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Controlling the gun-runners:
Proposals for EU action to regulate arms
brokering
and shipping agents
Brian Wood / Elizabeth Clegg
BASIC / NISAT / Saferworld Briefing
February 1999
Published by the British American Security
Information Council
The Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, and
Saferworld
Contents
Executive Summary
Recommendations for
an EU control system
Controlling the gun-runners:
-
The problem of arms brokering
and shipping
-
Brokering arms transfers to
Africa: exploiting loopholes and circumventing national
and international controls
-
Controlling arms brokering
and shipping agents: Key issues
-
Current practice in controlling
arms and brokering
-
Recommendations for an EU
system to control arms brokering and shipping agents
Endnotes
Executive Summary
The problem of arms brokering and shipping
There is growing evidence that significant quantities of arms
entering the worst affected conflict and human-rights crisis
zones are transferred there by arms brokering and shipping
agents. Some of these deals are brokered by EU residents -
whether citizens or foreign nationals - operating in the European
Union. Others are arranged by EU residents or EU passport-holders
operating further afield. These agents often organise the
transfer of arms and security equipment from third countries,
without the weapons touching EU soil. Many of the transfers
would not receive an export licence if the declared intention
was to export the equipment directly from EU states. Arms
brokering and shipping agents have shown themselves to be
capable of operating regardless of UN and EU arms embargoes.
Yet despite increasing evidence of their operations, and the
often devastating impact on civilians of the weapons they
supply, the control and oversight of their activities in most
EU countries remains inadequate or non-existent.
The German Government has indicated its intention to tackle
this problem during its Presidency of the EU (January to June
1999). This is an important opportunity to close one of the
most significant loopholes in EU controls over arms transfers.
Recommendations for an EU control system
Establish EU-wide controls on the activities of arms brokering
agents
EU controls on arms brokering activities should apply to:
a) any EU passport-holder, wherever located; b) any foreign
national who is resident in the EU; or c) companies which
are incorporated or registered in the EU. As an immediate
step, all Member States could follow Swedish practice and
control arms brokering and shipping agents domiciled in the
EU, even if they are operating abroad.
Adopt a comprehensive list of activities to be controlled
The buying, selling, promotion, advertising, and marketing
of all military goods and services should be controlled by
EU Member States, as should the mediation in or facilitation
of such transfers. In addition there should be a prohibition
on the brokering and shipping of military, security and police
equipment and services whose sole or primary practical use
results in serious violations of humanitarian or international
human rights law.
Register all EU arms brokering and shipping agents
All arms brokering and shipping agents who are either
EU citizens (irrespective of where they are domiciled), EU
residents for taxpaying purposes or companies registered in
the EU should be required to register with their national
governments. All EU Member States should compile a list of
"approved" or "registered" agents. Agents who break the law
or deliberately supply misleading information should be prosecuted
and banned from any further involvement in arms brokering.
All those on such a register should be required regularly
to publish detailed audited accounts relating to their arms
dealings and showing the names of their beneficiaries.
Licence each transaction on a case by case basis
Each transaction involving EU arms brokering and shipping
agents should require a licence, issued in advance by their
national government. Licence applications for arms brokering
activities should be subject to the same scrutiny as arms
exports from the EU.
Encourage adoption of EU controls by partner countries
In order to ensure that arms brokers do not evade EU
controls by moving abroad, the EU should seek to internationalise
any control system. The ultimate goal should be an International
Convention on the Control of Arms Brokering and Shipping Agents.
Controlling the gun-runners
1. The problem of arms brokering and
shipping
The proliferation of weapons, particularly small arms, is
fuelling violations of international human rights and humanitarian
law, thwarting sustainable development and destabilising regional
peace and security throughout the world.
There is growing evidence that significant quantities of
arms entering the worst affected regions of conflict and human-rights
crisis zones are transferred there by arms brokering and shipping
agents.1 Some of these deals are
brokered by EU residents - whether citizens or foreign nationals
- operating in the European Union. Others are arranged by
EU residents or EU passport-holders operating further afield.
