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Small Arms and Light Weapons

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PROJECT ON LIGHT WEAPONS

Links between domestic laws and
international light weapons control

Dr. Natalie J. Goldring

American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict

Controlling the Global Trade in Light Weapons
Washington, DC, 11-12 December 1997

Introduction

Although largely neglected by analysts and policymakers until quite recently, light weapons proliferation represents a pervasive and continuing problem. Light weapons have probably been responsible for most of the recent killing in conflicts, despite the regular involvement of both light and major conventional weapons in many conflicts.¹

This paper addresses one aspect of the light weapons problem, presenting the preliminary results of a project to develop strategies which would overcome domestic obstacles to the control of light weapons.² It demonstrates that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to control the illicit international market in light weapons without monitoring and controlling domestic access to weapons. In the United States, for example, two key obstacles to light weapons control are the activities of "pro-gun" groups such as the National Rifle Association (NRA), and the U.S. government's failure to enforce controls on light weapons transfers.

The first section of the paper discusses issues related to domestic control of light weapons. The focus is on domestic issues in the United States, supplemented with brief overviews of recent initiatives on domestic gun control in the United Kingdom and Australia. The section provides several examples of how the US government has helped create the problems it now faces (such as armed drug lords) through inadequate controls on light weapons transfers. To have effective international controls, it will be important to enforce existing laws governing sales of weapons and to provide sufficient resources to control national borders. It will also be important for the United States to work with other governments on efforts that recognize and deal with the interrelationship between drug trafficking and gun trafficking.

The next section provides an update on recent international efforts regarding light weapons. It describes the results to date of three UN efforts focused on small arms and light weapons: the UN Disarmament Commission's work on illicit transfers, the UN Economic and Social Council's (ECOSOC) study on firearms regulations, and the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. It also provides an update on the recent Organization of American States (OAS) convention on illicit weapons.

The third section of the paper focuses on the ways in which "pro-gun" organizations such as the National Rifle Association (NRA) have actively opposed controls on light weapons and small arms, while arguing disingenuously that they oppose illegal weapons transfers. The NRA in particular is devoting extensive resources to opposing international controls, in addition to its traditional campaigns to block domestic gun measures, be they safety measures or actual controls on weapons purchases.

The fourth section of the paper presents preliminary policy options. These include strategies for sharing ideas and policy proposals with domestic gun control groups as a means of bridging the gap between campaigns dedicated to reducing violence on a national level and those focusing on controlling international flows of weapons. Just as the absence of domestic controls will tend to undermine international restraint efforts, the presence of domestic controls may increase the likelihood of successful international restraint efforts.

Domestic Controls of Small Arms and Light Weapons

National laws governing small arms and light weapons vary widely from country to country. For example, while the United Kingdom and Australia have recently taken significant gun control initiatives, the same weapons are still widely available in many other countries, such as the United States. This section provides a brief update on recent changes in gun laws in the United Kingdom and Australia, but concentrates on US gun laws. This is not because US laws are typical, but because US weapons production and weapons exports constitute such a major part of the world weapons market.

Increased domestic control in the United Kingdom
One important effort to tighten domestic controls is the ban on handguns currently being implemented in the United Kingdom. In February 1997, a new UK law banned private possession of handguns of greater than .22 calibre. This law was spurred in large part by the massacre in Dunblane, Scotland, in March 1996, in which 16 children and one teacher were killed in just a few minutes by a lone gunman.

The February ban on handguns greater than .22 calibre reportedly affected some 80 percent of handguns in the United Kingdom, or an estimated 160,000 handguns. It included new procedures for storing .22 calibre handguns in gun clubs, and provided stricter standards for firearms ownership certification. Owners of prohibited weapons were required to hand them in by 1 October 1997. This program appears to have been largely successful -- as of a week before the hand-in date, approximately 120,000 of the 160,000 prohibited weapons had been turned in.

Ironically, while the February 1997 law enhanced domestic weapons controls, it may have undermined efforts to limit light weapons transfers. Applications for export licenses reportedly rose significantly while the ban was under discussion, and other gun owners apparently chose to take their weapons abroad before the legislation took effect. Allowing export of weapons that are prohibited or about to be prohibited risks creating a situation in which weapons not considered safe for UK citizens will be exported, setting a highly questionable moral standard.

Fortunately, however, virtually all of the weapons turned in as a result of the February law will be destroyed. According to a press account in the Daily Telegraph, "nothing will be excepted from destruction...apart from Glock 17s, which the police use themselves, and any item of historical interest."³ Mr Alun Michael, Minister of State, Home Department, said,

The vast majority of these firearms are being destroyed under local arrangements in each police force area once the claimant has received compensation from the Home Office Firearms Compensation Section. Some forces have begun destroying firearms where the related claim has already been met, though no central record of actual destruction is being kept. None of the surrendered firearms will be sold either within the United Kingdom or abroad. A small minority of firearms may be retained by police forces for training purposes and some by museums for public display.⁴

Following his election victory in May 1997, Prime Minister Tony Blair reiterated the new government's support for a total ban on handguns, and pledged to ban them by the end of 1997. In June 1997, the House of Commons voted in favor of such a ban.⁵ The bill passed the Lords on 27 October 1997, and was returned to the House of Commons with amendments. It passed the House of Commons with amendments on 11 November 1997, and received royal assent on 27 November 1997. In addition to banning all handguns not included in the February bill, this bill revokes the right for gun owners to keep their guns on club premises.

Increased domestic control in Australia
In April 1996, just six weeks after the Dunblane massacre, another lone gunman killed more than 30 people in Port Arthur, Australia. The next month, State and Territory Police Ministers held a special meeting and reached agreement on a nationwide program to ban semi-automatic and pump action firearms and to implement a buyback program for the prohibited weapons.⁶ Their intent was to create standard nationwide laws, in contrast to the diverse laws in effect in the states and territories at the time.

The new laws are quite far reaching. They include bans on several types of rifles and shotguns, the introduction of comprehensive registration systems for all firearms, implementation of required permits and a 28-day waiting period for firearms purchases, safety training and storage requirements, and compensation and amnesty arrangements.⁷

A key part of the implementation of the new laws is a gun buyback and amnesty program to collect weapons prohibited as the result of new gun control legislation. For much of the Commonwealth this program was in operation for 12 months, ending 30 September 1997 (it ended earlier in South Australia).⁸ By the end of the buyback period, more than 640,000 weapons had been handed in.⁹

The government set a useful precedent in requiring that all weapons collected from the buyback be destroyed. The only exceptions are weapons of particular historical interest which may be purchased by museums, and non-military-style weapons that can be consigned to dealers for overseas sale. In the latter case, however, if the weapons are not sold within one year, they must be returned to the buyback program and destroyed. So far an estimated 383,000 guns have been destroyed in Australia as part of the buyback program.¹⁰

US legislation governing light weapons
In the United States, a few key laws contain the main provisions affecting light weapons: the Gun Control Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. chapter 44), the National Firearms Act of 1934 (26 U.S.C. chapter 53), and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (22 U.S.C. 2778). Authority for dealing with light weapons issues is often divided among different departments and agencies. For example, the Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) deals with the import provisions of the Arms Export Control Act, while the Department of State is in charge of the export control provisions.

