Printer Friendly

Transatlantic Security

Back to the main page on Transatlantic Security

NATO

NATO's Strategy Review:
A Litmus Test for NATO-Russia Relations

Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BITS)

Research Note 97.5, December 1997

Table of Contents

Introduction and Executive Summary

Recommendations

NATO Strategy Since the End of the Cold War

Nuclear Doctrine - A Topic for the Strategy Review

Options for Change

Endnotes

Introduction and Executive Summary
NATO's Foreign Minister meeting in Brussels on December 16-17, 1997 will take important decisions and provide basic guidance for developing a new NATO strategy. "NATO member States have decided to examine NATO's Strategic Concept to ensure that it is fully consistent with Europe's new security situation and challenges."¹ Highlighting the crucial importance for NATO-Russia relations, this Alliance Statement first appeared in the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation" signed in Paris on May 27, 1997. Both, NATO's North Atlantic Council meeting in Sintra in May 1997 and the Madrid Summit in July 1997 reiterated the decision.²

A revision of NATO's strategy is long overdue.³ The current "Alliance's New Strategic Concept" had already been overtaken by events when it was adopted in November and December 1991. When the "Strategic Concept" was formulated, the Soviet Union had still existed, during approval and implementation it had already become part of history.

Consequently, the decision to review Alliance strategy is of great importance. NATO will have to reconsider its basic rationale - collective defense - because the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union has wide ranging consequences. This is a great opportunity: for the first time the Alliance will be able to take full advantage of the strategic change that took place in its area of responsibility. Results of NATO's upcoming strategy review will also be measured against the Alliance's repeated claims to substantially adapt and transform itself.

NATO Ministers during their autumn meetings will have to ensure that the decision to review the strategy of the Alliance will be fully implemented. This includes setting up a working structure to develop the new strategy, scheduling the drafting and consultation process, and issuing political guidance for the development of the new strategy.

Political guidance to NATO ministers will need to cover a number of potentially controversial topics such as:

• the Alliance's future core functions including the relationship between its political and its military tasks;
• the Alliance's intention to enlarge to the East while at the same time developing close ties and intensive cooperation with the Russian Federation;
• the Alliance's future role in a developing European Security Architecture for the 21st century;
• the Alliance's future approach to arms control;
• the future relationship between the Alliance's collective defense tasks and its new tasks such as peace-support operations;
• the command structure as well as a force structure allowing for collective defense operations of the NATO members and for ad-hoc coalitions of some Alliance members with nations outside of NATO in Peace Support Operations;
• and the future role of nuclear weapons in NATO's political and military strategy.

Finally, ministers are faced with the difficult task of deciding whether the new strategy should be valid beyond the first round of NATO enlargement. NATO's civil and military bureaucracies require guidance on the time-frame for the new Strategic Concept. Is the new strategy going to remain in place beyond the first round of enlargement? Can the new strategy accommodate new members, for example the Baltic states? These questions need to be considered before the process of reviewing the Strategic Concept begins.

This research note recommends that:

• for the first time NATO should conduct its strategy review in a fully transparent manner and publish all resulting documents. National parliaments of NATO members, prospective new members, Partners for Peace and most important the Russian Federation and the public should have unrestricted access to draft strategy documents;
• the Russian Federation should be consulted on a permanent basis, i.e. at all stages. Preferably, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council should be used to discuss the strategy review with Russia according to the provisions contained in the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation"⁴;
• NATO should review both its politico-military strategy and its military strategy. There should be no doubt that proper political guidance and control over military developments is executed.
• special consideration should be given to the review of NATO's nuclear strategy. Clear options for change exist, which could have a positive influence on NATO-Russia relations;
• finally, NATO Ministers should issue political guidance that enables the Alliance to take full advantage of the security changes in Europe. Simply replacing "Russia" for the "Soviet Union" in the Alliance's New Strategic Concept clearly will not meet that requirement.

This research note will demonstrate the need for change in NATO's strategy by taking NATO's nuclear posture and strategy as an example.

