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PROJECT ON LIGHT WEAPONS
Controlling Global Light Weapons Transfers:
Working Toward Policy Options
Susannah L. Dyer and Dr. Natalie J. Goldring
Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the
International Studies Association, San Diego, CA 16-20 April
1996
Table of Contents
Introduction
Tradtional Approaches
Cross-Cutting Issues
Improving the Prospects for Control
Endnotes
Introduction
This paper provides a framework for analysis of policy proposals
designed to limit the global flow of light weapons.1
Some of the concepts outlined below are borrowed from approaches
to limit major conventional weapons transfers, as both share
certain dynamics. However, while the general headings for
these approaches are the same, the specifics are likely to
be quite different because of the unique characteristics of
light weapons and their transfer. Any workable set of policy
options must take into account the special nature of this
class of weapons. Policy measures designed to limit light
weapons transfers must also be pursued within the broader
context of measures to reduce the likelihood of war and conflict;
frequently light weapons are the symptom of broader problems.
While various communities are becoming more aware of light
weapons issues, light weapons are not yet an established part
of the international security agenda. Before efforts to limit
light weapons transfers are likely to be effective, the issue
itself must receive significantly more national and international
attention. As the level of awareness of these issues increases,
public information efforts can be pursued in concert with
efforts to develop a new norm or standard against the transfer
of light weapons. Ultimately, it will be difficult or impossible
to limit light weapons transfers until such a norm exists.2
Traditional Approaches
Policies designed to limit major conventional weapons systems
offer a starting point for developing measures to be applied
to the control of light weapons. As with major conventional
weapons, transparency, oversight, and control are general
categories under which analysts and advocates can assess specific
policy options. The next three sections deal with these categories
in turn. In reality, however, many issues need to be addressed
through all three categories, and many policy approaches overlap
the categories as well. For this reason, the "traditional
approaches" section and the section on "cross-cutting issues"
should be read as two parts of a larger whole.
Transparency
Transparency refers to the amount of information that is available
on countries' arms transfer policies as well as on the transfers
themselves. To date, efforts to increase transparency of conventional
weapons transfers have focused on the seven categories of
major weapons included in the United Nations Register of Conventional
Arms. Because of this narrow focus, existing measures have
had little effect on transparency in the area of light weapons,
but do provide useful models and precedents for future efforts.
Prospects for increasing transparency of light weapons transfers
include:
- Expanding the UN Register to address the issue of light
weapons, by including this class of weapons in the register,
or by including specific weapons such as landmines.
An alternative would be to implement a separate register
for light weapons under the jurisdiction of the UN. Although
the collection of information on both transfers and holdings
would probably be incomplete, it would allow analysts, governments,
and the public to gain more knowledge about the extent of
light weapons transfers. No agreement was reached on expansion
of the Register during the first phase of discussions on
its progress, but the issue is likely to be raised again
when the next UN panel of experts convenes in 1997.
This proposal has the advantage of not requiring significant
research or new information. The main challenge to implementing
a separate register would be reaching consensus among
UN members to make this information public and agreeing
on which weapons to include. In many respects, it would
be easier administratively to simply expand the Register
of Conventional Arms to include all weapons transfers.
- Developing arms registers tailored to regional dynamics.
Such regional registers could supplement information provided
to the UN's global register. Verification measures and provision
of current data, which are not included in the global register,
might be more easily incorporated into regional approaches.
The issue of regional registers has already been raised
in fora such as the Organization of American States (OAS)
and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Regional registers are most likely to be effective when
used in coordination with other regional confidence- and
security-building measures to reduce the likelihood of
conflict. For example, in December 1995, the United Nations
established a trust fund to support confidence-building
measures and conflict prevention efforts being undertaken
by the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions
in Central Africa. The group intends to promote transparency
and restraint of weapons transfers in the region by establishing
a regional arms register as part of the larger confidence-building
program.
One advantage of pursuing regional registers is that
fewer countries need to agree on the parameters in order
to establish the register. Regional registers can also
set a useful precedent for eventual expansion of the global
register. The difficulty of pursuing this approach is
that countries that are involved in sub-regional conflicts
are unlikely to be willing to increase transparency for
fear of exposing their weaknesses. In some cases, conflict
resolution and confidence- and security-building measures
may need to precede efforts at greater openness. With
respect to the need for research, there is little documentation
of either prior or ongoing efforts in this direction;
a compilation of such efforts would be quite useful for
future policy work and research.
- Opening up national processes to scrutiny. Because
there are many more suppliers of light weapons than of major
conventional weapons, understanding national export policies
is an extremely important prerequisite for producing constructive
policy proposals. Some states may be unwilling to pursue
a policy of openness, fearing that public exposure may generate
increased competition, or bring unwelcome attention to their
transfers to certain countries. However, efforts to shed
light on national policies will increase understanding of
light weapons transfers, will provide information necessary
for demanding accountability for dangerous transfers, and
may provide a pressure point for improving these policies.
With its history of relative openness with regard to its
weapons control processes and policies, US leadership in
this context would be ideal.
This recommendation and the two that follow deal primarily
with national processes. As with regional registers, increasing
transparency at the national level can increase access
to information, decrease uncertainty, and help resolve
questions about neighbors' capabilities and intentions.
It may also be possible to formalize these national arrangements
through multilateral agreements such as the Wassenaar
Arrangement.
The advantage of dealing with these issues at the
national level is that only one government need be convinced,
and focused public pressure can achieve results relatively
quickly. Perhaps the primary disadvantage is that nobody
wants to be the first to indicate their holdings, transfers,
budgets, or capabilities. In some cases, access to information
at the national level has been attained as a result of
multilateral agreements, as was the case with the agreement
on Conventional Forces in Europe. More research on successful
efforts to increase transparency in these ways could aid
future attempts.