These agents often organise the transfer of arms and security
equipment from third countries, without the weapons touching
EU soil. However, many of the transfers would not receive
an export licence if the declared intention was to export
the equipment directly from EU states. Yet despite increasing
evidence of the operations of arms brokers, and the often
devastating impact on civilians of the weapons they supply,
the control and oversight of their activities in most EU countries
remains inadequate or non-existent.
The German Government has indicated its intention to launch
an initiative, during its Presidency of the EU (January to
June 1999), to control the activities of arms brokering agents.
This presents an important opportunity to close one of the
most significant loopholes in EU controls over arms transfers.
2. Brokering arms transfers to Africa:
exploiting loopholes and circumventing national and international
controls
The region of Central Africa stretching from Burundi, Rwanda
and Uganda, across the Democratic Republic of Congo, to Angola
and the Congo Republic (Brazzaville), has increasingly become
one of the most serious crisis zones in the world. Military
actions in this region have become inter-linked with those
in neighbouring regions including West Africa, the Horn of
Africa and Southern Africa. Governments and armed opposition
groups in such crisis zones bear responsibility for targeting
civilians through acts of reprisal killing, arbitrary arrest,
abduction and torture. The most common means whereby such
international crimes are committed is through small arms and
associated equipment. Over the past five years, these have
flowed to the perpetrators of international crimes in Central
Africa from over 20 Organisation for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE) Member States, as well as from certain other
states, such as China, Israel, and South Africa.2 This has occurred usually in disregard of appeals by
EU and Associated Countries' governments as well as international
humanitarian and human rights organisations.
Some of this influx of arms has been the result of the activities
of EU-based arms brokering and shipping agents and associated
sub-contractors. These brokers take advantage of loopholes
in national legislation since most EU governments do not properly
regulate the involvement of their nationals or residents in
the brokering and trafficking of arms where the transfers
take place from third world countries outside the EU. Even
where EU governments have taken steps to control the activities
of brokering and shipping agents, their efforts have often
been inadequate, and are frequently undermined by brokers
simply stepping over the border into another EU Member or
non-Member State in order to conduct their transactions. In
this way unscrupulous arms dealers have been able to undermine
the stated policies of the Eu and its partners, as set out
in inter alia the EU 1991-92 Criteria, now elaborated
in the 1998 Code of Conduct, and the 1993 OSCE Principles
Governing Conventional Arms Transfers.
Arms brokering and shipping agents have shown themselves
to be capable of operating regardless of the existence of
UN, EU or other arms embargoes. In cases where a binding UN
embargo has been imposed by the international community, all
states are required to implement prompt and effective measures
which would enforce the embargo. Nevertheless, in recent years
evidence has emerged of EU arms brokering and shipping agents
arranging the supply of weapons to countries which were in
fact subject to a UN arms embargo. A recent high profile case,
which came to light in April 1998, involved the UK company
Sandline International arranging the trasport of arms from
Bulgaria to forces seeking to reinstate Ahmed Tejan Kabbah
as President of Sierra Leone. Another UK company -- Mil Tec
-- and its partners are known to have arranged shipments of
arms to Rwanda before and during the 1994 genocide3 (see Example 1). Unfortunately, for various reasons, not
all governments take adequate steps to implement international
embargoes and unscrupulous individuals, agencies and companies
are able to exploit weaknesses and inconsistencies in many
national arms export control systems.
| Example 1. Breaking
an arms embargo: the Rwandan genocide
UK and South African based arms brokering agents and
their network of shipping and other subcontractors in
other countries violated the international arms embargo
against Rwanda in 1994. They did this by evading inadequate
national laws in their home countries, and by easily
disguising the routes of their deliveries, choosing
to operate where there were loose customs, transport
and financial regulations.