The BATF's activities are constrained both by resources and by law. The BATF does not have design approval, standard setting, or recall regulatory powers. According to the Violence Policy Center, "...America's gun manufacturers have near carte blanche to manufacture virtually any product they wish. As long as the firearm is not fully automatic, uses ammunition that is 50 caliber or less and has a barrel of a set minimum length, there are no federal restrictions."¹¹ With limited numbers of agents -- a press report said there were just 65 in all of Southern California, for example -- enforcement is challenging at best. In addition, licensed firearms dealers are only subject to a surprise inspection once per year, and BATF agents only go to gun shows when they are investigating a specific case.¹² This further restricts BATF's enforcement capabilities.

Potential enhancements to US legislation
Legislation introduced in the first session of the 105th Congress took a variety of approaches to enhancing gun control. Some legislation would extend state laws to the national level, other bills focused on public safety issues related to weapons, and still others were specifically designed to close loopholes in existing law. Two key bills are the proposed "one gun a month law" and the proposed ban on domestic production of weapons that do not meet the standards for imported weapons ("junk guns").

The National Rifle Association has opposed both of these bills, claiming they violate Americans' Second Amendment rights to bear firearms. In addition, the NRA claims that opponents of junk guns are denying Americans affordable weapons for self-defense, challenging the technical assessments of junk guns' low quality. The NRA's opposition to these two bills exemplifies the contradiction between the NRA's consistent policy positions in opposition to gun control and its claim that it actively opposes illicit weapons transfers.

One key bill would strengthen restrictions on weapons purchases by extending provisions currently in effect in several states to the national level. The proposed Twelve is Enough Anti-Gunrunning Act (H.R. 12), introduced in January 1997 by Rep. Charles Schumer (D-NY), would establish a national "one gun a month" law. This law is designed to prevent gun runners from purchasing multiple weapons in states with lax gun laws and then transporting them and re-selling them on the black market in states with more restrictive gun laws. Just as the law would reduce the monetary incentive for domestic gun trafficking, it would also make international gun running less viable.

While some individual states have passed one gun a month laws, a national limit is necessary to make the controls effective. Otherwise, prospective gun runners can simply arrange to make their purchases in neighboring states. According to Senator Lautenberg, one of the main sponsors of the Senate version of the bill, The Anti-Gun Trafficking Act of 1997 (S. 466), "a one-gun-a-month law would take a bite out of gunrunning without imposing any burden on hunters and other law-abiding gun users. After all, who but gang members, drug dealers, and other criminals needs more than 12 guns a year?"¹³

Public safety issues are addressed by the proposed American Handgun Standards Act (S. 70) and the Gun Safety Act (H.R. 116) introduced in January 1997. Both bills would ban domestic manufacture of all US-made handguns that are prohibited for import, and are designed to stop manufacture of "junk guns" such as the Saturday Night Special. These weapons cannot be legally imported into the United States because they do not meet minimum safety standards for weapons size, design and performance.¹⁴ According to the Senate version of the bill, "the disparate treatment of imported handguns and domestically produced handguns has led to the creation of a high-volume market for junk guns, defined as those handguns that fail to meet the quality and safety standards required of imported handguns."¹⁵ According to Handgun Control, Inc., "Whatever name attached to them, these handguns are not useful for sport or self-defense because their short barrels make them inaccurate and their low quality of construction make them dangerous and unreliable. They are, however, favored by criminals because of their low cost and easy concealability."¹⁶

Difficulty in enforcing existing US laws
Several vignettes regarding US weaponry highlight the difficulty of ensuring adequate controls over light weapons. These problems seem to stem from both insufficient political will and inadequate financial resources. These vignettes focus on the United States because the magnitude of such problems seems to be greater with respect to US weapons.

• Despite the Clinton administration's commitment to gun control, Central and South American countries routinely complain about the seeming inability of the United States to control its own borders. On the problem of US guns flowing into Mexico, Mexican Ambassador to the United States Jesús Silva-Herzog noted that "When we talk about drugs they [Americans] say it [the problem] is the supply, and when we bring up arms it is the demand. In other words, we can never win."¹⁷

• Between 1989 and 1993, the Department of State's Office of Defense Trade Controls verified end-user certificates for only 21 of 1632 applications for small arms to 8 Latin American countries.¹⁸

• According to Brazilian diplomats, in recent drug raids in Brazil, officials captured 100 weapons. One weapon had been transferred legally from the United States; the other 99 had been transferred illegally from the United States.¹⁹ In a September 1996 article, Justice Minister Nelson Jobim said,

In the international arena, one of the serious problems that we have to confront is that of the smuggling of heavy weapons from the United States, especially the AR-15 rifle, either through triangle operations through countries bordering Brazil, or directly through sea or air routes, especially those originating with Miami.²⁰

• Mexican officials have long maintained that thousands of US-made weapons flood south each year.²¹ According to the Mexican Federal Attorney General's office, in 1994, the Mexican police seized more than 16,000 pistols and 6,000 machine guns, rifles, and shotguns, the majority of them manufactured in the United States.²² While Mexico maintains strict laws on gun ownership, lax US regulations have made cross-border gun running a profitable business. The existence of 6,000 legal gun shops in the four states bordering Mexico is also of concern to Mexican officials.²³ While at first the United States appeared to ignore Mexico's requests for increased US border control, a US-Mexico declaration on drug trafficking agreed during President Clinton's visit to Mexico in May 1997 includes a provision to increase cooperation to curb cross-border firearms trafficking.²⁴

• The report from the Mexican Federal Attorney General's office cited above provided evidence that guns and drugs frequently follow the same transportation routes, with guns going south while the drugs go north.²⁵ According to Mexican Ambassador to the United States Jesús Silva-Herzog, "Our preliminary information is that most of the illegal gun trafficking from the U.S. goes to narcotics traffickers."²⁶ This interrelationship is also shown by the places in which guns are priced in terms of kilos of cocaine. In an article on the drugs/guns connection in Mexico, a Clinton administration official blamed the lax laws, rather than weak enforcement, saying, "Since the United States doesn't have very tight gun control laws, there is only a limited amount of things we can do."²⁷

• According to Judicial and Investigative Police Directorate data from Colombia, more than 15,000 weapons were seized in operations during the first six months of 1997. An estimated 80 percent of these weapons were made in the United States.²⁸ There, too, the interaction between drugs and guns is strong. National Police Director General Rosse Jose Serrano said, "It is a mixture of guerrillas and drug traffickers; no longer is there a difference. One does not know if the drug trafficker is a guerrilla or if the guerrilla is a drug trafficker. The line is blurred now; it is a brotherhood community."²⁹

In addition to the weapons flows resulting from inadequate enforcement of existing laws, "leftover" weapons also pose significant problems. For example, the United States left an estimated 1.8 million small arms in Vietnam, including nearly 800,000 M-16 rifles, more than 850,000 other rifles, and 90,000 M1911A1 .45 calibre pistols. The US military left roughly 300,000 additional small arms in Cambodia, including more than 150,000 M16A1 rifles and more than 100,000 other rifles.³⁰ These weapons are now recirculating around the world. A major weapons seizure in California in spring 1997 reportedly consisted of weapons parts initially shipped from US stockpiles left in Vietnam.³¹ The capture included parts for M-2 carbines, M-79 grenade launchers, and M-16 rifles.³²

International Efforts to Deal With Light Weapons

This section summarizes key international initiatives dealing with light weapons issues. These activities are important in their own right and because gun groups have devoted such significant resources to fighting them. Ironically, in several cases, the gun groups' attention to these efforts has brought international attention to panels whose work generally garners little notice.