- Encouraging accessibility to information on prospective
transfers early in the process. Early information on
transfers under consideration would allow increased scrutiny,
opening up the process both within governments and in the
public eye. For example, in the United States, the report
known as the "section 657 report" (after its section number
in the Foreign Assistance Act) was renumbered section 655
and reinstated as part of the bill authorizing expenditures
for the Department of Defense which was signed into law
10 February 1996. This provision requires a detailed annual
report on all US commercial and foreign military sales,
including items as small as bullets and as large as tanks.
Reinstating this report may allow early detection of dangerous
patterns of US transfers before destabilizing buildups occur.
If other countries followed the US lead on this issue, international
transparency would increase significantly.
Research on past weapons transfers shows that the
later in the process that information is obtained, the
more difficult it is to stop a transfer. Sunshine favors
restraint. Governmental reluctance to share information
about prospective transfers may well indicate that the
transfers themselves are suspect. One way of testing this
hypothesis would be to research covert sales that have
become public and examine the level of support for those
sales when they became public.
- Requiring transparency of national military spending.
Economic aid could be conditioned on comprehensive reporting
of levels of military expenditure utilizing the existing
UN framework for annual reports on country military expenditures.
Economic aid could also be accompanied by programs to reduce
global military spending.
One of the advantages of pursuing this proposal is
that the mechanism for sharing information about military
expenditures is already in place. While the UN military
expenditure reports have not achieved nearly the level
of participation of the Register of Conventional Arms,
the register of military expenditures exists, as does
the infrastructure necessary to administer it. Conditioning
aid on participation is not likely to be a popular suggestion
-- recipient countries are wary of strings attached to
aid programs. Recipients also argue that such approaches
discriminate against countries that have fewer resources.
It is true that wealthier countries are more likely to
be aid-independent, and more able as a result to make
independent decisions on military spending and other issues.
Nonetheless, there is a strong argument that countries
providing aid should be able to set standards for which
countries should receive their presumably limited funds.
- Integrating sources of information. Too often,
the global weapons trade is viewed in a segmented fashion,
with some data dealing with commercial exports, some with
government-to-government transfers, and some with black
market transactions. As a result, analysis can often tell
only part of the story. Especially in the area of light
weapons, available information on commercial sales must
be integrated with data on government-to-government transfers.
In addition, information on the black market must also be
incorporated into analysis of light weapons transfers. Although
the limitations of accessibility and reliability of information
are significant, inclusion of this sector in analysis of
light weapons will aid development of a comprehensive picture
of trade and transfers.
There are many advantages to integrating information
sources, including the prospect of more readily detecting
patterns of behavior or transfers. However, this is perhaps
the most difficult transparency proposal to implement.
While these are measures that would primarily affect governments,
these reports could provide information on the range of
weapons transfers taking place.
Information about black market transfers is exceptionally
difficult to come by -- both suppliers and recipients
have significant incentives to keep this information secret.
Further research could be helpful in bringing together
the information that is known, and perhaps suggesting
which information sources have been most (or least!) reliable.
Oversight
Oversight refers to the process of regulating arms transfers.
Such processes are controlled by bureaucracies, legislatures,
or even international organizations. Since the monetary values
of light weapons transfers are significantly lower than those
for major conventional weapons, oversight structures have
often failed to address this category of weaponry. Countries
and international organizations must be convinced that oversight
measures for light weapons are in their interest, for while
the dollar value may be low, the prospects for destruction
and instability are considerable. Measures to improve and
expand oversight of light weapons transfers include:
- Including light weapons in the COCOM successor regime.
At present, the follow-on to the Coordinating Committee
on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), the Wassenaar Arrangement
appears to address only the seven categories of conventional
weapons included in the UN Register of Conventional Arms.
Including light weapons, as proposed by the Dutch early
in negotiations, would increase the relevance of the exercise
for countries other than the top suppliers of heavy weapons.3
One advantage of including light weapons in the Wassenaar
Arrangement is that it would then cover the range from
dual-use items to light weaponry to major conventional
weaponry. The weaponry side of the arrangement would no
longer be limited to the "small group on arms." Because
support already exists for this proposal, it could be
an only moderately difficult means of achieving increased
oversight. Perhaps the biggest barrier to this proposal
is that the arrangement itself is quite fragile. Countries
do not yet agree on what the arrangement is, its objectives
and procedures. Some countries argue that the arrangement
needs to be established before it can be expanded; others
point to the Register and say that expansion will happen
either now or never. Nonetheless, the Wassenaar Arrangement
represents an opportunity to achieve multilateral controls
on dual use and weapons exports. While momentum has been
hurt by the apparent failure of the April 1996 plenary
meeting, there may be considerably more room for movement
after the June 1996 Russian presidential election.
- Establishing a presumption against selling weapons
to countries that violate internationally accepted human
rights standards and countries involved in acts of armed
aggression. A number of countries and international
bodies, including the Organisation on Security and Cooperation
in Europe, the European Union, South Africa, and the United
States have developed criteria ("codes of conduct") to govern
weapons transfers. These criteria take into account recipient
human rights records, and their involvement in armed aggression
or terrorism. Making sure these criteria are applied to
the transfer of light weapons, ensuring enforcement of these
guidelines, and pressing for the adoption of similar measures
by other nations would increase scrutiny of the economic,
political, and sociological effects of light weapons transfers.
Since many of the criteria, such as not supplying states
who use the weapons against their own people, simply restate
widely held tenets, such regulations would not necessitate
new laws in many countries, but rather expansion and better
enforcement of existing legislation. A number of UN Member
States have also voiced their support for a global code
of conduct in both the General Assembly and the Conference
on Disarmament. Such a UN code would provide a foundation
for national and regional codes.