NATO Strategy Since the End of the Cold War
NATO has agreed to develop its New Strategic Concept for political approval during the Alliance's April 1999 summit. At the same summit, the Alliance will welcome a first group of new members and finally it will celebrate its 50th anniversary. Russia might well perceive NATO's development of the new strategic concept as a litmus test for the Alliance's commitment to adapt and transform itself as well as for the Alliance's political will to "build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security", as envisaged in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.⁵

NATO's most recent strategy review took place in 1990 and 1991.⁶ It resulted in two documents. During NATO's Rome Summit in November 1991 a political strategy document was adopted and published, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept".⁷ Subsequently NATO's Defense Ministers approved a military strategy document "MC Directive For Military Implementation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept"(MC 400) during their regular meeting in December 1991. Despite official claims that NATO for the first time in history had fully published its strategy, the document was kept classified.⁸ A separate classified document, NATO's "Political Principles for Nuclear Planning and Consultation" was approved during the autumn 1992 meeting of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group in Gleneagles. It updated the guidelines for NATO's nuclear planning and decision-making process.⁹

NATO's first post-Cold War strategy review was characterized by giving up the Alliance's long-standing "forward defense" concept, which required forward deployment of massive mechanized forces in Central Europe, expected to be the future battlefield. Instead, the Alliance introduced a more flexible concept of counter-concentrations, which is based on in-place cover-forces to be quickly reinforced first by immediate reaction forces, then by rapid reaction forces, main defense forces and augmentation forces. The new concept gave additional weight to planning for NATO's flanks and supplemented NATO's core function of collective defense by substantially increasing the Alliance's capability for flexibility and crisis management. The concept reflected the more favorable political situation in Europe after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, but was still heavily influenced by retaining the capability to rapidly react to any re-emerging Soviet threat. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union only days after the new strategy was finally adopted, NATO doctrinal thinking became more and more influenced by requirements originating from crisis management and out of area operations.

This became more clear when NATO's Military Committee took the initiative and developed a doctrinal document, "MC 327 Peace Support Operations" providing for guidance in operations other than collective defense. Due to substantial internal disputes over major elements of the document,¹⁰ it was never approved by NATO political authorities. However, its controversial contents re-emerged soon after.

Within the framework of NATO's "Long-Term Study", which began in 1994 and is still underway, NATO's military strategy document was revised again in 1995-96.¹¹ During the Alliance's June 1996 Council meeting in Berlin, MC 400/1 entitled "MC Directive for Military Implementation of Alliance Strategy" was approved by NATO's Foreign Ministers. The decision was announced within the Communiqué by the ministers welcoming "the first results of the Military Committees Long Term Study".¹² NATO's Defense Ministers approved and publicly mentioned the decision during their DPC meeting held on June 13, 1996.¹³ The new military strategy document again has not been published.

MC 400/1 covers changes in NATO's military strategy since 1991. The document reflects decreased emphasis on planning Alliance-wide collective defense and much increased emphasis on Peace-Support Operations, crisis management and regional collective defense. While NATO is no longer expected to face an alliance-wide threat (unless after substantial warning time), the Alliance's military strategy now concentrates on preparations for a major conflict representing regional defense (e.g. at one of NATO's flanks) and parallel capacities to stay involved in Peace Support Operations outside the Alliance's Treaty Area. The document incorporates formerly highly controversial doctrinal elements such as the idea that Peace Support Operations might form a continuum of operations from humanitarian aid to peace-enforcement and even collective regional defense.

It remains to be seen, whether NATO's decision to reexamine the Alliance's New Strategic Concept of 1991 will cover both the politico-military Strategic Concept and MC 400/1. However, the Alliance will have to ensure, that political guidance will direct the military strategy development and not vice versa.

Nuclear Doctrine - A Topic for the Strategy Review
NATO nuclear doctrine has a long-standing history of being simultaneously important and controversial. Throughout the Cold War, lasting discussions about the interpretation of NATO's "flexible response" strategy continued. NATO's strategy review of 1990-1991 had a substantial impact on the Alliance's nuclear doctrine and posture.

Both strategic and sub-strategic weapons were given a mainly political role. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept describes their function as preserving peace, preventing coercion and playing an essential stabilizing role in Europe, providing a hedge against a reemerging major threat and guarding against uncertainties resulting from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

While particularly US strategic weapons are perceived to provide the supreme guarantee for the security of the Allies, the independent British and French contributions are separately mentioned. Whereas NATO's system of targeting non-strategic weapons has been substantially changed, NATO still maintains peacetime plans for the employment of strategic weapons assigned to NATO. SACEUR is responsible for coordination with US national targeting plans.

