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"Biting the Bullet" Briefing 3
Stockpile Security and
Reducing Surplus Weapons
By Owen Greene
Content:
1. Executive Summary
2. Stockpile Security and Reducing
Surplus Weapons
Endnotes
1. Executive Summary
Measures to enhance the security and management of legal
stocks of small arms and to reduce 'surplus' weapons are clearly
essential components of an effective international action
programmes to combat illicit trafficking and prevent and reduce
the proliferation of small arms. Many of the weapons of concern
are lost from official stockpiles through theft, corruption
or neglect. Moreover, the existence of large quantities of
'surplus' smell arms is a major factor in the excessive availability
and flows of these weapons.
The primary responsibility for measures to address these
problems lies with governments. Regional and international
organisations involved in any way with managing and disposing
of small arms also have important responsibilities to take
action. Nevertheless, this is a global issue, and the entire
international community should play a role in developing policies
on the management of stockpiles and the disposal or destruction
of surplus weapons. This briefing outlines the dimensions
of the issues, drawing on recent experience, and identifies
ways in which an international action programme could usefully
be developed to address them.
1.1 Developing international
norms and standards
There is already wide acceptance that international norms
and standards on stockpile management and surplus weapons
need to be established and developed. The United Nations General
Assembly overwhelmingly endorsed the 1997 report of the UN
Panel of Experts on Small Arms and the 1999 report of the
UN Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, both of which
made strong recommendations on the subject. In brief, these
reports recommended all States to:
-
take measures to ensure that there are adequate safeguards
to prevent the loss of weapons from official or authorised
stocks (particularly from storage facilities);
-
expeditiously destroy all confiscated or collected small
arms;
-
promote the destruction of surplus weapons; and
-
assist other States, at their request, in efforts to
carry out the above recommendations.
A number of national and regional initiatives have been taken
to ensure or promote destruction or other responsible disposal
of surplus small arms and to ensure the security of officially
held weapons. These include programmes in Southern Africa,
initiatives through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council,
and advanced efforts to develop norms and standards in the
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
In relation to stockpile security and surplus weapons, the
main objectives of the Conference on the Illicit Trade
in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, to
be convened by the UN in 2001, should be to:
-
consolidate and strengthen international norms and standards
relating to the security of small arms stocks and the
management and disposal of surplus weapons;
-
establish and strengthen international programmes and
mechanisms to promote and co-ordinate the implementation
of such norms and standards; and
-
establish follow-up processes of regular international
reviews of the adequacy and operation of such standards
and programmes, and which provide a framework to negotiate
further agreements on these issues as necessary and appropriate.
1.2 Management and security of
official stocks of small arms
The UN 2001 Conference should consolidate and elaborate the
implications of the fundamental international principle that
States and other relevant authorities have a responsibility
to ensure that authorised stocks of small arms are adequately
safeguarded against loss through theft, corruption or neglect.
This includes stocks held by armed forces, police, para-militaries,
arms manufacturers and dealers and security companies, as
well as private citizens.
To this end, the UN 2001 Conference should aim to achieve
agreement on a number of specific commitments, relating
to: national reviews of current practices; ensuring adequate
and detailed standards and procedures relating to the management
and security of their small arms stocks; establishing effective
systems for management and accountability; ensuring good record-keeping
and regular stocktaking; ensuring that losses are properly
reported and investigated; ensuring that action is taken to
rectify weaknesses; reviewing official holdings regularly
to ensure timely identification and disposal of surplus weapons;
ensuring high standards in non-state bodies authorised to
hold small arms; encouraging states to request assistance
as soon as it is needed; and ensuring that relevant international
organisations also use good practices.
To promote implementation of the above commitments, the
UN 2001 Conference should: establish international programmes
to promote good practice; establish international specialist
training programmes; and establish a UN system for emergency
assistance with arms stockpile security. An international
mechanism should also be established involving: exchanges
of information and good practice; arrangements to enhance
and co-ordinate provision of appropriate international
assistance; arrangements to encourage and help States
to notify losses or thefts of small arms; and systems
for receiving and making appropriate use of such information
on thefts or losses. The UN Secretary-General should be
requested to conduct a UN study on the ways and means
of establishing such a mechanism.