This proposal links light weapons transfers to codes
of conduct. One advantage is that such codes are receiving
increasing attention, and are gaining more and more support
in international fora. Ensuring that such codes explicitly
include light weapons is easiest as the codes themselves
are being formulated. For example, former Costa Rican
President Oscar Arias Sanchez plans to include light weapons
in the proposed International Code of Conduct that he
and other Nobel Peace Prize laureates are developing.
The primary barrier to success is that many countries
are reluctant to adopt such codes for fear that they could
be barred from transferring weapons to traditional clients.
For example, US government officials have argued that
the US Code of Conduct proposal is unworkable because
it could ban transfers to Saudi Arabia. Proponents of
the Code say that if Saudi Arabia is unable to improve
its human rights record significantly, it should not be
rewarded with US weaponry, and point out that the code
has the standard clause allowing the President to certify
an exception based on national security grounds. Research
could aid these efforts by creating a base of knowledge
about existing laws and regulations in supplier countries.
- Improving national oversight mechanisms to increase
attention to light weapons transfers. For example, current
US policy requires the President to notify Congress of proposed
weapons transfers exceeding certain dollar values (with
the notification requirements varying depending on the items
involved). Lowering these dollar values for Congressional
notification would allow more comprehensive debate on a
wider range of weapons transfers. Such an approach would
also emphasize the political and military consequences of
light weapons transfers, rather than simply treating them
as just another commodity.
This proposal and the one that follows have most of
the advantages and disadvantages of nationally-based transparency
measures. The administrative burden of improving oversight
would vary depending on the country and how much information
is already gathered. For the United States, the administrative
burden would not be very great, since the Executive Branch
already has to compile this information for the Section
655 report described in the transparency section above.
Here, too, research on existing requirements would be
helpful. In particular, we need better information about
current national legislation, and about the prospects
for enhancement.
- Enhancing national customs regulations and improving
international cooperation among customs services involved
with monitoring imports and exports of weapons. Sharing
information on national regulations governing light weapons
transfers could help countries establish more universal
standards. Cooperation initiatives might include creating
standard import and end-user certificates to combat fraudulent
transactions, developing limitations on large-scale transfers,
and instituting a computerized global tracking system to
monitor transfers of light weapons. Exporting countries
could also require additional documentation to grant export
licenses, such as import licenses approved by the recipient
government.4 To combat theft, international cooperation
efforts could also be directed at improving national controls
over light weapons stocks.
This proposal has the advantage of dealing with information
that is often unclassified but inaccessible. For example,
data may be gathered in unclassified form, but retained
in files rather than published. Moving beyond enhancing
national regulations to cooperating multinationally in
enforcing these regulations is a different matter; there
are often financial and political barriers to enforcement
nationally, let alone multinationally. Research in this
area could focus on determining whether other efforts,
such as drug interdiction, have produced useful lessons
for attempts to restrain the trade in weapons and technologies.
- Observing commitments under international law.
Regulation of light weapons transfers should rely on commitments
already in place under international law. As light weapons
are a key element in the pursuit of war, they should be
regulated under the agreed principles on the conduct of
war enshrined in international humanitarian law. Adopted
in 1977, the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions
prohibit the use of weapons causing "superfluous injury"
or "unnecessary suffering," and also prohibit the use of
indiscriminate weapons.5 Highlighting these important
international commitments is one of the few avenues which
presumes that respect for human life limits the rights to
use certain means and methods of war because of their "military
utility." Emphasizing this humanitarian approach, efforts
to ban landmines and laser weapons are focusing on the Review
Conference of the Conventional Weapons Convention to be
held in Geneva in late April and early May.
As with efforts to enforce customs regulations or
existing laws restricting weapons transfers to human-rights
abusers, efforts to enforce international law have the
significant advantage of dealing with mechanisms that
are already in place. However, an important barrier is
that countries have not been committed enough to these
principles to enforce them in the past. Public support
is likely to be key in overcoming this obstacle. The International
Committee of the Red Cross and others are currently documenting
the extent and applicability of international law in this
area.
Control
Control refers to limiting the quantity or quality of weapons
transferred. Supplier and recipient measures are necessary
to form a comprehensive framework for control. While unilateral
restraint by both suppliers and recipients could be a good
starting point for a control regime, long-term restraint will
only be effective if it is multilateral.
Controlling light weapons transfers is a complex, often daunting
issue. Proposals to control light weapons must address all
channels of proliferation, not relying solely on traditional
controls on licit government-to-government transfers. Many
light weapons transfers take place through the gray or black
markets. While some transactions are government-to-government,
others are commercial or private, and are more difficult to
monitor and control.
Bearing these often significant limitations in mind, specific
ways of controlling light weapons transfers include:
- Improving domestic gun control. The international
crisis surrounding the supply of light weapons is mirrored
in the domestic situations of numerous countries. Gaining
control over the domestic market has a two-fold effect,
improving the prospects for control of weapons purchased
domestically and smuggled abroad while also decreasing the
potential for internal violence by limiting supplies of
light weapons within the state. Creative ways of approaching
the proliferation of light weapons, such as gun buy-back
programs, could reduce the overall supply of these weapons.6
Such economic incentives could increase the effectiveness
of disarmament and dismantlement efforts. However, the administrators
of these programs must take into account possible perverse
effects on the market of these approaches. For example,
providing cash in return for guns introduces a new demand
factor, thereby increasing the perceived value of the weapons,
and possibly providing an unfortunate new incentive for
crime -- stealing guns to turn them in for cash.7
While this is an ambitious proposal, it also has broad-based
support. These efforts are just beginning in many countries,
and their success is not at all assured. Nonetheless,
they tie control of international weapons transfers to
an issue that is much more readily understood -- violence
in the streets. While broad-based support is a strong
asset to this effort, opponents of such controls include
weapons manufacturers and powerful lobbying interests
such as the National Rifle Association in the United States.