The role of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons posture has been diminished. There was no longer a need for maintaining thousands of tactical nuclear weapons for the sole purpose of fighting a nuclear war on the European battlefield. Their numbers were substantially reduced and flexibility for using the remaining weapons was increased. During the October 1991 meeting of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group in Taormina it was decided to eliminate the thousands of nuclear weapons for use with NATO land forces as agreed by Presidents Yeltsin and Bush in mutual unilateral declarations during September 1991. All remaining nuclear artillery shells and all warheads for short-range missiles were withdrawn. In addition the number of nuclear bombs, designated for use with NATO Air Forces was reduced in two steps. Tactical nuclear weapons were renamed sub-strategic weapons to indicate the change in their function. Today sub-strategic nuclear weapons at NATO's disposal are made up by:

• 150 to 200 US B-61 free fall bombs, stored in European countries for use with the US Air Force as well as European countries' armed forces¹⁴
• Sea-launched cruise missiles onboard US Navy warships and additional US Air Force bombs as possible reinforcements during times of crisis and war¹⁵
• some British Trident missiles onboard ballistic missile submarines¹⁶ and
• and, if the French government so decided, by French sub-strategic nuclear weapons, i.e. nuclear-tipped stand-off missiles.

However, NATO decided to maintain sub-strategic weapons on the European continent for the foreseeable future. Their contribution to securing intra-alliance solidarity, increasing NATO's flexibility in deterrence and military operations and increasing the credibility of Alliance military options is perceived to be essential. To increase their role in crisis management NATO decided to add flexibility to its nuclear targeting system. Targets for sub-strategic weapons are no longer to be pre-planned. Instead NATO's Major Commanders have been tasked to create databases listing the information about possible targets from which targeting plans could be rapidly and easily developed during crisis and according to political guidance given within the crisis. Adaptive nuclear targeting and a focus on a much wider range of possible countries (such as states assumed to have the potential to develop Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)) have largely increased NATO's intelligence requirements for nuclear targeting. However, most of these countries are non-nuclear states, some are parties to Nuclear Weapons Free Zones.¹⁷

While the use of nuclear weapons was considered to be rather "remote", NATO's nuclear war-fighting options still consisted of three basic options: initial use, selected use and major nuclear response. They provide the Alliance military commanders with substantial flexibility to consider the utility of nuclear weapons in a wide range of situations.

NATO's revision of the military strategy document during 1994-96 resulted in some additional change. However this was less substantial since the Alliance did not revise its overriding politico-military strategy. The most important change to NATO's nuclear strategy aspects reflects NATO's enhanced interest in out of area contingencies. Substantial room is given to risks resulting from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is also reflected in the role of nuclear weapons in deterring WMD attacks. In addition, NATO has decided to reduce the readiness level of some of its Air Force units designated for the use of nuclear weapons. Only one unit per country providing dual capable aircraft for NATO nuclear tasks will be required to be at full readiness.¹⁸

Nevertheless, the strategy review of 1990/91 as well as the revision of MC 400/1 did not result in visible change to a number of politically critical areas:

• NATO did not comment publicly on whether it would continue to be prepared to use nuclear weapons first. "First Use" remains an option in NATO nuclear policy.
• NATO language agreed at the London Summit of 1991, describing nuclear weapons as weapons of "last resort", was never repeated. Instead, the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used was described as "remote".
• Finally the Alliance did not publicly announce any substantive changes to its policy of nuclear sharing.

NATO's strategy documents also did not touch on the sensitive question of whether NATO should prepare for future nuclear weapons deployments in new member states. Russia expressed serious opposition to such a development, perceived to enable NATO to destroy targets on Russian soil with sub-strategic nuclear weapons, thus transforming them into weapons of strategic effect.

As NATO did not want to give the impression of having second-class members, it insisted on the right to include fully all new members in NATO's nuclear arrangements. The Alliance's Study on Enlargement, published in September 1995, stated that new members would be eligible "to join the Nuclear Planning Group and its subordinate bodies and to participate in nuclear consultation during exercises and crisis".¹⁹ When Russian opposition continued, the Alliance offered to restrain itself in a politically but not legally binding manner.