1.3 Destruction and other responsible
disposal of surplus stocks of small arms
The UN 2001 Conference should consolidate and elaborate the
implications of the international principle that all States
and other relevant authorities holding surplus small arms
are strongly encouraged to destroy them, and that the utmost
restraint should be exercised with respect to any transfers
of such weapons. Further, confiscated or collected unauthorised
(or inadequately marked) small arms should be expeditiously
destroyed (subject to the legal constraints associated with
preparing for criminal prosecutions).
To this end, the UN 2001 Conference should aim to achieve
agreement on a number of specific commitments, relating
to: conducting regular reviews of national small arms holdings;
identifying and disposing of surplus arms; adopting a norm
for the destruction of surplus small arms; promoting transparency
and awareness of surplus arms destruction processes; acting
with great restraint in authorising transfers of surplus small
arms; requiring responsible disposal of small arms that are
rendered surplus by transfers; ensuring destruction of all
confiscated, collected or inadequately marked small arms;
ensuring responsible disposal of surplus parts and components
and ammunition; requesting early assistance where necessary
for implementation of commitments; and providing assistance
in response to such requests.
To promote implementation of the above commitments, the
UN 2001 Conference should: establish international programmes
to promote good practice, identify needs, and mobilize resources.
It should also establish an international mechanism involving:
a panel of international experts to review and identify
effective techniques for the destruction of surplus arms;
consider the establishment of resource centres to facilitate
the provision of technical support and advice in mastering
and using the above techniques; information exchange
arrangements to promote appropriate transparency and
facilitate reviews of progress in destroying or disposing
of surplus arms; arrangements to facilitate
use of international observers to monitor destruction
or disposal; and arrangements to mobilise resources
to meet the needs of States and other authorities requiring
assistance in the destruction or disposal of surplus small
arms.
1.4 Follow-on mechanisms
The UN 2001 Conference should establish procedures for regular
international review of progress in implementing each of the
commitments, programmes, and measures outlined above. It should
also establish procedures for regular review of the adequacy
of such commitments and programmes and for their further development
as appropriate.
2. Stockpile Security and Reducing
Surplus Weapons
2.1 Introduction
Small arms proliferation and misuse contribute to human suffering
and insecurity throughout much of the world, and in many areas
small arms escalate, intensify and prolong conflicts and exacerbate
banditry, crime and social violence. Many of the weapons of
concern are lost from official stockpiles. Moreover, the existence
of large quantities of 'surplus' small arms is a major factor
in the excessive availability and flows of such weapons.1
Measures to ensure arms stockpile security and reduce surplus
arms are therefore a priority. The primary responsibility
for such measures lies with governments. Regional and international
organisations in any way with managing and disposing of small
arms also have important responsibilities to take action.
However, this is a global issue, and the entire international
community needs to contribute to efforts to develop policies
on the management of stockpiles and the disposal and destruction
of surplus weapons.
Next year, the United Nations (UN) will convene a conference
on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All
its Aspects. This 'UN 2001 Conference' should aim to establish
an International Action Programme on the illicit trafficking,
proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons,
as discussed in Briefing No 1 of this series.2
This international action programme should aim to establish
international norms, agreements and mechanisms to promote,
re-inforce, co-ordinate and complement national and regional
efforts to combat illicit arms trafficking, and prevent and
reduce small arms proliferation and misuse. In view of the
variety and complexity of factors contributing to these problems,
such an international action programme must be integrated
and appropriately comprehensive in scope. Many issues need
to be addressed, including: preventing and combating illicit
manufacture, transfer, possession and misuse of small arms;
strengthening controls on legal manufacture, transfer and
accumulation of small arms; reducing excessive and destabilizing
availability of such weapons in areas where their proliferation
and misuse is already a problem; and promoting a secure and
just environment for citizens and peaceful development.
Measures to enhance the security and management of legal
stocks of small arms and to reduce 'surplus' weapons are clearly
essential components of an effective international action
programme to combat illicit trafficking and prevent and reduce
the proliferation of small arms. This briefing aims to identify
and discuss ways in which these aspects of an international
action programme could usefully be developed, and how the
UN 2001 Conference should contribute.
2.2 The Problem
Vast quantities of small arms and light weapons are held
by armed forces, police and other state bodies, and in the
majority of countries these are the primary stocks of semi-automatic
weapons and other military-oriented equipment. It is not surprising,
therefore, that they are generally key targets for criminals,
bandits and armed opposition forces wishing to obtain such
arms.
In most regions, many of the weapons illicitly trafficked
have come from authorised holders of weapons, including the
armed forces, police, and other armed agencies of the state.