The UN Security Council had imposed an arms embargo
on Rwanda more than a month after the genocide began
in early April 1994. This was already too late but the
situation was compounded when, even after the UN embargo
was agreed, more small arms and ammunition were supplied
to the perpetrators via routes inadequately monitored
by international observers. Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch drew attention in mid-1995 to reported
arms deliveries via airports in former Zaire. Goma airport
in particular had become the main delivery point for
the supply of further arms and ammunition to the perpetrators
of the genocide, and the Zairian authorities were collaborating
in this build-up. Human Rights Watch exposed officially
sanctioned Chinese and French arms deliveries, as well
as supplies by South African traders, while Amnesty
International reported that supplies of small arms were
delivered from Albania, Bulgaria and Israel by UK-based
traders using secret international networks. Both NGOs
warned that further deliveries from various sources
were being reported locally.
Interviews by investigative journalists with aircrew
associated with these deliveries revealed that the UK
brokers and traders had used a host of sub-contracting
companies to conceal their activities. For example,
UK aircrew stated that in May 1994 aircraft flew empty
from Ostend in Belgium to Tirana in Albania where small
arms were loaded under Israeli supervision and then
flown to Goma in the former Zaire with no checking of
documentation, despite a refueling stop in Cairo. Secret
documents from the military archives of the exiled Rwandan
armed forces revealed that a UK company, Mil Tec, registered
in the Isle of Man, was centrally involved during April
to July 1994 using links in Albania, France, Israel
and Italy.
The NGOs warned that, in the context of cross-border
attacks and counter-attacks, further serious human-rights
abuses were escalating. As a result of international
public pressure, in mid-1995 the UN Security Council
decided to establish an International Commission of
Inquiry to investigate the matter and recommend action.
EU states have so far failed to prosecute those responsible
for arming the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide
even though such complicity is a crime under the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(1948).
|
Whilst the international community does not always agree
to place an embargo on every country in a human rights crisis
or armed conflict, many countries are currently experiencing
such a level of crisis or conflict as would in practice make
them ineligible for arms transfers from EU Member States.
EU governments have agreed to exercise caution with regard
to arms transfers to sensitive regions, but there has grown
an increasing body of evidence that suggest that EU national
continue to undermine such controls by brokering and shipping
arms from third countries in such crisis zones.
| Example 2. Crisis
with no mandatory arms embargo: the case of Congo Brazzaville
Fighting amongst political factions, involving deliberate
attacks on civilians, erupted in the Congo Republic
in June 1997 and was still continuing in early 1999.
In early October 1997 this fighting reached catastrophic
proportions. Even the ICRC personnel had to withdraw
from Brazzaville for a time, and at least 5,000 Congolese
civilians were killed and many more injured. The belligerents
used small arms and heavier weaponry, including attack
helicopters, some of it supplied by two West European
dealers.
Documents found in the offices of the ousted government
of the Congo Republic showed that, between June and
September 1997, a German arms broker and an arms trader,
allegedly of Belgian nationality, supplied millions
of dollars worth of military equipment to the forces
of the beleaguered President Lissouba. The German dealer
negotiated orders for a wide range of military equipment
totalling $42.4 million of which he received $27.1 million.
Both dealers operated from South Africa where some of
the equipment was obtained using several companies registered
in a number of countries and using Belgian, French and
UK bank accounts. Furthermore, between January and July
1997, a time when rivalry between political militia
in the Congo was increasing and observers were warning
of an outbreak of fighting and the threat to civilians,
Italian traders supplied the Congo with 15 tonnes of
cartridges apparently worth over one billion lire.
Amongst the documents seized from the presidential
palace by the militia of the new head of state, Sassou
Nguesso, was one dated 27 June 1997 signed by the German
broker as chairman of CED Marketing, acknowledging an
order from the Congo-Brazzaville government for the
purchase of two MI-17 IV transport helicopters. This
deal was made with the so-called Belgian manager of
a company called Sablon Trading, which had an account
at the First National Bank in Johannesburg. According
to the letter, the helicopters were ordered from an
"East-European" supplier.