Generally well-funded, these opponents represent a significant
barrier to controls. The United Nations is attempting
to counter such groups, through efforts such as those
of its Economic and Social Council, which is engaged in
a study of the relationship between firearms and crime
and the damage caused by civilian-owner firearms. Further
research on the extent, accomplishments, and limitations
of gun buy-back and other domestic programs would aid
future efforts.
- Eliminating or restricting certain types of weapons.
The prospects for success of these measures are greatest
when global norms against particular weapons and their effects
have been established. For example, the global effort to
ban anti-personnel landmines is well underway and measures
to control blinding laser weapons are also being pursued.
This approach can also be undertaken in the domestic
sphere, as with assault weapons and the "Saturday night
special" pistol in the United States. Controls on ammunition
production have also been proposed, as has a tax on ammunition
sales. When such control measures are well-defined and
linked directly to specific problems, they tend to generate
more support than more sweeping measures. Later on, when
the principle of controlling particular weapons or ammunition
has been accepted, broader measures may be more easily
implemented.
There are several advantages to outright bans on certain
types of weapons. Perhaps most prominent is that such
bans are much easier to monitor and enforce than are qualitative
or quantitative limits. For example, if a weapon system
is banned, detection of a single weapon of that type is
a violation. Focusing on particularly harmful or indiscriminate
weapons can also help mobilize public outcry. However,
complete bans are difficult to accomplish, and even advocates
of restraint often disagree about which specific weapons
are most deadly or indiscriminate. As the recent debate
in the US Congress over repealing the assault weapons
bans demonstrates, any victories in this arena will likely
be the target of heavy criticism and opposition until
a norm against the specific weapon or class of weapons
is established. Researchers could aid this effort by compiling
information about countries' attempts to accomplish such
limits, and determining whether common factors contributed
to the success or failure of such attempts.
One promising new area is that of controls on advanced
technologies and weapons. BASIC is beginning a research
project which examines whether certain advanced technologies
may have fewer sources of supply and less indigenous production,
making them more susceptible to control than other light
weapons.
- Developing a global regime to eliminate black market
military sales. By sharing international intelligence,
encouraging tighter government control of private weapons
transactions, and strengthening cooperative efforts toward
international control of drugs and terrorism, the international
community could gain increased leverage over black market
transfers.8
As with proposals described above that link the weapons
trade to the drug trade and terrorism, public support
for controls is high -- the "black market" conjures up
images of back alley transactions among disreputable characters.
Yet the secrecy with which these deals are made decreases
the prospects for success. In addition, efforts to control
black market transfers must not be limited to those shady
back-alley deals. Instead, control measures should address
the range of black market arrangements, from covert government
transactions to black market deals among underground elements.
UN proposals on controlling illicit weapons transfers
and cooperation among governments to combat terrorism
may create new fora in which to address control of black
market transfers and potentially exert control over such
transfers.
While some researchers are dealing with these issues,
the extent of their contact with each other is unclear.
Bringing them into closer contact and better publicizing
their results could shed light on this issue. Additional
research could also focus on assessment of increased oversight
and control of the international banking system to determine
whether the financial dimensions of the equation offer
any solutions. Investigation of the role of transport
and communication in the black market would also be helpful.
- Supporting regional recipient restraint. Due to
unique factors at play in each region of concern, restraint
measures need to be tailored to the dynamics of the area
and the particular actors involved. However, international
support and respect for agreements is essential. In regions
where the prospects for cooperation and actual arms limitations
are greatest, agreements might be reached through existing
regional organizations to limit arms transfers from outside
the region. As part of a broader regional security regime,
such agreements might also include confidence-building measures
such as information exchanges and advance notification of
imports. More ambitious measures might include limits on
indigenous production and controls on co-production.
In more troublesome regions where internally initiated
control of weapons flows is less viable, outside influence
might encourage actors to pursue controls on light weapons
transfers as one element in a regional security system.
Beginning with information exchanges and moving toward
quantitative restrictions or ceilings on imports might
lower regional tensions.
Regional restraint is a key factor in any attempts
to restrain light weapons transfers. Unless recipients
agree on restraint, it will be difficult if not impossible
to accomplish. Current interest in regional arms control
is high; many countries seem to recognize that they can
deal with security needs more effectively on a regional
level than on a global level. However, some disagree about
the definition of the region, or where the primary threats
come from. For example, India argues that China is the
most significant threat to its security, thus limiting
the usefulness of regional negotiations among countries
in Southern Asia. Research to examine precedents such
as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and
their applicability to other regions is underway, and
should be encouraged.
- Cooperating and sharing expertise and intelligence
on bureaucratic and border controls. Such cooperative
efforts could lead to tighter control of certain weapons
flows across international borders. The United States has
been working with China and others to develop centralized
export control systems. US government officials also stress
their cooperation with law enforcement and customs officials
in other countries to help curb the illicit transfer of
US weapons. However, some of these countries have sought
significantly more cooperation than the United States has
offered.9 In the past, insufficient financial
and material resources such as computers, and lack of expertise
have limited the viability of these efforts.
To the extent that countries agree that stronger controls
are desirable, information sharing is relatively easy
to accomplish. For many countries, the primary barrier
will be lack of money to implement the proposal. It is
important to distinguish, however, between improving information
sharing and improving enforcement; the first is much easier
and less costly than the second. More information on existing
controls, highlighted in the section above on oversight,
will make determining common interests less difficult.
- Limiting the supply of surplus weapons. Many countries
sell or give away older weapons as the result of modernization
programs or to meet the limitations of arms control agreements.
These surplus weapons may provide profits for the supplier
and an inexpensive alternative to new weapons for the recipient,
thereby creating incentives for a dangerous "cascading"
of low-cost weapons. Industrialized countries should be
encouraged to change rules which currently favor selling
surplus weapons as a low-cost alternative to their destruction,
and should establish more strict controls on transactions
involving surplus weaponry.