Many governments like to pretend, even to themselves, that
rigorous security is maintained over all of their state weapons
stocks. In fact, losses from official small arms and ammunition
stores through theft, corruption or neglect appear to be a
problem in most countries. This is particularly the case in
war-torn or conflict-prone regions.3
Most of the small arms in official or authorised stocks are
held in designated storage areas. The maintenance of secure
arms depots requires specially designed facilities, substantial
resources and well-trained personnel. Many official arms stores
lack one or more of these elements, and are highly vulnerable
to weapons losses. Even professional and well-resourced armed
forces regularly misplace or lose small arms or ammunition
from storage areas. Inadequate or infrequent stocktaking means
that such losses sometimes go unnoticed for years. The remainder
of officially held small arms are carried by personnel or
stored with operational units. Security of these holdings
is even harder to ensure than in specially established arms
storage facilities.
Further, the existence of large quantities of surplus arms
and ammunition contributes greatly to small arms proliferation.4
In this context, the term surplus weapons refers to all small
arms held by the armed forces, police and other authorised
agencies that are surplus to their requirements. For example,
large stocks of arms and ammunition are frequently rendered
surplus during security force restructuring or re-equipment
programmes or as a result of peace agreements.
Stocks of surplus small arms are particularly prone to being
inadequately safeguarded or irresponsibly dumped or transferred.
There are incentives to dispose of such relatively low-value
weapons as quickly as possible. Often the main demand for
such weapons is from private dealers or brokers, or from relatively
impoverished armed services in conflict-prone areas. Alternatively,
if surplus weapons are retained in stock, there is a tendency
to devote inadequate resources to ensure safe storage of arms
that are regarded as obsolete or unnecessary. Losses sometimes
remain undiscovered for long periods. Thorough investigations
may not be regarded as a high priority, particularly if the
stolen weapons have not been used in local disturbances and
appear to have left the country.
In some countries, the armed services lack effective systems
for determining appropriate levels of weapons reserves. There
is a tendency to retain reserves far in excess of not only
their reasonable requirements but also of their capacity to
store securely. It is also important to recognise that military
and police doctrines, and standard operating procedures involving
wide dispersal of stocks of small arms, intensify the challenges
of ensuring stockpile security. In these and other respects,
stockpile security is intimately related to stockpile management
and doctrine.
The security of stocks of small arms legally in the possession
of civilians must also be addressed in this context. In some
societies, civilians are authorised to hold substantial numbers
of small arms and ammunition. Similarly, arms manufacturers
typically hold stocks of weapons prior to transfer or sale.
Regulations need to be in place that ensure that such holdings
are secure, whilst compliance with such regulations needs
to be adequately enforced.
Finally, there is the closely linked question of the management
of confiscated illicit or unauthorised arms, and weapons gathered
in weapons collection programmes. Almost by definition these
are surplus weapons. But instead of being destroyed, they
are often inadequately stored, and subsequently lost or recycled
to undesirable uses.
Losses from official arms stocks
Arms stockpile security is a particular problem in war-torn
and conflict-prone areas, and in countries undergoing profound
political turmoil or transition. Rebel army groups and bandits
typically obtain their arms and ammunition through seizures
from police and army units or stores, as illustrated during
the 1990s in conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia,
Congo-Brazzaville, Assam, and the Transcaucasus. At times
of weakness or desperation, commanders sometimes even open
their weapons stores to sections of the: civilian population,
to intensify the challenges faced by armed rivals and to disperse
stocks that might otherwise be captured. This occurred for
example during the civil wars in El Salvador, Nicaragua and
Tajikistan.
Albania provides one: of several examples of losses from
official stockpiles during political instability. Hundreds
of thousands of semi-automatic and other weapons were seized
from Albanian police and army stores in the turmoil after
the collapse of pyramid-selling schemes in 1997. Among the
losses were some 600,000 Kalashnikov automatic 200,000 Simonov
guns, 1,000,000 mines, 20-30,000 special '10th of July' production
rifles, hundreds of tons of explosives thousands of artillery
shells, and thousands of other automatic weapons, light and
heavy machine guns and grenade-launchers.5 The
fact that, as a matter of strategic policy, the Albanian state
had spread its military holdings in many thousands (reportedly
up to 700,000) of small bunkers around the country made defence
against such seizures almost impossible. Once out of direct
official control weapons are very difficult to retrieve. In
the case of Albania, most of the lost weapons flowed into
criminal and illicit trafficking networks and to the conflicts
in the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo.