A fax sent by the "Belgian" trader to Lissouba's secretary
mentioned another order of five helicopters. A technical
note mentions that the MI-17 IV helicopter can be used
as a combat helicopter with rockets, guns and bombs.
It bears hand-written inscriptions on the cost of the
rockets. Combat helicopters were used to bomb the Mpila
and Poto-Poto districts of Brazzaville on 26 August
1997 allegedly causing hundreds of civilian deaths.
The new Congo-Brazzaville government said that this
was a crime against humanity and has handed evidence
to the United Nations, and to the French, Belgian, German
and US governments. It should be noted, however, the
" Cobra" militia of Sassou Nguesso is reported also
to have used international networks of arms suppliers,
some of whom appear to overlap with those of Lissouba.
|
3. Controlling arms brokering and shipping agents: Key
issues
There are a number of key issues to address in the establishment
of effective and comprehensive controls on the activities
of arms brokering and shipping agents.
Weak legislation and enforcement mechanisms
One argument which is invoked against the development
of comprehensive EU controls on the activities of EU arms
brokering and shipping agents who are operating outside the
EU is that these agents are already required to comply with
the export control laws of the foreign exporting country.
However, this argument lacks force. Arms traders supplying
illegitimate customers usually exploit loopholes or weaknesses
in EU national arms control systems and in those of third
countries. Countries with weak export and import controls
may be targeted and vague legal definitions, poor licensing
procedures, corruption, and a lack of capacity to enforce
customs controls provide arms brokering and shipping agents
with an opportunity to move arms along clandestine supply
routes. That said, however, experienced arms brokers who agree
to supply recipients in crisis zones will try not to directly
contravene national laws, at least where they know law enforcement
agencies have the capacity to bring this legislation to bear.
Lax financial controls/company regulation
The financial dimensions of arms brokering activities
are also in need of proper control. In addition to using foreign
sources of supply, EU arms brokering and shipping agents are
able to use foreign shipping and banking operations and can
launder the proceeds from their arms dealings in offshore
tax-haven accounts, opening and closing different 'paper'
companies. A UK Government Home Office report by Andrew Edwards4
found that an estimated 90,000 companies were incorporated
in the UK offshore tax havens, where they are allowed to conduct
business in relative secrecy without filing public accounts
or revealing the names of their beneficial owners. The report
estimates that these island companies hold around 5% of the
global offshore tax-haven funds of $6 trillion - which is
just under half UK GNP. This lack of regulation and enforcement
has been exploited by arms brokers - as in the Rwanda and
Congo Brazzaville cases where the dealers used tax haven accounts
in the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man - as well as by
cargo carriers who also use "flags of convenience" and ports
with lax customs procedures.
The coverage of EU controls
Where an arms embargo is agreed at national, regional
or international level, but the terms are not clearly set
out by participant states in their domestic law, experienced
arms brokering or shipping agents will find ways to continue
their operations, arranging the transfer of arms to the embargoed
country. However, even in cases where national legislation
clearly articulates the status of an arms embargo, arms brokering
and shipping agents may still find ways of avoiding national
controls. For example, it may be relatively easy for EU-based
brokering and shipping agents to step out of the EU and to
complete their dealings in a country which either is not party
to an arms embargo, or enforces its export control legislation
so loosely as to make smuggling relatively easy. This type
of situation has arisen in connection with German arms brokering
agents stepping out of German territory to avoid national
controls on their activities, as well as with Belgian, Dutch,
and Luxembourg security equipment brokers using German and
US links to market electro-shock weapons.
