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Export Controls

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European Framework Agreement:
Sample Letters


Letter from the Arms Transfer Working Group (ATWG) to U.S. Officials

Letter from the United Kingdom Arms Working Group (UKAWG) to European Officials

Sample Letter to U.K. Parliamentarians

Letter from the Arms Transfer Working Group (ATWG) to U.S. Officials

August 8, 2000

Dear __________,

We are writing as participants of the Arms Transfer Working Group - an alliance of more than 30 arms control, human rights, peace and religious organizations working for the non-proliferation of conventional weapons - to express our concern about the "Framework Agreement concerning Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring and Operation of the European Defense Industry" signed in July by the defense ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Spain and the United Kingdom. We are especially concerned about the link between the U.S. Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI) and the Framework Agreement. We believe that these new arrangements, especially taken together, could result in a lower level of control over the transfer of sensitive arms and technology.

Although the Framework Agreement is aimed at restructuring the European defense industry, its implementation may also impact the way U.S. arms and technology are handled by European governments and firms. For example, the goal of the Agreement is to eliminate existing obstacles to intra-European joint ventures and mergers - consolidation being deemed necessary in the face of domination by U.S. companies - thereby facilitating the movement of technology and subsystems among participating European states. This may mean that the DTSI's favoritism to certain states as a reward for adopting strict control procedures - like the planned ITAR exemption for the United Kingdom - becomes meaningless in the end, as there are fewer and fewer "national" companies. The lack of transparency surrounding transfers among firms involved in joint production or within multinational firms makes it all the more difficult for the United States to exercise control over its exports once they arrive in Europe.

In addition, by encouraging parties to the Agreement to reduce barriers to trade in defense goods, parts, and technology - even those not traded in the context of joint production - the new European arrangement will further reduce the level of control over the movement of arms across Europe. Indeed, the Framework Agreement has the potential to move European states down a slippery slope toward the lowest common denominator of export controls.

Further, the Framework Agreement is designed to make the European defense industry more competitive in the global defense market by facilitating the joint decision-making process on third-party exports. If the Europeans are successful in capturing more market share, U.S. firms could respond by demanding further reforms of U.S. arms export controls. This could conceivably develop into a race to the bottom as the American and European defense industries struggle to secure lucrative third-party contracts.

When you presented the U.S. government's reform initiative to non-governmental organizations in May, you indicated that your goal was to elicit tighter levels of control by close allies. Instead, the European Framework Agreement represents a considerable step in the opposite direction. Clearly, the DTSI has not had its desired impact. We therefore urge Departments of State and Defense to engage the responsible European governments at the highest possible level to seek a mutually agreeable way to implement this agreement without decreasing the effectiveness of current U.S. and European export controls.

Finally, we would like to have the opportunity to meet with you to discuss these concerns, and to be given an update on negotiations with the United Kingdom and Australia on ITAR exemptions. Please contact Arms Transfer Working Group co-chairs Tamar Gabelnick (202-675-1018) or Erik Floden (202-546-0975) at your earliest convenience to set up such a meeting.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

Letter from the United Kingdom Arms Working Group (UKAWG) to European Officials

22nd June 2000

Dear ____________,

Re: Request for a meeting on the Letter of Intent between 6 Defence Ministers on Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring of the European Industry

We are writing to request a meeting with relevant officials from the XX department on the forthcoming Framework Agreement on Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring of the European Industry.

While BASIC acknowledges - and welcomes - the possibility that this new agreement has the potential to strengthen export control policy. At the same time, we have the following concerns:

· Export controls could be reduced to the lowest common denominator: The Letter of Intent (LoI) asserts clearly that any new arrangements will be 'within the ambit of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.' However, since the criteria of the Code are subject to differing interpretation, there may well be differences between the six participating states on the legitimacy of certain potential recipients of arms. New, simplified procedures for the export of arms raise concerns about the risks of diluting such more restrictive export control criteria of participating states, increasing the prospects of EU export controls being reduced to the lowest common denominator.

