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AFGHANISTAN IN 2007: AN UPDATE AND OVERVIEW
OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
SUMMARY OF PANEL DISCUSSION
Sponsored by BASIC and the George Washington
University Conflict Prevention Forum
March 27, 2007 10:00-11:00 am
at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George
Washington University
1957 E St. St., NW, 6th Floor, Washington, DC
The conflict in Afghanistan returned to
headlines across the globe in 2006 as a resurgent Taliban
conducted a bloody campaign aimed at destabilizing the central
government. The violence claimed 4,000 lives, many of them
Afghan civilians. The immediate threat posed by the insurgency,
however, threatens to derail progress achieved since 2001.
This panel discussion explored the role and operations of
Afghan and international forces in achieving security and
discussed topics such as the development of Afghan national
forces, civil-military relations, and the mission of international
military forces.
Panelists:
Professor
Ali Jalali, former Interior Minister of Afghanistan
and Distinguished Professor at the National Defense University
Dr.
Seth Jones, Political Analyst, the RAND Corporation
Homira
Nassery, former USAID contractor in Afghanistan
Cameron
Scott, Program Associate, BASIC
Moderator: Steven
Monblatt, BASIC's Co-Executive Director in Washington,
DC
Summaries of the Panelists' Presentations.
Cameron Scott
Cameron Scott discussed how Afghanistan's search for security
and stability is hindered by many problems at present, many
of which are related to poor governance. Issues such as corruption,
an unreliable judicial system, a lack of economic development
and poor provision of public services all contribute to the
current crisis. Mr. Scott maintains that none of these problems
are military in nature and cannot be solved by military action.
Yet he adds that there is a need for military action at this
stage to complement the political strategy, and the deaths
of 4,000 Afghans in insurgency-related violence should bear
witness to this unfortunate reality. NATO's International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has and will continue to
play a critical role in this struggle, and can give crucial
support to the political ends of the Afghan government. Violence
skyrocketed in 2006, and witnessed the use of methods previously
rare to Afghanistan such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
and suicide bombings. While civilians suffered most from this,
security forces were primary targets as well.
Mr. Scott argued that ISAF must do more if it
is to succeed, however, because it cannot pursue a clear hold
and build strategy with its current force levels. Shortfalls
of troops and equipment, as well as operational caveats placed
on some contingents by their governments, hinder the ability
of ISAF commanders to make complete and appropriate use of
all available resources. He also emphasized how ISAF must
take utmost care to protect civilians and infrastructure in
order to establish conditions for reconstruction to continue,
and using discriminating force when engaging insurgents. He
believes that in time the Afghan national security forces
will assume full responsibility for protecting civilians and
defeating the insurgency, but forces that began to be built
from scratch just 5 years ago must be given time to develop;
while international forces must continue to assist in this
development, they must shoulder the responsibility of security
provision for the short-term future.
Seth Jones
Seth Jones has conducted extensive research on the role of
international forces and  insurgencies.
In his research, he has found that three main factors are
the most important when defeating an insurgency: (1) The capability
and legitimacy of indigenous forces, especially police; (2)
The quality of the local government; and (3) The amount of
external support provided to insurgents. On average, it takes
14 years to win a counter-insurgency conflict.
Mr. Jones has been to Afghanistan 12 times.
While the media often report that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda
are the main insurgents, there are actually at least 6 groups
(1) Taliban; (2) Jalaluddin Haqqani network; (3) Hezb-i-Islami
Gulbuddin (HIG); (4) foreign fighters; (5) Pakistani and Afghan
tribes; and (6) criminal groups. These networked insurgencies
have increased their attacks since the 2001 invasion by U.S.-led
forces and sanctuaries in Pakistan have only helped to sustain
insurgents.
He noted that efforts to build security forces
have been limited in their success and in particular, progress
in creating police forces has been abysmal. Military may need
to be involved to provide security, but they should not be
the primary actors in reconstruction. Mr. Jones warned that
trends in the South and East of the country were not good
and said that a political and diplomatic initiative with Pakistan
is needed to get a handle on the insurgent sanctuary problem.
