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NATO
More Than Bombs and 'Verifiers'
(Appeared in Washington Post on Sunday, February
7, 1999; Page B02)
The United States is once again considering sending troops
abroad, this time as part of a NATO peacekeeping force that
would attempt to bring order to Kosovo in the Balkans. The
Clinton administration has been reluctant to commit to such
an effort, but the recent massacre there has created an impetus
for intervention. This crisis might have been averted altogether
if either NATO or Europe's primary security organization had
a professional "intervention force" that could be used to
defuse such situations.
As things stand now, the United States and its allies have
only two choices when ethnic massacres occur overseas. One
is to issue warnings to the warring parties, which are often
ignored. The second is to respond with some kind of military
force. But that comes with its own problems, including casualties
and an ever-expanding and never-ending mission. What we are
suggesting is a third option of nonmilitary intervention.
We need to create a new type of unit to intervene before
military action is necessary. The requirements for this new
formation, which might be called "Civilian Intervention Units,"
would include both a permanent core of workers and the capability
to draw on larger numbers as needed. Operations would vary
from election monitoring to disaster relief to peacekeeping.
A permanent unit would be an alternative to the team of "verifiers"
that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) created and sent to Kosovo in an effort to resolve
tensions between warring Serbs and Albanian separatists. The
verifiers are not part of any permanent unit and most of them
have no prior experience in peacekeeping. Indeed, the "verifiers"
label was invented for use in Kosovo. The ad hoc nature of
the OSCE mission was itself a problem: In the weeks that it
took for the participating governments to gather a group of
retired military officers and diplomats to send to the region,
the deal they were trying to preserve began to erode.
The OSCE "help wanted" advertisement for the verifiers is
telling: It had such minimal requirements--essentially, a
knowledge of English and computers and a drivers' license--that
it could be mistaken for an attempt to hire unskilled office
help. But the 700 verifiers are now involved in complex, difficult
work--mediating disputes, building democracy, investigating
war crimes and preparing elections. These tasks should be
carried out by a highly skilled unit with several thousand
members to draw upon. The need is not just in Kosovo, but
in other parts of the world, too.
A permanent unit of trained monitors is needed to observe
elections, oversee the control and destruction of armaments,
conduct forensic investigations of war crimes, mediate and
arbitrate. These requirements are too frequent and too specialized
to continue to rely on temporary missions--which, once over,
are essentially cast aside. The administration did not even
debrief the monitors it sent to recent elections in Bosnia.
Tough security backup would be essential, but that could
consist of a police force accustomed to interacting with civilians.
Paramilitary police units with light armored vehicles--such
as the German border guards and Italian carabinieri--exist
in several European states and could serve as prototypes.
Coordination of humanitarian relief is also needed. Governments
and nonprofits are comparatively well prepared to supply food,
medicine, clothing and shelter, but its management is often
poor and should be overseen by these new units.
Creating a permanent unit would not be easy. There is no
precedent and the bureaucracies in Washington and Europe seem
to lack imagination as they wrestle with the crises that dominate
the modern age. The corporate cultures of Foggy Bottom, the
Pentagon and Capitol Hill dismiss nonmilitary intervention
as "social work." The United States has opposed proposals
from Sweden and Argentina in the United Nations for a standby
civil intervention unit. Those who follow the U.S. lead get
the message. As a result, military spending is increasing,
while the budget for nonmilitary intervention is relatively
meager: The OSCE's entire budget is less than $100 million,
compared with NATO's $400 billion for military spending. The
OSCE cannot be blamed for recruiting "temps" when the United
States and other nations have denied it the resources it needs.
With only military means available to tackle security issues,
it is no surprise that crises deteriorate until the military
is needed. It should also be no surprise that NATO's "SWAT"
team is of limited use in complex situations. In domestic
law-and-order policy, the value of investing in cops on the
beat, youth employment programs, mediation, counseling and
gun control is understood. But international security policy
is overwhelmingly military.
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright should both encourage
the Europeans to develop this new force and ask Congress to
support its creation. Nonmilitary tasks are not NATO's job,
but the alliance should favor any policy shift that would
reduce the calls on its military might.
Europe, and the world, needs something more than SWAT teams
and untrained verifiers.
Daniel Plesch is director of the British American Security
Information Council, an independent research organization.
Julianne Smith is BASIC's senior analyst.
SOME QUALIFICATIONS
Here is the OSCE's job posting for the Kosovo Verification
Mission. Words in bold are as they appeared in the ad, along
with the phrase, "POSTS ARE OPEN UNTIL FILLED":
* ESSENTIAL: Several years experience in the area of work;
knowledge of written and spoken English; computer literacy
(Microsoft applications); excellent physical condition with
no chronic health problems that limit physical activity; possession
of a valid driver's license and capability to drive standard
transmission vehicles; ability to establish contact and develop
confident relations with local population as well as the ability
to work with government officials and institutions; flexibility
and adaptability to difficult living conditions; willingness
to be deployed in different Field Offices; ability to perform
in a crisis environment.
* DESIRABLE: Knowledge of local languages; prior experience
in peacekeeping, international operations, or another international
organization.
© Copyright 1999 The Washington Post Company
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