Spurred by the leadership of former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the United Nations has been increasingly involved in light weapons issues in recent years. Arguably, the most significant international efforts dealing with light weapons have taken place under UN auspices. In addition to discussions about light weapons in the 1994 and 1997 expert reviews of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, important work on light weapons has been taking place within three key venues: the UN Disarmament Commission, the Economic and Social Council's Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, and the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms.³³ Important regional efforts such as those of the Organization of American States are also moving forward.

While these groups have dealt with different aspects of the problem of small arms and light weapons, there is also some overlap among their recommendations. Individually, each group has reached consensus on important principles that are likely to aid efforts to control the international trade in light weapons. Perhaps most important, they have been willing to set standards, such as including in all UN peacekeeping missions a mandate to destroy weapons that remain when conflicts end. They have set guidelines for weapons transfers, emphasizing ways to reduce the illicit weapons market. They have also agreed on ways to improve national and regional controls on small arms and light weapons, such as improving monitoring of customs regulations and border controls. They have not been as successful in increasing access to information on light weapons transfers at a regional and global level. Nonetheless, their work has advanced the issue considerably, and provides many useful precedents for future action.

UN Disarmament Commission
The UN Disarmament Commission adopted guidelines for international arms transfers in spring 1996 which focused mainly on the illicit trade. Their general perspective was that "States should ensure that they have an adequate system of national laws and/or regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over armaments and the export and import of arms in order, among other goals, to prevent illicit trafficking." The Disarmament Commission recommended that states institute a variety of national measures to combat illicit trafficking, including: strengthening national laws and regulations, establishing effective import and export licensing procedures, providing adequate numbers of customs officials, and defining which weapons are legal for civilians and which can be held by military personnel. International initiatives outlined by the Disarmament Commission included: establishing verifiable end-user certificates, sharing customs information, cooperating on border control and law enforcement, complying with UN arms embargoes, developing common legislative and administrative import and export controls, and participating in the UN Register of Conventional Arms.³⁴

The Economic and Social Council's Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
The second effort is a United Nations firearms survey carried out through the Economic and Social Council's (ECOSOC) Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. This inquiry's scope is to exchange data on civilian-owned firearms regulations at national, regional, and international levels, and to establish a database on firearms regulation. An international group of experts, including customs, police, and military officials as well as representatives of regional criminal justice institutes, has developed a set of recommendations based on information supplied by approximately 50 member states. On 5 May 1997, the Commission released a draft report of nearly 150 pages that provides a summary of the survey results as well as recommendations for international action.³⁵ According to the survey results, major legislative reforms have recently been undertaken in Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Estonia, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom, while such reforms are pending or under discussion in Brazil, Denmark, Finland, India, Jamaica, Poland, and South Africa. Other initiatives underway include licensing requirements, penalties for firearms offenses and firearms smuggling, and gun amnesties to promote public awareness.³⁶

At its May 1997 meeting in Vienna, the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice adopted a resolution on "Firearm regulation for the purpose of crime prevention and public safety." An early draft of this resolution was submitted by the governments of Japan, Canada, and Mexico; the resolution was eventually sponsored by more than 30 countries. The resolution recommends continued UN data collection and dissemination on firearms regulation. It also urges member states to institute a variety of measures, including: regulations on firearm safety, licensing of firearm businesses, and marking firearms at the point of manufacture and import.³⁷

The US-based National Rifle Association (NRA) submitted a statement declaring that the conclusions of the firearms survey were "incomplete and inconclusive" and that "Its conclusions are not supported and its recommendations are not warranted at this time."³⁸ This statement was never introduced as a formal resolution, suggesting that the NRA was unable to convince even a single country to support its position.

In fall and winter 1997-1998, the firearms panel is holding four regional workshops on firearms regulation. The first two workshops were in Ljubljana, Slovenia, in September 1997 and Arusha, Tanzania in November 1997. The third workshop will be in Sao Paolo, Brazil in December 1997, and the fourth is expected to be in New Delhi, India, but a date has not yet been set. The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice is expected to meet again in Vienna from late April to early May 1998.³⁹

The UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms
The third effort is that of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. This panel's mandate was to address the types of small arms and light weapons being used in conflicts being dealt with by the UN, the nature and causes of excessive and destabilizing transfers of small arms and light weapons, and ways and means to prevent and reduce excessive and destabilizing accumulations.⁴⁰

As is often the case with such panels, the experts did not reach consensus on their conclusions until very late in the process, stalling over issues such as regional options for controlling light weapons transfers and the extent to which the panel should emphasize improving the transparency of light weapons transfers. Fortunately, the panel achieved consensus on a report to the Secretary-General during the last two days of its final meeting in New York in July 1997.

The panel's report emphasizes destroying surplus weapons and weapons remaining after conflicts end, including halting the practice of storing surplus weapons in poorly guarded warehouses. In particular, the report recommends that all peacekeeping missions include a mandate to destroy weapons remaining when conflicts end. Other key national recommendations included improving border controls and training for customs officials. At the regional level, the panel endorsed continuing and expanding regional buyback programs, and using the example of the destruction of light weapons in Mali (see policy section for additional detail) and proposed regional moratorium as a model for other areas. The panel report also endorses studying problems associated with ammunition, and evaluating the feasibility of marking weapons at the time of manufacture and restricting manufacture and sales of small arms and light weapons to government-authorized manufacturers and dealers. However, the panel largely ignored light weapons transparency issues, leaving them to the UN register panel, which did not reach consensus on these issues. There was significant emphasis in the small arms panel's report on controlling illicit weapons transfers, including calling for a global conference on the topic.

In November 1997, the UN's First Committee adopted a resolution endorsing the panel's conclusions by a vote of 137-0, with eight abstentions; the General Assembly is expected to follow suit.⁴¹ The resolution also authorized the Secretary-General to initiate a study of issues related to ammunition, consider an international conference on the illicit weapons trade, and establish another group of governmental experts in 1998 to report on the implementation of the panel's recommendations and to present supplemental recommendations.

The Organization of American States
The Organization of American States (OAS) has been setting a strong example at the regional level with its recently agreed Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials. This convention on illicit weapons was signed in Washington, DC on 14 November 1997.

