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Amnesty International, BASIC, International Alert,
Oxfam and Saferworld
Third Preparatory Conference, New York, USA
March 2001
How Guns Get to War Zones:
Techniques of Clandestine Arms Delivery
The transport of weapons and ammunition by air always is
an operation carried out with discretion, even when the transfer
is a legal one from one sovereign Government to another and
no international embargoes are being breached; in the case
of illicit arms transfers the degree of deceit which may be
involved is great - but so, of course, are the rewards.
Interviewed last year, Captain Brian 'Sport' Martin told
Brian Johnson-Thomas that UNITA rebels in Angola were willing
to pay him and his two colleagues 100,000 U.S dollars per
trip to fly to UNITA's secret air base, Alpha One. He described
his meeting with a UNITA Colonel:
"That was in Kigali, in a little shack. There were tiny
lights on. They put the charts on the table and I had a look
at it, and it's not a easy place to get into at night, and
they insisted on doing it at night….and you have to
come in, into a valley and up onto the runway so (makes titling
movement with hands).…come down into the valley and
up and land so you lose some of the runway because of the
angle you are at…. they have got low cloud there and
so on and the early hours of the morning and fog….you're
doing it all on GPS…. Doing an approach on the GPS
and nothing else".
This laconic account indicates clearly that aircrew who become
involved in this clandestine world are, whatever else one
may think of them, consumate aviators who are able to fly
in conditions on, or beyond, normal aviation limits.
Captain Martin again: " With the (Boeing) seven-oh (7)
you would get in just about anywhere….we landed on
1800 yards.…to me, It's proper flying, you don't talk
to anybody.…there is nobody to talk to. We do a lot
of map reading as well you know….we follow the rivers
and things like that. It's nice flying, it really is…."
EXAMPLES
1. Concealment - Transfer of ammunition from
Bratislava in the Slovak Republic, to Khartoum in Sudan, diversion
from flight plan.
The simplest method used to conceal the true destination
of an arms shipment is for the aircraft to divert from it's
approved flight plan. Documents A and B show how this works
in practice. Aircraft 9G-ROX (with Alan Maskell as Loadmaster)
is apparently flying, says document ammunition from Bratislava
in the Slovak Republic to N'Djamena in Chad. It's only when
Document B is scrutinised that we see that the aircraft actually
landed at Khartoum at a time when Sudan was under a European
Union arms embargo. Loadmaster 'Jim' and Flight Engineer 'John'
had a similar experience with nearly 5 tonnes of weapons and
ammunition that was diverted from Israel to Turkmenistan,
and ultimately Afghanistan, some seven years ago. Jim starts
the conversation:
" The first sheet here is basically the weight control
and the acceptance of the 165 boxes weighing 4474 kilos into
the security compound at Schipol airport…. Following
that one there's the actual shippers declaration for dangerous
goods, which is from a shipper called Distraco S.A 1060 Brussels
to Israel Military Industries, Ashkamat Hasharon in Israel,
P.O Box 1044…. That is supposedly where it was going….to
Tel Aviv and the listing is cartridges, small arms, 143 boxes
- that's the dangerous part of the shipment although there
was a further 22 boxes weighing just over a tonne which were
in fact weapons themselves…. Automatic rifles, pistols,
hand grenades. Certainly we did take off (from Schipol) and
go down towards the Mediterranean but at some point we did
turn left up towards the Black Sea and turned right to somewhere".
John remembers that "somewhere." "It was a military airfield
in Turkmenistan and we used to offload ammunition there for
Afghanistan."
2. Bluff - Transfer of arms from Bratislava to Guayaquil
in Ecuador, cargo deceit.
Another favourite technique is simply to declare an arms
cargo as an innocuous one. On 8th March 1995 overflying
and landing permits were sought for a giant Antonov 124 cargo
aircraft ostensibly flying a 'hospital truck and special equipments'
from Bratislava to Guayaquil in Ecuador. This was at the time
of the conflict between Peru and Ecuador when arms supplies
to both countries were notionally embargoed by the OAS. During
a routine refuelling stop in the Azores, a passing pilot was
attracted by what was, to him, a new type of aircraft and
he went aboard. It was then discovered that the cargo was
military and not medical, thus prompting the Portuguese authorities
to impound the aircraft. Document C shows the original flight
plan, documents D and E show the internal Telex messages between
shipping agents and suppliers and document F shows the amended
flight plan for '104 tons military trucks and its equipment'.
What makes this particular example interesting, of course,
is that this particular shipment was detected.
An even more common deception is for an unauthorised aircraft
to use the flight number of an authorised flight across the
State. Since most aircraft movements are scheduled, i.e. planned
well in advance, it is possible to know that, say, Flight
XYZ 123 is due to transit the airspace of Country Blank between
1310 and 1430 on Day X.
