ISSUE AREAS:

ENGAGING IRAN

Iran in the Dock

Including:

• Why does Iran want nuclear power?
• Why might Iran want nuclear weapons?
• The Evidence of a Weapons Programme
• The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran

Back to the main page on Iran

Why does Iran want nuclear power?

Iran is developing an extensive nuclear programme with the aim of installing 6,000 MW of generating capacity over the next 20 years. This includes completion of the Bushehr reactor by Russia who has agreed to supply and take back used fuel. Iran also wishes to diversify nuclear generation with different types of reactors and eventually become self sufficient in fuel production. Iran has the legitimate ‘right’ to develop these facilities under Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards, as long as it clearly is not using them to develop a nuclear weapon capability. However, revelations in recent years about aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme have heightened long-standing concerns over Tehran’s ultimate intentions.

Iran’s claim that its pursuit of nuclear fuel-cycle technologies is motivated by energy needs is strongly questioned by some in Washington; they point to the considerable energy resources the country is endowed with.

Oil

After Saudi Arabia, Iran possesses the second largest oil reserves in the world, producing almost four million barrels per day across 32 oilfield sites. Iran’s peak production hit six million barrels per day in 1974. But its failure to maintain this level is not because its reserves are running low, but rather because poor management and state intervention have hindered its oil industry development. According to the US Government’s Energy Information Agency (EIA): “Iran's oil sector is considered old and inefficient, needing thorough revamping, advanced technology and foreign investment.” Those who provide this investment will acquire valuable access to Iran’s oil wealth.

Gas and renewables

Natural gas currently accounts for nearly half of Iran’s total energy consumption - yet 62% of the country’s known reserves have not been developed. Even at the largest field, South Pars, only 18 out of 28 planned phases have been completed. Indian and Chinese companies are finalising deals to invest in the gas field, which is now 80% owned by the two countries. There is a vast untapped potential for renewable energies such as solar, wind and geothermal.

Nuclear

Like many states looking to maintain a high economic growth rate as central to their national objectives, their consumption requirements are increasing rapidly. “Demographic trends and intensified industrialization have caused [energy] demand to grow by 8 percent per year,” reports a US Library of Congress country survey. Oil is a valuable generator of foreign currency; the domestic generation of electricity for nuclear power enables Iran to maintain increasingly valuable oil exports and expand domestic energy consumption.

Nuclear power has added pull for Iran. Despite its falling out of fashion in many countries as a result of catastrophic accidents, its cost and security dangers, as well as problems of waste disposal, it is still almost universally seen within Iran as a leading-edge technology that will assist Iran achieving technological modernity.

“The Iranian nation has the right to advance in all peaceful scientific fields and have access to all facilities. We need this technology in the fields of energy, medicine and engineering and for our scientific progress and will continue pursuing it.” newly elected President Ahmadinejad in June 2005

Having scientists at the forefront of research and development is highly desirable - simultaneously demonstrating and promoting advanced technology development. Nuclear power is seen as providing longevity and potentially large, sustainable output. Such a perception is supported by the international nuclear industry. “According to all the surveys performed in the power sector of Iran,” reported an IAEA survey in 2003, “the nuclear option is the most competitive to fossil alternatives.” As the global demand for oil continues to grow and production levels off, the very same pressures that lead industrialised countries such as the US and UK to consider nuclear options have an equally compelling attraction within Iran. In Europe and the US the nuclear industry has a tough selling job to do. According to the UK governments 2005 yearbook, “the economics of nuclear power make it an unattractive option for new generating capacity, and there are still important issues concerning nuclear waste to be resolved.” But in Iran such debates are not happening in the mainstream.

While there is widespread popular discontent with the theocratic regime within Iran its nuclear energy programme has become a source of considerable national pride. Commenting on the programme, the previous, reformist president Khatami said in August 2004 “This is our national interest and prestige. This is our strategy. But if they want to deny us our basic right, we and our nation have to be prepared to pay the price.”

In the 1960s, nuclear power was seen as clean safe and efficient. And ‘Atoms for Peace’ formed a key foundation stone of the NPT. But attitudes to nuclear power outside of Iran have changed over the ensuing decades. Costs have escalated, decommissioning remains a technically challenging task, and no country has yet solved the problem of waste disposal. Many countries have started to phase it out of their energy mix or have avoided it altogether. Despite a recent renaissance, owing to the decline of fossil fuels, climate change and the lobbying power of he nuclear industry, nuclear power remains a highly controversial energy choice for long-standing economic, environmental and security reasons.