Within the NATO-Russia Founding Act NATO members finally declared "that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspects of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and do not foresee any future need to do so". In addition the Alliance stated, it had "no intention, no plan and no reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites" on new member territories.²⁰

However, NATO's commitment to not to deploy nuclear weapons, use existing facilities or build new nuclear weapons storage infrastructure on new members' soil does not limit NATO operational freedom of action during times of crisis or war. It is not a legally binding commitment and it also does not prohibit pilots from these countries from being fully trained for NATO nuclear missions during peacetime. No live warheads are necessary for this task. Throughout NATO training dummy warheads are regularly used for this purpose. Thus, at least theoretically it is entirely possible, to fully train pilots from the new member countries, as soon as the new member's Air Forces are equipped with at least one squadron of Western-built dual capable aircraft.

Options for Change
NATO's nuclear strategy is the most clear-cut example of the anachronisms in NATO policy remaining from Cold War times. While NATO's nuclear posture has changed quantitatively, the basic principles of its nuclear policies - e.g. first use of nuclear weapons, forward basing of nuclear weapons, flexible options for nuclear use and nuclear sharing are still in place. These principles were developed under completely different political circumstances. Their main functions - to deter the Soviet Union and link the United States to European security - have vanished. Their side functions - to provide for political cohesion within the Alliance and prevent Germany from pursuing an independent security policy - can no longer be achieved by the old means of integrating military defense. Furthermore, NATO itself argues that its military functions have lost importance and its political functions gained relevance.

These developments pave the way for a fundamental review of both NATO's nuclear posture and nuclear doctrine. The outcome of such a review should be a reduction if not elimination of the nuclear aspects of Article V commitments. Already, all NATO Nuclear Weapon States have committed themselves politically not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states which are members of the NPT. It is therefore only a small step to issue a total no-first use pledge.

Militarily and politically, the foundations for forward-basing of tactical nuclear weapons, the flexible response strategy, and nuclear sharing were all based on the scenario of a large-scale military conflict in Central Europe. This scenario is no longer credible, therefore the possibility exists

• to withdraw all remaining nuclear weapons from Europe;
• to move from "flexible response" to minimum or even existential deterrence;
• and to end nuclear sharing arrangements.

Such a step would have at least two positive side-effects: it would strengthen the non-proliferation regime and make the quick conclusion of both, a START III agreement and arms control agreements on sub-strategic nuclear weapons more easy.

If NATO stops short of these steps, it will have to provide a new clear-cut and coherent rationale for its nuclear posture. Not reducing the reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO's military posture will clearly send the wrong signal to the Russian Federation. Many in Russia already consider mirroring NATO's flexible response strategy and balancing NATO's conventional military advantage by re-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in Russian military doctrine.

The Alliance has recognized the need to start a dialogue with Moscow on nuclear weapons issues.²¹ In the framework of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) expert groups will discuss tactical nuclear weapons, de-targeting, de-alerting, and safety and security issues. This is a positive step, which, however, will have to be followed by establishing a dialogue on nuclear postures and doctrine. Without finding a common understanding about the remaining functions of nuclear weapons, far-reaching reductions in tactical as well as strategic weapons will be hard to achieve.

The strategy review has therefore to be paralleled by dialogue between the four European nuclear weapon states on all aspects of their nuclear weapons policies, including nuclear postures and doctrines. The PJC is the ideal place for such a dialogue because it has a clear mandate to deal with almost all aspects of nuclear weapons policies and is supposed to be the central place for resolving differences between NATO and the Russian Federation.

In the context of the strategic review NATO should:

• limit the role of strategic nuclear weapons in the Alliance's Strategy to truly become weapons of last resort, i.e. to adapt to a strategy of minimum or even existential deterrence;
• fully exclude the use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear states;
• renounce the first-use option and reject the preemptive use of nuclear weapons against biological and chemical weapons threats;
• withdraw the last US sub-strategic nuclear weapons deployed in Europe;
• support the conclusion of a treaty limiting or banning sub-strategic nuclear weapons;
• reconsider and give up NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements;
• de-alert both sub-strategic and strategic nuclear weapons systems.

_____________________

Endnotes

1. NATO, "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation", Paris, 27 May, 1997, p. 3.
   
2. NATO, "Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation", M-1(97)81, Madrid, 8. July 1997.
   
3. The Netherlands tried to initiate a strategy review as early as 1995; see: Rob de Wijk: NATO at the Brink of the New Millennium, London/Washington, 1997, p. 102. However there is still no consensus that the Alliance's Strategy should be revised in a substantial manner; see: Paul Cornish: "Die NATO vor der Jahrtausendwende - Neue Aufgaben, neue Mitglieder ... neue Strategie?", in: NATO-Brief, No. 3, 1997, pp. 21-24.
   