The problems are not confined to areas of conflict and turmoil.
Many developing states and states in economic transition maintain
very large holdings of small arms, light weapons and ammunition,
but lack the resources or systems to prevent losses through
theft, corruption or neglect. The problems of stockpile security
in much of the former Soviet Union are widely recognised,
for example, but also appear rife throughout much of Asia,
Africa and Latin America. Reliable information remains scarce,
not least because many weapons losses remain undiscovered
due to inadequate stocktaking or go unreported by the armed
forces, police or other armed agencies involved.
It appears that whenever authorities have chosen to look
closely into the matter, they have discovered serious problems
Sweden, for example, has a high reputation for the efficiency
and professionalism of its armed and police forces, including
attention to stockpile security. In the late 1990s the Swedish
authorities carried out a detailed stockpile management and
security situation and identified significant problems, including
vulnerability of dispersed stocks (for example at police stations)
to criminal attack and inadequate stocktaking. Sweden has
subsequently embarked upon a re-organisation programme, including
concentrating weapons stocks at larger, more secure, facilities
and implementing systems for regular checking of inventories.
In most states, it appears that less attention and resources
are devoted to arms stockpile security and management in police
and para-military forces than in the military forces.
Risks from surplus arms
With the end of the Cold War and; the break-up of the Soviet
Union, vast quantities of arms became surplus to requirements
for national security, including tens of millions of small
arms. Some of these were responsibly destroyed. But a large
proportion were released for export or sale to brokers, with
many finding their way for use in armed conflicts or banditry
in sub-Saharan Africa, Central and South Asia, the Balkans,
and elsewhere. Large quantities of such weapons were exported
to poorer allies; for example, several NATO countries 'cascaded'
surplus weapons to Greece and Turkey. These transfers then
rendered surplus the older existing weapons stocks, which
in turn were released into wider circulation, some flowing
into conflict areas such as the Balkans and Transcaucasus.
The generation of surplus weapons is a natural consequence
of changing security requirements, defence restructuring and
re-equipment programmes, and is by no means chiefly linked
with the end of the Cold War. All countries periodically have:
to dispose of significant quantities of surplus small arms,
including ammunition. Often inadequate resources are provided
to ensure that they are disposed of responsibly. Relevant
officials are essentially instructed to dispose of them as
quickly as possible, without expense and if possible at a
small profit. Even where national authorities decide to retain
the weapons for other state purposes, problems may arise.
For example, army re-equipment programmes in India generally
involve transfers of surplus military small arms to police
forces. But stockpile security in the police is generally
weaker than in the :army, increasing the risk that the weapons
will be lost. In addition, there is also the knock-on problem
of disposing of police weapons made surplus by the transfer
of new arms.
In practice, many armed forces appear to be unprofessional
in their approach to excess arms holdings, and confused about
whether older weapons are surplus or need to be held in reserve.
In the confusion, stocks held officially in reserve are often
neglected and vulnerable to loss. All weapons held in reserve
are at risk of loss or theft, and require costly management
and security systems. If adequate resources for security are
not available, it is better to regard the weapons as surplus
and to destroy or otherwise responsibly dispose of them. Experiences
in Mozambique, Angola, and many other conflict-prone countries
indicate that if this is not done, the weapons may be lost
from state control and can add to security threats.
2.3 Progress towards international
norms and standards
Weapons stockpile management and security, and the disposal
of surplus arms, are therefore major issues of concern for
the UN 2001 Conference. There is already wide international
acceptance that international norms and standards on these
matters need to be established and developed. The UN General
Assembly overwhelmingly endorsed the 1997 report of the UN
Panel of Experts on Small Arms and the 1999 report of the
UN Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, both of which
made strong recommendations on these (and other) issues.6
In brief, these reports, endorsed by the UN General Assembly,
recommended all States to:
-
take measures to ensure adequate safeguards to prevent
loss of weapons from official or authorised stocks (particularly
from storage facilities);
-
expeditiously destroy all confiscated or collected small
arms;
-
promote the destruction of surplus weapons; and
-
assist other States, at their request, in their efforts
to carry out the above recommendations.
In addition, these reports recommended that the UN and relevant
international and regional organisations promote and support
implementation of the above measures. In this context, these
organisations have a particular role where they are involved
in the implementation of peace agreements or in assisting
war-torn societies facing urgent problems of small arms proliferation.
