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Britain Outlines Proposals for European
Defence: Cool Response From the US
16 March 1999
By Tasos Kokkinides
George Robertson, the British Defence Minister,
outlined in more detail the British initiative on Euro-defence
and called for renewed efforts towards European defence capability.
He said that: "Our ultimate aim… is not so much a European
Security and Defence Identity but something altogether
more ambitious - namely a European Defence Capability."
[underlined in original]
The Guardian, in its editorial on the
11 March, cautioned against this distinction. It said: "The
Defence Secretary's speech had a snag…He distinguished
between a European defence capability (chiefs of staff getting
together) and a European security identity (the identification
of common political interests) implying the former could anticipate
the latter. But this runs the risk of letting the military
tail wag the democratic dog".
George Robertson also called for "better and
wiser" spending on defence by the Europeans. Meanwhile Captain
Mike Doubleday, spokesperson for the Department of Defense
in Washington gave a cool response to Robertson's speech.
Below are excerpts from the speech by George
Robertson, British Defence Minister, at the RUSI Conference
"NATO at 50", on 10 March.
The European Defence Debate
On Monday, Prime Minister Blair emphasised the importance
of strengthening Europe's military capability - to make a
better contribution to NATO, and to realise our aims for European
security and defence. Without effective military capability
to back up European foreign policy goals, we are wasting our
time. We risk being an economic giant, but a strategic midget.
It has been gratifying to see how quickly and
enthusiastically our European Partners have taken up Tony
Blair's call for fresh thinking at Poertschach, last autumn.
Tony Blair launched an open debate, but it is no secret that
we have worked particularly closely with France and Germany.
We hope that the St Malo Declaration and its endorsement by
the German Chancellor was a valuable contribution to the debate
and an indication of our shared determination to drive it
forward.
I am, therefore, particularly pleased that discussions
have largely steered away from the narrow and sterile institutional
debate that has so often dominated this subject. Institutional
re-engineering alone will solve little, and the debate has
focused on the real issues. It is political will plus the
ability to act that matter first and foremost, rather than
the way they are wired together. You cannot send a wiring
diagram to a crisis.
Our ultimate aim, therefore, is not so much
a European Security and Defence Identity but something
altogether more ambitious - namely a European Defence Capability.
Our objective has been quite simple. We want
to strengthen the ability of the European Union to pursue
foreign policy objectives. To give the European Union a place
in international affairs worthy of its size, experience and
economic strength. Europe is a continent of 370 million people,
but our collective foreign policy voice can to some on occasion
seem little more than a confused whisper.
To speak and act with concerted strength we
need to do two things. Firstly, we need to strengthen the
European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy and our
political willingness to take decisions. This must include
decisions on military matters, and on the ability to take
political control of crisis management operations. Only then
can we mount a European operation when NATO as a whole is
not engaged. Secondly we must underpin our foreign policy
with a strengthened military capability.
The tools provided by the Amsterdam Treaty will
certainly help us to take a major step forward. The High Representative
for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Policy Planning
and Early Warning Unit, and Common Strategies will all help
the European Union to make more rapid and coherent decisions.
But on their own they will not be enough. Europe has to be
more ambitious, particularly where military questions arise.
At the highest level, this means that European
Defence Ministers will need to have a role, alongside Foreign
Ministers, in decision making. You will not be surprised to
hear that, as a Defence Minister, I attach the highest priority
to ensuring that the EU is given the structures and capacities
to ensure that military decisions are competent and sensible
ones. After all, it is Defence Ministers who ultimately carry
the very heavy responsibility for committing our young men
and women to situations in which they may lose their lives.
The ongoing debate, one of the most relevant
and urgent of our lifetimes, has to take full account of the
contribution that all European countries make to our collective
security. No country must feel that they have lost out in
some way. All of this is an opportunity for, not a threat
to, genuinely inclusive and effective security.
Building on Berlin
Some may think it ungracious and untimely to be focusing
on future European security and defence arrangements at a
conference to celebrate the 50th anniversary of NATO. To them
I say you are wrong. By reinforcing European capability, we
will immeasurably strengthen the Alliance as a whole. The
Allies have invested fifty years of effort in building NATO.
Whatever new arrangements are devised. NATO is and must remain
the cornerstone of our security and defence policy. Both Britain
and France have made this clear from the very beginning of
this debate, but what does this mean in practice?
First, NATO must continue to be the sole instrument
for dealing with territorial defence. Second, NATO will also
be the preferred instrument for dealing with many lesser crises.
When Europeans and North Americans wish to act together, we
will naturally turn to the Alliance as the means to do so.
Third, there must be no unnecessary duplication of the Alliance's
formidable capabilities. We cannot afford, politically or
financially, to try to build capabilities and processes for
Europe that exist elsewhere.
