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NATO
Kosovo: Progress Toward A Solution?
4 May 1999
By Karel Koster, AMOK, Netherlands
There have been considerable shifts in the political force
field determining the course of the war in the Balkans. Most
significant is the shift to a search for a political solution
through the office of the Russian Federation. The main reason
for that is the obvious failure of the air war to attain the
objectives set for it. The failure in the military field is
directly connected to this shift towards diplomatic solutions.
However, the interests of the parties involved are partially
contradictory: not everyone wants a diplomatic solution, either
because of the political price which must be paid or because
the party involved calculates it can achieve better terms
in exchange for a deal. Naturally the political and military
events are the key determinants for this diplomatic framework.
As I pointed out before, the warring parties must be able
to sell any agreement to their backers. It is quite impossible
for both sides to actually gain a complete victory, although
they will certainly want to refer to any negotiated result
as such.
Below I will discuss recent military developments, political
developments inside the main countries concerned and the diplomatic
efforts being made to attain a solution. There are also a
few notes on related key issues.
MILITARY
During the last weeks the bombing campaign has been broadened
from suppression of the air defences of Yugoslavia to include
economic and political targets. This has been done through
an increased sortie rate made possible by a great increase
in the number of aircraft in the theatre and improved weather
conditions. The broadening of the target list has automatically
increased the danger of collateral damage, resulting in a
series of incidents in which NATO bombs and missiles have
missed their targets and struck power stations, residential
areas, buses and other civilian objects. Hundreds of Serb
civilians have been killed and wounded as a direct result
of these attacks. The attack on the Yugoslav power grid on
the night of 2-3 May, which effectively shut off all electrical
power throughout the country, was the culmination of this
effort. If this is repeated every night the civilian population
as a whole will suffer.
During the last few days it has also been made known that
the NATO (primarily US) aircraft ran out of precision-guided
munitions and are therefore shifting to less precise weaponry,
until such time as additional supplies of the former are again
available.
It was also announced that new B-52 heavy bombers are being
deployed armed with old-fashioned unguided iron bombs which
will therefore be dropped through carpet bombing. Hence collateral
damage will inevitably increase. Such a policy decision on
targets is quite a deliberate one: the only way to intensify
the bombing campaign is to broaden the number of targets and
this in turn means hitting targets which are also part of
the civilian infrastructure. A useful secondary aim is to
hit the political elite governing Yugoslavia directly by bombing
factories and buildings belonging to them (a recent article
in the Financial Times described some of these connections).
Civilian deaths are inevitable and it is therefore less than
ingenuous to claim that they are unintended. That suggests
that one does not know that civilians will be killed and that
is ridiculous. It is more precise to state that the choice
of targets will inevitably lead to civilian deaths and NATO
is quite prepared to accept responsibility for this.
However, the worst consequences of this type of targeting
may be indirect and in the future. The environment is being
damaged (for instance when a toxic cloud was released after
the bombing of a chemical plant near Belgrade), the atmosphere
and ground water are being poisoned. Other possible dangers
which have been noted include hitting nuclear reactors and
the still somewhat speculative use of depleted uranium shells.
There have been one or two references to NATO spokespersons
confirming this, but without naming precise locations and
times. At best the health risks attached to depleted uranium
are unclear (as Gulf war veterans and Iraqi civilians can
testify), at worst they are another long-term health risk.
As for the third type of target, military vehicles and weapons
systems involved in the ethnic cleansing operations in Kosovo,
there has been little direct proof of these being hit: on
the contrary. Improving weather and closer cooperation with
forward air controllers attached to special forces operating
inside Kosovo may improve this.
A defining factor is of course the state of the Yugoslav
air defence system, where a distinction must be made between
the centralised system defending against high-flying aircraft
with radar directed surface to air missiles, and the low level
short range shoulder launched anti-air missiles and anti-aircraft
cannon. The probable shooting down of the F-16, which undertakes
its missions at height, implies that the centralised system
or parts of it are still there. The emergency landing of a
badly damaged A-10 specialised in low level missions at Skopje
in Macedonia, suggests low level missions would result in
significant losses of NATO aircraft. This can also be concluded
from the lack of action by the Apache ground strike helicopters:
although they have been present at an Albanian airbase for
one or two weeks there has been no report of their use. So
at best, the air defence system is suppressed but still greatly
respected by the NATO commanders, given the somewhat artificial
operational restraints allowing no losses at all and therefore
preventing them from taking any kind of risk.This means that
the minimum conditions for a successful ground operation do
not exist. Hence the emphasis on continuing the bombing campaign
for many months in the hope of creating a 'permissive environment'
for a peace keeping force.