Regional organisations have also developed policies and programmes
relating to stockpile security and disposal of small arms,
which are contributing to the detailed elaboration of norms
and standards in these areas, as well as focusing attention
on the need to tackle bad practices.
For example, in 1999 the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
(EAPC) established an ad-hoc working group on small arms and
light weapons. After a series of meetings and workshops, this
group developed a series of proposals for activities within
the EAPC and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
Partnership for Peace programme, including a strong emphasis
on assistance and co-operation in training; identifying and
disseminating best practices to enhance arms stockpile management
and security; and promoting disposal and destruction of surplus
arms.7 These proposals were accepted, and a number
of activities in this area have been pursued during 2000.
The OSCE is also in the process of developing norms and standards
in this area, for inclusion in an OSCE document on small arms
and light weapons, to be agreed at the OSCE Summit in November
2000.
In Southern Africa, measures to enhance stockpile security
and destruction and responsible disposal of small arms are
an integral part of the Southern Africa Regional Action Programme
on Light Arms and Illicit Arms Trafficking, endorsed at the
European Union-Southern African Development Community (EU-SADC)
Ministerial Meeting in November 1998.8 Similarly,
there are substantial provisions in the Protocol on Small
Arms that has been developed among SADC countries during 2000.9
Initiatives and good practices
As awareness of the problems of stockpile security and surplus
weapons has increased, there have been several national initiatives
to ensure good practice, in addition to regional initiatives
such as those in NATO/EAPC, OSCE and SADC outlined above.
For example, in February 1999, South Africa announced its
decision to destroy all surplus small arms in its possession,
which included some 260,000 automatic rifles and several hundred
tons of ammunition. Numerous countries, including several
EU and NATO countries, have reviewed their policies relating
to the disposal of surplus arms, and have given higher priority
to the destruction of such weapons. Many countries, including
China, have adopted policies involving expeditious destruction
of all confiscated and collected small arms. Mozambique, Mali,
Cambodia and Liberia ail have programmes involving the destruction
of excessive small arms, implemented with the assistance of
the donor community. Likewise, Switzerland, the Netherlands
and Canada have sponsored international workshops to promote
small arms stockpile security. In general, however, fewer
initiatives have, been taken relating to stockpile security
than promoting destruction of surplus small arms.
2.4 Objectives for the UN 2001
Conference
The objectives for the UN 2001 Conference relating to stockpile
security and reduction of surplus weapons should, in principle,
be much the same as for other key dimensions of the international
action programme. The Conference should aim to achieve agreements
at a high political level that:
-
consolidate and strengthen international norms and standards
relating to the security of small arms stocks and the
management and disposal of surplus weapons;
-
establish and strengthen international programmes and
mechanisms to promote and co-ordinate implementation of
such norms and standards; and
-
establish follow-up processes involving regular international
reviews of the adequacy and operation of such standards
and programmes, and provide a framework to negotiate further
agreements on these issues as necessary and appropriate.
In this context, it is necessary to elaborate on the substance
of what could usefully be agreed. The following sections highlight
some key elements of possible agreement on these issues at
the UN 2001 Conference.
2.5 Management and security of
small arms stocks
The fundamental international principle to be established
relating to the security of authorised stocks of small arms
is that the relevant authorities have a responsibility to
ensure that such stocks are adequately safeguarded against
loss through theft, corruption or neglect. States' armed forces,
police, and other armed agencies hold the vast majority of
authorised stocks of small arms and light weapons, their parts
and components and ammunition. Moreover, all non-governmental
bodies authorised to hold such weapons (such as private arms
dealers, manufacturers, or security companies) should be subject
to regulation by States.
Nevertheless, the UN and other international and regional
organisations also have direct responsibilities to promote
and ensure arms stockpile security. This is particularly the
case where they are conducting peacekeeping or peace support
operations; facilitating disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration
programmes; or co-operating in weapons collection or destruction
projects.
The UN General Assembly, as part of its endorsement of the
1997 and 1999 reports of UN Groups of Experts on Small Arms,
has already endorsed the above fundamental principle. However,
in practice this represents relatively weak international
commitment since many governments do not consider themselves
to be bound by UN General Assembly resolutions. Explicit high-level
political commitment to this principle by all participating
States should be achieved at the UN 2001 Conference. Moreover,
the obligations implied by acceptance of this principle need
to be elaborated through specific international agreements,
and mechanisms need to be developed to promote their implementation.
