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NATO
Kosovo: Moods and Musings in Washington
19 April 1999
By Jack Seymour, BASIC Senior Fellow
As protocolary preparations for the NATO Summit
continue apace, Americans in the capital city are increasingly
perplexed by NATO's failure to break Milosevic. A cottage
industry has grown up among rival think tanks to address questions
like democratization in Serbia, stabilization in the Balkans
and the like. Heavy criticism has been leveled at the Administration
for failures of policy, misjudgemetns, and the like in the
events leading up to Rambouillet and NATO'S eventual attack
order. NATO's failure to achieve its objective of protecting
the Albanians in Kosovo is well exposed. It is playing "catch
up ball" in the public mind. Moreover, increasing attention
is going to the apparent disconnect between the military means
and the political objectives. Congress, upon its return from
the Easter recess, has joined the chorus, though with perhaps
more expressions of support for the objectives of the campaign
and its overall effectiveness in military terms.
There is little question in most minds that
something had to be done to stop Milosevic and save the Albanian
Kosovars. Few blame NATO for the great exodus that came after
the bombing began, but few regard the NATO action as successful
either. Behind a determination to "stay the course," to get
Milosevic, and to return the Kosovar refugees to their homes,
however, llurk profound doubts.
These doubts include uincertainties about the
outcome of a continuing bombing campaign. There is a hot debate
about whether air strikes alone could have or still can do
the job. Calls for in ground troops are rising this week,
but the great American public remains nearly split on the
issue. The Administration's request for a supplemental appropriation,
whose estimates began at $3-4 billion and now are at $6 billion,
has raised the serious question about costs now and in future
for the operation. Most assume the money will come from the
hard-won budget surplus of about $18 billion. The question
of costs is put in another way by talk of calling up 33,000
reservists just to continue the current air campaign. Both
measures may start to hit home to the Congreess and the public
that this Kosovo thing is serious. If it turns sour, the effect
on the Clinton "legacy" and his annointed successor's chances
in 2000 could be decisive.
Thus Kosovo grows like topsy to engulf US election
politics as well as the NATO summit. Early suggestions to
cancel the Summit died quickly, but the Administration has
announced that there the festivities of the celebration of
50 years will be kept to a minimum. Senator Warner, chairman
of the Senate Armed Services Committee has, perhaps logically,
suggested that a new strategic doctrine should not be approved
until resolution of the Kosovo situation.
Kosovo bids fare to teach many lessons for NATO,
its leaders, its publics, and its think tankers. The problem
is that, while great minds are engaged, and many have issued
proposals for stabilizing the Balkans-- eventually, no one
in this city at least seems able to come forward with a plausible
package of measures to resolve the immediate problem in the
here and now. The outlook for the near term is thus more of
the same, until one side wearies and diplomacy can enter in.
Two closing thoughts about this for the Summit.
First, there has been discussion of measures to block the
oil flow to Yugoslavia through Montenegro. According to one
report the US is likely to put this question to its allies
at the Summit. The idea sounds reasonable and necessary, but
like all the others it runs into practical contradictions
and national sensitivities of one kind or another. Second,
Russian diplomacy of some kind or another may turn out to
be essential to save NATO's bacon. The Russians have been
rebuffed in one attempt, but their credibility seems intact,
their interest in a resolution likewise. Whether they and
NATO can bring themselves to talk to each other in earnest
about a coordinated diplomatic move remains uncertain. There
could be advantages to both if such a move could succeed.
Then some of the many plans for what to do in the long term
might become relevant.
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