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European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

European Defense:
Not More Tanks, More Cops

23 November 1999

By Jonathan M. White

From Kennedy's Grand Strategy to Nixon's attacks on those "free-riding Europeans" and from the INF debate to Clinton's Transatlantic Agenda of the 1990s, the question of burden sharing between the US and the Europeans within NATO has always played a role in shaping the security debate. In the wake of the recent Kosovo air campaign this issue has revived. US preponderance in terms of aircraft utilized, weapons delivered and sea power demonstrated serious disparities between the US and its European partners (the US provided 70% of the aircraft and 80% of total weapons delivered). As a result, the Europeans are eagerly pursuing the development of common defense capacities and their European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) to address these supposed inadequacies. A closer examination reveals that the real capacity gap is not in weaponry but in ready peacekeeping, monitoring and policing capacity.

But, from both sides of the Atlantic there is the tendency to see the problem as one of aggregate defense spending. US policy makers point out that the NATO European defense spending is about half of that of US's. It is assumed that to acquire the advanced weapons, command and control systems and airlift necessary to develop mobile, autonomous military capacities European spending must increase. Some Europeans see spending increases a prohibitive when faced with the constants of the Maastrict criteria that is required for entry into the euro zone. In addition the depreciation of the euro since its launch in January 1999 has reduced the dollar value of European defense budgets by 7% in real terms. Currency pressure may likely shift European policies toward the more competitive export defense markets and away from the costly acquisition of the US technology that is much needed. Increased defense spending by NATO's new members, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic seems even more unlikely as their priorities will continue to be the economic and social aspects of transition.

However, this line of thinking is unfounded. The solution to the capability gap does not exclusively lie with increased defense spending, but rather with the way Europeans spend their money. Currently NATO Europe possesses the "raw materials" necessary for creation of an expeditionary capacity. France, Germany, the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Norway could potentially handle one regional conflict. Their combined tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers, helicopters and fighter aircraft would be sufficient enough to outfit a dozen modern ground divisions of US Army-size and a comparable number of fighter wings. These eight European countries could muster about 1.5 million troops.

There are three problems though. First, apart from Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK and partly France, the armies of Europe depend on conscription to fill the ranks. Many are not legally or practically deployable overseas. Second, Europe lacks airlift transport and the logistical capabilities to project such a force over long distances. Many European governments resist relinquishing the last bastion of national sovereignty, their defense industries, in the name of a common European cause. Until they do so a much less efficient defense-industrial base in Europe will fail to form conglomerations similar to those created in the US during the 1980s and to reorient capital toward the production of strategic transport. Although the Europeans allocate roughly half of what the Americans do toward defense, they have less than 10% of the US transportable defense capability because they have no financial interests in such procurements. Thirdly, while NATO's Combined Joint Task Force offers a basic framework for coordination, ESDI cannot begin the vital work it intends until the issue of developing real capacities is even addressed.

The top priority must be to address the imbalance with non-military conflict prevention budget. The total European and US contribution is far less than the cost of a single fighter plane. Next spring will probably bring renewed conflict in the Balkans. Yet again we will have few options between talking and bombing. There are no permanent standby monitors or police. Senior NATO commanders as well as many diplomats are crying out for this kind of low level capability, but US and European politicians and ministries are too hidebound in their thinking to create such capabilities.

The UK and France would serve their own and the wider interest by concentrating in this area as they try to take the lead in this area. The savings earned by spending more wisely and through a common European defense market should go toward preventative initiatives that encourage regional stability and raise the threshold for the costly deployment of such forces.

* Austria, Finland, Ireland & Sweden

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