The problem of enforcement
Another argument often deployed against adopting legislation
on arms brokering and shipping agents is that the difficulty
enforcing such legislation is so great that it renders such
efforts futile. All law, to be effective, must be based on
a degree of public consensus coupled with a determination
to enforce it. While there is no substitute for political
will, there are clear international legal, humanitarian and
political reasons for introducing legislation in this area.
If the stark absence of public data and regulation of arms
brokering and shipping agents were rectified in the EU, this
would considerably improve the ability of EU law enforcers
to prevent illicit arms trafficking through third countries.
The current lack of controls breeds a culture of impunity.
Although detection and enforcement will often be more difficult
than in the case of illegal direct arms exports from the EU,
what is important is that proper controls and law enforcement
capacity should be in place so that when cases come to light,
more effective investigations and prosecutions can be carried
out by EU authorities.
4. Current practice in controlling arms
brokering
Examination of current policies for controlling the activities
of arms brokering and shipping agents provides clear examples
both of weaknesses that need to be addressed and of best practice
which could be adopted.
France
French law currently requires that all French citizens
who wish to become involved in the production or trading of
arms in France should register with the government. Only French
nationals can be granted permission to engage in such activities.
The government intelligence services carry out checks to ensure
that individuals and companies who wish to engage in producing
or trading arms do not have criminal convictions. However,
there is no licensing of individual transfers and the French
government has no power to regulate the brokering and shipping
activities of their citizens if they occur outside French
territory.
Germany
In Germany, controls on arms brokering in Europe can
be briefly summarised as follows.
Brokering activities are divided into two types:
i) buying and selling; ii) mediation. Where an individual
located in Germany is involved in buying and then selling
any type of controlled (lethal or non-lethal) military equipment
he/she must apply for a licence from the German government.
Where an individual acts as a mediator or a facilitator of
a transaction involving military equipment (but the equipment
does not enter into his/her legal possession), a licence is
required only if the transaction involves lethal military
items listed in the War Weapons Act, but not if it includes
only non-lethal items listed in the Foreign Trade and Payment
Act.
Arms brokering licences issued by the German
government are subject to the same level of scrutiny as an
arms export licence and there is a close alignment between
export policy and policy regarding brokering supplies through
third countries. However, the loophole which allows individuals
conducting their business in German territory to mediate in
the transactions involving non-lethal military items will
allow the unlicensed transfer of such equipment to regions
of conflict. Moreover, there are no extra-territorial provisions
included within German laws on arms brokering. Thus they are
liable to circumvention by individuals who step out of the
country in order to conduct the transaction.
Sweden
In Sweden, there is also a restrictive attitude towards
issuing brokerage permits since the Swedish rationale for
international arms activities (regardless of what form they
take) is that they should directly contribute to securing
the needs of Sweden's own armed forces. In the view of the
Swedish government, brokering can rarely be said to contribute
to that objective.
Swedish arms brokers require a permit in order
to engage in arms brokering activities. Subsequent to a permit
being issued, a licence is required for each transaction in
which the broker wishes to engage. Each individual transaction
is judged according to the same rules as arms exports from
Sweden. The range of goods that is controlled for the purposes
of arms brokering is the same as that range of goods which
is controlled for export i.e. "military equipment".
Controls apply to arms brokering agents domiciled
in Sweden, irrespective of nationality or pattern of operations
and despite the fact that most of the business could be conducted
from hotel rooms in foreign capitals. Swedish controls apply
as long as the agent's permanent residence is in Sweden. The
concept of 'domicile' is the same as has been used for taxation
purposes.
The territorial application of Swedish controls
on arms brokering agents can thus be seen to have been taken
on one step further than German controls in the sense that
they apply to Swedish-domiciled individuals wherever they
are located. Stepping outside Swedish territory would thus
not exempt a Swedish citizen from laws relating to arms brokering.
