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NATO
The Roots of NATO's Kosovo Policy
15 April 1999
By Karel Koster, Working Group Eurobomb
Three developments seem to be the determining
factors of NATO's Kosovo policy at present: the refusal of
the NATO countries to make any concessions in the diplomatic
sphere; the accompanying increased pace of the air campaign
which has now clearly shifted to the destruction of the civilian
infrastructure of Yugoslavia; and the political ramifications
of the refugee streams.
Military
Good weather would appear to have allowed NATO to intensify
its bombing campaign. The targets are always referred to as
being part of the supporting infrastructure for the military
apparatus. At the same time they form part of the civilian
economic infrastructure (bridges, oil refineries, car factories).
Heated discussion about civilian casualties caused by the
bombing tend to obfuscate the main trend of the campaign,
which is focusing in the direction of smashing the apparatus
required for a fairly comfortable standard of living. This
is clearly the 'Iraqi option': the plan is apparently to confront
people with such a future. The hidden message: get rid of
Milosevic and change Yugoslav policy (meaning presumably:
accept Rambouillet and a NATO-led peace). Another part of
the military operations concerns hunting down weapons systems
in Kosovo, perhaps to indirectly support the remnants of the
KLA still operating in a number of mountainous regions. British
reports claim to have hit Yugoslav army convoys, for the rest
there has been no evidence whatsoever of successful attacks.
This suggests that:
a) these systems are too well hidden;
b) that the decentralized low-level air-defense systems
are still very much a force to be reckoned with; and,
c) that NATO does not want to make the low-level bomb runs
necessary to improve the chances of locating and hitting
these weapons systems.
The primary operational target would seem to
be to strike at the roads (bridges etc) which these Yugoslav
units need to use to attack KLA forces (and at a later stage,
a NATO intervention force); in the longer term the attacks
on oil storage depots are presumably a strategic attempt at
immobilizing the mechanized units of the Yugoslav army. However,
they may be presumed to have sufficient local fuel supplies
to maintain their present readiness. As for the centralized
air-defense system: as it has presumably failed to shoot down
any other aircraft after the Stealth bomber, it would seem
that the NATO seems to have succeeded in suppressing it. At
the very least, considerable operational freedom has been
achieved through either the direct destruction of radar systems
and communication centers, or the tactical jamming of the
air defense systems which takes place to cover every NATO
operation.
In Albania a build-up of a limited military
strike force has begun, partially under the guise of refugee
relief. Hence building an infrastructure for helping the refugees
can also be part of the supporting infrastructure for the
Apache and MLRS deployment. As has been pointed out by a number
of experts these weapons give NATO a semi-ground involvement
option deep into Kosovo. The Apaches can attack mechanized
Yugoslav units by simply hovering over the border and engaging
targets from there. The MLRS can use the ATACMS system to
attack troop concentrations with cluster munitions anywhere
in Kosovo. Within 30 kms of the border massive artillery fire
can also be brought down. This deployment can be interpreted
in a number of ways: either as a first step towards a massive
ground operation to take all of Kosovo, or support for a limited
NATO ground operation, or support for KLA units operating
just across the border. The first will not be realistic for
many weeks (and is unlikely to take place just from Albania);
the second is perhaps a possibility within a fortnight, and
the third can be applied as soon as the units arrive. In general
the deployment of these units increase the military options
open to the NATO command. In Macedonia some kind of build-up
is also taking place, as there have been reports of mechanized
units moving up through Thessaloniki in Greece. Militarily
such a deployment would be necessary to make threat number
one mentioned above a possibility. The situation in the north,
the third invasion route (which would go into Serbia proper)
is unknown. Theoretically forces in Bosnia could be used,
as well as any units deployed in Hungary. I have seen no reports
of a build-up in those countries: there was only a single
report of the cutting of the Belgrade - Montenegro railway
line by SFOR troops in Bosnia). So in general terms: air war
proceeding and degrading Yugoslav military capacity as well
as initiating the destruction of the civilian infrastructure
apparently to strike at the political will of the Serbian
population (which shows no sign of wilting: on the contrary).
Yugoslav air defense system is ineffective (unless NATO has
succeeded in hiding casualties- but the Yugoslav government
would certainly publish any proof of downed NATO aircraft).
On the NATO side military build-up proceeding either with
practical military aims or to create a credible threat for
Milosevic and thus force him to consider surrender.
Refugees
Milosevic has clearly made a major change in his refugees
strategy. The plan now appears to keep the larger part of
the Kosovar population in Kosovo, rather than driving them
out. The aim of causing instability in Macedonia and maximum
political damage to the European countries (by the pressure
on them to absorb the refugees) has to some extent been achieved.
At the same time, emptying the country makes it easier for
NATO to initiate an all-out bombing campaign (or ground operations).
By keeping the population in its place, the Yugoslav leadership
is forcing NATO military planners to face the dilemma of causing
further humanitarian disasters by large-scale military operations
or having to operate in a very limited fashion which will
have consequences for the chances of military success. Such
a situation also opens the way to a political solution: the
statement that the population can return is also a negotiating
offer opening the way to a split-Kosovo solution - especially
if some part of the Kosovar leadership can be persuaded to
accept it. That is probably part of the offer made to Rugova.
However, after the ethnic cleansing campaign it is unlikely
that he can command much support. The refugees in the Balkan
are also a recruiting pool for the KLA, which by hook or by
crook (there have been reports of press ganging) are building
up a guerilla army to operate from Albanian territory, perhaps
as part of the limited ground war options being created by
NATO.
Political/Diplomatic
There has been a slight shift in the public position
taken by NATO spokespersons, who now seem to allow the possibility
of an international peacekeeping force under the leadership
of another organization, along with Russian and other participation
in this force. However, this interpretation might be too optimistic.
Behind the scenes diplomatic efforts are continuing, perhaps
with an eye on such a solution. The G-8 meeting desired by
the Russians as well as Italy and France, may provide an opportunity
to move in that direction. The suggestion that the US prisoners
may be released is also a sign of diplomatic talks. It seems
extremely unlikely that there would be a release if there
were not some kind of quid pro quo. The question is what that
might be. The military moves by NATO suggest that a maximum
amount of confusion is being created as to the possibility
of a ground war. The aim is again to force Yugoslav concessions
through this threat.
The overall picture on the NATO side appears
to be one of enforcing its political aims, although these
are now becoming somewhat unclear. The general perception
of the public is also creating its own dynamic: it has become
a win or lose prestige question for both sides in which neither
can afford to seem to lose the war. The question remains whether
a solution is possible that, perhaps with a little sleight
of hand, makes it possible to retreat from an all-out confrontation.
For this external meaning Russian help is more necessary than
ever, run through the UN or the OSCE. If however a diplomatic
solution is uninteresting for NATO, then the diplomatic efforts
will be sidetracked. In the run-up to a total confrontation,
one can perceive one intermediate station: a limited ground
attack might open the way to negotiations, because victory
can be claimed by both sides. For Milosevic: stopping further
conquest; for NATO - creating a safe haven for refugees and
showing it means business. If however the NATO war aims (perhaps
one should ask: the US war aims) are much further reaching
(for instance, creating a NATO dominated Balkan where all
other influences are removed) then escalation is inevitable.
Another interesting development is the result
of a number of opinion polls taken in eastern Europe last
week: it would seem that large parts of East European public
opinion opposes the NATO bombing campaign. This will have
serious consequences in the short term as far as setting up
military operations based in Hungary is concerned. In the
longer term there are dangerous consequences regarding the
position of the Hungarian minorities in Rumania and Slovakia
(and other minorities elsewhere).
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