KLA operations: from the north-east of Albania reporters
have written about KLA offensives into Kosovo, aimed at joining
up with KLA pockets at present surrounded by Yugoslav forces.
The most significant report concerns the taking (or is it
the construction?) of a road running across the border, providing
a logistic link between KLA forces operating in Kosovo and
their supplyhead in Albania. This seem to indicate that the
KLA controls a small area of Kosovo, which is itself an important
political fact. The nature of the battle going on seems to
be conventional (at least in that particular location). The
Yugoslav army is countering with artillery and mortar bombardments
of the road and targets beyond in Albania. Further into Kosovo
the war seems to have a classic guerilla character: one Yugoslav
police officer spoke about one-or two man attacks on Yugoslav
units. In Albania the refugees have been sent away from the
border area, out of range of the Yugoslav artillery. This
would also relieve the lines of communication for military
operations.
* In the meantime NATO has been building up its ground presence
in both Albania and Macedonia. Tanks and MLRS systems are
in Albania, officially to protect the strangely non-active
Apaches. Units belonging to the 82 and 101 airborne divisions
as well as part of the HQ of the NATO rapid reaction force
and US tanks and armoured personnel carriers have been reported
in Albania. In Macedonia British tanks and Dutch artillery
have been deployed.
There have been no reports of the large scale build up needed
for a ground offensive into Kosovo. Depending on the scale
of such an operation it will take from three weeks to three
months to deploy, and operations from Macedonia and Albania
are severely limited by the logistical parameters (port capacity,
railway lines and roads available along the main axes of attack
which are limited to a few routes). The Hungarian option,
which has been given some prominence in official and unofficial
statements, is apparently not being pursued either. Of course
there are also severe political restrictions in both Macedonia/Greece
(strong local and government opposition to a ground offensive
being launched from their territory) and Hungary (because
this would endanger the Hungarian minority in the Vojvodina
in northern Serbia). It is interesting that even the option
of a large-scale build up as a threat to invade, so as to
put the Yugoslav government under pressure, is apparently
not being considered. Perhaps because of faith in the air
campaign, or because of the expense, or political opposition
in the surrounding countries, or a combination of these reasons.
* The air campaign is being pursued with full vigour. Rumanian,
and Bulgarian air space has been opened for NATO, although
at present no aircraft are based there (facilities would presumably
also be limited). There have been reports of Hungarian air
bases being prepared for the basing of NATO aircraft.
On the Yugoslav side the operations seem to be by and large
confined to absorbing the punishment being meted out by NATO
and countering KLA operations along the border with Albania.
How strongly these are being pursued is unclear: reports of
continued fighting indicate that the weapon systems being
employed are not being neutralised by NATO air power. Hence
the KLA demands to be equipped with heavy weapons to counter
the Yugoslav ones.
Refugees
In recent days the stream of refugees into Macedonia and
Albania has again been increasing. The largest proportion
seems to be staying in the surrounding countries and not travelling
on into western Europe or elsewhere. This has important future
consequences (refugee camps comparable to those of the Palestinians
in the Middle East) . The KLA is recruiting personnel from
these refugees and amongst the émigré community
in the US and Western Europe. A crisis is developing amongst
the hundreds of thousands of refugees trapped inside Kosovo.
Refugee agencies are warning of an impending famine, the result
of a systematic Yugoslav effort to cut food supplies to these
people and their isolation in large remote pockets in mountainous
terrain.
Oil boycott
This appears to be turning into a symbolic political gesture.
According to one report the rules of engagement for the NATO
naval units policing this embargo include the instruction
not to visit and board tanker accompanied by naval escorts.
This is perhaps the result of France's opposition to such
an embargo, not covered by a UN resolution. Of course Russia
has also stated its vehement opposition.
THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK
In view of the lack of immediate success of the air campaign
and the political strains within both sides resulting from
this the question arises whether both sides still want total
victory. It is useful to try to form a picture of the minimum
demands at present on the table.