The initiative began in response to US concerns about drug trafficking across the US-Mexican border. Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo first proposed an arms trafficking convention at the Bolivia Summit of the Rio Group (known formally as the Permanent Mechanism of Political Consultation and Consensus) in September 1996. At that time, he expressed particular concern about illegal weapons trafficking, which he said, "supplies drug trafficking, organized crime and terrorist groups, and is an assault against economic growth, the consolidation of democracy and against innocent individuals and communities."⁴²

An experts working group led by Mexican OAS Ambassador Carmen de Del Cueto met several times during 1997 to draft the convention. Consensus was reached surprisingly quickly; a draft convention was completed in March 1997, and the group's final draft was adopted in October 1997 by the Permanent Council of the OAS in Washington, DC.⁴³ The aim of the OAS initiative is in step with efforts elsewhere, especially in the European Union, where the Netherlands has sponsored an initiative to combat illicit weapons flows.⁴⁴ A program on illicit weapons trafficking has been adopted by the European Union Council of Ministers as a non-binding declaration, and focuses on combating illicit weapons transfers both within and outside the EU.

Under the terms of the OAS convention, signatories will be required to mark weapons at the time of manufacture and import, and will have to tighten border controls to prevent illicit transfers. The convention also emphasizes the importance of information sharing and communication, and prevents exporting states from authorizing the transfer of firearms until the recipient state issues an import license. State parties must share information collected, and are encouraged to cooperate fully on all technical and legal matters.⁴⁵

Although many of these provisions are significant, the convention does not seek uniform domestic legislation. The preamble even makes specific reference to national sovereignty, and the agreement itself avoids any reference to a national registry of gun owners, even though earlier drafts required states to establish domestic registries.⁴⁶ Much of this omission can be attributed to pressure from the NRA, as well as the United States' disinclination to change its domestic gun legislation; a central registry of gun owners would be illegal according to current US law.⁴⁷

Other US laws could also interfere with implementation of the convention. For example, enforcement is on a government-to-government level. But if other governments make enquiries about licenses issued in the United States, they may be unable to obtain the information; current US law protects proprietary information contained in State and Commerce Department licenses. In addition, weak US laws on weapons purchases still allow "straw purchases" in most states, facilitating gun running.

In addition, the Convention does not contain clear provisions for the disposal of weapons confiscated under the new regime. The final version requires that signatories undertake "measures to ensure that all firearms" do not fall into the hands of private individuals or businesses through auction, sale or other disposal," but it does not refer to the compulsory destruction of these weapons to prevent recirculation.⁴⁸ Nor does it stipulate that information about implementation be made public.

The Convention will go into effect as soon as it has been ratified by two countries, but the Consultative Committee outlined in the Convention will only meet after the agreement has been ratified by 10 countries. Although some signatories are expected to ratify fairly quickly, including Mexico and Uruguay, poorer nations may be unable to implement the necessary changes that would have to accompany ratification. The implementation process could be stalled for a number of months, even years.⁴⁹

Existing drug control regimes provided the model for firearms control cooperation within the OAS, especially the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD).⁵⁰ In addition, since 1993, an experts group within the OAS has held a series of meetings to discuss the development of model regulations on firearms issues. In Caracas in mid-1996, they agreed to develop model regulations on a "harmonized import/export certificate system," including provisions on trans-shipment. According to a White House fact sheet, "Model Regulations to Control the Movement of Firearms, Ammunition, and Firearms Parts and Components" drafted by a group of CICAD experts were agreed to in Lima, Peru in November 1997.⁵¹ The model regulations have not been presented to the OAS General Assembly for approval. The White House fact sheet also indicated that President Clinton has already directed the State Department to begin implementing these regulations and to encourage other countries to do the same.

The Role of "Pro-Gun" Organizations

The gun industry's fear seems to be that recognition of the significant relationship between domestic and international gun control will increase pressure for domestic gun control. In response to recent efforts at international light weapons control, the gun organizations have taken two sets of steps; they have worked toward strengthening their own international links, and they have directly attacked both proposals for light weapons control and the organizations sponsoring those proposals.

Past efforts to strengthen international gun connections
In recent months, there has been significant press attention to the formation of the "World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities," which had its first general meeting in Nuremberg, Germany, on 13 March 1997. However, such international efforts are not new.

In 1992, for example, a representative of the Sporting Shooters Association of Australia addressed the National Rifle Association at its annual board meeting, seeking its help with setting up a world conference dealing with firearms laws "with the primary objective of protecting the rights of firearms owners wherever they are threatened." According to press reports, the NRA board endorsed the proposal for such a conference. As a result, the International Conference on Firearms Legislation (ICFL) was established.⁵² The first meeting of the ICFL took place in August 1993 in Australia, and included 12 representatives from groups in the United States, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia.⁵³ The group continued to meet during the early- to mid-1990s, in locations as diverse as Australia, the United States, and South Africa, although only limited information is available about their gatherings.

The World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities
In March 1997, gun organizations and firearms manufacturers from 12 countries met in Nuremberg, Germany, to establish a new international organization, the "World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities." The World Forum will be based in Brussels; its founding members include the NRA and the Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers Institute, which is based in Connecticut.⁵⁴ Few details are available concerning this new organization; gun-organization representatives refused to provide information about scheduled meetings or organizational plans. In fact, one NRA representative, Oregon lawyer Thomas Mason, cited lawyer-client privilege in refusing to answer BASIC's inquiries. This is ironic given Mason's repeated criticism of the UN small arms panel and other UN bodies for not holding open meetings and not inviting pro-gun organizations to brief these groups.

According to a news release from the Sporting Shooters Association of Australia (SSAA), "The Forum will facilitate the exchange of information, the reaching of consensus positions and actions by the member associations or the Forum itself in those situations which warrant it."⁵⁵ The SSAA also said that the group would "receive at regular intervals representatives from all over the world who are active in target shooting, hunting and firearms collection, to discuss subjects of common interest and in particular regulatory efforts currently harming sports shooting."⁵⁶

According to Gun News Digest, by June 1997, the coalition had 21 participating organizations. The US contingent is apparently the largest, with at least six groups; other groups were generally from countries with significant gun industries, including Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The World Forum will "work jointly to establish a presence during discussions of global gun control to insure that correct and unbiased information is available to international decision makers."⁵⁷ A one-paragraph NRA account of the group's 26 June 1997 meeting in Brussels indicated that the World Forum is expected to apply for NGO status at the United Nations, and stated that "Among the many challenges the Forum now faces are efforts by the United Nations to promote international gun control schemes as well as proposed gun bans that could put an end to the shooting sports in several nations."⁵⁸ The group's existence and activities remain under wraps.

Press reports are unclear about the scope of the effort and the nature of sponsorship of the World Forum organization. According to one report, the annual budget of the group will be $200,000.⁵⁹ This budget seems low for a group that has already held two large international meetings and intends to set up international operations based in Brussels. The budget is far less than the NRA has reportedly earmarked for its anti-gun control activities at the United Nations. This budget, could, of course, be supplemented by in-kind contributions from the group's members.