4. The PJC's work programme foresees consultations on "military strategy, defense policy and military doctrines in NATO and Russia" as well as on "nuclear weapons issues, including doctrine and strategy". NATO, Russia, "Work Programme of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council until the End of 1997", New York, 26 September 1997, p. 2.
   
5. NATO, Founding Act, p. 3.
   
6. For background and more detailed descriptions see: Otfried Nassauer: "Neue NATO-Strategie" in: Erich Schmidt-Eenboom/ Jo Angerer (eds.): Siegermacht NATO. Berg am See, 1993, pp. 37-115 and Rob de Wijk: NATO at the Brink of the New Millennium. London/Washington, 1997.
   
7. NATO, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept", Rome, 7-8 November, 1991.
   
8. NATO's long-standing "flexible response" strategy was also contained in two separate documents. While the so-called Harmel-Report, a politico-military strategy document had been published, the military implementation document MC 14/3 was kept classified. It is difficult to judge, whether in terms of transparency anything changed in substance with the 1990/91 strategy review.
   
9. NATO, "Final Communiqué", Gleneagles, 20-21 October, 1992.
   
10. For additional background see Patricia Chilton, Otfried Nassauer et al.: "NATO, Peacekeeping and the UN", BASIC-BITS Research Report 94.1, Berlin/London/Washington, September 1994. Additional hints can be found in Rob de Wijk, op. cit.
    
11. Rob de Wijk, pp. 101-106.
    
12. NATO, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin, 3 June 1996, M-NAC-1(96)63, p. 2 and Otfried Nassauer: "Die Neue Alte NATO", Die Tageszeitung, Berlin, 4 June, 1997, p. 1.
    
13. NATO, Meeting of the NAC in Defense Ministers Session, M-NAC(DM)2(96)89 Committee, Brussels, 13 June 1997
    
14. For a recent description of NATO's storage capabilities for B-61 free-fall-bombs see Otfried Nassauer, et al.: "U.S. Nuclear NATO Arsenals 1996-97", BASIC-BITS Research Note 97.1, Berlin/London/Washington, February 1997.
    
15. See Otfried Nassauer: "Sea-launched Cruise Missiles in NATO Nuclear Planning", BASIC Report 90.3, London/Washington, 1990. During times of peace, these weapons are stored ashore in the United States.
    
16. The UK decision to give some of its Trident missiles a sub-strategic mission adds substantial range and precision to NATO's sub-strategic capabilities, while in respect to targets (e.g. on Russian soil) creating a substantial risk of fatal misperceptions. Russia's ballistic missile early-warning system easily could prove unable to distinguish between the launch of a sub-strategic Trident SLBM and the launch of such a missile representing the initial launch within the context of a strategic attack.
    
17. This aspect might be of specific importance for NATO's strategy review, since the US adopted a new nuclear doctrine in November 1997, substantially emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts. See R. Jeffrey Smith: Clinton Directive Changes Strategy on Nuclear Arms, Washington Post, 7 December, 1997.
    
18. Consequently, Germany, since the end of 1995, maintains only its Tornado fighter bombers at Buechel Air Base fully trained and ready to undertake nuclear missions, while formerly "nuclear" units at Noervenich and Memmingen have been assigned reduced readiness status. Today, no nuclear weapons are stored at these formerly nuclear bases. For additional details see: Otfried Nassauer, et al.: "U.S. Nuclear NATO Arsenals 1996-97", BASIC-BITS Research Note 97.1, Berlin/London/Washington, February 1997.
    
19. NATO, "Study on Enlargement", Brussels, September 1995.
    
20. NATO, "Founding Act on Mutual Relations cooperation and security between NATO and the Russian Federation", Paris, 27 May, 1997, p. 8.
    
21. Centre for European Security and Disarmament: "NATO-Russia Establish Nuclear Weapons Working Group", Brussels: CESD NATO Briefing, 4 December 1997.

This research note was written by:

Otfried Nassauer, Director and Oliver Meier, Senior Analyst, Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BITS), with research assistance provided by Gerhard Piper

The Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BITS) is an independent research organization analyzing international security issues.

The BITS-Foerderverein e.V. is a tax exempt non-profit organization under German laws.

BITS would like to thank the W. Alton Jones Foundation for its generous support on the Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PENN), and the Ford Foundation for its generous support on the project on NATO-Russia Relations.

Back to Trans-atlantic Security Home Page