But there may be occasions when the Alliance
as a whole is not engaged, and it is relevant to operate as
Europeans. In such cases, the European Allies will want to
be confident of our access to NATO's assets and capabilities
-commanders, headquarters, and planning capacities. The provisions
agreed at Berlin in 1996 allow the Western European Union
access to these for European-led operations. There is clearly
a lot of practical sense to these arrangements and we should
build on them.
In peacetime, it also makes sense for NATO to
absorb European aspects into its planning - these are not,
after all, aspects that will change the fundamental character
of a plan. Equally in operations it is more efficient and
effective to draw on NATO's capabilities. By way of illustration,
NATO planning for possible operations in Kosovo employs over
400 staff officers. This is not the sort of capability that
we need to, or would want to replicate in the EU.
On the other hand, it is important that these
capabilities are available to the EU and given a sufficiently
high profile within NATO. As Alain Richard said last night,
one way of doing this might be to bolster DSACEUR's European
role and provide him with extra staff support. A further way
might be to identify a range of European command options,
and illustrative force packages that could be used for EU-led
operations, and to ensure that these are tested and exercised.
Defence Decision Making in the EU
The other major challenge will be to provide EU Foreign
and Defence Ministers and their representatives with the means
to take sensible military decisions, to provide guidance to
planning in NATO, and to act as a customer for NATO's products.
They will need access to sources of intelligence and a capacity
to analyse crisis or potential crisis situations. They must
develop the competence to ask the right questions and understand
the answers.
Europe must examine what is actually needed,
not what the existing European institutions - organised as
they are today, shuffled around, fused, or whatever - can
provide. The accent must be on the real questions - political
will, decision making, and effective military capability -
rather than the institutional niceties.
Spending Better
It is indisputable that the development of genuine operational
capability is a demanding goal. Scarce resources must be directed
towards priorities and this means tough choices. But we cannot
use this as an excuse to shy away from what we all see to
be necessity. The trend in European defence budgets is downwards.
Pressure on public spending suggests that this trend could
continue.
All of the European Allies need to find ways
to spend better and wiser. We should ask what percentage of
our defence budgets do we spend on up-to-date defence equipment?
What proportion of high readiness, deployable forces, the
currency of effective clout, do we get for our budgets? Can
we really field key capabilities, such as strategic lift,
combat service support and precision, night and day bombing?
The Washington Summit will launch the Defence
Capabilities Initiative. The WEU has begun an audit of collective
European capability. The British Government strongly support
these measures, but it is vital that they do not stir up a
dust storm of statistics, but miss the battlefield reality.
We also support the approach of assessing calibre,
rather than a catalogue of assets. This is key to establishing
the usability of our forces. On paper, the European allies
and their partners have more than 5,000 combat aircraft. How
many of these are fit for new missions? Our armed forces total
some two and a half million men and women. How many of these
could be deployed at short notice to a crisis? How large is
the gap between our aspirations and our ability to deliver?
We should also look at Europe's existing multinational
forces. We need to promote greater information sharing about
roles and operational capabilities, so that we can learn from
each other and share best practice. Our collective punch can
multiply in weight by improving interoperability. This means
more combined training, better information sharing, and more
focused force planning. I raised these ideas at the NATO Ministerial
in Vilamoura, Portugal, last year, and I hope that they will
be followed up at the Washington Summit.
Then there is the supply side. Consolidation
and rationalisation of Europe's defence industry is essential
if it is to remain efficient and competitive - or even to
exist. We need to remove wasteful duplication of research
and development, and to benefit from the economies of longer
production runs founded on common requirements and successful
exports. Governments should resist the urge to interfere in
the details of restructuring, but we do have a role as market
regulators and principal customers.
But let me make one point very clear. Britain
does not, and will not, advocate a 'fortress Europe'. Protectionism
must not displace the valuable relationship we have with American
defence industry. The development of two insular defence and
aerospace industries would be utterly counter-productive,
so we must maintain transatlantic co-operation. The exchange
of technology which results and the benefits of inter-operability
are too valuable to be given up.
The agenda for European defence is formidable
- but its urgency is underlined with every day. If we are
to fulfil our ambitions for a strong Europe in a strengthened
NATO, then constructing a European pillar and reinvigorating
the transatlantic partnership is the very fibre of our alliance.
Excerpts from US Department of Defense News
Briefing
Thursday, March 11, 1999
Captain Mike Doubleday, Public Affairs
Q: George Robinson [sic], the Defense Minister
of Great Britain, has called for closer EU, European Union,
and NATO, closer ties with the intention in the future to
be able to provide an all-European force where the U.S. would
be absent in case of need. I would ask you, has this come
to the DoD as a welcome, as something that will take some
stress off of U.S. forces? Or what?
A: We believe that NATO is the most effective
security apparatus probably in the history of the world. We
believe that NATO and the structure that already exists within
NATO is the structure that should be used in the future. I
would just leave it at that.
Q: So not warmly..
A: I would just leave it with we believe that
we have great success with NATO.
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