The NRA: Taking the lead in attacking international efforts at light weapons control
A significant recent activity of gun groups has been attacking international efforts at light weapons control. The gun groups seem to be quite concerned about all three UN efforts described in the previous section of this paper, though their activities related to the UN small arms panel have received the most notice in the press. The NRA has generally led the attack, regularly writing on the theme of "global gun grabbers."⁶⁰

After the release of the small arms panel report in summer 1997, the NRA publicized its results widely, citing certain provisions as particularly problematic. These include the panel's support for destroying small arms left over when conflicts end, studying marking firearms at the time of manufacture, and studying the possibility of restricting production and trade of small arms to manufacturers and dealers. According to the NRA, "...this panel's recommendations provide an alarming example of what international gun control bureaucrats at the UN want to pursue."⁶¹

NRA publications frequently emphasize the possibility that UN efforts to control light weapons could somehow prompt national efforts in the United States. For example, a January 1997 paper that NRA representatives tried to present to the UN small arms panel stated, "One view, with which we clearly do not agree, is that the availability of firearms in one jurisdiction affects other jurisdictions."⁶² Their overall approach is simply to suggest that the views of other countries or organizations are irrelevant to US policy. At the ECOSOC firearms' panel meeting in Tanzania in November 1997, for example, the NRA's representative repeated his message that, "With all due respect to the main supporter of this effort, non-hunting societies should not seek to impose their values on hunting societies."⁶³ (emphasis in original)

Tanya Metaksa, Executive Director of the NRA's Institute for Legislative Action, has been particularly outspoken on these issues. She has written to Senator Jesse Helms to propose that Congress deny funds to UN activities related to "small arms used by the civilian population in the United States." In this letter, she addressed the UN Disarmament Commission's recommendations that national controls over light weapons be harmonized, arguing that, "Any 'harmonization' would inevitable mean tightening controls on the loosely regulated U.S. gun business, and would be opposed by the National Rifle Association and other U.S. pro-gun organizations."⁶⁴ In the same letter, she quoted Andrew Molchan, director of the US Association of Federally Licensed Firearms Dealers, who said, "It's politics as usual, the Colombians blaming their internal problems on American law....The domestic arms trade is irrelevant to what's happening internationally."⁶⁵

While the NRA is by no means shy about attacking President Clinton's gun control positions, it has also been quick to blame other governments for the UN's actions. The British, Japanese, and Canadian governments have all come under direct attack, but the NRA's most violent attacks have been on the Japanese government. A recent fax alert assessing the ECOSOC regional firearms workshop in Tanzania focused largely on the Japanese government, "In fact, through the UN, the government of Japan actually paid the expenses (emphasis added) for 23 of the 28 governments who sent representatives to the Africa conference."⁶⁶ The NRA either did not know or chose to ignore the fact that such sponsorship is common, especially when the regional participants come from countries with few resources.

The NRA has evidently also found such attacks useful as a fundraising strategy. A recent direct mail letter from Tanya Metaksa to supporters of the NRA's Institute for Legislative Action focused on the ECOSOC study. Interestingly, although the NRA has been arguing that it is an international organization, the letter focuses solely on the consequences for gun owners in the United States. The letter stated that the consideration of a UN declaration of principles on firearms would likely be followed by an international treaty, meaning that

...we are just two steps away from an international treaty that could cost you and your family your rights and your guns - without even a full vote by Congress!

...As I write, a multi-national cadre of gun-ban extremists is lobbying the United Nations, demanding that this Declaration include a virtual worldwide ban on firearms ownership. (emphasis in original)

...Would you be forced to get a government license to keep a gun in your home? Would you be forced to register all the firearms you now own? Would your handguns, semi-auto hunting rifles and pump shotguns be outlawed, and subject to government seizures, like we have witnessed in Australia and Great Britain? What would happen if the UN demands gun confiscation on American soil?

Joining the chorus: other gun groups also attack international control efforts
Several other gun groups have joined efforts to counter the activities of the United Nations and other international groups. For example, another US gun group, the Second Amendment Foundation, expressed its fears that the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms "could turn into a real problem by promoting a treaty on arms smuggling that would require signatory nations to regulate the market."⁶⁷ After the release of the small arms panel's report, they echoed the NRA's conclusions about the report, using virtually identical language.⁶⁸

Some gun groups blame governments in Japan and Canada for UN efforts to promote light weapons control. For example, the American Firearms Council has published an article entitled "Japan Pushes UN Gun Control Plan."⁶⁹ Other groups focus blame on both the Clinton administration and foreign governments, "The Clinton romance with global gun control fully blossomed when he gave his support to a new United Nations gun ban plan. We're not talking about sightings of black helicopters everywhere, but the real thing: a U.N. gun control initiative hatched in Tokyo."⁷⁰

Gun Owners of America has characterized the UN as "a tourniquet that is slowly being drawn around gun owners' necks," and a front for domestic gun control in the United States. They have even gone so far as to recommend US withdrawal from the United Nations to avoid what they see as dangerous momentum toward global gun control. Referring to the work of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, they say that "These other countries were not sneaking in the back door of U.S. sovereignty -- our own government was hiding behind the U.N. to carry out the civilian disarmament they did not think they could get away with by themselves."⁷¹ Not surprisingly, they are also hostile to suggestions of any links between domestic gun control and international control of small arms and light weapons, "Pretty soon we will be told that we need a 'one-gun-a-month' rationing scheme to stop the flow of guns not just to poor crime-racked Washington, DC, but to drug-lord oppressed Colombia."⁷²

Policy Options

There are many available options and strategies to make the connections between domestic gun control and international control over small arms and light weapons. The first two parts of this section deal with the prospects for increasing transparency and improving oversight. But transparency and oversight measures are only preliminary steps toward limiting light weapons transfers. To be effective, they must be supplemented by additional policy actions.

The additional measures described below have been developed in part through discussions among participants and advisors of BASIC's Project on Light Weapons. Several of these recommendations have subsequently been taken up by the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. Some of the proposals focus on individual types of weapons, others focus on national and international control processes, and still others focus on conflict. As with the proposals for increased transparency and improved oversight, these proposals indicate a range of possible means of decreasing light weapons flows. In turn, it will be difficult to implement these proposals without better transparency and oversight mechanisms, as such measures would be necessary for monitoring and verification.

Increasing transparency
Many proposals focus on obtaining and publicizing information about countries' policies and laws related to light weapons. These proposals are based on the assumption that openness ("sunshine") favors restraint -- that public scrutiny leads to more care in decision-making. Other transparency proposals focus on making information available about light weapons transfers through sub-regional, regional, and global weapons registers and other information exchanges.

Unfortunately, efforts to expand the UN Register of Conventional Arms to include light weapons have not been successful. The 1997 experts' panel on the register was unable to reach consensus on any expansion of the register, and another review panel is not expected to meet for at least 3 years. However, several regional and sub-regional initiatives to increase transparency show promise.