Accumulations of surplus weapons may also result from
settlement of conflicts, where disarmament occurs without
provision for collection of weapons from warring parties.
Instead, weapons may be kept by ex-combatants, and sometimes
are sold illegally or used to support criminal activity.
Disarmament processes should clearly address the problem
of where these weapons will go, emphasizing that re-circulation
of these weapons either domestically or internationally
should be prevented. Gun buy-back programs are one mechanism
being used to deal with this problem.10
Limiting the supply of surplus weapons is one of the
more promising avenues for future light weapons policy.
Too often, weapons move from one country to another as
conflicts end, helping to resolve one conflict while spurring
others. Monitoring the dismantlement and destruction of
weapons is expensive and time consuming, however, and
requires continuing commitment on the part of participating
countries and institutions. Rigorous analysis of the successes
and failures of recent demilitarization efforts is critical
to increasing the prospects for success of future efforts.
- Strengthening international law. Efforts might
also be directed at strengthening international legal commitments
and making them more relevant to the concerns of light weapons
proliferation. For example, the Conventional Weapons Convention
does not apply to internal armed conflict, where the effects
of light weapons are particularly significant.11
One of the primary advantages of this approach is
that the results tend to be longer-lived than those produced
by one-time initiatives. However, efforts to strengthen
international law are likely to face a paradox: if the
issues dealt with are comprehensive in scope, it will
be more difficult to reach consensus, while at the same
time, there will be a tendency to reduce proposals to
the least common politically acceptable denominator, which
may produce meaningless or even counter-productive policy.
As with several of the proposals to increase oversight
and transparency, the first step is to produce useful
analyses of the requirements and provisions of existing
law. Thorough analysis of existing law will help suggest
the most urgent improvements.
- Investigating technical approaches. Safeguards
to restrict the unauthorized use of light weapons have been
proposed, as have technical methods of rendering weapons
inoperable if they are not serviced or maintained within
a specific period of time. However, there is a danger that
this approach may cloud the debate by re-focusing it on
the technology or safety of weapons, instead of the control
or elimination of weapons. This has been the case with certain
proposals to limit landmines which allowed "safe" or "self-neutralizing"
mines.
In this uncertain post-Cold War world of flexible
alliances, it is perhaps even more likely than before
that today's ally may be tomorrow's adversary. While recipients
will likely object if they do not have full control over
weapons they have purchased, fail-safe devices could be
quite useful. For example, there would have been less
concern about the Stinger missiles left in Afghanistan
if they had been rendered inoperable by not being serviced
for six months after transfer. However, relying on technical
fixes is often a risky proposition. It is certainly worthwhile
to continue investigating this approach, as long as people
do not expect the result to be "safe" light weaponry.
- Implementing economic measures. Control by suppliers
through economic means might be also be pursued by conditioning
economic aid or trading status on decreasing weapons imports
and participating in global and regional registers. Such
measures could be pursued unilaterally, or multilaterally
through the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.
This proposal has the advantage and disadvantage of
directly linking performance and rewards. The advantage
is that the link is direct and obvious, and performance
is relatively easy to monitor and measure. The primary
disadvantage is that once again, the countries that are
expected to conform to certain standards will argue that
they are being discriminated against. The international
lending institutions have significant experience with
setting numerous standards for country performance --
perhaps researchers could determine whether particular
approaches have been successful in alleviating concerns
about discrimination.
Cross-Cutting Issues
While the above categories incorporate many general policy
proposals for limiting transfers of light weapons, the particular
dynamics of light weapons create important cross-cutting issues.
Addressing these issues will often require a combination of
approaches, focusing on increasing oversight and transparency
as a means of creating new norms and increasing the prospects
for restraint.
Responses to Conflict
Because the flow of light weapons is closely linked to the
level of conflict, effective control efforts must respond
to current regional dynamics, tailoring transparency, oversight,
and control measures to the particular situation and level
of conflict. Before conflict begins or in its early stages,
transparency measures may include monitoring weapons flows
into a region, and encouraging transparency of weapons imports.
Regional agreements on consultation, pre-notification, and
improvement of national export controls may lessen tensions
and help reduce the overall flow of weapons within and to
the region. The international community can support these
efforts by cooperating on the control of gray and black market
transfers, and restricting aid to the region which might be
used to increase weapons supplies.
While conflict is under way, weapons limitations must focus
on supplier restraint. Embargoes can be put in place, but
must be actively enforced in order to be effective. After
conflict has ended, measures to control the flow of light
weapons need to be incorporated into demobilization and disarmament
strategies.12
Gathering information on the implementation of demobilization
measures as part of peacekeeping measures is a positive first
step. A project which includes such information gathering
is currently being completed at the United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Its primary conclusion
is that:
the establishment of viable stability requires that
three primary aspects be included in every approach to intra-state
conflict resolution: (1) the implementation of a comprehensive,
systematic disarmament programme as soon as a peace operation
is set-up; (2) the establishment of an arms management programme
that continues into national post-conflict reconstruction
processes; and (3) the encouragement of close cooperation
on weapons control and management programmes between countries
in the region where the peace operation is being implemented.13
Individuals and institutions administering demobilization
programs should also work closely with people attempting to
increase understanding and control of light weapons; these
efforts have traditionally been separate.
The United Nations has been a leading force in encouraging
the study of connections between conflict and the proliferation
of light weapons. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
who has coined the term "microdisarmament," continues to stress
the disarming of warring factions as a major focus for the
world community. In 1994, a UN advisory mission to Mali studied
the security situation in the country, the various political
and socio-economic factors at play, and their relationship
to the proliferation of light weapons in the region. Smuggling,
theft, illegal sales, misuse of weapons, and existing national
legislation were all investigated, and the mission concluded
that, "The lack of security was fuelling the demand for weapons.
