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NATO
British Defence Committee Releases Report
on NATO Strategy
13 April 1999
A report titled "The Future of NATO: The Washington Summit"
was released 13 April 1999 by the Defence Committee of the
House of Commons. The report "looks at the issues likely to
be debated at the Washington Summit, and the conclusions likely
to emerge". However, the report highlights the lack of debate
on NATO strategy, which, it says, "is often muted and sometimes
ill-informed" and asks the government to initiate a debate
in the House before the Summit . It says: "We hope that Parliament
will be given an opportunity to debate this issue in advance
of the departure of ministers to the Washington Summit".
Following are excerpts of the report:
NATO'S NEW ROLES AND MISSIONS
The Balance Between the Old and New Roles
We wish to see the New Strategic Concept outline a new
direction for NATO for the years ahead. New roles must be
outlined and prioritised … However, [NATO's] core function
of territorial defence must not be undermined by its new missions,
and NATO must retain its military capability to fulfil Article
5 tasks, however remote such threats may seem.
NATO's Nuclear Posture
It seems that the debate about NATO's use of nuclear
weapons policy among Allied nations has been resolved for
the time being, and that the policy will remain unchanged
in the new Strategic Concept. While we recognise that nuclear
weapons remain central to NATO's strategy, the Alliance's
nuclear policy will continue to evolve, and we welcome open
debate upon it....We agree that greater nuclear transparency
by NATO could only be beneficial.
The New Missions
We expect to see the new Strategic Concept clearly outline
NATO's competences for peace support operations and its plans
for cooperation with other organisations to pursue lasting
peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. We note the
important work being done by NATO on Infrastructure, Logistics
and Civil Emergency Planning in working with humanitarian
aid agencies and relevant government agencies, and hope that
this work will be pursued further.
It is likely that NATO will become more involved in measures
to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction....Counter-proliferation
is likely to be one of the topics to be touched upon in the
new Strategic Concept....[W]e would support NATO's adoption
of a non-proliferation mission. But NATO must be aware of
the limitations of its role in counter-proliferation: its
principal objective in this area should remain the more even-handed
prevention, or reversal, of proliferation through diplomatic
means and the support, rather than duplication, of the work
of other international organisations.
While we agree that "the widest involvement of the UN …
is clearly desirable", in practice, accepting that NATO should
not act except in self defence without a UN Security Council
mandate would mean accepting a Russian veto on NATO action
- this would not be tolerable. That NATO cannot act without
the consent and agreement of all 19 of its members, each of
which belongs to the UN and respects that organisation's philosophy,
ought to ensure that any operation is legitimate under international
law.
NATO's Area of Action
We were told that...'the British government's instinct
will be to leave [the definition of NATO's area of operations]
as it is at the moment, very flexible.'...The Secretary General
of NATO has said that the question of NATO's global reach
will be addressed in a precise manner in the new Strategic
Concept and we look forward to this clearer definition of
NATO's view of its global role.
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY
NATO and the WEU
In formulating the arrangements for a strengthened ESDI,
there must be no decoupling of the transatlantic alliance
which would alienate our North American Allies. There must
be no duplication of NATO resources. And there must be no
discrimination amongst the European countries on the basis
of their differing relationships with the EU and the Alliance.
There is a large measure of agreement on the aims of a strengthened
ESDI though there are differences of emphasis between the
main players. It will be necessary to reconcile the industrial,
political and military elements whilst maintaining transatlantic
cooperation. In addressing the industrial restructuring element,
close attention will need to be paid to security of supply
issues.
If the EU is to be merged with the WEU, NATO together with
Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden, will have to reconsider
their relationship to take account of those nation's traditions
of neutrality.…We would see advantage in the Washington
Summit producing a clear statement of NATO's view on the proposed
integration of the WEU and the EU.
We recommend … that the UK should press for a clear
statement of support for the development of the ESDI to be
included in the new Strategic Concept....We hope that the
Washington Summit will produce a convincing plan, based on
the findings of the Defence Capabilities Initiative, to bring
our European Allies' force structure into line with NATO's
new missions. We believe that this will, inevitably, require
some reconsideration of the thorny problem of role specialisation
within the European forces.
NATO AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
Russia
The new Strategic Concept … has a role much greater
than setting out the mission statement for NATO's military
planners. It must provide the platform from which NATO can
seek to explain itself to Russia - and it cannot begin to
do so if it cannot explain itself to itself.
Russian politicians are inclined to view the Washington Summit
as a triumphalist celebration of a Cold War victory, and fear
that that the new Strategic Concept will mark a retreat from
the development of NATO as a political organisation to an
explicit prioritisation of military force as a legitimate
instrument of diplomacy. Their fears should not be dismissed
as groundless and the drafters of the new Strategic Concept
would be well-advised to … make clear that the use
of military force in support of political objectives …
is a last resort.
NATO has already stated that it has no plan, no intention
and no reason to station forces (either conventional or nuclear)
in the new members' territories, and we see no reason why
this commitment should not be embodied in the new Strategic
Concept. However, enforced stationing of troops in Serbia
would make it even more difficult to convince Russians of
NATO's good intentions.
Pressures on NATO to acquire ballistic missile defences and
on Russia to proceed down the path of nuclearisation are likely
to grow rather than diminish. It will require imagination
and restraint to respond to them in ways that do not damage
fundamental mutual interests.
The first thing we could do is to re-emphasise to Russia
that it is still welcome to attend the NATO Summit, and that
debate about the Alliance's strategy in the Balkans is not
closed. We express the hope that Russia will attend the Washington
Summit.
Ukraine
NATO must approach the Ukraine-Russia relationship with
subtlety and discretion. Nevertheless we should leave no doubt
that Russia's respect for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial
integrity is not a bilateral matter, but a fundamental interest
of the Alliance....Any attempt to link progress in NATO's
relationship with Ukraine to progress with Russia would insult
Ukraine's independent status[...].
NATO ENLARGEMENT
We note that the debate on the costs of enlargement has been
somewhat subdued in recent months; however, we are pleased
to see that NATO is continuing to update its analysis and
hope that the implications of its studies and their correlation
with reality will be taken into account as the Alliance contemplates
further enlargement. However, we remain disappointed that
NATO has not made publicly available, as we have requested,
declassified versions of its studies on the financial and
military implications of enlargement.
A NATO of 19 will embody a more diffuse set of European interests
and perspectives… The danger could be a NATO that was
so intent on internal political compromise that it lost effective
touch with a firm strategic purpose in relation to the rest
of Europe.
We would not wish to see the Alliance's military effectiveness
jeopardised by future enlargements. Certainly it is the case
that few, if any, of the candidate countries could add to
NATO's military effectiveness at present....Today, NATO would
face several problems if it were to embark upon a further
round of enlargement straight away. …[A] great deal
of work has yet to be done with the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland before they attain NATO standards in many areas,
and further enlargement might disrupt this process. A further
consideration is that, were there to be further invitations
issued at Washington, some candidate states would be in the
unhappy position of having been rejected twice, which could
have serious internal repercussions - particularly, perhaps,
for those countries which are also experiencing rejection
from the European Union.
We fear that "waves" of enlargement or strict timetables
will only exacerbate division, rivalry and insecurity. It
is our belief that further enlargement should be limited,
gradual and conducted on a case-by-case basis. We also believe
that the attitude of Russia - and the security of Ukraine
- are factors that must be taken into account.
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