NATO
The Alliance has shifted its demands as the failure of the
initial military policy became clear. It has backed off from
Rambouillet (agreement must be 'based on Rambouillet') , the
leadership of a peacekeeping force having to be NATO (spokespersons
have referred to a NATO 'core' participating with a NATO command
structure) and there are also hints that a bombing pause will
be allowed to carry out an agreement; the demand for all Yugoslav
troops to be withdrawn from Kosovo has been dropped. However,
the old language is also being used by NATO spokespersons:
so there are contradictions. In general Russian diplomatic
and military involvement in an agreement is openly welcomed.
Various American officials have, however, continued to refer
to the Yugoslav government as being involved in war crimes:
obviously this will make a deal more difficult.
Belgrade
Two basic interests are being weighed in Yugoslavia: one
the hope of a complete political victory as a result of a
split in NATO; the other the need to make sufficient concessions
in the negotiations to allow the bombing to stop. Although
the bombing campaign has united the Yugoslavs around Milosevic,
it is also wrecking the economy and livelihood of a large
part of the population. There will be some pressure for compromise
so as to stop the bombing. This pressure was represented by
Vuk Draskovic, the former political opponent of Milosevic
and minister in his government. It seems likely that Milosevic
deliberately allowed him to state his opposition to present
policy because it was done publicly and because there were
no immediate measures taken against him. When after three
days there had been no response from NATO Draskovic was fired
(because keeping him on would have suggested weakness on the
part of Milosevic). Since then there have been further peace
feelers through the Russian negotiator Chernomyrdin. He stated
that the Yugoslav government would allow an armed peacekeeping
force into Yugoslavia but this was later reduced to 'unarmed
peacekeepers'. Attempts are also being made to achieve a deal
with Rugova whom the Yugoslav government likes to portray
as an acceptable Kosovar leader. Clearly a minimum position
here is maintaining formal sovereignty over Kosovo, symbolised
by some kind of Yugoslav presence.
UCK
Officially UCK will accept just autonomy for Kosovo, but
in practice this will probably amount to full independence
with all the logical ramifications (combining these aspirations
with those of the Albanian minority in Macedonia for a 'greater
Albania'). This seem to be well recognised by the NATO powers
because there has so far been no sign of KLA units receiving
heavier weapons for their campaign. If the KLA should succeed
in controlling a part of Kosovo then this will complicate
the negotiations. It is also in its direct interest to escalate
the war further and to involve NATO in the ground war, so
as to create the situation on the ground that it needs to
pursue the dream of an independent Kosovo.
US plus UK
Relevant in the USA are the recent votes in the House of
Representatives:
- refusal to support the air war, the result of a tie vote
- a vote requiring the president to seek congressional approval
for ground forces was passed .
Although Clinton can override such votes the very existence
of such opposition is important. It is an important brake
on initiation of an all-out war. A little further away, but
surely occupying the minds of the candidates are presidential
elections. Which is more advantageous: support of a policy
which may lead US ground troops to be committed in a ground
war? If that goes badly wrong any candidate supporting it
will be crippled in his campaign. As it is, the inept handling
of the entire situation by Clinton may well result in a badly
damaged Gore campaign. Blair's militancy and identification
with the US in this war is a little puzzling: one cannot understand
the British interests being pursued, other than being exactly
identical with the American ones.
European NATO
The German government is under great pressure from inside
the ruling coalition (not just the Greens) to come up with
a political solution. Two major political facts are relevant:
- Russia's proximity, which tends to make confrontational
strategies such as the American one less appealing.
- The very practical political consequences of renewed chaos
on the Balkans, which would mean a refugee crisis across
Europe. Hence the emphasis on creating a stability pact.
There is great public support for the air war because of
the refugee images on the TV screens in most West European
countries. However, the increased destruction of the Yugoslav
civilian infrastructure and the increasing number of civilian
victims on the other will tend to increase the public call
for a political solution. Developments leading to a ground
war will result in increased tensions in a number of governments:
in Germany the government may well fall.
Russia
Clearly Russia sees Kosovo as an important defining moment
in international relations. This position is influenced by
the traditional ties with the Serbs, but not decisively. Internally
the nationalists and communist use the issue to strengthen
their own position versus that of the pro-Western politicians.
