an arms control agreement which covers tactical
nuclear weapons and includes a withdrawal of US-owned European-deployed
tactical nuclear weapons. This could happen within or outside
the START-framework. If such a framework proves impossible,
because NATO-Russia relations have deteriorated too much,
NATO should agree to unilaterally withdraw all US free-fall
bombs from Europe.
4. This would allow the European states to make
their own input and declare that they no longer require such
weapons during peacetime. It would also likely smoke out secret
progress in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group towards supporting
the US in its push for pre-emptive nuclear counter-proliferation
preparations, because forward deployed B-61s may form part
of that strategy and European dual capable aircraft might
be asked to join American ones in such operations.
5. The Alliance should adopt the new members'
standard on nuclear co-operation for all non-nuclear NATO-members.
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have joined NATO as
first class members while accepting that they will be eligible
to participate in NATO nuclear planning and consultation agreements.
However under current and foreseeable circumstances all new
members will neither deploy nuclear weapons on their soil,
nor host the infrastructure for doing so, nor train pilots
to participate in NATO nuclear operations, nor enter Programs
of Cooperation. They have no requirement to deploy nuclear-capable
aircraft either. If Poland, NATO's new 'front-line' state,
does not need nuclear arms then clearly there is no need for
other countries, such as Greece and Belgium, to prepare to
fly nuclear missions. A number of arguments and political
developments, outlined later in this paper, support such a
change.
6. NATO should issue a separate document on
nuclear policy during the Summit. This paper should include
statements on nuclear policies agreed earlier by the NWS,
such as the 1985 commitment that the NPT is valid under all
circumstances or the 1995 commitment entered in the context
of the NPT "Principles and Objectives" as well as the statement
on the Middle East and on Article VI. Because NATO states
have successfully insulated their military policies (and officers)
from the NPT commitments they will be reluctant to re-issue
these commitments, however refusal will be hard to sustain
and extremely damaging to the NPT as it would constitute a
revocation of the core political commitments made in the permanent
extension of the NPT. The US in particular is keen to dismiss
the statement on the Middle East - something Europeans approach
differently.
7. NATO should change its first use doctrine.
However the change should be put in a different context. No
first use is no longer primarily the European security issue
that is was when the idea was discussed in the 1980s. Today,
NATO should commit itself to a no first use policy in the
context of meeting the Alliance's obligations under existing
negative security assurances, which NATO would violate in
almost all cases if the Alliance ever were to use nuclear
weapons first against a non-nuclear weapon state.
8. The Alliance should state that it no longer
requires SLBMs to be kept on short notice to fire. This is
a concrete means of adding to the de-alerting debate as well
as indicating that NATO is willing to implement a no first
use policy. The UK has already announced that it can operate
its SLBMs at a reduced notice to fire - although it does not
call this de-alerting. NATO's fighter bombers are already
off quick reaction alert. If the US maintains its forces on
alert it should do so without an alibi from Europe.
For some five years the PENN Network, working
transatlantically, has sought to re-open political debate
within Europe on NATO related nuclear weapons issues. Today,
this debate has been re-opened. NATO faces challenges over
its nuclear policies from several perspectives:
* NATO members are facing strong demands to
meet their commitments on nuclear disarmament.
* NATO members are being challenged over the
political legitimacy and the legality of NATO nuclear sharing
under the NPT. Neutral and Non-Aligned States have called
on NATO to revoke nuclear sharing arrangements, since they
are incompatible with the NPT.
* NATO members are likely to face both the risks
resulting from future nuclear proliferation and the blame
for not having acted in time in making progress on nuclear
disarmament and safeguarding the NPT.
NATO's nuclear weapon states have tried to avoid
the change urgently required. Thus they have risked the future
of both nuclear disarmament and the NPT. Since they did not
succeed in entirely prohibiting the debate within the Alliance,
they are now indicating they might be willing to discuss the
nuclear aspects of NATO's strategy after NATO's April Summit
within a high level NATO group. However, this position is
likely to be changed once NATO has adopted its new strategy
during that Summit and - maybe - some minor changes to the
nuclear paragraphs have been made. Unless NATO enters a firm
and binding commitment to fully revisit the role of nuclear
weapons in its strategy and to draw conclusions at its autumn
1999 Ministerials, i.e. in time for the world community to
prepare positions for the 2000 NPT Review Conference - NATO's
nuclear members are likely to argue that no further change
is required for a strategy just adopted after a thorough review.
This would close the window of opportunity for fresh momentum
to nuclear disarmament that exists today and would put the
NPT at risk.
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