ENGAGING IRAN
Strategies of Engagement
Including:
General considerations behind engagement
Back to the main page on Iran
Aggressive engagement with Iran will have a widespread regional
impact (see military force below). However, there are equally compelling
reasons against concessions with the Iranian regime if they are
indeed pursuing nuclear weapons. Cooperation risks undermining the
NPT by encouraging other states to push the boundaries and acquire
nuclear weapons capabilities; and it risks damaging the international
line against Iranian social and human rights policies.
SUMMARIES OF SELECTED ARTICLES
Defusing
Iran's Bomb
Henry Sokolski - Hoover Institution Policy Review - June
2005
Pessimistic about the chances of any strategy being able to
stop Iran from developing a nuclear bomb, Sokolski focuses
on ways of minimising the damage to the US and raising the
costs to Iran. A nuclear Iran risks regional proliferation,
heightened oil prices, and more terrorism. Sokolski calls
for the US to remain united with its European and Middle Eastern
allies.
Deter
and Contain: Dealing with a Nuclear Iran
Michael Eisenstadt - Nonproliferation Policy Education
Center - 1 March 2005
Despite assertions by some that Iran is an irrational, undeterrable
state, Eisenstadt defends the prospects of successful deterrence.
The key problems are the factionalism of the Iranian regime,
the implications of Iran as a nuclear state-sponsor of terrorism,
and the impact on proliferation given any domestic instability.
Eisenstadt outlines methods to counter Iran’s nuclear threat,
including the strengthening of regional allies. However, he
dismisses the practicality of any short-term possibility for
using Iraq as a regional counterweight.
|
Military Force
President Bush has several
times obliquely referred to the option of military force against
Iran to prevent their development of a nuclear capability, sparking
debate within Washington. Some refer to the apparently successful
Israeli strike against the fledgling Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor
back in 1981. Others see this as simply having driven Iraqi nuclear
research underground. With ground troops tied up in Iraq, few predict
a ground invasion. More likely, given military capacity and current
doctrine is a series of specific air strikes aimed at key targets.
There are several reasons why an extensive air strike is unlikely
to be successful in preventing the Iranians developing a nuclear
capability:
- The Iranians have learned from Saddam’s experience. Their nuclear
facilities are much more extensive, and a good deal lies hidden
underground. The probability that any US or Israeli attack could
eliminate Iran’s nuclear program is small.
- Iran would most likely withdraw from the NPT, end any negotiations
process, and begin a new, accelerated program.
- Any strikes would strengthen the regime’s resolve and arm them
with regional backing and popular domestic support. American and
Israeli intervention has long been the root and target of much
hatred across the region.
- They could retaliate either directly, against shipping in the
Straights of Hormuz or other valuable soft targets, or indirectly,
through sponsored military organisations such as Hezbollah against
civilian targets. They could attempt to foment a Shia uprising
in Iraq.
SUMMARIES OF SELECTED ARTICLES
Deterring
a Nuclear Iran
Jason Zaborski - Summer 2005, The Washington Quarterly
Will
Iran Be Next?
Mark Gaffney - 8 May 03, Information Clearing House
Will Iran be next? An article suggesting that military action
against Iraq is only the start of a rash of military action
against middle eastern nations. With Russia intent on supplying
nuclear technology and products, and calls from Israel and
elsewhere to take action against Iran, it is argued that military
action is inevitable. As the US has invaded Iraq as opposed
to nuclear armed N. Korea, Iran is likely to be developing
nuclear weapons in an attempt to discourage American action.
The author supports the idea that action would most likely
come in the form of a strike against the Bushehr reactor.
Diplomacy
only option to resolve Iran's nuclear dispute
HC/2322/1432 - 24 May 2005, Islamic Republic News Agency
Senior members of the International Institute for Strategic
Studies think the US has little option but to encourage diplomacy
with Iran over its nuclear enrichment programme. The Institute
argues that a US led invasion would need considerable personnel
backing from allied countries, while air strikes would only
cause the Iranians to pull out of the NPT and speed up the
armament process. In this analysis, Israel is also considered
unlikely to act unilaterally, considering the possible retaliation
from groups such as Hizbollah. Here, Iran is also expected
to continue suspension of the enrichment programme, until
it feels strong enough, despite warnings of referral to the
UN Security Council. The Institute also conceded that Iran
may stay in the NPT until near ‘break out’, but points out
that possessing a nuclear weapon may be some years in the
future.