Given the potential of solar power and other renewable technologies there may be no need to use nuclear power at all. But in the absence of major international cooperation and technology transfers to support Iran in developing renewable technologies, energy efficiency and new applications that are clean, safe and inexhaustible in supply, it is hardly surprising to find Iran (like many Western countries) falling back on nuclear power.

Why might Iran want nuclear weapons?

“The United States strongly believes that Iran has a clandestine program to produce nuclear weapons,” asserted John Bolton in his testimony to the US House of Representatives in June 2004. “We know that Iran has violated its NPT and IAEA commitments.” Leaving aside the veracity of these statements for a moment, there are two main reasons why Iran might be seeking to develop a nuclear weapons capability: security and prestige.

Security

Iran has clear motives for acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran has few friends and is situated in a war-plagued region (five major wars in less than 25 years) and was invaded by Iraq in 1980, a conflict that cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of Iranians. Israel is a bitter enemy with a thinly hidden nuclear arsenal. Regional rival Pakistan has an overt nuclear arsenal, while Saudi Arabia and Turkey remain American allies, with historically difficult relations with Iran.

Iran is encircled by US military forces in its neighbouring countries of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, UAE, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan (though US restrictions over the use of forces from bases in central Asia are increasingly restricted). With the US Fifth Fleet patrolling the Persian Gulf and B2 bombers operating out of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, together, US forces have the capacity to deliver simultaneously up to 10,000 independently-targetable missiles and directed bombs on Iran. The United States continues to deny diplomatic recognition to the Islamic Republic and has already occupied and enacted regime changes in two key neighbouring states: Afghanistan and Iraq. In January 2002 President Bush used his State of the Union address to declare Iran part of the Axis of Evil, along with Iraq and North Korea..

Nuclear weapons may be seen by some within Iran as a guarantee against US aggression, mindful of the care with which the US has dealt with North Korea when compared to Iraq. Continued possession and further development of nuclear weapons by the established nuclear weapon states, as well as India, Pakistan and Israel, on the grounds of national security, reinforces this point of view.

However, it is more likely that Iran’s security would be dramatically undermined as a consequence of any serious nuclear weapon program, whether open or illicit. Such a program would Increase tension in the region, and the likelihood of attack from the United States or Israel. It would also undermine Iran’s ability to engage more positively with its neighbours.

Prestige

The precedent that nuclear weapons equate to international prestige was set by the original five nuclear powers. However, the link between nuclear technology and international respect has been weakening. The development of nuclear weapons has not seen significantly different treatment afforded to India or Pakistan by the international community, indeed it could be argued that their development of nuclear weapons has been a barrier to stronger relations with the West. The current debate over Security Council membership has not involved nuclear weapon membership at all. In Iran’s case, it may actually make Iran more of a pariah state, and weaken any possible rapprochement.

The Evidence of a Weapons Programme

Nuclear weapons developments in India, Libya, North Korea and Pakistan all involved the use of civil nuclear energy as cover. It is the view of many international actors, including the United States, EU, IAEA and many others that this must not be allowed to happen again and that Iran must be held to its promises under the NPT. Most security analysts believe that the size, scale and design of Iran's known nuclear programme is not consistent with the ‘peaceful’ pursuit of nuclear energy. Moreover the discovery of secret Iranian nuclear facilities within the last few years, such as the Natanz uranium enrichment facility (which has been hardened against aerial attack) has further heightened suspicions.

Much as in Iraq before the 2003 war, the evidence about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, however compelling, is mainly circumstantial. In June 2003 the IAEA declared Iran in breach of its ‘obligations under the Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed.” While documenting Iran’s deceptions, the IAEA says it has found no conclusive evidence of a nuclear weapons programme. However, unlike the situation in Iraq in 2003, it is well established that Iran has advanced and growing nuclear capabilities, both technical and productive, which could allow it to produce nuclear weapons in the near future. For example Iran's 'dual-use' centrifuge enrichment capabilities can supply fuel for nuclear energy, but if this fuel is fed through the same process a few more times, it becomes sufficiently enriched to provide fissile material for nuclear weapons.

After some initial delay, an intensive round of discussions and inspections were instigated by the IAEA in February 2003. To date the Director General of the IAEA has provided, at three monthly intervals, two verbal and seven written reports to the 35 Member States that comprise the IAEA Board of Governors. Each successive report has provided instances of nuclear fuel cycle activities and experiments undertaken by Iran which were not declared to the IAEA. In particular uranium enrichment, uranium conversion and plutonium separation activities have been carried out in secret over a period of 18 years and on a far more sophisticated scale than anyone suspected. The reports also detail a history of “extensive concealment activities” which means the IAEA is not in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran that could be used for weapons purposes.