The availability of weapons was fuelling the cycle of banditry
and violence which in turn was virtually bringing structural
development to a halt and preventing any progress on socio-economic
problems."14 A second mission was dispatched in
March 1995 to study the illicit traffic in light weapons in
seven states in the Sahara-Sahel region. According to the
Secretary-General, additional resources are needed if these
efforts to stem the flow of light weapons are to be successful.15
On 27 March 1996, the Mali government held a bonfire in Timbuktu,
Mali, destroying more than 2600 light weapons, including machine
guns, grenade launchers, rifles, and pistols. According to
the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, 95 percent
of the weapons were in working condition, and many were in
better condition than the Malian Army's weapons. According
to press reports, similar exercises are being planned in Mauritania,
Senegal, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Gabon.16
Building New Institutions
With the end of the Cold War, governments and other participants
in many Cold War institutions have attempted to rework or
revise them to increase their usefulness. One recent example
is the creation of a follow-on to the Coordinating Committee
on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). This effort was variously
named the "New Forum," the "Multilateral Control Regime" (MCR)
or the "Arms and Technology Control Regime" (ATCR). The current
name is the "Wassenaar Arrangement," after the town in the
Netherlands where the agreement to establish the group was
signed. As of December, the Wassenaar Arrangement included
28 countries; since the initial agreement was reached, Argentina,
Romania, and South Korea have signed on. Unfortunately, the
plenary meeting 2-3 April 1996 apparently dissolved over Russian
refusal to provide information in advance of delivery on transfers
to states considered particularly dangerous. Participating
countries are reportedly planning to meet again in July after
the Russian elections to determine whether they can salvage
the arrangement. Because of uncertainty about the future of
the arrangement, the discussion that follows deals with the
proposed structure of the arrangement.
While the participating countries will deal with both dual-use
and weapons export issues, a smaller group is focusing specifically
on weapons issues. This so-called "small group on arms" consists
of most of the world's largest exporters of conventional weaponry:
the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany,
and Italy.
To date, the Wassenaar Arrangement has focused on major conventional
weaponry, although participants are apparently considering
dealing with light weapons. One option reportedly under discussion
by the group is to restrict transfers of both major conventional
weapons and light weapons to areas where embargoes are being
removed or UN peacekeeping efforts are coming to an end.
The Wassenaar Arrangement could significantly improve the
prospects for transparency, oversight, and control of light
weapons. If participants favor an incremental approach, they
could begin with transparency measures to increase available
information about light weapons transfers, and could work
to increase international oversight of light weapons. Once
these measures were in place, participants could move on to
control measures. However, while some analysts argued under
similar circumstances for gradual strengthening of the UN
Register of Conventional Arms, the promised expansion and
enhancement of the Register have not occurred. This suggests
that unless control measures are included from the beginning,
they may never be implemented.
Despite recent setbacks, the Wassenaar Arrangement offers
real prospects for multilateral control of dual-use and weapons
exports. However, the arrangement is quite vulnerable right
now -- China does not take part, and a Russian withdrawal
might well demolish the entire framework. At the same time,
however, many countries are interested in being included,
indicating that international support for the mechanism is
still quite strong. Unfortunately, the difficulty of even
establishing the arrangement suggests that countries are less
likely to be enthusiastic about including light weapons at
an early date, as BASIC, Human Rights Watch and others have
suggested.
The above measures focus on direct means of controlling light
weapons transfers, and require the active leadership and support
of the suppliers and recipients in question. As a result of
these strenuous requirements, skeptics often dismiss the possibility
of control, citing the implausibility of reducing and even
reversing the flow of light weapons. Yet when viewed as a
long-term goal, control of light weapons transfers is more
viable, especially when more modest intermediate steps may
be combined to produce long-term policy change.
In the near term, many proposals focus on placing the issue
of light weapons transfers on the international agenda. Proposals
for control will be taken seriously only after the legitimacy
of the issue is recognized. Projects designed to increase
the profile of the light weapons issue may be undertaken by
a variety of groups, including the international community
of NGOs, research organizations, academics, media, and concerned
citizens. After gaining greater understanding of these issues,
these groups will be better positioned to make constructive
policy proposals and to be active and committed participants
in improving the prospects for control.
Making the Argument
To many of those affected by light weapons, whether through
academic endeavor or first-hand experience, the issue at hand
is frighteningly obvious: light weapons kill, maim and destroy;
they cause instability and prolong wars; they promote a culture
of violence which is gaining momentum around the world; and
they divert much-needed resources away from social and economic
development. Dealing with all of these elements is critical
if efforts to reduce the killing are to be successful. While
light weapons do the killing, they are at the same time generally
symptoms of other problems, such as disputes over resources
and borders. To reduce the killing, we must understand and
overcome many obstacles. While some are political and military
in nature, others are economic, social, and even psychological.
Suppliers of conventional weaponry often argue that these
transfers preserve jobs and keep weapon supply lines open.
This argument has been applied to weapons transfers as a whole,
even though the dollar value of light weapons transfers is
relatively low. Although the human costs of light weapons
are well recognized, these economic arguments may gain public
and elite support in countries faced with difficult economic
conditions and powerful lobbying by defense industries. Advocates
of light weapons control must prevent existing mechanisms
which favor economic factors over security from automatically
being applied to light weapons transfers.