Iran
Nuclear Weapons
Sharon Otterman - 25 November 2003, Council on Foreign
Relations
A summary of key points surrounding the issue, with a relatively
upbeat assessment of the likelihood of military action. Discussion
of the possibility of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme
is included.
Commentary:
The Dynamic of War
Arnaud de Borchgrave - 29 April 2005, Washington Times
The Washington Times argues that action taken by the US on
Iran could seriously undermine efforts in Iraq considering
the porous border between the two countries, and the regimes
links with groups such as Hezbollah that may retaliate on
Israeli targets.
The
Least Bad Iran Option
Jeffrey Bergner - 7 March 2005, The Weekly Standard
This author argues that the EU- 3 talks are doomed to failure,
as Iran has little incentive to take up the Europeans negotiating
offer. When this happens, further negotiations involving the
US are unlikely to affect Iran’s nuclear ambitions, as is
a referral to the UN Security Council. Unilateral action,
to avoid the veto probably laid down by China or Russia in
the event of UN referral is also considered highly improbable,
as Europe would take the brunt of the economic disadvantages,
and would have to have to renegade on its generally pro UN
stance. The only alternative is to carry out military strikes,
which would be the most effective in delaying Iran’s alleged
nuclear weapons policy. This, however, would lead to the continued
spread of anti-Americanism, and possibly terrorism.
Attacking
Iran: I know it sounds crazy, but...
Ray McGovern - 2 March 2005, ZNet
Article by former CIA analyst Ray McGovern outlining his view
on current US policy on Iran and Israel. Topics include possible
reasons both for and against air strikes on Iran at the present
time. He also cites the threat from Israel, backed by Washington
as being central to any Iranian quest for nuclear weapons.
The author also argues that Israel is also the key hinderance
to a Nuclear Free Middle East, however when this is pointed
out in Washington, the ‘issue is then dropped from all discussion
by U.S. policymakers’, who side with Israel.
Symposium:
The Showdown
Jamie Glazov - 29 July 2005, FrontPageMagazine.com
Right wing thinkers discuss steps that the US should be taking
against Iran to ensure it does not achieve a nuclear weapons
capability.
A Preemptive
Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences
Sammy Salana and Karen Ruster - CNS - July 2004
The article outlines the likely targets of any military
strike against Iran, and the consequences of such an attack.
The authors assert that Iran would be emboldened, and the
chance of its gaining nuclear weapons increased in the long
run. They also cover the impact on Iran’s domestic politics,
the IAEA and NPT, the politics of the region, Iraq and terrorism,
and the overall interests of the United States, including
their relations with Russia.
|
Non-Military Threats
"We're supporting the diplomacy, but everybody has said, all of
us united, including the EU-3, that if the Iranians decide that
they won't take this way out [negotiations], then the international
community has other options like the Security Council."
Condoleezza Rice, Fox & Friends, June 2005
Referral to the Security Council has become the common threat used
by both the United States and the Europeans. This is an escalator
threat, starting with sanctions. Yet there are reasons to question
its efficacy:
IAEA inspectors state that, though Iran has been less than forthcoming
in declaring some of its facilities, they have not found any evidence
of a nuclear weapons programme.
Key states such as Russia and China are openly opposed to any significant
UN action against TeheranWhile encouraging Iran to import nuclear
materials from abroad and return the spent fuel, Russian Energy
Minister Alexander Rumyantsev commented in July 2005 that: "Iran
is legally entitled to produce its required atomic fuel”. Whilst
Moscow and Beijing may abstain on any resolution rebuking Teheran,
they would ensure that any resolution was weak (see Russia
and China)
The United States already has widespread economic sanctions against
Iran, and any third-party firms doing business there. But they would
have to consider carefully any threat to withdraw trade relations,
as this may simply push the Iranians east towards China and India.