This pressure has resulted in the ploy of using a pro-western
politician (Chernomyrdin) as the chief intermediary between
NATO and Yugoslavia. If he succeeds in achieving a negotiated
peace, everyone in Russia gains. If he fails, the pro-western
politicians will be blamed. Externally, it is a Russian interest
to convince the West that its interests should be considered;:
not just concerning the situation on the Balkans, but everywhere.
If NATO gets its way here, then a precedent will exist which
can be used again, nearer Russia. Since Russia does not have
much of a conventional army to threaten with (merely symbolical
moves like the deployment of a single ship to the Adriatic,
naval exercises in the Baltic), the nuclear card has been
played. A meeting of the Russian Security Council last week
at the very least considered reactivating and deploying tactical
nuclear weapons, developing new ones and adapting a strategy
which would employ them to compensate for conventional weakness.
This was deliberately leaked. No doubt the Russian government
calculates that such signals will get Western attention and
force NATO to take heed. The bottom line is that no solution
on the Balkan is possible without Russia, that it must be
presented as a UN, not a NATO solution and that it will have
a price through the IMF funding.
Region
The neighbouring countries (Bulgaria, Rumania, Macedonia)
all want to join NATO like Hungary. The governments pay lip
service to NATO policy but this masks huge opposition to the
bombing policy amongst the population. Not just because some
of the bombs can stray, but also because of the negative economic
effects. First there were years of sanctions, now the local
industry and agriculture have been directly affected by the
cutting of the trade routes running across Yugoslavia (bombing
of Danube bridges). The tourist industry will be badly affected
too. Because of the increasing involvement of these countries
(air space and facilities made available for the bombing campaign)
they are also logical targets for reprisals by Yugoslavia.
This possibility has in turn resulted in a series of security
guarantees which are very similar to those given to NATO member
states. In this way the broadening of the war to neighbouring
countries has been built in. Al of these countries have their
own problems with borders and minorities: this is therefore
a sensitive and dangerous situation.
COMPROMISE
In view of this range of opposing interests the key question
is a very difficult one to answer: is compromise possible?
I would say yes, but because of the strength of the forces
bent on war and the dangerous dynamic of Western public opinion
which can yet result in a ground war with far-reaching consequences
because of public outrage at the atrocities taking place,
as well as the foolish extremist positions some of the leading
politicians have manoeuvred themselves into, some complicate
fudges are necessary. The compromise would consist of something
like a UN-backed force with a core of NATO troops from small
NATO countries (Italy, Greece, Portugal) plus perhaps outsiders
like S. Africa and certainly Russia and Ukraine. The leading
states waging the present war would only be allowed observers:
it seems to me that a large-scale presence of US or UK forces
would be equivalent to an occupation force in Yugoslav eyes.
This is particularly relevant in connection with the Rambouillet
agreement, in which full access to all of Yugoslavia was demanded
for NATO forces. Kosovo would be an autonomous province within
Yugoslavia, with a limited Serb army presence on the borders
of Kosovo (sovereignty question). This is based on the assumption
that the West still wants a deal with Milosevic, and Milosevic
will accept an international armed presence, if it includes
Russians and is based on a UN mandate. The fudge for NATO
consist of continuing to deal with Milosevic and not being
allowed to control developments in Kosovo. The fudge for Milosevic
involves giving up a large part of de facto sovereignty over
part of his territory while claiming it is still part of Yugoslavia.
Through the distribution of the peacekeeping force there may
even be de facto division of the province:NATO in the south
and Russians et al in the north. The question remains whether
this fudge is possible. There are a number of loose cannons
in play which can upset any chance of a deal.
- Albright may see this war as a crusade which must be fought
right to the bitter end; her spokesman Rubin's contemptuous
remarks on Ukrainian participation in the peacekeeping force
this weekend were not helpful, to say the least.
- In Russia the extreme nationalists and communists in the
Duma may want to push for military aid to Yugoslavia;
- In Yugoslavia the extreme nationalist Seselj may decry the
compromise as treason, organise a coup against Milosevic and
continue the war
- The UCK continues to arm itself and has a vested interest
in continuing the war: its final aim remains a greater Albania;
they may have no interest in a peace deal, especially if it
involves being disarmed (fudges around this are possible -
absorb them in a new Kosovar police force)
- (less likely) Croatia may want to renew its territorial
demands in reaction to a weakened Yugoslavia.
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