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NATO
Connecting the Dots
21 April 1999
By Julianne Smith, Senior Analyst
While public opinion regarding Kosovo changes
as rapidly as the spring weather in Washington, one fact remains
constant: the current crisis has most of the population in
the Western world scratching their heads and asking themselves,
"Just how did we get into this mess anyway?" Is NATO that
short-sighted? Was Clinton's domestic battle with impeachment
so distracting? Is the post-Cold War security environment
so boring that we can no longer hire decent intelligence gatherers?
If one simply connects the dots in the chart below, the answer
becomes apparent. Almost a decade after the end of the Cold
War, the West has yet to invest in the preventive tools it
needs for standard maintenance of a security system plagued
by leaks. This capability gap has, in turn, left NATO with
the current flood of disaster, which is now threatening the
entire region with long-term damage.
Begin with "limited funding and interest in
preventive tools" on the circle. This is the current state
of affairs in the US and most likely, in Western and Eastern
Europe as well. Support in the US Administration and Congress
for regional and international organizations focusing on human
rights, international law, peacekeeping, minority rights,
democratization, civil society, and early warning is at best,
minimal, at worst, non-existent. The result: limited commitment/attention
to stabilizing conflict ridden areas of the world that are
on the brink of boiling over.
Sometimes such conflicts manage to die down
even with limited attempts from the outside world to put a
lid on them. Often they do not. The Kosovo Albanians tried
for eight years to bring attention to their cause and the
brewing conflict at hand. Nothing happened. Eventually, they
chose to use violent means. Next dot: rising tensions and
violent conflict.
Once the violence began in Kosovo, the West
woke up and articulated good intentions (dot number three)
of finding an end to the violence. (Of course, violence does
not always succeed in gaining the attention of policy makers,
i.e., the Kurds in Turkey. Nevertheless, it did work in this
case.) Having missed the early opportunities to work with
the Serbian democrats to oust Milosevic, use economic assistance
and membership in Western organizations as a carrot and stick
approach to the crisis, or implement sound civil society programs,
the West was left with the two tools in their proverbial toolbox
-- diplomacy and military intervention. Diplomacy was frantically
tried and failed. With no time for long-term strategic thinking,
NATO opted to avoid anticipated delays with the UN and/or
the Russians and begin an air campaign. Dot number four: eleventh
hour solutions that lack strategic vision.
Unsurprisingly, the bombing campaign has thus
far failed to achieve the intended results - removal of Milosevic's
troops from Kosovo, repatriation of the refugees and an end
to the violence. Instead, it has produced a dire refugee crisis,
tainted relations with Russia, degraded the role of the UN,
severely strained the economies of Yugoslavia's neighbors,
and cast a dark shadow over the upcoming NATO summit. Such
poor results (dot number five) carry the threat of severe
political damage to those currently in office and therefore,
bring tremendous pressure to bear on the Alliance to find
another quick fix.
At present, NATO has two options: it can use
the summit to announce a quick fix for Kosovo (unrelenting
military might either through ground troops or the continuation
of the air strikes) and hope that it'll be able to paint over
the leaks that such a quick fix would inevitably produce.
Alternatively, NATO can use the summit to take an inventory
of its current toolbox, admit that such tools have not yet
been effective in Kosovo (and probably won't be effective
for future Kosovos), and work to outline a long-term regional
approach to security in the Balkans. Such an approach would:
- establish formal relations between NATO and other security
organizations such as the OSCE and the EU, thereby enhancing
the civilian-military component of security;
- assign one of those bodies the task of coordinating
the civilian implementation of a post-conflict reconstruction
strategy (i.e., policing, judicial and parliamentary reform);
- outline a strategy for indicting Milosevic and others
as war criminals with specifics on who is responsible
for carrying out such a strategy;
- call for increased funding for the OSCE to facilitate
the creation of a civilian intervention unit to be used
in future ethnic conflicts (one should simply move the
decimal point of their $112 million budget to the right);
- outline an economic assistance program that would demonstrate
the rewards of democratic reform to the Serb population;
- enhance US financial support for SECI (the Southeastern
Cooperative Initiative) and EU financial support for the
Royaumont Process, two programs that provide much needed
technical support in the region.
NATO may very well come up with a watered down
version of one or more of the above listed options under the
heading of a "Doctrine on Southeastern Europe." Remembering
NATO's last reference to the crisis in Yugoslavia in its 1991
Strategic Concept, though, one should be cautioned against
believing that this summit's rhetoric on the Balkans will
be any different. Kosovo will indeed be mentioned at some
point. Whether or not reference to the crisis will produce
a constructive policy for the region as a whole remains to
be seen. With NATO's pride on the line, Clinton and NATO will
do their best to convince themselves and the public that their
approach to Kosovo was the right one.
And eventually, even with a short-sighted, quick
fix from NATO, the smoke will clear, CNN will halt its 24
hour coverage of Kosovo, and we'll all stop scratching our
heads and asking what went wrong. NATO will return to Brussels
still blinded by the glint of its high tech tools, and Clinton
will start scripting the closing chapter of his term in office.
Organizations working towards enhancing conflict prevention
and crisis management will begin again their calls for more
funding and support. Without the glitzy marketing appeal of
shiny jets, a looming crisis to bring their cause to light,
or admission by NATO that such softer security tools are needed,
however, those calls will likely fall on deaf ears. And we'll
stop connecting the dots... ... ... until the next crisis.
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