What is a Credible Threat?
The Cold War gave rise to considerable discussion of deterrence
within the context of nuclear policy. Thomas C. Schelling
outlined three key elements to effective deterrence:
- There must be a clear and credible threat. The target
must know the stakes and must believe the punishment can
and will be carried out if they do not comply.
- The threatened punishment to the target must be sufficient
(i.e. worse than not complying).
- The target must be reassured that there will be no punishment
if it does comply, or it has no incentive to cooperate.
These points apply to threats made in negotiations as much
as they do in Cold War-type situations. Threats that are not
credible are dangerous, and escalate crises. They are often
received as insults and encourage the opposition to call the
bluff and go ahead regardless.
|
The US has already enacted harsh sanctions
against Iran and severed diplomatic relations in 1980: it has little
ability to raise these bars any higher. In contrast the EU is currently
a major trading partner for Iran. There may be some chance of gaining
E3 backing for European sanctions, although this is by no means
certain - even less so for other members of the EU. Europeans will
be reluctant to impose restrictions that will injure their own interests
whilst the jury is still out on Iranian nuclear ambitions. The experience
from sanctions against Iraq is fresh in the mind: sanctions hurt
the population and caused tremendous suffering, while to some extent
playing into the hands of the repressive regime ensuring it had
even tighter control over economic activity. The Europeans would
also have to consider carefully the international impact from any
threat to withdraw trade relations: they may simply push the Iranians
east towards China and India.
We intend to bolster our cooperation with Iran in the
domains of gas and oil extraction, transportation, North-South Corridor,
launching Zohre satellite and purchase of goods produced by the
Iranian small industries including carpets, handicrafts and foodstuff…
The volume of the trade exchanges should be increased ten times
in the future and reach 20 billion dollars.”
Statement
by Russia's Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantse, July 15
SUMMARIES OF SELECTED ARTICLES
IRAN:
Nuclear Negotiations
Lionel Beehner - 16 May 2005, Council on Foreign Relations
Article looking at the changing nature of the nuclear negotiations,
with the increasing likelihood of referral to the UN Security
Council. Action by the UN, however, would have to be backed
by Russia and others, who have significant stakes in the Iranian
energy industry. Military action, in the form of strikes on
Iran’s nuclear facilities, is agreed to be unlikely, considering
the possibility of retaliation.
US
policy towards Iran
Peter Rudolf - April 2005, SWP Comments
The US Administration’s support for the E3/EU talks does imply
that it itself its willing to engage with the Iranians...
far from it.
IRAN:
Nuclear Negotiations
Esther Pan - 14 April 2005, Council on Foreign Relations
Details of the nuclear enrichment negotiations between the
EU-3 and Iran.
Europe
is talking Iran around
Ray Takeyh - 6 May 2005, International Herald Tribune
According to this analysis, by not being more positive towards
the EU3 and Iranian negotiations, the US has only served to
isolate itself politically, especially as the IAEA has not
said that the Iranians are developing a nuclear bomb. The
reluctance of both the EU3 and the Iranians to involve the
UN would suggest as well that they will be forced to come
to an agreement. After all, in the event of being referred
to the UN Security Council, China and Russia are unlikely
to support sanctioning anyway, considering their trading ties
to the country, says the International Herald Tribune.
Another
Country
Rageh Omaar - 1 April 2005, Guardian
’As rumours persist of US plans to invade Iran, Rageh Omaar,
the face of the BBC during the Iraq war, visits Tehran - and
finds a nation far removed from the one George Bush seems
to fear’. He attempts to show that the educational levels
and economy of Iran makes sanctions and military action unlikely
to be effective.
US
funds to promote democracy in Iran
George Gedda - 11 April 2005, San Francisco Chronicle
A US initiative to provide up to $3 million to organisations
promoting democracy in Iran has been described as being in
clear violation of a US-Iranian accord. The US promised "not
to intervene directly or indirectly, politically or militarily
in Iran's internal affairs", under the 1981 U.S-Iranian agreement.
