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Implementing and Deepening the OAS Agenda on Small Arms
and Light Weapons
Presentation by Ian Davis, Director
At the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing
of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives,
and Other Related Materials
Consultative Committee, Third Regular Meeting
Washington, D.C., 2 May 2002
.
1. Introduction [1]
I would like to begin by thanking the Consultative Committee
for the invitation to address this meeting. I will focus my
remarks on the opportunities for strengthening the linkages
between OAS initiatives on small arms and light weapons (SALW)
and the UN Conference Program of Action agreed last July in
New York.
While the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms
And Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (hereafter referred to
as the UN Conference) did not live up to the high expectations
of many governments and NGOs, it did provide the opportunity
to build on regional action while establishing the need for,
as well as some beginnings of, international action. The failure
of the UN Conference to agree on adequate steps at the international
level has placed the onus on regional institutions and initiatives
as the major driving force for addressing the small arms problem
on the ground.
During my presentation I will also be drawing on European
perspectives on the small arms problematic. Prior to being
appointed Director at BASIC last October, I spent three years
researching the harmonization of arms export controls in the
European Union (EU) and three years on a research and advocacy
program on small arms controls in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
In my view, and I hope that you will agree, there are some
very useful areas of 'best practice' within the EU, the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Stability
Pact for South East Europe, which could be of interest to
the OAS and its member states. For example, the Stability
Pact Regional Implementation Plan for South Eastern Europe,
which was agreed last fall, seeks to enhance regional cooperation
in this critical area, providing both information sharing
and local standard setting geared toward moving forward with
tangible projects.
I understand that a representative from the EU spoke at yesterday's
meeting, but I would be pleased to discuss some of these European
perspectives in more detail after my presentation if this
would be helpful. As I said, however, my focus will be on
the OAS, which has been a pioneer among regional organizations
in developing small arms crime control initiatives and significant
potential is associated with these agreements. The signing
of the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing
and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other
Related Materials (hereafter referred to as the Inter-American
Convention), the development of the Inter-American Drug Abuse
Control Commission's (CICAD) Model Regulations for the Control
of the International Movement of Firearms, Their Parts and
Components and Ammunition (hereafter referred to as the Model
Regulations) and several sub-regional initiatives in Central
and South America are evidence of this.
Implementation of many of these agreements and initiatives,
however, often lags behind for a variety of reasons, some
political, some financial and some technical. The UN Conference
has addressed many of these issues, helping to generate political
momentum, and to support the provision of increased financing
and technical assistance available to OAS Member States through
CICAD, the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development
in Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-LiREC), UNDP and bilaterally
through the US government. In addition, in a very encouraging
development for effective implementation, representatives
of governments, civil society, customs and law enforcement
developed a detailed 'matrix for action' at a conference last
December in San José, Costa Rica. This kind of focused
attention to regional and sub-regional implementation needs
to be vigorously followed-up and duplicated in other regions
of the Americas.
In order to work toward the implementation of the Inter-American
Convention, for example, more than 16 of 33 signatories need
to respond to the approved questionnaire identifying points
of contact and responsible central authorities and move toward
taking inventory of related measures and legislation already
in place. Technical assistance will be of limited use and
financial resources will be wasted if States do not have a
clear picture of their situation and capabilities from the
beginning. At the same time the OAS, NGOs and other multilateral
institutions have to find ways to maintain momentum towards
ratification and implementation when there are changes in
national governments or transfers of responsibility from one
ministry to another.
It may also be time for the OAS to alter the way in which
it frames the issues and analyzes measures to combat small
arms trafficking and its consequences. For several reasons,
many distinctions between government and commercial sales
as well as military and civilian firearms need to be reconsidered
and made more flexible. Criminals and irregular armed groups
do not make such distinctions, and neither should governments.
In this presentation I want to highlight five critical areas
that could form the core of future OAS priorities:
- Controlling legal transfers between states;
- Preventing and combating illicit transfers;
- Controlling civilian possession of small arms;
- Weapons collection and destruction mechanisms; and
- Creating secure environments to reduce the demand for
small arms.