While latterly Iran has cooperated with the IAEA inspections in most respects and agreed in December 2003 to sign and act by the terms of an additional protocol (AP), it has yet to ratify it. Moreover, some of the initial information provided by Iran has subsequently been found to be partial or even false and Agency access has often been delayed or circumscribed.

Why some believe Iran should be denied enrichment

For the US government, and a number of other states and international actors, including it would seem, the EU-3, Iran’s record of violating its safeguards obligations and pattern of deception to date has made it unadvisable for the international community to permit Iran to produce weapon-usable uranium or plutonium. They do not believe that negotiated assurances verified by IAEA inspections can be relied upon to prevent Iran reaching the point of nuclear 'breakout'. Consequently, they are insisting that Iran must not develop nuclear weapons and that it must also abandon major 'dual use' elements of its nuclear programme - including its domestic capacity both to enrich uranium for fuel production and to separate plutonium by reprocessing. The US-EU view is that Iran should rely on guaranteed international supplies of fuel to meet its energy needs, but a great deal of further work is needed on constructing a proposal that genuinely addresses Iranian desires for security of nuclear fuel supply over the longer term.

Iran is probably positioning itself as a "virtual" or threshold nuclear weapon state, with the ability to manufacture a nuclear device within a short period from knowledge and technology devoted to nuclear power. This ‘breakout’ option would put Iran on a par with a number of 'Non-Nuclear Weapon States', such as Sweden and Japan. The difference is these states are in good standing with the international community and IAEA, while Iran is not. That is why the United States, EU-3 and others are arguing against allowing Iran access to sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle.

The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran

Direct threat to Neighbours

Concern about a nuclear Iran is greatest in Israel. Iran refuses to recognise Israel’s existence. It was recently reported that a 40ft banner used to hang outside the entrance of the foreign ministry in Teheran bearing the message: "Israel Must Burn". If Iran acquired nuclear weapons they would enter into an uneasy deterrence relationship with Israel. At present, the Israeli leadership does not appear to be in any mood to accept such a scenario. Silvan Shalom, the Israeli foreign minister, warned in March 2005: “The idea that this tyranny of Iran will hold a nuclear bomb is a nightmare, not only for us but for the whole world.”

Nuclear arms race in the Middle East

Experience has shown that countries respond rapidly with their own nuclear weapons programmes in response to the deployment of nuclear weapons by their military, political or even cultural adversaries: the Soviet Union to the United States, India to China, Pakistan to India, even France to Britain and vice versa. Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt may all fear a resurgent nuclear Iran and develop their own secret programmes. With increasingly critical global strategic resources and fierce enmities that go back generations, the introduction of more nuclear weapons into the area may be very dangerous.

An end to the global non-proliferation regime

The impact upon the already weakened Non-Proliferation Treaty may be fatal before it has time to adapt. The regime has been remarkably successful up to now in slowing the spread of nuclear weapons, but proliferation will speed up as more countries acquire them, as the norm is challenged. Iranian possession is a key watershed in this process.

Instability of Iranian political system

Iran is not a stable and nor well-developed democracy. The fact that its decision on the use of nuclear weapons is in the hands of small unaccountable group of clerics does not inspire confidence.

Link to terrorists

A nuclear Iran may make it easier for terrorist groups to gain access to nuclear weapons. As a state, Iran has sponsored groups engaged in terrorism elsewhere in the Middle East, but the greater threat may arise through unofficial links, as Iranian scientists or military officers may collaborate with such groups. A.Q. Khan’s commercial network run from Pakistan is an example of this. It is important to stress that Iran has no links with Al Qaeda groups, and Shia Iranians have a fundamental enmity with such Islamist radicals, they are highly unlikely to have any links with them.

Nuclear accident

Throughout the Cold War there were a number of accidents involving nuclear accidents that could have sparked a nuclear exchange. The command and control systems deployed by the established nuclear powers have developed through decades. There has been a great deal of concern expressed over Indian and Pakistani command and control over their warheads; clearly such concerns would be at least as deep over a nuclear Iran, particularly if they are to exist with inferior conventional capability in any uneasy deterrent relationship with Israel. The chance of a nuclear accident, through disaster, terrorist attack, or mistaken release of weapons, will increase.

Back to the main page on Iran