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NATO

NATO Foreign Ministers Meet in Brussels

12 April 1999

By David Fouquet

NATO Headquarters, Brussels

NATO Foreign Ministers gathered in Brussels Monday for an unusual session devoted to the three-week war in Yugoslavia. The ministers appeared to grope for "third party" mediation efforts to resolve the conflict and for additional strategies of its own in the aftermath of its still inconclusive air campaign on Yugoslavia.

In a day of talks which produced few evident concrete decisions, the Alliance and individual Ministers nevertheless appeared to have issued a number of modifications in their rhetoric in the hopes it could provide an opening for United Nations, Russian or other contacts with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer before and during the meeting floated a plan for a greater role for the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Fischer's French colleague Hubert Vedrine stressed the possibility of a UN Security Council initiative, although this would possible only if Russia lent its weight to it and carried China along. Some also suggested that Greek non-governmental organizations, the only ones still in place in Kosovo might also be useful in a humanitarian role because of the Athens Government's general sympathy to the Serbs and the religious links between the two countries.

The declarations emerging from the Brussels NATO Headquarters generally diluted some of the earlier NATO positions on such issues as the Rambouillet autonomy plan for Kosovo, the NATO leadership for a peace enforcement military mission, or possibly the complete withdrawal of Serb military and security personnel from Kosovo. But they restated NATO demands for President Milosevic to end violence and withdraw Serbian forces from Kosovo, agree to the stationing of "an international military presence" there, and accept the Rambouillet plan as the "basis" for a settlement. They also added the more recent demands that refugees be allowed to return to their homes and that access by humanitarian organisations be accepted.

Other major elements of the discussions included preparations for an 8000-strong NATO force, which was being deployed to assist humanitarian refugee operations in Albania and the urgent need to provide relief for the several hundred thousand Kosovar Albanian refugees still in Kosovo. Most emphasised the Alliance's new demand that the refugees be allowed to return to their homelands in security, but did not spell out the specific circumstances under which they could return to the largely devastated villages and regions. But despite the build-up of political pressure in Washington and some support in public opinion in some European NATO countries for the deployment of ground forces, Ministers seemed to reject any military intervention that would have to fight its way into the province. They refused to define the notion of "a permissive environment" that would lead them to dispatch ground troops to Kosovo.

British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook said that it would take two or three months to prepare an invasion force and that "we don't have two or three months" to come to the aid of refugees in Kosovo. Several Ministers and sources stressed that the meeting was not called to formulate major decisions but to take stock and reaffirm Alliance solidarity in the face of widespread criticism and scepticism about the limited nature of the precision bombing campaign.

The strategy discussions were taking place just before what the Alliance was seeking to signal as possibly a major new phase in their intensification of the bombings of military, police, paramilitary and dual-use and infrastructure targets throughout Yugoslavia. Participants and sources noted repeatedly that the air bombing of Iraq lasted 55 days and that the Alliance would continue its deliberate campaign of attacks on Yugoslavia as long as required. One NATO source said the Allied air campaign strategy was not based on the concept of "carpet bombing" as in World War II, but was a campaign of "attrition" aimed at eroding Yugoslav military capability. One knowledgeable NATO source said that they were seeking to develop a diplomatic initiative with the help of other parties, that would perhaps be more acceptable to Milosevic while signaling to him that a significant round of escalations in their military actions was being prepared. Ministers noted that the numbers of Allied aircraft had increased some 60 percent from 400 to 560 since the start of the operations and that the number of cruise missile platforms had also increased from 10 to 19. Some also noted the ongoing deployment of US Apache combat helicopter gunships and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Albania for possible cross-border on Serb tanks and other mobile targets into Yugoslavia.

Several participants underlined that while the gathering was not meant to make major decisions it was essentially designed to demonstrate to public opinion and to Serbia that the Alliance remained in complete solidarity behind the plans. Several noted the more moderate tone of the Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou during this session than on previous occasions.

They also said that the Ministers began discussions in Brussels that were expected to lead to a more complete proposal to be issued at the Washington Summit in late April. This more general strategic plan for the Balkans region, included what they referred to as the integration of a democratic Serbia into the regional and European context. Statements at the Brussels session also stressed the apparently growing expression of Alliance security guarantees to neighboring Albania and Macedonia. They also issued a warning that Serb threats to the integrity of the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro would not be tolerated.

David Fouquet is a journalist specializing in European Security matters.
He wrote this report from NATO HQ for BASIC.

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