Washington argues that it is not intervening.
|
Policy thus far: Successes and Failures
|
Date
|
Event
|
|
12 August 2005
|
President George Bush warns Iran that he has not ruled out
military action to prevent them developing nuclear weapons
|
|
11 August 2005
|
IAEA Board of Governors passes resolution calling upon the
Iranians to stop enriching uranium
|
|
10 August 2005
|
Seals removed from Isfahan UCF facility instruments
|
|
31 July 2005
|
Iran announces it will resume uranium enrichment if the EU3
fail to deliver an offer by the following day.
|
|
24 June 2005
|
Election of Ahmadinejad as President.
|
|
March 2005
|
President Bush announces will back the E3/EU talks with US
incentives, including removal of US barrier to Iranian membership
of WTO and import of aircraft spare parts.
|
|
February 2005
|
President Mohammed Khatami announces that Iran will never
give up its nuclear technology, and signs agreement with Russia
on the supply of fuel for the Bushehr nuclear reactor
|
|
22 November 2004
|
Iran confirms that it is suspending uranium.
|
|
15 November 2004
|
The Paris Agreement is signed: a compromise whereby Iran
agrees to temporarily suspend its enrichment for the duration
of negotiations.
|
|
18 October 2004
|
Iran declares it is willing to negotiate with the EU3, but
will never renounce its right to enrich.
|
|
18 September 2004
|
IAEA passes a resolution calling for Iran to suspend all
activities related to uranium enrichment.
|
|
August 2004
|
Israel and Iran trade thinly-veiled threats.
|
|
27 July 2004
|
Iran resumes centrifuge production at Natanz.
|
|
14 June 2004
|
IAEA accuses Iran of "less than satisfactory" cooperation.
|
|
March 2004
|
Iran's military admits to producing P-1 type centrifuges
at an air-base near Teheran.
|
|
December 2003
|
Iran signs the Model Additional Protocol to the NPT.
|
|
26 November 2003
|
IAEA passes an EU3/US resolution warning Iran on its nuclear
programme, but does not recommend sanctions.
|
|
11 November 2003
|
IAEA reveals Iran has admitted to possessing plutonium, but
denies there is any evidence it has attempted to make a weapon
with it.
|
|
31 October 2003
|
IAEA states Iran has provided a "comprehensive" declaration
of its nuclear programme.
|
|
21 October 2003
|
Iran reaches an agreement with the IAEA, to give more transparent
access and suspend enrichment.
|
|
September 2003
|
The IAEA set a deadline of 31 October for Iran to completely
open up access to their nuclear facilities.
|
|
July - September 2003
|
IAEA resume inspections in Iran.
|
|
16 June 2003
|
IAEA report states: "Iran failed to report certain nuclear
materials and activities" and urges "co-operative actions"
- but it does not declare Iran in breach of the NPT.
|
|
February - May 2003
|
IAEA conduct inspections in Iran.
|
|
February 2003
|
Iran admits to possessing two enrichment facilities at Natanz,
and a test-bed facility at Kalaye Electric Company.
|
|
December 2002
|
The US accuses Iran of harbouring a secret nuclear weapons
programme, releasing images of sites at Natanz and Arak.
|
|
August 2002
|
A pilot uranium enrichment centrifuge plant at Natanz is
revealed in the media, courtesy of information from an Iranian
resistance group.
|
SUMMARIES OF SELECTED ARTICLES
US
Policy Towards Iran: Developments, Options and Scenarios
Peter Rudolf - German Institute for International and Security
Affairs - April 2005
The Bush administration agreed in March 2005 to offer some
limited incentives to Iran, seemingly backing the EU negotiation
process. However, Rudolf argues that this may be a superficial
gesture rather than a genuine indicator of a real change in
US policy.
What
Transatlantic Strategy on Iran?
Therese Delpech - Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- March 2005
Unlike with Iraq, Delpech notes there is no serious dispute
between Europe and the United States over the current situation
with Iran. There is a common perspective on the key issues.
However, there is no consensus on a common strategy. Exchange
of information, the absence of confrontation and the lack
of any alternative policy are more apt descriptions.
|
Back to the main page on Iran
|