2. Controlling legal transfers between states
Efforts to combat the spread and misuse of small arms will
be undermined if governments do not restrain legal transfers
of small arms. All states, whether manufacturers, suppliers,
transit states or recipients of new or old weaponry, have
a responsibility to increase accountability and restraint
over legal transfers. Although the movement toward higher
standards governing arms exports has begun with important
agreements such as the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports,
discussions have largely been confined to supplier states.
Developing high international standards on weapons transfers
will only be possible when all countries - both suppliers
and recipients - are engaged in discussions. Since 1997, a
commission of 19 Nobel Peace Laureates (including the Dhali
Lama, Desmond Tutu, Oscar Arias, Rigoberta Menchu and Jose
Ramos Hortas) has led the call for a Framework Convention
on International Arms Transfers which would obligate governments
to uphold internationally recognized standards of democracy,
human rights and peaceful international relations. Drafted
by a group of NGOs and international lawyers led by the Arias
Foundation and including BASIC, FAS, Amnesty International,
Saferworld, Project Ploughshares and Oxfam, the Framework
Convention is currently being circulated in the UN and other
international for a. Building consensus among the OAS states
on the need for rigorous and principled common controls would
add great momentum to the global movement toward a Framework
Convention on International Arms Transfers.
Tamar Gabelnick from the Federation of American Scientists
will be talking about the Framework Convention in her presentation,
so I will limit my remarks to the need for a complementary
initiative at the hemispheric or regional level, and more
specifically, the prospects for developing an OAS Code of
Conduct on Arms Transfers (to mirror the EU Code of Conduct
on Arms Exports)
The 1998 EU Code of Conduct's significance is partly in the
elaboration of guiding principles to be taken into account
when considering arms export licence applications and partly
in the operative provisions it establishes for information
exchange and consultation. The Code sets out minimum levels
of restraint and allows member states to operate more restrictive
national policies if they so wish.
There are eight criteria that form the guidelines for the
EU Code, which require member states to take into account
the effect of arms sales on inter alia human rights,
regional stability and economic and social development. One
of the strongest commitments, for example, is that EU governments
will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk
that the proposed export might be used for internal repression.
The key will be how the member states implement the guidelines
in practice. If they are implemented in full, they should
lead to increased restraint and closer alignment of member
states' arms export policies.
The Code's key operative provisions are the denial notification
mechanism and the associated 'no undercutting without consultation'
procedure. When a member state denies an export licence (on
grounds relating to one or more of the eight criteria) it
must notify all other member states. If another member state
is approached for the same transaction within three years,
it first has to consult the country that denied it. After
the consultation the export may proceed (there is no right
of veto) but the exporting country must provide a detailed
explanation of its rationale. It is hoped that these requirements
will prevent (or at least reduce) undercutting. If it does
- and evidence so far suggests that it has - this will be
a significant achievement.
Member states are also required to circulate to each other
in confidence annual reports of their national arms exports
and implementation of the Code. These are discussed, along
with ways to strengthen the Code, at annual review meetings
within the EU Council of Ministers which then produces a consolidated
Report. Operation of the Code was strengthened in June 2000
with the adoption of a Common List of Military Equipment (which
is based on the Wassenaar Arrangement's Munitions List and
is expected to act as a reference point for EU member states'
national military lists, rather than directly replace them.
Although some strengthening of the EU Code remains necessary,
it is generally regarded as success, particularly in increasing
transparency - most EU member states now publish annual reports
on arms exports, for example.
Could the Code be replicated in the OAS? Well, as a starting
point, the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security produced
a draft proposal on "Responsible Small Arms and Light Weapons
Transfers", in March 2000. Moreover, the proposed draft contains
export control criteria that appear to have been based on
the eight criteria within the EU Code. And it is also worth
noting that the United States and Canada have already endorsed
the principles of the EU Code, and have agreed to another
similar set of export criteria in the OSCE Document on Small
Arms and Light Weapons.