The 'rogue' aircraft presents itself to the air traffic controllers
at the right height and on the correct Airway and uses the
approved call sign, but is half an hour early, controllers
will readily accept that the aircraft has the right to be
on that route. By the time that the properly shows up the
'rogue' aircraft (traveling, remember, at around 800 kph)
has already become somebody else's problem.
SOLUTIONS
These examples highlight the need for concrete action at
the UN Conference to ensure that the illicit delivery of arms
is dealt with at international and national levels.
Enforcement of arms embargoes
Transfers of small arms should be conducted in strict accordance
with states' existing obligations under international law.
All UN member states are required to adhere to UN resolutions
by refraining from transferring arms to an embargoed country,
they are also required to take steps to enforce the embargo
against individuals within their jurisdiction. The international
community, in the form of the UN Conference, must now address
embargo enforcement, as a crucial element in the fight against
the illicit trade. States should treat any arms transfer in
breach of a UN arms embargo as a serious criminal offence
and adapt their domestic laws accordingly. To be effective
such legislation must be matched with adequate resources for
police and customs officials to ensure compliance, for example
by follow up checks to track the end-use of exports. In addition,
where appropriate the international community should offer
technical assistance and resources, particularly in the region
surrounding an embargoed county, through which are likely
transit routes, in order to enhance their national controls
and ensure stringent enforcement regimes. Targeted sanctions
should be applied against states that transfer arms in contravention
of embargoes.
Controlling legal transfers and enforcing the responsibilities
of states
Many illicit arms transfers originate as Government licensed
deals that then get diverted. Therefore in order to tackle
illicit trade of arms it is crucial to look at controls on
the "legal" trade. It is essential that global criteria governing
the transfer of small arms and light weapons are developed
at the UN Conference, based on existing commitments under
international law, as well as other areas of growing concern,
for example the need to avoid the destabilising accumulation
of weapons in a region, and the need to avoid undermining
sustainable development.
Effective control over the end-use of small arms and light
weapons when exported
All states need to strengthen their mechanisms for assuring
and monitoring the end-use of small-arms and light weapons
post-export to prevent diversion from legal markets and end
users. Many governments currently rely on paper forms of end-use
certificates that are easily forged and circumvented by unscrupulous
end users. The UN Conference is an opportunity to develop
international norms and standards governing end-use. This
could include states adopting a system whereby end-use undertakings
take the form of legally binding contract that, if broken,
would result in targeting sanctions against those responsible.
Such sanctions could include the refusal of further exports
whether under existing or new contracts, or the withholding
of spare parts and servicing.
Regulating arms brokers and shipping agents
Unlike arms manufacturers and exporters, brokers and shipping
agents are entirely unregulated. Such lack of regulation makes
it very difficult to distinguish between legitimate operators
and criminal dealers. An international convention on arms
brokering and shipping agents is under discussion at the UN
Conference. It is essential that this international convention
includes shipping agents as well. The UN conference should
play a central role in establishing agreed international definitions
and standards for addressing all aspects for the problem of
arms brokers and shipping agents. The UN agreement should
commit states to establish national laws, regulations and
procedures to regulate arms brokering activities that may
take place within their area of jurisdiction, criminalise
breaches of such regulations and monitor and enforce their
implementation.
Cargo checks
Currently, air freight documents such as air waybills
and cargo manifests, do not require detailed descriptions
or cross referencing of the goods described in arms export
and import licences. Arms have been described as agricultural
equipment, mining equipment, tents and second hand clothing.
Air freight documents should contain more detailed descriptions
or cross references of the goods described in arms export
and import licences. In addition, if the airport authorities
at certain key transit points - such as Cairo and Nairobi
- where many freighter aircraft call for fuel, were more assiduous
at checking actual cargoes carried against manifests, then
many more such anomalies would be discovered.
Documentation checks of flight path
Rigorous checks are needed in an aircraft's flight plans.
Where an aircraft has diverted to another destination to offload
cargo a close perusal of the aircraft's own documentation
would disclose discrepancies.
Aircraft registration checks
Under current systems, an aircraft registration number and
the name of the airline leasing or operating the plane can
readily be switched to conceal an operation. A cargo aircraft
might typically be registered in one country, then leased
and chartered by companies registered an other. For example,
Equatorial Guinea has acted as a "flag of convenience" by
registering planes that other countries operate. A national
authority that registers an aircraft to fly under its flag,
may also fail to ensure the air-worthiness and safety of that
plane. A legal requirement for aircraft to be registered in
countries that are operating them should be established.
For a more detailed appreciation see: "Running Guns: The
Global Black Market in Small Arms" (edited by Lora Lumpe.
London: Zed Books and New York: St Martins Press 2000) Brian
Johnson-Thomas.
For further information please contact BASIC at basicuk@basicint.org
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