After getting the light weapons issue onto the international
agenda, the next step is to create an environment that is
supportive of control. This means countering the economic
arguments summarized above, and delegitimizing light weapons
transfers. It is also important to keep control measures in
place long enough to be effective, instead of implementing
such measures and then quickly allowing them to lapse. For
example, Germany has halted arms supplies to Turkey at least
three times since 1992. However, these sanctions were left
in place only briefly. After Turkey resumed the behavior that
had occasioned the limitations in the first place, they were
eventually reimposed, but the measures were seen as largely
symbolic.17
Ultimately, unless there is an global norm which decries
the consequences of light weapons, it will be difficult to
control this class of weapons. At the same time, however,
the process of developing this global norm will increase media
and public attention to the issue, help produce vital social
pressure and suggest to policymakers that control of light
weapons is in their interest.
Providing Information to Influence
Policy
There is an urgent need for more and better information on
various aspects of light weapons transfers. Evidence of the
consequences of supply and misuse of weapons will help convince
policymakers that the benefits of controlling light weapons
far outweigh the costs. In addition, increased understanding
of the various dynamics of the global market in light weapons
is necessary in order to evaluate the potential effectiveness
of various policy options. In September 1995, the government
of Japan issued a statement saying, "Another serious problem
facing the international community is the proliferation of
small arms. It is Japan's intention to submit to this session
of the General Assembly a draft resolution on the establishment,
under the Secretary-General, of a panel of experts to address
this issue."18 This resolution was submitted to
the First Committee on 2 November 1995, and was cosponsored
by the governments of Argentina, Ecuador, and South Africa.
Early work on light weapons transfers has emphasized case
studies of particular recipients, or, in some cases, particular
weapons. These case studies have been extremely useful in
adding to the available information regarding light weapons.
However, they often stand in isolation, with little if any
work done to assess common problems or opportunities across
countries or regions. In addition, case studies of particular
weapons generally fail to draw connections with other weapons
that may pose similar challenges or opportunities for limitation.
To date, case studies have also generally not evaluated the
role of key cities in the process. Analysts should assess
the possible contributions of additional information on the
types of transactions taking place in key cities such as Karachi,
Bombay, Singapore, Miami, and Bangkok. Experience with monitoring
and controlling weapons flows in and out of these cities could
increase the effectiveness of national or international efforts.
This is yet another area where research efforts and policy
proposals must be developed at the same time.
Once obtained, the information that is gathered by researchers,
governments, or other analysts must then be publicized in
order to have greatest effect. Data on imports and exports
should be published and utilized as part of confidence-building
measures. Collecting and bringing attention to data on the
negative consequences of light weapons can also help influence
national and international policies. Especially with respect
to the human rights aspects of light weapons transfers and
use, governments are more likely to curb transfers if confronted
with the prospect that their international reputation may
suffer as a result of increased public scrutiny. Using electronic
communication to increase public access to information via
the internet is one means of increasing this scrutiny.
Journalists also play a critical role in publicizing the
negative consequences of light weapons, through coverage of
ethnic conflicts, publicity of specific sales, and editorial
comment on national and international policies. Investigative
journalists have been particularly helpful in obtaining and
publishing information about illegal weapons transfers. Journalists
can reach a large and diverse group of readers quickly and
at low cost. Their support should be enlisted to increase
elite attention to light weapons and develop a broad base
of public support for control of light weapons transfers.
Journalists and others who do field research are also key
sources of information on weapons transfers within individual
countries.
In each of these cases, early access to information is critical.
It is much easier to exercise leverage over proposed transfers
when discussions are still underway. Early warning of proposed
transfers can be extremely valuable. Once sales contracts
have been signed, transfers are generally very difficult to
stop. Occasionally, however, sales have been stopped quite
late in the process. For example, in 1995, a coalition of
arms control and human rights groups led by Human Rights Watch
prevented the proposed transfer of cluster bombs to Turkey
on human rights grounds. A researcher's discovery of the proposed
transfer was followed by media work and lobbying by grassroots,
advocacy, and analytic organizations, and the sale was halted.
Early access to information is also key in stopping non-governmental
transfers, though it is much more difficult to obtain.
Building Coalitions
In order to address effectively the many negative consequences
of light weapons, a diverse coalition to control their transfer
must be established. The perspectives of physicians, humanitarian
aid workers, economists, trade unions, police, and religious,
veterans', gun control, peace, and environmental groups must
be included in such a coalition.
Members of this new coalition have much to teach each other.
For example, physicians and humanitarian aid workers can point
out the destruction that can be inflicted by light weapons.
Economists and trade union members can show the economic costs
of conflict and can assess the benefits of redirecting aid
to economic development and increased non-military trade.
Peace and religious groups can suggest alternate means of
resolving conflicts and can propose confidence- and security-building
measures that do not include weapons buildups. Local police
forces and gun control groups can provide information about
gun buy-back programs and other policy options that may be
applicable to other countries or municipalities. Establishing
a partnership with these groups could mobilize communities
concerned with domestic gun control and encourage their involvement
with issues of violence on a global level.
Such new coalitions bring new challenges for coordination
and information sharing. However, they also provide the opportunity
to attract new audiences and supporters, and magnify the effectiveness
of the individual groups. Working together, these groups can
help focus our efforts, mobilize decision-makers, increase
public awareness, and bring the issue to the local level by
looking at effects on local communities.
Some seemingly unlikely coalitions may in fact be possible.
For example, companies in non-military fields may be concerned
about the effects of light weapons transfers in the countries
in which they do business. Domestic unrest may increase the
likelihood of instability, and even nationalization of industry,
thus making their investments vulnerable. These commerce-based
connections could be the source of significant long-term policy
change.
In addition, traditional allies such as arms control and
disarmament organizations and religious groups must work together
more effectively internationally. While new technology is
by no means a panacea, international communication can be
less expensive and more effective through the use of electronic
mail and other such tools. Increased timely access to information
is critical to affecting policy.