The draft proposal on Responsible Small Arms Transfers was
discussed at the OAS General Assembly meeting in Canada in
June 2000 where a resolution was adopted giving the Committee
on Hemispheric Security a mandate to develop a declaration
specifically addressing the UN 2001 Conference. However, there
was no mention of the proposed policy for 'Responsible Transfers'.
The UN Conference Program of Action does include language
to address diversion and the technical ability of states to
manage stockpiles, but lacks action on most of the criteria
within the OAS proposal, including a startling omission of
any mention of human rights.
While no substitute for a legally binding convention that
explicitly ties states' obligations under international law
to arms transfers, regional Codes of Conduct represent an
interim step along this process of international norm building
in export controls. It is hoped that the OAS can return to
this question in the near future and build on the existing
draft proposal in order to develop an OAS Code of Conduct
on Arms Exports. BASIC stands ready to assist with technical
advice or facilitating meetings with EU member states and
independent experts in order to take this process forward.
3. Preventing and combating illicit transfers
Even if a rigorous and restrictive regional Code of Conduct
and/or Convention on International Arms Transfers were agreed,
many parts of the Americas would still be awash with illegal
weapons. This disastrous situation must be combated by removing
excess weapons from society and by ensuring that no further
illicit weapons transfers occur. Small arms are transferred
illegally in a variety of ways to serve many different objectives.
Although the OAS has already developed important and pioneering
initiatives on illicit trafficking, it has a critical role
to play in furthering the agenda on illicit trafficking at
the national, regional and international level.
Allegations published just this week by CNN of Israeli manufactured
weapons being brokered from Guatemalan stocks, through Nicaraguan
channels, to the ELN guerrilla group in Colombia make clear
the need to tackle the illicit trade in weapons as an inherently
multi-stage process. In particular, three issues need to be
prioritized:
- improving marking and tracing;
- advancing the development of brokering and transportation
regulations; and
- enhancing financial regulations.
Marking and tracing
Again, my colleague from the Federation of American Scientists
will be discussing some of the key technical and policy developments
in marking and tracing, and so I will limit my remarks to
the need for and benefits from information exchange in this
area. In the European context, for example, a review of the
first information exchange on SALW carried out by OSCE member
states in June 2001, 28 (out of 46) participating states reported
having policies on marking. However, the submissions revealed
that there is a lot of variety in the national marking systems
currently in place, and that the OSCE minimum criteria (the
year and country of manufacture, the manufacturer and the
weapon's serial number) is marked on weapons in a manner readable
to non-experts by only four participating states.
While the UN Conference Program of Action leaves the majority
of the responsibility for marking and tracing to individual
states it does encourage the allocation of financial and technical
support for states interested in developing such capacity
and utilizing new technologies. In terms of international
tracing the boldest move taken by the PoA in this regard was
the decision to undertake a study for "examining the feasibility
of developing an international instrument to enable States
to identify and trace in a timely and reliable manner illicit
small arms and light weapons." However, the lack of international
commitment vis-à-vis the establishment of international
cooperation on tracing, must, in the absence of enhanced political
will, place a question mark over the prospects that any such
feasibility study will yield positive results.
Thus, as well as fully implementing the Inter-American Convention
provisions on marking and information exchange, the OAS member
states can play a very useful catalytic and leadership role
at the international level. By sharing their practical regional
experiences, OAS states can help develop international best
practice, and are well placed to promote a climate where international
cooperation on marking and tracing is encouraged and the process
of developing an international instrument can begin.
Brokering and transportation
Despite increasing evidence of the consequences of unregulated
arms brokering and transportation, many OAS member states
lack legislation for the control of such activities. A notable
exception is the United States, which does have extensive
provisions for registering and licensing of arms brokers,
including full extraterritorial application.