Developing specific commitments
The UN 2001 Conference should aim to achieve agreement on
specific commitments aimed at promoting and ensuring security
of small arms stocks. A number of potentially useful commitments
are listed below, to contribute to debate. They are not listed
in any specific order, but several are interdependent.
Review current practices: All States shall, within
three years and at regular intervals thereafter, comprehensively
review the systems and policies for small arms stockpile management
and security maintained by their armed forces, police and
other bodies authorised to maintain small arms stocks. The
aim of these reviews is to ensure the adequacy of such systems,
and identify problems and opportunities for improvement of
stockpile security.
Establish effective systems for management and accountability:
All States shall ensure that the armed forces, police and
every other body authorised to hold small arms have clearly
established officials and bodies responsible for the management
and security of their weapons stocks, with sufficient resources
and authority to meet their responsibilities adequately.
Ensure adequate and detailed standards and procedures:
All States shall ensure that the armed forces, police and
every other body authorised to hold small arms establish adequate
and detailed standards and procedures relating to the management
and security of their small arms stocks. These standards and
procedures should, inter alia, relate to: appropriate
locations for stockpiles; physical security measures; control
of access to stocks; inventory management and accounting control;
staff training; security of transport of small arms; security,
accounting and control of small arms held by operational units
and authorised personnel; and procedures and sanctions in
the event of thefts or losses.
Ensure good record-keeping and regular stocktaking:
All States shall ensure that accurate records of the numbers,
types and locations are maintained for all small arms under
the control of armed forces, police, other state agencies,
and any non-governmental group authorised to hold such weapons
(such as manufacturers, dealers or security companies). States
shall ensure that thorough stocktaking programmes are regularly
carried out to ensure that any losses or other stockpile security
problems are identified in a timely way.
Ensure that losses are properly reported and investigated:
All States shall ensure that bodies responsible for stockpile
management and security shall immediately notify any losses
or other serious irregularities to appropriate national authorities
and that these shall be properly investigated.
Ensure weaknesses are rectified: Where safeguards
are identified to be inadequate, States shall ensure that
measures are taken to rectify the situation, if necessary
by relocating or destroying insecure small arms stocks.
Regularly review holdings, to ensure timely identification
and disposal of surplus weapons: All States shall ensure
that there are regular reviews of requirements for any holdings
of small arms. Any holdings of such weapons that are surplus
to reasonable requirements should be explicitly identified
as such, and disposed of accordingly (see below).
Request assistance if needed: States that identify
problems with safeguards on small arms stocks, but which lack
the capacity or resources to rectify the problems, should
request assistance from other States or regional or international
organisations that are in a position to provide it. Where
sources of such assistance cannot rapidly be identified, the
State shall notify the UN Secretary-General and request support
in mobilising appropriate assistance.
Ensure high standards in non-state bodies: All States
shall ensure that all citizens or non-state bodies that are
authorised to hold small arms are under an obligation to maintain
accurate and readily accessible records of their holdings
and adequate safeguards against their theft or loss. States
shall ensure that compliance with such obligations is regularly
reviewed and enforced.
Relevant international organisations should use good practices:
The UN and all regional and international organisations responsible
for operations involving responsibility for armed forces or
small arms stockpiles shall ensure that they comply with the
above obligations, as appropriate.
Establishing and developing international programmes
and mechanisms
It is important for the UN 2001 Conference to establish international
programmes and mechanisms to promote implementation of the
above commitments. These could usefully include the following:
Programmes to promote good practice: The United Nations,
regional organisations and other appropriate bodies are encouraged
to arrange programmes of workshops on maintaining and enhancing
the security of stocks of small arms (i.e. small arms, light
weapons, their parts and components and ammunition). The aims
of such workshops would include: raising awareness among policy-makers
and responsible officials; exchanging information and experience;
identifying and disseminating good practice; clarifying needs
for technical assistance; and helping to mobilise technical
and other resources to meet such needs.
International specialist training programmes: International
programmes for specialist training on small arms stockpile
management and security should be developed. To contribute
to this, the UN and other appropriate international or regional
organisations should consider establishing and developing
training facilities and programmes in this area.
Mechanism to promote implementation of international standards:
The United Nations shall establish an international mechanism
to promote implementation of commitments to ensure security
of small arms stocks. Elements of this mechanism should include:
-
Exchanges of information and good practice on
safeguarding small arms stocks. All States would be requested
to provide information to the UN relating to their systems
and procedures for ensuring adequate security for their
small arms stocks, together with relevant national contact
points.