The UK
Currently it is an offence for any UK national to participate
in the trafficking or brokering of arms in contravention of
a UN arms embargo. In its White Paper on Strategic Export
Controls, published in July 1998, the government has proposed
extending this prohibition to cover the involvement of any
UK national in trafficking and brokering in controlled goods
to countries that are subject to EU, OSCE and/or national
embargoes. The UK government is also proposing to impose controls
on the trafficking and brokering of torture equipment, anti-personnel
mines, and missiles capable of a range of at least 300km.
However, the official UK proposals state that
"¼ the Government does not propose
to use this power to introduce controls on trafficking and
brokering of all goods that are subject to export controls.
It is right in principle that UK controls on trafficking and
brokering should be more limited than on actual exports from
the UK as those involved in such activities will also be required
to comply with the export control laws of the exporting country.
Secondly, enforcement of controls on trafficking and brokering
is less straightforward than the enforcement of controls on
exports from the UK and it is therefore right that resources
for enforcement of such measures should be targeted on the
most critical areas."5
As the Examples outlined above show, it is difficult
to see how control of arms brokers is a less "critical area".
Moreover, the argument that brokering and trafficking agents
will also be required to comply with the export control laws
of the exporting country is not convincing. As mentioned above,
brokering and trafficking agents often target their efforts
on countries with poor export and import controls, or countries
where a level of corruption exists which allows such controls
to be easily circumvented. While detection and enforcement
will often be more difficult than in the case of actual arms
exports from the UK, new resources should be allocated to
ensure that proper controls and law enforcement capacity are
in place so that when cases come to light, action can be taken.
The USA
The US Government has recently adopted new regulations
to control international arms brokering. Any US citizen, wherever
located, and any foreign person located in the USA or
subject to US jurisdiction, who engages in brokering activities
involving military goods or services, must first register
with the US Department of State. Each transaction must then
be given prior written approval by the State Department. There
may remain a loophole in respect of some crime control equipment
on the Commerce control list as opposed to the Munitions list,
but this new regulation would appear to be a big advance and
its operation should be closely studied.
5. Recommendations for an
EU system to control arms brokering and shipping agents
Establish EU-wide controls on the activities of arms brokering
agents The issue of territoriality is fundamental to the
effective control of arms brokering and shipping agents. To
be most effective in preventing the illicit transfer of arms
into regions of conflict, EU controls on arms brokering activities
should apply to:
a) any EU passport-holder, wherever located;
b) any foreign national who is resident in the EU; and
c) companies which are incorporated or registered in the EU.
This will require legislation with an extraterritorial dimension
to enable the prosecution of those based in the EU who fail
to comply with EU law while conducting unlawful arms trafficking
activities outside the EU. Constitutional considerations in
some EU Member States should not be invoked to prevent an
extraterritorial dimension - similar to that used to tackle
illicit drug trafficking - from being included in EU controls
on arms brokering. An immediate first step for EU agreement
could be for each state to follow the Swedish practice. This
would mean that arms brokering and shipping agents domiciled
in an EU Member State would be bound by EU controls even if
their operations are conducted outside the EU.
Adopt a comprehensive list of activities to be controlled
The buying, selling, promotion, advertising, and marketing
of all military goods and services should be controlled by
EU Member States, as should the mediation in or facilitation
of such transfers. Military goods and services should include:
all types of major conventional weaponry, all types of small
arms and light weapons, police and paramilitary equipment,
military and paramilitary training equipment and services.
In addition there should be a prohibition on the brokering
and shipping of military, security and police equipment and
services whose sole or primary practical use results in serious
violations of humanitarian or international human rights law.
This should include anti-personnel mines, death penalty equipment,
leg irons and electro-shock weapons; the list of such items
under control should be kept under regular review.
Register all EU arms brokering and shipping agents
In order to ensure EU-wide co-ordination of controls,
all international arms brokering and shipping agents who are
EU citizens (irrespective of where they are domiciled), EU
residents for taxpaying purposes and companies registered
in the EU should be required to register with their national
governments.6 All EU Member States should compile and publish a national
list of "approved" or "registered" agents as soon as possible.