Another way of increasing transparency is by using country case studies to produce regional or global overviews. Individual case studies often provide detailed information about one or two countries, including key actors, dynamics of light weapons flows, motivations for weapons transfers, and economic considerations affecting recent weapons imports and exports.⁷³ By building an inventory of such cases, analysts should be able to prepare regional or global assessments of the light weapons trade. Such analyses should include problems and opportunities associated with past attempts to limit light weapons transfers, while also suggesting better routes for the future. In addition, case studies of key conflicts, such as the former Yugoslavia or Northern Ireland, may also help with formulating policy proposals for specific situations.

Establishing or improving oversight
In some countries, it may be necessary to begin by establishing or strengthening national laws providing for oversight of the light weapons trade. If countries lack administrative procedures for documenting imports and exports of light weapons, they may not have access to the information necessary to participate in transparency regimes.

It is also important to learn from prior successes and failures. Comparative case studies of successful demobilization and/or disarmament after conflicts have ended can be used as the basis for policy recommendations to improve future oversight. Similarly, in-depth critiques of demobilization or disarmament failures may help prevent similar problems in other countries. Countries just emerging from conflict will have significantly different needs and priorities than those with more domestic stability.

Controlling individual types of weapons
One option is to ban entire categories of weapons that are especially indiscriminate in their effects. Efforts to ban landmines and blinding weapons are underway; there has been particular success with the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines. As described above, both the United Kingdom and Australia have recently banned categories of weapons in response to civilian killings. Ironically, however, each government has neglected to include the weapons used in the attacks in the other country.

Other options focus on limiting, rather than barring, whole types of weapons. While these approaches may be more readily implemented because they are less severe, they may also be more difficult to monitor and verify. A total ban is more readily verified than more modest limits, because any weapon within the category is by definition a violation of the ban.

Limit ammunition

Limiting ammunition holds promise in helping to break the cycle of violence. Because light weapons often last for decades, even if all transfers of light weapons were stopped today, the world would still be awash in them decades from now. But ammunition is rapidly consumed in conflict. Ammunition is also unattractive for smuggling, since it has relatively high weight and relatively low dollar value. Reliable (safe) ammunition is also difficult to produce. Ammunition also has a significantly shorter shelf-life than the weapons in which it is used. For these reasons, limitations on ammunition supplies may be more feasible than limitations on the weapons themselves.

However, the little information that is currently available on ammunition is widely dispersed. The UN small arms group endorsed a study of explosives and ammunition, and the General Assembly is expected to do the same. This should help answer questions about technical aspects of ammunition, the nature and structure of the ammunition industry, and the prospects for control.

Limit high-tech light weapons transfers

Another option is to limit transfers of light weapons that use advanced technology. "High-tech" light weapons such as portable surface-to-air missiles threaten civilians as well as military forces. The threat to civilians is one of the reasons the US Central Intelligence Agency is apparently still trying to buy back the highly capable Stinger anti-aircraft missiles that the US government transferred to the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s. Because high-tech light weapons are made by fewer suppliers than lower-tech weapons, and because they have not yet been widely disseminated, they may be more readily controlled. To prevent further dissemination, it would also be useful to prohibit coproduction and codevelopment of high-tech light weapons, and to establish controls on transfers of new light weapons technologies.

Focus on national and international control processes
A focus on national and international processes to control light weapons transfers could have several dimensions, including: greater oversight of existing national control and enforcement mechanisms; harmonizing national measures in bilateral, regional and global frameworks; and/or enhancing national policies.⁷⁴

Attention to national and international processes is a prominent feature of many recent documents, including the ECOSOC firearms panel May 1997 resolution, the UN small arms experts group report, and the OAS convention. Common themes include preventing illicit trafficking, strengthening regional and international cooperation, and exercising effective control over weapons imports and exports.

Increase domestic oversight

As noted above, the direct relationship between lax US gun laws and illicit trafficking in US weapons suggests that to control light weapons internationally, it will be necessary to control them nationally. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to control the illicit market in light weapons without monitoring and controlling domestic access to weapons. To have effective international controls, it will also be important to enforce existing laws governing sales of weapons and to provide sufficient resources to monitor and police national borders.

As mentioned in the section on domestic controls, laws limiting purchasers to one gun per month are already being implemented in several states in the United States; the proposed legislation would implement a similar plan on the national level.⁷⁵ Such legislation has already decreased gun running in the affected states; national legislation would make it more difficult to obtain the large quantities of weaponry that make illicit trafficking financially attractive. Coupled with enforcement of existing guidelines governing the domestic sale of weapons, this could make it much easier to limit the international trade in these weapons.

For those in countries with strict gun control legislation, "one gun a month" seems like a weak control measure. However, it is also important to understand the extent of change from existing practices that this proposal represents. At present, in almost every state in the United States, an authorized purchaser can buy literally dozens of weapons at one time. This makes diversion to unauthorized purchasers a relatively simple task.

Other useful national controls include verifying end-user documentation on transfers and developing strategies for controlling diversion and theft, increasing efforts to uncover and destroy illegal weapons, and imposing stronger penalties for illegal possession of weapons and smuggling. All of these proposals could present more effective barriers to theft and diversion of light weapons, while also making such attempts more costly. The credibility of such efforts would be enhanced if governments simultaneously eliminated covert aid and transfers.

Destroy surplus weapons

A promising way to decrease access to light weapons is by controlling and destroying the large stocks of surplus weapons that have resulted from force reductions. At present, these weapons are often kept in poorly guarded warehouses. At the first sign of tension, the warehouses can be broken into and the weapons stolen, as occurred in Albania.⁷⁶

Destroying surplus stocks, or at least establishing better controls, can also decrease the damage caused by these weapons. To ensure that weapons are permanently taken out of circulation, destruction of weaponry can also be incorporated into other efforts to control light weapons flows. For all destruction efforts, it will be important to keep careful records and to make them public. This will assure those who give up their weapons that the weapons will actually be destroyed.

Strengthen regional and international cooperation in combating the illicit weapons trade

The illicit weapons trade is often a multi-national or regional problem. Some countries are primarily transhipment points, while others are key origin or destination points. But all are important links in illicit weapons transfers. Attacking all aspects of the problem simultaneously is often impossible. Determining weak links in the chain, such as frequent and predictable routes for illicit transfers, may be more effective at less cost.

The Mali government has been involved in several efforts to control light weapons trafficking in its sub-region. Just recently, Interior ministers from Mali, Senegal, and Mauritania agreed to joint efforts to stop drug and light weapons trafficking at their common borders through simultaneous patrols along their joint borders.⁷⁷

Mark all small arms and light weapons at the time of manufacture

This practice of establishing a "weapons biography" could help in tracking light weapons and limiting the illicit trade. States could also establish databases of authorized manufacturers and dealers. Marking firearms at the time of manufacture is a key provision of the new OAS convention on illicit weapons. It may also be possible to extend this recommendation to marking weapons when transferred.