-
Resources and exchanges of information to enhance and
co-ordinate provision of appropriate assistance to
ensure adequate security of small arms stockpiles.
-
Arrangements to encourage and help States to notify
losses or thefts of significant quantities
of small arms to other national and international bodies
concerned with preventing and combating illicit trafficking
in small arms.
-
Systems for receiving and making appropriate use
of such information on thefts or losses, developed
in consultation, inter alia, with Interpol.
The United Nations Secretary-General should be requested
to conduct a UN study on the ways and means of establishing
such a mechanism, with the assistance of a UN group of governmental
experts.
System for emergency assistance with arms stockpile security:
The United Nations should consider ways and means to provide
emergency assistance with safeguarding storage facilities
containing small arms and other materials of concern in countries
or regions where the security of such facilities is under
threat. Such assistance shall be provided with the consent
of the State or States concerned.
2.6 Destruction and other responsible
disposal of surplus stocks of small arms
The fundamental principles to be internationally established
relating to surplus stocks of small arms (i.e. small arms,
light weapons, their parts and components and ammunition)
are that all States holding surplus small arms should where
possible seek to destroy them, and that the utmost restraint
should be exercised with respect to any transfers of such
weapons. Further, confiscated or collected unauthorised (or
inadequately marked) small arms should be expeditiously destroyed
(subject to the legal constraints associated with preparing
for criminal prosecutions).
It is above all the responsibility of States to implement
these principles. However, the UN and other regional and international
organisations also have a responsibility to promote and support
their implementation. They should also implement these principles
where they have responsibility for confiscated or collected
surplus arms in the context of peacekeeping, peace support
operations, or other peace missions; facilitating disarmament,
demobilisation and re-integration programmes; or co-operating
in weapons collection or destruction projects.
As noted above, the UN General Assembly has already endorsed
these fundamental principles. A key objective of the UN 2001
Conference is to establish high political commitment to these
principles, and to agree specific obligations, programmes
and mechanisms to promote their implementation.
Developing specific commitments
A number of potentially useful commitments to promote destruction
and responsible disposal of surplus weapons are listed below,
in order to contribute to the debate. As will be clear, they
are generally linked and mutually reinforcing.
Conduct regular reviews of small arms holdings, to identify
and dispose of surplus arms: All States shall regularly
review the stocks of small arms held by armed forces, police
and other authorised bodies. They shall ensure that stocks
of small arms surplus to requirements are clearly identified,
and that programmes for responsible and expeditious disposal
of such stocks are established and implemented. They shall
ensure that such stocks are adequately safeguarded until disposal.
Norm of destruction of surplus small arms: All States
should normally destroy surplus small arms, using internationally
accepted and effective procedures (as identified by the mechanism
outlined in the next sub-section). Surplus weapons retained
for other purposes (such as museum exhibits or collectors
items) should be permanently disabled and decommissioned.
Promote transparency and awareness of surplus arms destruction
process: All States are encouraged to make arrangements
that promote the transparency of the process of destruction
of surplus weapons, including providing information on numbers
and types of small arms that are to be destroyed (or have
been destroyed) and the location and timing of such destruction
(subject to security concerns). Wherever appropriate, States
are encouraged to carry out public destruction events or at
least to invite observers to monitor the process, in the interests
of awareness raising and confidence building.
High restraint in transfers of surplus small arms:
Where States judge that there are strong reasons for doing
so, surplus small arms may be transferred. But States should
exercise the utmost restraint in authorising such transfers,
particularly to areas of on-going conflict, and take all possible
measures to prevent the diversion of arms transfers to such
areas or to illicit markets.
Require responsible disposal of small arms that are rendered
surplus by transfers: Before authorising transfers of
small arms, States should ensure that the recipient State
has established effective plans for responsible disposal of
any arms and ammunition that the transfer will render surplus
to requirements.
Request assistance where necessary for implementation
of commitments: States that lack adequate technical or
other resources to implement the above commitments should
request assistance. Where appropriate assistance is not readily
available, the State should notify the UN Secretary-General
and request support in mobilising appropriate assistance.
Mobilise assistance in response to requests: All States
and appropriate international or regional organisations in
a position to do so should provide assistance in the destruction
or other responsible disposal of surplus stocks of small arms,
at the request of the State concerned.