Although the Inter-American Convention does not explicitly
address the issues of arms brokering and transportation, a
number of provisions could be regarded as applying to the
control of these activities. Moreover, the States Parties
have agreed to exchange information that could be relevant
to control illicit arms brokering and transportation, including
details of "authorized producers, dealers, importers, exporters
and, wherever possible, carriers of firearms, ammunition,
explosives and other related materials" and "routes customarily
used by criminal organizations engaged in illicit trafficking."
Finally, the 'controlled delivery' of firearms where suspect
cargoes are monitored as they pass through territories of
one or more states parties with a view to "identifying persons
involved in the commission of offenses" could yield important
information on arms brokering and transport agents.
As with marking and tracing, the UN Conference Program of
Action leaves measures to control arms brokers up to national
governments, though as a follow-up activity it does agree
to consider further steps to "enhance international cooperation
in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering."
The OAS did take some steps towards dealing with brokering
and transit of small arms in the above mentioned 2001 General
Assembly resolution that calls for a hemispheric study and
encourages States to adopt domestic legislation to prevent
illegal brokering and transit activities. At this point OAS
Member States who feel not enough is done to control brokering
activities can lead the way in implementing (albeit voluntarily)
the provisions for registration and licensing of brokers that
are contained in the UN Firearms Protocol.
Financial regulation
Another factor contributing to the ease with which illicit
arms transfers can be made in the western hemisphere is the
presence of a multitude of financial and tax havens. The lack
of regulation and oversight of financial transactions, which
typifies the operation of tax havens, greatly assists the
financial dimensions of the illicit small arms trade.
The UN Conference Program of Action does not make any direct
reference to financial regulation though it does encourage
States to ratify international legal instruments on transnational
organized crime. Exploratory efforts to control arms brokering
activities might be indirectly related to the issue of financial
regulation, but this area continues to be one that requires
more thorough treatment.
Again the OAS could take an important lead in this area.
Article XII of the Inter-American Convention stipulates that
States Parties will exchange information on "techniques, practices,
and legislation to combat money laundering related to illicit
manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms," but does not
stipulate any concrete actions to be taken in this regard.
Such actions are urgently needed and could provide an extremely
productive avenue for action in the near term.
4. Controlling civilian possession of small arms
Controlling civilian possession of weapons is a critical element
of an integrated approach to small arms control. High levels
of gun violence have created crime waves in a number of OAS
countries, while the importance of effective domestic firearms
regulation in reducing the proliferation and misuse of small
arms and light weapons has been affirmed by the United Nations
in several different contexts: the UN Security Council Resolution
1209 (1998); the Report of the Disarmament Commission considered
at the General Assembly (1999); and the Report of the UN Commission
on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (1997), which calls
on all countries to introduce regulations to ensure licensing,
safe storage and tracing of firearms.
The UN Conference Program of Action lays out 25 measures
to be taken by states at the national level that range from
putting in place laws governing production of small arms to
preventing the use of small arms against children in armed
conflict. However, the specific issue of the civilian possession
of small arms was one crucial area that was excluded. During
the negotiations some states called for a ban on civilian
ownership of military-style small arms and light weapons while
opponents claimed that any such action would interfere with
issues of national sovereignty. However, none of the discussion
at the UN Conference resulted in action to control and influence
behavior at the local level where decisions to obtain and
use small arms are often made.
Countries or regions where there is little effective domestic
regulation often play a major role in feeding an illicit supply
of small arms and light weapons to countries where regulations
may be more restrictive. Therefore, the Inter-American Convention
and the UN PoA will not be effective policy tools without
parallel and complementary domestic firearm legislation by
national governments.
5. Weapons Collection and Destruction
The destruction of small arms and light weapons is the only
way in which collected weapons are permanently removed and
cannot reenter the supply chain. This applies equally to weapons
collected in the course of disarmament and demobilization
operations, weapons collected during peacekeeping operations,
surplus inventories among security forces and weapons turned
in by citizens. Destruction in all these cases is the only
demonstrated means of keeping weapons from re-circulating.