· 'White Lists' will not be made public: The proposed white lists of acceptable destinations for the export of joint venture equipment will not be made public. This undermines the aims of the EU Code and UK policy to increase transparency over arms exports.

We understand that the details of this agreement, such as the countries to be included in the White Lists and end-use controls, will be finalised over the next year. BASIC believes that, in order to ensure that this agreement improves common export controls, experts from the NGO and academic community must be consulted during this process. We would welcome the opportunity to work with your office to ensure that UK Government policies on export controls and transparency are protected in the implementation of the agreement.

Therefore we ask you to consider meeting with representatives from the UK Arms Working Group at the earliest opportunity to establish a dialogue on this important issues at the earliest possible opportunity. In addition, it is our understanding that UK defence industry representatives already have been provided several briefings on the subject - and we would welcome a similar opportunity.

We look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely

Sample Letter to U.K. Parliamentarians

MP
House of Commons
London SW1A 1AA

23rd June 2000

Dear MP

Re: Forthcoming Agreement on Arms Export Controls could threaten EU Code of Conduct, Transparency and Parliamentary Scrutiny

I am writing to you regarding a forthcoming agreement which has the potential to undermine European arms export controls and threaten progress on transparency and parliamentary scrutiny of weapons transfers.

In 1998, the Defence Ministers of the six leading European arms manufacturing countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and UK) signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) on "measures to facilitate the restructuring of the European Defence Industry". After two years of negotiations it is expected that a "Framework Agreement" will be adopted on July 24th at Farnborough Air Show. The agreement will be legally binding, with the status of an international treaty, requiring ratification by national parliaments.

The Framework Agreement will have a direct impact on the export control policies and procedures of the signatory countries. Although the text of the agreement is not public, it is understood that it will do the following:

  • Simplify and reduce export control procedures on all joint ventures among any of the six participating states: Industry currently argues that existing licensing procedures impedes joint ventures across European borders, thereby undermining the future of the European defence industry. This agreement will allow for the free circulation of components and finished products in joint ventures amongst the six participating states.

  • Ensure that export licensing decisions will be taken by collective agreement of all state participating in the joint venture: Currently, decisions on where to export joint venture equipment is the sole responsibility of the country of final assembly. Under the terms of this new agreement, all participating countries will have a say in which countries it will be exported to. Although this is meant to be a consensus decision, it is likely that a country's influence on the final decision will be proportionate to its role in the joint venture.

  • Establish 'White Lists' of acceptable destinations: For each venture, participating states will agree a 'white list' of legitimate destinations to which the defence equipment can be exported. These lists may vary depending on the project - for instance restrictions on the export of a helicopter may be different to that of small arms and light weapons.

While many officials involved in the negotiations maintain that this is a positive initiative, there are a number of areas which are a cause for concern for NGOs and parliamentarians calling for tougher controls on arms exports.

  • · Possibility that export controls will be reduced to the lowest common denominator: The LoI asserts clearly that any new arrangements will be 'within the ambit of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.' However, since the criteria of the Code are subject to differing interpretation, there may well be differences between the six participating states on the legitimacy of certain potential recipients of arms. New, simplified procedures for the export of arms raise concerns about the risks of diluting such EU Member States' more restrictive export control criteria, increasing the prospects of EU export controls being reduced to the lowest common denominator.

  • White Lists will not be made public: The aim of the agreement is to promote a competitive European defence industry, and the 'white lists' of export destinations for joint venture equipment will not be made public because of "commercial confidentiality". This runs counter to the stated aim of the EU Code of Conduct to promote "greater transparency" among the 15 EU states. It further prevents any form of parliamentary oversight on joint venture exports.

The priority now is to ensure that the LoI results in the most effective and transparent export controls, which adhere to the toughest interpretation of the EU Code of Conduct criteria.

Attached is a series of parliamentary questions which we hope you will consider tabling. If you require any further information of have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

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