A Constructive EU-US Approach to the Iran
Nuclear Dispute
Statement - 6 December 2005
The breakdown of negotiations between Iran and the
E3/EU* threatens to become a full-scale crisis unless all sides
adopt a more constructive and flexible approach.
Iran claims that its development of nuclear power
is benign, but like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
we are not yet convinced that this is the case. Iran's cooperation
with international inspections has helped to build some confidence,
but it remains uncertain whether Tehran is seeking to acquire a
threshold nuclear weapons capability. International concern is
fully justified by Iran's past concealment of important parts of
its nuclear programme (such as the Natanz uranium enrichment
facility) and the wholly unacceptable threats towards Israel
re-iterated recently by President Ahmadinejad.
We strongly agree that the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by Iran or any other existing non-nuclear weapon
state would be destabilizing and dangerous and must be avoided.
However in our judgement the current strategy of the EU and the
United States is unlikely to achieve this important objective. We
offer the following guidance on how to achieve the desired
outcome.
The failures so far
The EU initially entered into what seemed to be constructive
negotiations with Iran. However, inflexible negotiating positions
on both sides of the table have damaged the prospects of a
negotiated settlement. The EU's rigid demands are particularly
difficult to fathom. Despite the lack of clear treaty backing, EU
negotiators insist that the Iranian government abandon all efforts
to produce nuclear fuel. But it is evident that the incentives
offered by the EU to persuade Iran to voluntarily forego these
treaty rights have been insufficient. Furthermore threats to refer
Iran to the UN Security Council (UNSC) lack credibility without
widespread international support.
A great deal of political capital was expended by the EU-US in
securing a resolution at the IAEA governing board in September,
which declared Iran in "non-compliance" with the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), but deferred a decision on referral to the UNSC until
some later date. But it is evident that, as things currently stand,
reaching agreement on actual referral and then, an appropriate form
of punitive sanctions within the UNSC, will be even more difficult
and divisive.
While these weaknesses in EU diplomacy are serious, the Iranian
government's behaviour also continues to jeopardise prospects for
resolving this dispute. In addition to the President's recent
threat against Israel, the Iranian government has failed to
cooperate adequately with IAEA inspections. The Iranian Parliament
continues to refuse to ratify the Additional Protocol to its
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, which would
formalise increased IAEA access to Iran's nuclear sites. Finally,
Iran's resumption of uranium conversion at Esfahan and continued
construction of the heavy water plant at Arak, although lawful, has
raised tensions further. These actions serve to make constructive
dialogue more difficult.
In parallel the failure of the US government to attempt any
meaningful diplomacy with Iran or to rule out military action has
also been damaging. US policy appears to be based on the premise
that Iran's further isolation will prompt regime change. Such a
policy is fanciful, almost certainly counter-productive and no
substitute for the proper engagement which is now urgently
needed.
Stereotyping of Iran and Islamic culture, often latched on to by
Western media - of bearded fanatics, support for suicide bombers
and veiled gunmen - is also hindering progress. It is important to
offer a truer, broader picture of contemporary life in Iran.
Otherwise similar half-truths and manufactured fears to those that
were used to build support against Iraq may be used to demonise
Iran.
The way forward: Iran
Public pronouncements by EU and US policymakers and opinion
shapers too often fail to reflect that Iran is a complex country.
While there are clearly highly reactionary elements within the
Iranian government and the state apparatus is used to perpetuate
human rights abuses, the country has a rich culture and history,
containing people with technological, economic and political
aspirations and understandable fears of foreign attack. A limited
vision can only feed tensions between Iran and the West. The
current nuclear dispute is not the cause, but a symptom, of a
failed relationship. It is this relationship that must, in the
long-term, be improved if further political crises like the present
one are to be avoided.
In the short-term, we believe the best strategy lies with
ensuring that controls over Iran's nuclear fuel cycle are fair and
equitable. And to satisfy international concerns, Tehran should
accept an intrusive nuclear inspections regime going beyond what is
stipulated in its Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA.
While it would be preferable in the long-term for Iran, as well
as other countries, to rely on other, safer energy sources, the EU
and US governments must recognise that, without evidence of nuclear
weapons development, their entitlement and ability to impose
restrictions on Iran's nuclear programme are limited.