Several countries around the world have committed themselves
to this policy. South Africa has destroyed surplus military
and police weapons and seized illegal weapons, while the UK
ban on handguns resulted in massive collections of civilian
weapons, which were destroyed. The OAS could provide an important
means of collecting and sharing information gained from destruction
initiatives and supporting further efforts.
In particular, the collection and destruction of illicit
or surplus weapons within civil society should be prioritized
by OAS member states. Potential measures include:
· implementing policies for the systematic collection
and destruction of weapons which are seized from in the illegal
possession of civilians;
· promoting programs to encourage citizens to surrender
illegal, unsafe or unwanted firearms with a policy to destroy
these collected weapons;
· accompanying changes in weapons possession laws
with verifiable plans to destroy all the weapons surrendered;
and
· establishing and enhancing police-community relations,
so that citizens have the confidence to work with the police
to combat illicit weapons possession and trafficking and to
address security concerns, including reducing fear of crime
and insecurity.
In addition to committing to the destruction of weapons collected
from civilians, OAS member states could undertake to destroy
weapons which are defined as surplus to their national security
needs rather than stockpiling or selling these weapons to
other countries. Arms caches that remain after conflicts should
also be destroyed. The OAS could consider the establishment
of a fund to destroy weapons and to share expertise on weapons
destruction methods.
Individual OAS member states could undertake the collection
and verifiable destruction of surplus weapons accumulated
as a result of arms control and disarmament agreements, and
conduct open destruction of weapons defined as surplus to
the needs of national law enforcement and security forces
by national equipment replacement programs.
6. Creating Secure Environments to Reduce the Need for
Small Arms
The demand for small arms is often fuelled by conditions
of insecurity, oppression, human rights violations and under-development.
To be effective, therefore, actions to limit the supply of
small arms and to remove weapons from societies, need to be
implemented in conjunction with initiatives to reform law
enforcement agencies, establish accountability mechanisms,
strengthen the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary
and the protection of human rights. Such measures will do
much to strengthen the capacity of law enforcement agencies
to combat illicit trafficking and to promote more effective
co-operation with civil society. Such measures need to be
integrated into wider economic and social development programs,
and conflict prevention initiatives. Aid to strengthen law
enforcement agencies should be conditional on adherence by
the recipient government to internationally recognized standards
for human rights, law enforcement and principles of good governance.
To conclude my presentation, I will focus on three such demand-side
measures which the OAS could prioritize:
-
security sector reform, especially law enforcement agencies;
-
regulation of private security forces; and
-
reversing cultures of violence
Reforming law enforcement agencies
Several OAS countries lack the capacity or political will
to provide their citizens with appropriate levels of human
security and protection. Frequently law enforcement agencies
lack the capacity to investigate or prosecute offenders, they
may also lack the support and respect of local communities,
and in some cases, human rights abuses by law enforcement
agencies may in fact increase the demand for small arms. OAS
member states should actively embark on co-operative initiatives
to reform police, military and security forces and thereby
foster public confidence in the capacity of state security
institutions to ensure their citizen's security.
The OAS could establish a fund to support joint reform and
training programs for law enforcement, military and justice
officials and support their implementation. Such training
and reform programs must have at their heart measures to ensure
respect for international human rights standards and international
humanitarian law. It is also important that such programs
have stringent monitoring and accountability mechanisms and
that NGOs and civil society by closely involved in such programs.
Furthermore, such programs should go hand in hand with measures
to develop, resources and reinforce independent and impartial
judicial structures. Again, cooperation with the OSCE could
be beneficial here, as it has developed a strong body of knowledge
and experience in many of these areas through the support
of reform programs in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
Regulation of private security forces
In Latin America in general, but most specifically in
parts of Central America, private security companies using
high powered weaponry, often of military design, have proliferated.
This is especially the case where public security forces have
been unable to provide citizens with a sense of security.
Demand for these services is fuelled by the need felt by many
banks, businesses and residences for armed protection. The
weapons used by agencies providing these services fuel the
legal firearms trade while the lack of government control
over the agencies, their employees and their weapons makes
it potentially easy for arms to slip into the black market
and end up in the hands of criminals. Again the lack of economic
opportunity and rule of law accelerates the vicious cycle
of small arms demand creation.