Focus on conflict
With respect to conflict, the most important actions are those that focus on preventing it from occurring. In this regard, regional confidence- and security-building measures can be quite useful, as can efforts to prevent destabilizing accumulations of weaponry. Once conflicts begin, it may be necessary to declare and enforce bans on weapons transfers to all parties to the conflict. At all stages -- before, during, and after conflicts -- more effective border controls will help prevent illicit imports and exports. Such controls are especially important in unstable regions such as the Great Lakes region in Africa, where weapons circulate from one conflict to another.

Destroying weapons when conflicts end

A particularly important post-conflict measure is increasing the effectiveness of disarmament after conflict settlement by ordering the return and destruction of weapons as part of disarmament processes. Put simply, destruction prevents reuse. Many of the weapons at use in conflicts today are actually "recycled" from other conflicts. We can avoid this by ensuring that when conflicts end and combatants are demobilized, their weapons are destroyed, not stored or sold. Ensuring that all UN peacekeeping missions include disarmament and destruction mandates will help tremendously in achieving this objective.

While destruction of weaponry has not been a widespread practice, there have been good precedents for future activity in recent years. In Mali in March 1996, more than 2500 weapons were destroyed as part of a disarmament process. In Mozambique in August and September 1997, more than 100 metric tons of firearms and ammunition captured in joint South African/Mozambican operations were destroyed. In October 1997, 20 metric tons of illegal firearms were destroyed in Pretoria, including handguns, rifles, and homemade weapons.⁷⁸

Summary

Many of these recommendations are mutually reinforcing. For example, both destroying surplus weapons and destroying weapons when conflicts end will help get weapons out of circulation, ending the "recycling" process. Increasing domestic oversight helps prevent diversion of weapons; doing so while also strengthening regional and global cooperation on illicit weapons helps restrict the available market for such weapons.

There has been significant progress in national, regional, and global fora on these issues in recent years. One key to future progress will be joint action by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working on a variety of issues, including humanitarian aid, disarmament, gun control, and development. NGOs, journalists, and the public can effectively pressure sometimes reluctant governments to construct and implement higher standards for light weapons manufacture, storage, and transfer. Continued progress also depends on sharing information effectively, maintaining active contacts with international governmental organizations working on these issues, and finding governments willing to take the lead in organizing regional and global efforts.

__________________

Endnotes

1. Examples of major conventional weapons in use in recent conflicts include: tanks and ships in Albania; combat aircraft, armour and artillery in Chechnya; aircraft and attack helicopters in Colombia; artillery, heavy infantry fighting vehicles and combat aircraft in the former Yugoslavia; tanks, armored vehicles, and fighter aircraft along the Ethiopia/Somali border; mortars and heavy artillery in Liberia; armoured personnel carriers and artillery in Yemen, and aircraft in Zaire. For more information about the interaction between light and major conventional weapons, see Dr. Natalie J. Goldring, "Bridging the Gap: Light and major conventional weapons in recent conflicts," Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, 18-21 March 1997.

2. Significant portions of this paper are based on Dr. Natalie J. Goldring, "Overcoming Domestic Obstacles to Light Weapons Control," prepared for the Sandia National Laboratories Annual Arms Control Conference, 18-20 April 1997 (publication by Sandia National Laboratories forthcoming). The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions to these papers of current and former BASIC staff members Susannah Dyer, Joel Johnston, Katherine Joseph, Christine Kucia, and Geraldine O'Callaghan.

This paper is a product of BASIC's Project on Light Weapons, an international research, public education, and advocacy program. Through a series of international workshops and extensive work with analysts and activists worldwide, the Project on Light Weapons has developed a research and policy agenda on the light weapons trade. Our research and publications now focus on the most promising approaches developed in our initial work, including destruction of light weapons in disarmament and demobilization efforts, and technical issues such as ammunition and high-technology light weapons, as well as the issue of illicit light weapons trafficking. Current national and international attitudes toward gun possession and gun control also make this an opportune time to emphasize the connections between domestic gun control and international control of light weapons flows.

3. "Tears as sportsmen lay down their arms," The Daily Telegraph, 15 September 1997.

4. Hansard, House of Commons Written Answers, Firearms Surrender Compensation, col.42, 17 November 1997.

5. Fred Barbash, "Britain Votes to Ban Handguns," The Washington Post, 12 June 1997.

6. "Our most frequently asked questions"

7. "Successful implementation of the laws," further information on the Australian firearms buyback program is available here.

8. "Firearms Reform - debated nationally for many years"

9. "National Tally"

10. Geraldine O'Callaghan correspondence with Rebecca Peters, Chair, Coalition for Gun Control, Australia, 1 May 1997.

11. "Firearms Industry Fact Sheet," Violence Policy Center, 1997.

12. Jeff Brazil and Steve Berry, "Crackdown on Assault Weapons Has Missed Mark," Los Angeles Times, August 24, 1997.

13. "The Anti-Gun Trafficking Act of 1997," US Senate, Congressional Record, 18 March 1997.

14. See the summary of "Ring of Fire."

15. "The American Handgun Standards Act of 1997," US Senate, Congressional Record, 21 January 1997.

16. "Key Legislative Issues for the 105th Congress," Handgun Control, Inc., updated November 10, 1997.

17. "Mexicans Too Have a Problem Border: Awash in US Guns," Christian Science Monitor, 11 April 1997.

18. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, A Review of Arms Export Licensing, cited in Michael Klare and David Andersen, A Scourge of Guns, Federation of American Scientists, 1997, p. 66.

19. "Brazil-US Counternarcotics Cooperation: Fighting the Illegal Trade of Weapons," statement of Brazilian embassy officials at a roundtable discussion hosted by BASIC, 20 March 1996.

20. "Brazil: Minister Views Efforts to Control Weapons Smuggling," a FBIS Daily Report translation of an article by Justice Minister Nelson Jobim titled "The Fight Against Weapons Trafficking," FBIS-TDD-96-029-L, 28 September 1996.

21. "Mexico, Harried over Drugs, Presses Own Peeve: U.S. Guns," New York Times, 19 March 1997.

22. "Mexico Asks U.S. to Track Guns Being Imported by Drug Cartels," Washington Post, 5 November 1996, p. A13.

23. "Mexicans Too Have a Problem Border: Awash in US Guns," Christian Science Monitor, 11 April 1997.

24. "Clinton Gains Pledge from Mexico," San Francisco Examiner, 6 May 1997, p. A2.

25. "Mexico Asks U.S. to Track Guns Being Imported by Drug Cartels," Washington Post, 5 November 1996, p. A13.

26. "Mexico Complains of Gun Smuggling," Associated Press, 3 May 1997.

27. "Mexico, Harried over Drugs, Presses Own Peeve: U.S. Guns," New York Times, 19 March 1997.

28. "Colombia: Report on Weapons, Increasing Violence," Santa Fe de Bogota Samana, in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-TDD-97-271, 28 September 1997.

29. "Colombia: Police Chief on Cali Arms Cache, Trafficker-Guerrilla Links," Santa Fe de Bogota Inravision Television in FBIS Daily Report FBIS-TOT-97-020-L, 26 February 1997.

30. Edward C. Ezell, Small Arms Today, 2nd edition, (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books), 1988, p. 444.