In this context, and in the light of proposed US nuclear
cooperation with India (a non-NPT state), the EU-US insistence that
Iran permanently shuts down much of its nuclear fuel activities are
not backed by the NPT and appear discriminatory. It may also
reinforce perceptions among Muslims that the US and EU wish to
relegate them to second-class status. US and British plans to
update their own nuclear arsenals, also exposes them to charges of
hypocrisy. Finally, states within the Non-Aligned Movement in
particular see Iran as the 'thin end of the wedge', and fear that
the US-EU axis will also attempt to restrict their access to
nuclear power technologies.
Without flexibility on the key issue of Iranian nuclear fuel
production there is little prospect of either reaching agreement
with Iran or, alternatively, building the strong international
consensus for dealing with the Iranian 'nuclear dossier'.
Since best estimates suggest that Iran is several years and
possibly a decade away from any potential nuclear weapon we
recommend a renewed EU-US effort to constructively negotiate a more
equitable agreement with the Iranian government.
Such an agreement might include acceptance by Iran to:
- establish a continuous, in-country IAEA inspections regime with
the power to visit any site, with due regard to Iran's sovereignty
and security;
- permanently cease construction of the heavy water reactor at
Arak, which is a dangerous potential source of plutonium for
nuclear weapons;
- relinquish any ambitions to reprocess spent nuclear fuel, which
can be more easily diverted for nuclear weapons, and
- permanently renounce its rights under Article X of the NPT to
withdraw from the IAEA safeguards regime, or failing that, enact
domestic legislation that binds the Iranian government to a
non-nuclear weapon policy indefinitely.
These concessions could be made in exchange for:
- international acceptance of a limited 'front end' nuclear fuel
production capability in Iran, possibly including the production of
low-enriched uranium , under the extensive safeguards described
above, and;
- a precise and detailed plan of action addressing Iran's
economic and security concerns.
This is only one potential formula. The Iranian government has
already said that it is prepared to accept vigorous inspections and
complete transparency of its nuclear fuel cycle activities. Iran's
President has also stated that the deployment of nuclear weapons
would break Islamic law, as has Iran's Supreme Leader. The Iranian
government should therefore have no objection to renouncing its
right to leave the NPT.
The way forward: global control of dangerous
nuclear materials
Under Article IV of the NPT it is lawful for Iran to develop a
nuclear power programme under IAEA safeguards, even if it reaches a
threshold capability to build nuclear weapons. Many other states
currently have this threshold status. The inherent dual-use nature
of nuclear energy is the 'Achilles Heel' of the NPT, one that the
international community must urgently resolve.
While most non-nuclear weapon states are reluctant to give up
their rights under Article IV they may be prepared to entertain a
new regulatory approach to the nuclear fuel cycle provided
that:
- it is realised by universal principles applying to all states;
and
- the nuclear weapon states take additional, meaningful steps
towards nuclear disarmament and commit to the same
constraints.
The full commitment by the US government to this multilateral
approach is necessary if a new and stronger global system of
nuclear controls is to emerge.
In addition, given that nuclear power remains a highly
controversial energy choice for economic, environmental and
security reasons, an International Sustainable Energy Fund (ISEF)
should be established by the G8 to offer a realistic alternative to
'Atoms for Peace'.
Conclusion
Iranians are a proud and patriotic people. US and EU policies
that appear to discriminate against Iran are likely to strengthen
domestic support for the present government and its pursuit of
nuclear technology and limit international pressure on Iran.
The present EU-US strategy is only likely to push Tehran
eastwards, building further economic and political relations with
Russia, China and India. Russia is keen to remain the principal
supplier and therefore controller of Iranian nuclear technology.
China and India depend increasingly upon oil and gas contracts with
Iran for future economic growth. The US and EU have to recognise
the limits of their influence and their threats. Russia, China and
India could play a decisive and positive role, if given the chance.
They are likely to support efforts that avoid conflict but also
prevent the emergence of a nuclear-armed regime in Tehran.
If negotiations are not revived this dispute may lead to
stalemate at the UNSC. This could leave the Iranians with
sufficient wriggle-room to develop their nuclear weapons capability
transparently and under existing safeguards. Continued allusions by
US officials to the prospect of military action also give the
Iranian government a powerful incentive to double their efforts in
this direction. Should these events occur, the prospect of military
action against Iran by either the US or Israel cannot be excluded.
Such action would be a disaster for global and regional security
and must be avoided. Diplomacy and creative compromise on all sides
are the only acceptable choice.
*E3/EU refers to the parties that have conducted negotiations
with Iran on the nuclear issue, being the Foreign Secretary of the
United Kingdom, the Foreign Ministers of France and Germany, and
the EU High Representative for Common Foreign & Security
Policy. For simplicity, we use EU to refer to this group.
Signatories
Affiliations are for purpose of identification only.