Brokers or shippers who are convicted of breaking the law
in any EU Member State, or who deliberately supply misleading
information to the registering authorities should be refused
registration, prosecuted, and banned from any further involvement
in arms brokering and shipping. This would ensure that unscrupulous
individuals who are convicted of offences in one Member State
do not merely relocate within the EU and carry on with their
arms brokering transactions - whether legal or illegal. In
addition, all companies or individuals based in the EU that
are involved in arms brokering activities should also be required
to present detailed audited accounts to their national authorities.
In addition, all companies or individuals based in the EU
that are involved in arms brokering and shipping activities
should be required regularly to publish detailed audited accounts
relating to their arms dealings and showing the names of their
beneficiaries. This will help to close some of the financial
loopholes which arms brokering and shipping agents use to
disguise their activities and the sources of their incomes.
Licence each transaction on a case by case basis
Each transaction involving EU arms brokering and shipping
agents should require a licence, issued by their national
government. Licence applications for arms brokering activities
should be subject to the same level of scrutiny as arms exports
from the EU. Accordingly they should be subject to the same
requirements as regards the provision of information on the
nature of the equipment being transferred, the source of the
equipment and the end-user. Such licence applications should
also be subject to the same end-use certification requirements
as EU arms exports. (In this regard, steps to harmonise EU
licensing procedures and end-use certification - both for
arms exports and brokering activities - would further enhance
the overall effectiveness of EU controls.)
Encourage adoption of EU controls by partner countries
In order to ensure that EU arms brokering and shipping
agents do not seek to evade EU controls on their activities
by establishing themselves abroad, the EU should seek to internationalise
any agreement on controlling such agents. Initial efforts
could focus on encouraging the EU Associated Countries and
prospective EU Member States to adopt and implement comparable
controls. The next step could be to extend the agreement into
the Wassenaar Arrangement and the OSCE, as well as to encourage
other regional groupings - such as the Organisation of American
States (OAS), the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) - to adopt similar control
agreements. The ultimate goal, however, should be an International
Convention on the Control of Arms Brokering and Shipping Agents.
Only when all states adopt and implement measures which are
consistent and rigorous can the unlicensed, and often illegal,
transfer of arms into crisis zones be halted.
______________________
Endnotes
1 In its White Paper of July 1998
on Strategic Export Controls the UK government defines brokering
as "Acting as an agent in putting a deal together between
supplier and customer, or making the practical arrangements
for the supply of the goods." For the purposes of this paper,
brokering and shipping agents are those companies or individuals
who engage in any of the following activities: buying and
selling arms; mediation in, or facilitation of, arms transfers;
promotion or marketing of arms; transportation of arms. "Arms"
should include all military, security and police equipment
and services.
2 National Security News Service
briefing for journalists, May 1998; selected publications
on Central Africa by Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch.
3 Mil Tec, a company registered
in the Isle of Man and owned by Kenyan nationals, was able
to arrange the transfer of arms to Rwanda without breaking
the law due to a failure of the government of the day to ensure
that the UN embargo was promptly implemented in the UK Crown
Dependencies.
4 Review of Financial Regulation
in the Crown Dependencies: A Report, Part 1, 24 October
1998.
5 UK Department of Trade and Industry
White Paper on Strategic Export Controls, July 1998, pp15.
I6 In the UK, anyone wishing to
buy and sell 'Section 1' and 'Section 2' firearms (including
hunting rifles, shotguns, muzzle-loading pistols) must be
registered as a firearms dealer with their local police force.
Anyone wishing to possess 'Section 5' or 'Prohibited' weapons
(including self-loading rifles, assault rifles, handguns,
rocket launchers and flame-throwers) can only do so under
an authority issued by the Secretary of State. This authority
is only issued to those who have a legitimate business need
to possess these items.
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