Ali Jalali
Ali Jalali acknowledged that the international community has
understood that there are multifaceted aspects to security
in a post-conflict society. But what happened in Afghanistan
was predictable and preventable. The U.S.-led invasion was
for the purpose of destroying Osama bin Laden and the Taliban,
not to reconstruct Afghanistan. Indeed, one of the key problems
has been the lack of a unified vision for Afghanistan, and
this is very important for the development of the security
sector. There has been too much emphasis on the military aspects
of security. Rather there should be a greater emphasis on
human/civilian aspects of security and winning hearts and
minds should be the aim, not the means. The international
community is creating security forces to secure the government,
foreign personnel and other security forces, but not necessarily
to secure the Afghan people.
Mr. Jalali argued that armies are built in decades,
not years, and this happens by forces living, fighting and
dying together. Until they have this cohesive professionalism,
the Afghan Army will still need the support of foreign assistance.
In addition, a state solution must make the state legitimate
and loving in the eyes of its people and this is not happening.
Even though Afghanistan is a weak state, it is a strong nation.
The problem lies with the country's dearth of resources and
this has made the creation of a centralized government that
has power extending to its peripheries very difficult. Afghanistan
will need at least another 15-20 years for this to happen
and until then, the country will require international assistance.
Homira Nassery
Homira Nassery approaches the problems facing Afghanistan
as a development specialist. During her visits to Afghanistan,
she has concluded that the number one issue with which Afghans
are concerned is security. The main reason Afghans have given
for supporting the Taliban was that they provided for security
in the absence of the rule of law.
Ms. Nassery observed that no implementing partners
(civilian personnel) have wanted to openly associate with
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) because by doing so
they could be perceived as being "spies." However,
there is a need for more collaboration between the two groups
when things get bad. That being said, each party should do
what it does best. The military should focus on security and
development agencies should provide assistance.
 She
reviewed the things that ISAF has done right, such as inter-cultural
instruction, and the development of transport and infrastructure.
But she also spelled out the sectors for the military to avoid,
such as economic development, health, education, and social
protection. Development agencies also face challenges. They
are often advised to confer with local authorities when distributing
aid, but they need to be careful because the self-interest
of these authorities can often lead to inequities. Ultimately,
however, transparency and corruption are everybody's responsibility
and people at every level should report corruption.
Ms. Nassery concluded that when working on the
ground in Afghanistan, there is a need to include all tribes
in community initiatives, and that more cooperation is needed
between agencies, although competition has been more common.
Working with traditional and existing groups is important
just as working with newer structures is critical. However,
we should always expect a certain amount of disconnect between
the center and the field.
Biographies
of Participants
Suggested Reading
"Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan."
CSIS. March 2007. Available online at: http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,3740/
Chayes, Sarah, The Punishment of Virtue:
Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban, New York: Penguin
Group. 2006.
"Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency: No Quick
Fixes." International Crisis Group. November 2006. Available
online at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4485&l=1
Jalali, Ali, "The Legacy of War and the Challenge
of Peace Building." Building a New Afghanistan. Robert
Rotberg, ed. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press and
the World Peace Foundation. 2007.
---- "The Future of Afghanistan." Parameters. Spring 2006.
Available online at: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06spring/jalali.pdf
---- "Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Services U.S.
House of Representatives." January 30, 2007. Full transcript
available online at: http://www.ndu.edu/nesa/docs/webfile/jalalitestimony30jan07.pdf
---- "Combating Opium in Afghanistan," with Robert Hunter,
Zoe Williams. Strategic Forum, November 2006. Available online
at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF224/SF224.pdf
Jones, Seth, "Afghanistan's Local Insurgency."
New York Times, Feb. 1, 2007.
----"Averting Failure in Afghanistan." Survival, Vol.
48, No. 1, Spring 2006.
----“Pakistan’s Dangerous Game." Survival, Vol.
49, No. 1, Spring 2007. Available on Carleton University's
Website: http://www.carleton.ca/csds/Jones%20Pakistan.pdf
Rotberg, Robert, ed. Building a New Afghanistan.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press and the World
Peace Foundation. 2007.
Scott, Cameron, "Assessing ISAF: A Baseline
Study of NATO's Role in Afghanistan." BASIC Report.
March 2007. Available online at http://www.basicint.org/europe/NATO/afghanistan.pdf
BASIC would like to thank the George Washington
University for the use of their facilities and assistance
with this event.
We would also like to thank BASIC's funders
for making events like this possible.
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