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Export Controls

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EU and US Cooperation on arms export controls in a post 9/11 world:

A roundtable discussion organised by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) and Saferworld

23 January 2003

Session 3 Discussion Paper: Man Portable Air Defense Systems

Richard Carlson III and Ian Davis (BASIC)

Introduction

The threat of a portable missile attack on military or civilian aircraft has become a prominent issue following the November 28 attack on a commercial Israeli airliner over Kenya. In fact, this threat from Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) has existed for many years. The missiles fired at the Israeli airliner in Mombassa have been linked by Israeli intelligence officials to an attempt in Prague last year to bring down an aircraft carrying the then Israeli foreign minister, Shimon Peres.[1]

But such attacks have an even longer history. Two Rhodesian jets were downed by SA-7s in the late 1970s and a Sudan airways jet was shot down in 1986 with a combined loss of 167 lives. Other countries which have experienced missile attacks on domestic airliners include Angola, the former Soviet republic of Georgia, Bosnia, Costa Rica, Mozambique, Mauritania, Somalia, and Armenia. Many of these missiles, such as the French Mistral, the US Stinger, and the Russian SA-7 Grail are widely available and highly sought after on the black market.

Accessibility

There are an estimated 500,000 MANPADS currently in existence with some of the simpler systems available for as little as $1,000 on the open market. The MANPADS thus far used in terrorist attacks, such as the Russian made SA-7, suggest that terrorist groups currently do not have access to more sophisticated systems, although general small arms proliferation trends suggest that it is only a matter of time before more advanced systems are used. Many of the MANPADS are unaccounted for, including at least 40 Stinger missile systems following the 1991 Gulf War, as well as hundreds of US made MANPADS shipped to foreign nations and then left untracked, and thousands of systems built by France, China and Russia.[2]

Countermeasures

MANPADS operate by targeting the heat of an aircraft engine and provide little warning to the pilot of their proximity prior to impact, thus complicating the use of even the most effective countermeasures. Advancements have been made in launch detection devices that generally involve the use of sophisticated ultraviolet or infrared systems to alert a pilot to the launch of a MANPAD missile, which will allow for the use of certain types of countermeasures, though these are generally found only on military aircraft.

Some US Air Force cargo planes have initiated the use of Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures that detect the launch of a MANPAD missile and target the guidance system with lasers, which would render navigation inoperable. Though this system has proved 100 percent effective in the test phase, the cost of designing new commercial aircraft and retrofitting older commercial aircraft with this system would exceed $25 billion.[3] While Israeli commercial airliners have taken to installing detection systems and countermeasures on their aircraft, this action is largely cost prohibitive for the airline industry in the United States. "U.S. and other commercial carriers (with the exception of Israel) are unwilling to pay these costs, taking the view that "the cost of installing expensive countermeasures far outweighs the risk of being attacked."[4]

Many airline officials have advocated that improving security around airport perimeters and other prevention measures are the greatest countermeasures against an attack on an airliner. The Air Transport Association stated that any cost of implementing a large scale countermeasure installation program on commercial aircraft or simply armed guards at airfield perimeters, should be assumed by the Federal government.[5] The White House's National Security Council has appointed an interagency task force to further examine and take actions against the threat of these missile systems against commercial airliners. Some recent steps include emergency inspections of all large US airports to access their vulnerability to attack, as well as a planned public educational program to inform law enforcement and citizens of how to recognize MANPAD systems and how to respond once they have been recognized.[6]

Attempting to Keep Missiles from Terrorists: The Role of the Wassenaar Agreement on Weapons Export Controls

On December 1, 2000, at its meeting in Slovakia, the 33-nation Wassenaar Arrangement (which contains most of the world's major arms exporters) adopted new controls on MANPADS. At the time, former State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said the agreement, "will help make the world safer by helping to keep dangerous surface-to-air missiles, such as Stingers and SA-18s, out of the hands of terrorists and international outlaws. It will thereby reduce the threats posed by illicit acquisition and use of such weapons to civilian aircraft, US troops overseas, and peacekeepers around the globe." [7]

The Wassenaar Arrangement's approval of this US proposal capped a two-year joint effort by the US Departments of State and Defense to carry out then Secretary Albright's 1998 initiative calling for strict multilateral controls on these missiles. The agreement was the first ever to attempt to place multilateral export controls on these weapons. Before approving the transfer of these weapons, Participating States are required to satisfy specific criteria, including securing end-use and non-transfer guarantees from the recipient government, and establishing whether a proposed recipient is both willing and able to implement effective security and accountability measures for storage, handling, transportation, and use of the weapons to prevent compromise, loss, theft, diversion, or unauthorized use.

Issues for further discussion:

• How effective have these multilateral controls been in reducing the threat posed by MANPADS?
• What more could be done to strengthen multilateral export controls on MANPADS?
• Should MANPADS be the subject of specific work within other multilateral frameworks dealing with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, such as the UN Program of Action and OSCE Document on Small Arms?
• Israel, for example, has petitioned the UN to draw up a worldwide inventory of MANPAD Systems[8] - how might this idea be taken forward?

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