BASIC's Project on Light Weapons is facilitating international
contacts through its development of a network of analysts
and advocates working on light weapons issues. Those participants
with e-mail links receive working papers and other information
via e-mail; those with access to the World Wide Web receive
additional information and publications. By updating and disseminating
a directory, Current Projects on Light Weapons, BASIC also
hopes to increase international communication and access to
information on these issues.
NGOs and private citizens must also forge links with local
and national governments and regional and international organizations
to find support, educate, and encourage leadership among policymakers.
No one type of organization is likely to achieve significant
change in light weapons transfers by itself. Integrated local,
national, and international initiatives are all necessary
in order to bring light weapons under control.
Moving from Transparency to
Control
To make progress in reducing the level of conflict and the
costs of war, we must ensure that measures aimed at limiting
transfers of light weapons are not reduced to mere transparency
measures. For example, after the Gulf War, many individuals,
groups, and countries suggested measures to restrain the international
weapons market. After months of discussion and debate, the
only substantive measure agreed to was the UN Register of
Conventional Arms, a transparency measure. The modest step
of implementing the register bore little relationship to the
more ambitious measures that had been suggested.
However, transparency measures can also be valuable, especially
as a stepping stone to more ambitious measures. For example,
some southern African countries have suggested stepped-up
efforts to monitor gun flows across borders in the region.
This monitoring effort could be expanded to include exchanges
of information among countries on what is being transferred.
Over time, the effort could develop to include imposition
and enforcement of controls over such weapons flows.
Learning From Our Successes
One area in which veterans, human rights, and peace advocates
have had considerable success in recent years is control of
anti-personnel landmines. This issue has special characteristics,
such as the frequency with which civilians are harmed by these
weapons. However, those proposing restraints on light weapons
transfers could learn a great deal from the international
landmines campaign. While this issue deserves much more complete
study, some general factors include:
- success in creating a new global norm on the negative
consequences of anti-personnel mines
- success in publicizing the negative consequences of landmines
use
- the active role of media in increasing public awareness,
especially through photographs
- the relatively low dollar value of landmines transfers,
which reduced the level of industry opposition to restraint
- the inclusion of landmines in the convention on excessively
injurious weapons
- the role of US support for control efforts
In The Technology of Killing, Eric Prokosch suggests four
keys to the success of the landmines campaign:
- An ability to conduct field research quickly and efficiently,
and to publish the results.
- The ability and resources to compile essential information
and make it available rapidly to activists.
- Access to national decision-makers and an ability to persuade
them to act quickly and decisively.
- An ability to get results at the United Nations.19
Further study of domestic gun control efforts would likely
suggest parallel lessons and factors. It would be useful to
assess common factors in the success of these two efforts,
and whether those factors could be applied to other areas.
___________________
Endnotes
- An earlier version of this paper was presented at the
Light Weapons Workshop sponsored by the British American
Security Information Council and the American and Indian
affiliates of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World
Affairs and hosted by the Institute for Defence Studies
and Analyses in New Delhi, India, 21-23 October 1995. It
was published in Light Weapons and International Security
(New Delhi: British American Security Information Council
and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1995). In
addition to general updates to that chapter, we have suggested
some preliminary research questions for each section. We
have also identified conditions that could facilitate these
approaches. and likely barriers to progress. As this is
a work in progress, we would greatly appreciate any comments
or suggestions readers may have on these or any other sections.
- For discussion of the need for creating such a norm and
measures that will help in its creation, please see the
section on "Improving the Prospects for Control."
- See section on "Building new institutions" for further
discussion of the Wassenaar Arrangement.
- Defense Trade News, July and October 1994, p. 6.
- For a helpful summary of these protocols and their application
to the control of antipersonnel weapons, see Eric Prokosch,
The Technology of Killing: A Military and Political History
of Antipersonnel Weapons, (London: Zed Books, 1995),
chapter 6.
- Organizations currently conducting research and analysis
of gun buy-back programs include the Monterey Institute
of International Studies (MIIS) and the Centro para la Paz
y la Reconciliacion.
- See section on "Responses to Conflict" for more information
on UN efforts in Mali and gun buy-back programs.
- See Michael T. Klare, "An Arms Control Agenda for the
Third World, Arms Control Today, April 1990, p. 12.
- See the statement of Brazilian government representatives,
BASIC roundtable on Light Weapons and International Security,
20 March 1996, for additional detail on this point.
- See Edward J. Laurance, "Surplus Weapons and the Micro-Disarmament
Process, a paper presented to the UN workshop, "Micro-disarmament
: A New Agenda for Disarmament and Arms Control," 8 November
1995 for analysis of gun buy-back programs as a method of
micro-disarmament.
- The International Committee of the Red Cross has been
instrumental in suggesting ways to increase the effectiveness
of the CWC. For a brief summary of their proposals, see
Prokosch, pp. 189-190.
- See Jo Husbands, "Controlling Transfers of Light Arms:
Linkages to Conflict Processes and Conflict Resolution Strategies,"
Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons, (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, 1995), especially pp. 131-133.
- "The Disarmament of Warring Parties as an Integral Part
of the Settlement of Conflicts," April 1996Final Progress
Report, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,
Geneva, April 1996.
- "The Mali Mission," Remarks by Mr. Goulding, Undersecretary
General for Political Affairs to the First Committee, United
Nations, 26 October 1994.
- Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization,
United Nations General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, August
1995, A/50/1, para. 957.
- Thalif Deen, "Disarmament: U.N. Moves to Demilitarize
Central Africa," Inter Press Service International News,
2 April 1996.
- Lale Sariibrahimoglu, "Germans put new ban on arms transfers,"
Jane's Defence Weekly, 16 April 1994.
- Statement by H.E. Mr. Yohei Kono, Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan at the Fiftieth
Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 26
September 1995, p. 10.
- Prokosch, p. 183.
BASIC gratefully acknowledges the Ford
Foundation's generous support for the Project on Light Weapons.
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