Dr Ali Ansari, School of History, University of St Andrews
(UK)
General Sir Hugh Beach (UK)
Janet Bloomfield, British Co-ordinator, Atomic Mirror (UK)
Martin Butcher, Director of Security Programs, Physicians for
Social Responsibility (PSR) (US)
Lotte Christy, Master of Mediation and Conflict Resolution
(Denmark)
Dr Andrew Cottey Senior Lecturer and Jean Monnet Chair in European
Political Integration, Departmenrt of Government, University
College Cork (Ireland)
David Culp, Legislative Representative, Friends Committee on
National Legislation (Quakers) Washington, D.C. (US)
Professor Alex Danchev, School of Politics and International
Relations, University of Nottingham (UK)
Dr Ian Davis, Executive Director, BASIC (UK)
Brian Eno, musician and writer (UK)
George Farebrother, Secretary, World Court Project UK
Dr Trevor Findlay, Director, Canadian Centre for Treaty
Compliance; Associate Professor Norman Paterson School of
International Affairs (Canada)
Air Marshal the Lord Garden KCB (UK)
Professor Heinz Gärtner, Austrian Institute for International
Affairs (Austria)
Jonathan Granoff, President, Global Security Institute (US)
Professor Nick Grief, Bournemouth University (UK)
Sir David Hare, Playwright (UK)
Professor Alastair Hay OBE BSc PhD, Molecular Epidemiology Unit,
University of Leeds (UK)
Hazel Henderson, author, Beyond Globalization and Planetary
Citizenship, (US)
Professor Robert Hinde, CBE, FRS, FBA, Chair, British Pugwash
(UK))
Rt Revd Richard Harries, Bishop of Oxford (UK)
Dr Raymond Hinnebusch, Professor of International Relations and
Middle East Politics, University of St. Andrews (UK)
Lorelei Kelly, Project Leader "Tools for Progress:Reframing
National Security" (US)
Michael Klein, former US Army Officer and CEO of Prya Capital UK
(UK)
Dr Claus Kold, The Turning Point (Denmark)
Karel Koster, Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation
(Netherlands)
Kevin Martin, Executive Director, Peace Action and Peace Action
Education Fund (US)
Ms. Peggy Mason, Former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament to the
UN; Chair of the UN Expert Study on Verification 1994-95
(Canada)
Dr Trevor McCrisken, Lecturer in American Politics and
International Studies, University of Warwick (UK)
Jack Mendelsohn, Adjunct Professor, The Elliott School of
International Affairs, George Washington University and former
Senior Foreign Service Officer, US Department of State (US)
Alistair Millar, Director, Washington Office, Fourth Freedom Forum
(US)
Carol Naughton, independent nuclear weapons consultant (UK)
Dr Daniel N. Nelson, Dean, University of New Haven and Senior
Consultant, Global Concepts, Inc. (US)
Rabbi Julia Neuberger (UK)
Dr Götz Neuneck, Institute for Peace Research and Security
Policy (IFSH), University of Hamburg (Germany)
Dr Gerd Nonneman, Reader in International Relations & Middle
East Politics, & former Executive Director of the British
Society for Middle Eastern Studies (UK)
Dr Jan Oberg, Director of the Transnational Foundation, TFF
(Sweden)
Dr Vladimir A. Orlov, Director of the Moscow-based PIR Center
(Center for Policy Studies in Russia) and Co-Director, ETC Program
at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (Russia)
Dr. Miriam Pemberton, Research Fellow, Foreign Policy In Focus,
Institute for Policy Studies (US)
Dan Plesch, Research Associate, Centre for International Studies
and Diplomacy, School of Oriental and African Studies, University
of London (UK)
Malcolm Savidge, Parliamentary Consultant, Oxford Research Group,
former MP for Aberdeen North:1997-2005 (UK)
Baroness Scott of Needham Market (UK)
Professor John Sloboda, Executive Director, Oxford Research Group
(UK)
Dr Phyllis Starkey MP, Chair of the All-Party Parliamentary
Britain-Iran Group (UK)
Hans von Sponeck, Former UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq
(Germany)
Becky Tinsley, Director, Waging Peace (UK)
Dr. Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Endowment, Moscow (Russia)
Professor Biljana Vankovska, University of Skopje, Macedonian
Helsinki Committee on Human Rights (Macedonia)
Mazin Younis, Iraqi Human Rights activist (UK)
Dr Helen Zealley OBE MD FRCPE FFPH, Chair of Friends of the Earth,
Scotland (UK)
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