Increasingly, employees of private security companies are
implicated in criminal activities including armed assault
and arms trafficking. Until there is more effective control
and regulation of the way these companies procure, store and
distribute their firearms it is highly likely that significant
numbers of private security weapons will continue to enter
the black market and contribute to increased levels of violence
and insecurity. Of course the pace of privatization of public
security functions can be most effectively challenged by adequate
investment in civilian police forces and competent judiciaries
accompanied by parallel efforts to remove corrupt officials.
However, these goals are only feasible over the long term
and there exists an urgent need to prevent abuses by private
security personnel and leakage from private security arsenals
in the interim. Some measures that might be appropriate in
the context of private security include:
- regular reviews of current practices;
- the establishment of effective systems for management
and accountability;
- ensuring adequate and detailed standards and procedures;
- ensuring good record-keeping and regular stocktaking;
and
- ensuring that losses are properly reported and investigated.
States should introduce new, or strengthen existing, national
legislation to control the activities of private security
companies, which should be required to register and apply
for authorization for each contract they enter into. Such
applications should be assessed in accordance with publicly
available criteria based on international and hemispheric
human rights standards, including measures to ensure that
the employers of private military and security companies introduce
sufficient safeguards to prevent breaches of human rights
norms and standards. These controls should be in accordance
with international standards on the use of force, including
the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the
UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials. All personnel should be properly trained
in and committed to respect such standards.
Reversing cultures of violence
Civil society groups in OAS countries have a crucial role
to play in raising community awareness of the impact and dangers
of small arms, and to reverse the 'cultures of violence' that
have developed in some countries. Collaborative projects are
required to advance such initiatives. Such projects should
be seen as integral to programs to improve governance and
to enhance the capacity of the police and judiciary to assure
the security of their citizens (and to enhance the confidence
of all citizens in such services).
One of the best examples of this kind of work involves, Viva
Rio, a Brazilian NGO. In Brazil, high death rates stem from
excessive gun use and a culture of violence affecting both
civil society and the police. In reaction to these spiraling
problems of urban violence, Viva Rio, launched a city-wide
disarmament campaign to reduce the number of firearms-related
deaths and injuries in Rio de Janeiro, by stigmatizing gun
use and creating alternatives to the culture of violence.
The OAS could establish systems of information exchange and
consultation throughout the Americas to identify and learn
from successful practices in this area. Similarly, the OAS
and its member states could develop local, national and regional
public education and awareness programs to enhance public
involvement and support for efforts to tackle small arms proliferation,
and to challenge and reverse 'gun cultures' where they occur
on the dangers of guns and their misuse. Restrictions on the
advertisement and promotion of small arms to civilians could
also be introduced.
7. Conclusion
The UN Conference went part of the way towards developing
measures and reinforcing SALW agreements and programs at all
levels: local, national, regional and global. However, the
UN Conference Program of Action sets out minimum commitments.
Regional organizations, such as the OAS, can and must go further.
The emphasis should be on moving forward with tangible projects
resulting in lasting reductions in SALW in the Americas. In
this respect, inter-regional cooperation - specifically between
the OSCE and OAS - would be one way in which best practice
can be shared and lessons learnt in order that scarce resources
can be better targeted to project fulfillment.
______________
[1] Dr Ian Davis (Director) and Michael Crowley (Senior
Analyst) at BASIC co-wrote this presentation, which draws
heavily on Biting the Bullet Briefing 15, implementing
the UN action programme for combating the illicit trafficking
in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, BASIC/International
Alert/Saferworld, March 2002; and William Godnick, The
Organization of American States and the 2001 United Nations
Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons
In All Its Aspects: Tackling the Illicit Trade in Small Arms
and Light Weapons, Biting the Bullet, Project Ploughshares
and the Arias Foundation, January 2002. The authors are also
grateful for the comments of Greg Puley.
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