31. Valerie Alvord, "Illegal weapons were well-traveled: Mexico-bound, they went round the world to San Diego," San Diego Union Tribune, March 21, 1997.

32. Valerie Alvord, "Selected gun parts a riddle waiting to be unraveled," San Diego Union Tribune, April 6, 1997.

33. Some of the material in this section and in the section on policy options is drawn from Dr. Natalie J. Goldring, "Developing Transparency and Associated Control Measures for Light Weapons," a paper presented the April 1997 workshop for the 1997 review group of governmental experts on the UN Conventional Arms Register, Tokyo, Japan. The paper also presents and assesses several proposals to increase the transparency of light weapons transfers, primarily within the UN context.

34. "Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36H of 6 December 1991," reprinted in "Review of the Implementation of the Recommendations and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly at its Tenth Special Session: Report of the Disarmament Commission," A/51/182, 1 July 1996, pp. 64-69.

35. "Draft United Nations International Study on Firearm Regulation," prepared by the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division, United Nations Office at Vienna, E/CN.15/1977/CRP.6, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 25 April 1997.

36. "UN International Study on Firearms Regulation," UN Backgrounder: Firearms (Vienna: UN Information Service, no date).

37. "Firearm regulation for the purpose of crime prevention and public safety," E/CN.15/1997/L.19, 30 April 1997.

38. "Statement submitted by the National Rifle Association of America - Institute for Legislative Action (roster), a non-governmental organization in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council," 28 April - 9 May 1997.

39. See next section on the role of "pro-gun" organizations for additional detail on gun groups' involvement in ECOSOC activities.

40. For further information about the small arms panel, see Dr. Natalie J. Goldring, "UN Small Arms Panel Makes Progress," BASIC Reports #56, 11 February 1997, and "After Discord, Consensus on UN Small Arms Report," BASIC Reports #59, 25 August 1997.

41. "General and Complete Disarmament: Small Arms," A/C.1/52/L.27/Rev.1, 10 November 1997.

42. "OAS To Approve Arms Trafficking Treaty," OAS Press Release, 12 November 1997.

43. "Draft Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials," OEA/Ser.G CP/doc.2875/97, 20 March 1997, Organization of American States Permanent Council.

44. "EU Targets Illegal Arms," Defense News, 11-17 May 1997.

45. "Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials", AG/RES.1(XXIV-E/97), adopted by the 24th Special Session of the General Assembly, Organization of American States, Washington, DC, 13 November 1997.

46. "Draft Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials," prepared by a group of experts in Cancun on 6-7 March 1997 and submitted by the Rio Group to the Organization of American States.

47. Kate Joseph, interview with official of Mexican mission to the OAS, 7 November 1997.

48. "Inter-American Convention", op cit., Article VII: Confiscation or Forfeiture.

49. Geraldine O'Callaghan, interview with a Canadian Foreign Ministry official, 1 December 1997.

50. The CICAD's current membership consists of 32 countries; it was established in 1986 to improve cooperation on controlling drug trafficking, production, and use among member states. The Commission has provided assistance to OAS member states on issues such as reducing supply and demand for drugs and information sharing.

51. "OAS Convention Against Illicit Firearms Trafficking," Fact Sheet, The White House, November 14, 1997.

52. Australian Shooters Journal, August 1992.

53. Australian Shooters Journal, September 1993.

54. Peter H. Stone, "From the K Street Corridor," National Journal, April 12, 1997, p. 712.

55. News Release, Sporting Shooters Association of Australia, 4 April 1997.

56. Australian Shooters Journal, May 1997.

57. "World Forum Seeks to Save Sport Shooting," Gun News Digest," Fall 1997, p. 20.

58. "World Forum on the Future of Sportshooting Activities Established," NRA-ILA Fax Alert, Vol. 4 No. 28, 11 July 1997.

59. Peter H. Stone, "From the K Street Corridor," National Journal, April 12, 1997, p. 712.

60. Letter from Tanya K. Metaksa, Executive Director of the NRA's Institute for Legislative Action, to Senator Jesse Helms, 11 January 1996.

61. "UN Panel Recommends Studying Gun Licensing," In NRA Grassfire, January 1998.

62. Statement of the National Rifle Association of America - Institute for Legislative Action before the United Nations Panel of Government Experts on Small Arms, 21 January 1997. Author's note: Despite the title, this statement was not in fact presented before the panel.

63. "Statement of Thomas L. Mason, National Rifle Association of America (NRA)," United Nations Regional Workshop on Firearm Regulation (Africa), Arusha, Tanzania, 6 November 1997.

64. Letter from Tanya K. Metaksa, Executive Director of the NRA's Institute for Legislative Action, to Senator Jesse Helms, 11 January 1996.

65. Andrew Molchan, director of the US Association of Federally Licensed Firearms Dealers, quoted in a letter to Senator Jesse Helms from Tanya K. Metaksa, Executive Director of the NRA's Institute for Legislative Action, 11 January 1996.

66. " Firearms Owned by Civilians are the Target," NRA-ILA Fax Alert, November 26, 1997.

67. "Global Gun Control? Global Fighters for Gun Rights," The Gottlieb-Tartaro Report, Issue 24, December 1996.

68. "The United Nations Wants Your Guns," The Gottlieb-Tartaro Report, Issue 35, November 1997.

69. "Japan Pushes UN Gun Control Plan," The American Firearms Council Journal, Vol. 1 No.1, Summer 1996.

70. "The Clinton War on Guns," American Rifleman, April 1996.

71. "News Flash: Rep. Ron Paul Moving to Eliminate Gun Control Bureaucracy -- Amendment would remove U.S. from U.N. jurisdiction," Gun Owners of America, 4 June 1997.

72. "The United Nations: Pressing for U.S. Gun Control," June 1997.

73. In the United States, for example, the Arms Project of Human Rights Watch has published an extremely valuable series of country case studies covering light weapons transfers and violations of the laws of war in countries such as Angola, Turkey, and Rwanda. Their work also addresses particular light weapons such as landmines, blinding lasers, and cluster bombs.

74. For an excellent analysis of the potential for such measures in South Africa, see Jacklyn Cock, "A Sociological Account of Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa," in Jasjit Singh, ed., Light Weapons and International Security, (New Delhi: Indian Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Council), 1995.

75. "Twelve is Enough Anti-Gunrunning Act," US House of Representatives, Congressional Record, 7 January 1997.

76. See, for example, Christine Spolar, "Many Guns, Few Solutions in Albania: Looting of Armories Litters Chaotic Country With Weapons," Washington Post, 12 March 1997, and Mike O'Conner, "Albanians, Struggling to Survive, Sell Stolen Rifles," New York Times, 24 April 1997.

77. "Mali: Mali, Senegal, Mauritania To Tighten Border Security," FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-AFR-97-305, 1 November 1997.

78. "South Africa: Police Destroy 20 Metric Tons of Illegal Firearms," FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-AFR-97-279, 6 October 1997.

BASIC gratefully acknowledges the Ford Foundation's generous support for the Project on Light Weapons

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