Destroy all confiscated, collected or inadequately marked
small arms: All confiscated or collected unauthorised
small arms, or inadequately marked weapons, should be destroyed
expeditiously (subject to any legal constraints associated
with the preparation of criminal prosecutions).
Ensure responsible disposal of surplus parts and components
and ammunition: All of the above commitments on responsible
disposal of surplus arms apply to the entire category of small
arms: small arms and light weapons, their parts and components
and ammunition. Destruction of ammunition (including cartridges,
shells, missiles, and grenades) typically requires specialist
expertise or facilities. Due provision needs to be made for
this to ensure timely and effective implementation of the
above obligations as they relate to such systems and materials.
Establishing and developing international programmes
and mechanisms
To promote and co-ordinate implementation of the above commitments,
a number of international programmes and mechanisms should
be established and developed. These could usefully include
the following:
Programmes to promote good practice, identify needs, and
mobilise resources: The United Nations and other appropriate
international and regional organisations should organise a
programme of workshops to promote implementation of the above
commitments. The aims of these workshops would be to: promote
awareness; identify and disseminate good practice; facilitate
exchanges of information and experience; clarify techniques
of destruction; clarify needs for technical and other assistance;
and help to mobilise technical and other resources to meet
such needs.
Establish an international mechanism: An international
mechanism and resource centre should be established (perhaps
under the auspices of the UN), to promote and facilitate the
effective and efficient destruction of stocks of surplus arms.
This mechanism would include the following components:
-
A mechanism involving a panel of international experts
to review and identify effective techniques for
the destruction of surplus arms, including specialist
techniques and resources required, for example, for the
safe destruction of ammunition;
-
Procedures and resource centres to facilitate the provision
of technical support and advice in mastering and using
the above techniques;
-
Information exchange arrangements relating
to the destruction or other responsible disposal of surplus
small arms, to promote appropriate transparancy
and facilitate reviews of progress in destroying
or disposing of surplus arms;
-
Arrangements to facilitate use of international observers
to monitor destruction of surplus or confiscated small
arms; and
-
Arrangements to mobilise resources to meet the
needs of States and other authorities requiring assistance
in the destruction or disposal of surplus small arms.
Regional organisations should be encouraged to contribute
to this mechanism and to complement and re-inforce it through
the development of regional resources and arrangements.
2.7 Follow-on mechanisms
The UN 2001 Conference should establish procedures for regular
international review of progress in implementing each of the
commitments, programmes and measures outlined above. It should
also establish procedures for regular review of the adequacy
of such commitments and programmes and for their further development
as appropriate.
Preventing the diversion of arms to illicit markets and end-users
is a key concern for all States. The opportunity, during the
UN 2001 Conference, to take concrete action within the framework
of the international action programme, should therefore not
be missed. The establishment of international standards and
programmes on the management and security of stockpiles of
small arms, and of international norms on the disposal and
destruction of surplus weapons would be far-reaching achievements.
Their implementation would take the international community
closer to achieving a reduction in the proliferation of small
arms.
________________
Endnotes
1 Henceforth in this beefing, unless otherwise
stated, the term 'small arms' will be used as shorthand for
'small arms and light weapons and their parts and components,
including ammunition'.
2 Owen Greene with Elizabeth Clegg, Sarah Meek
and Geraldine O'Callaghan, Framework Briefing: The UN 2001
Conference - setting the agenda; Biting the Bullet Project
Briefing No 1; BASIC, International Alert and Saferworld,
London, February 2000.
3 See, for example, Report of the Group of Governmental
Experts on Small Arms, UN Document A/54/258, 19 August 1999;
and Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms,
UN Document A/52/298, 27 August 1997.
4 Op cit.
5 Data source: Lt Col. Besim Malaj, Chief of Ammunition
Branch of the General Staff of the Albanian Army, 18 June
1998.
6 Op cit.
7 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 'EAPC PfP
and the Challenge of Small Arms and Light Weapons', NATO/EAPC
Unclassified document EAPC(D)(1999)23,, 4 November 1999.
8 Southern Africa Regional Action Programme
on Light Weapons and Illicit Arms Trafficking, Saferworld/lSS,
London, May 1998; Joint Communiqué on the Ministerial
Conference between the European Union and the Southern African
Development Community, Vienna, Austria, 3-4 November 1998.
9 The text of this Protocol, and the content of
the implementation programme associated with it, were developed
in early 2000 and are awaiting formal adoption by SADC.
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