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BASIC / Saferworld Fact Sheet
Code of Conduct on Arms Sales
Agreed by EU Governments
On May 25 1998, the Foreign Ministers of the 15 EU States
agreed the terms of an EU Code of Conduct on arms sales. The
Code of Conduct provides detailed export criteria which must
guide decisions by the Member States to grant or refuse an
application for an arms export licence; establishes a mechanism
whereby Member States consult with each other on the issuing
of arms export licences; requires Member States to submit
annual reports on arms exports and the Code's implementation;
and, crucially, establishes a process of annual review intended
to lead to a strengthening of the Code over the coming years.
The text of the Code also calls on the Member States to encourage
other arms exporting countries to adopt similar Codes of Conduct.
An important first step
With the EU collectively accounting for 40% of the global
trade in arms, the agreement on the Code represents a significant
step towards multilateral restraint in the export of conventional
arms. To reach consensus in an area as sensitive as the arms
trade amongst 15 different countries - including three of
the world's top five arms exporting nations - must be considered
a real achievement. Whilst there remains considerable room
for improvement on the agreement, for example there are some
ambiguities in the export guidelines, and the consultation
mechanisms are limited, the Code nevertheless indicates the
willingness of the 15 EU countries to take a progressive stance
on arms export controls. In particular, it is the first time
that countries have been required to consult each other on
specific arms exports.
Whilst it is too early to say what the long term material
impact of the Code will be on arms exports from the EU states,
it is worth noting that one immediate impact is the export
guidelines in the Code relating to human rights are stronger
than the previous UK national guidelines established in July
1997. The Code, therefore, effectively closes the loophole
in UK controls, which allowed for repressive equipment to
be exported to countries with poor human rights records provided
that the equipment was 'for the protection of the security
forces.'
EU-US co-operation crucial to future development of the
EU Code
Successful implementation and strengthening of the Code
in the coming months and years will depend on the EU Member
States maintaining the political will which has led to the
initial agreement. With this in mind, the EU countries will
look to developments in the United States. Having taken this
first tentative step, European governments may be discouraged
from going further if they fear the United States will simply
move into the arms markets vacated by the EU Member States.
It is crucial, therefore, that the EU governments and the
United States develop a co-ordinated approach to control over
arms exports to finally negate the argument 'if we don't sell
arms, someone else will.'
Export guidelines
Summary of the key criteria:
Human rights
- Member States will not issue an export licence if there
is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for
internal repression. Member States are further required
to exercise 'special caution and vigilance' in issuing licences
taking account of the nature of the equipment to countries
where serious violations of human rights have been established
by the UN or the EU.
- The Code defines equipment which might be used for internal
repression as: equipment where there is evidence of the
use of similar equipment for internal repression by the
proposed end user; and defines internal repression as including
torture and other cruel and degrading punishment, summary
or arbitrary executions, disappearances, and other violations
of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in the
Universal Declaration of Human rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Regional and international security
- Member States will not allow exports that would provoke
or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions
in the country of final destination. A licence will not
be issued if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient
would use the export aggressively against another country
or assert by force a territorial claim.
Development
- Member States will take into account whether the proposed
export would hamper the sustainable development of the recipient.
They will consider this in the context of the recipients
relative levels of military expenditure taking into account
any EU or bilateral aid.
The remaining criteria cover: the behaviour of the recipient
with regards to its attitude to terrorism; the risk that the
equipment might be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported
under undesirable conditions; the national security of the
Member States (including the risk of reverse engineering or
unintended technology transfer); and respect for the international
commitments of the EU Member States (including commitments
to enforce embargoes and commitments under the NPT, CWC and
MTCR).
Consultation mechanism
The Member States are required to notify their EU partners
of a decision to refuse an export licence and should a Member
State consider issuing a licence similar to one refused by
another Member State in the previous three years, it must
enter into bilateral consultations with the country that originally
refused the licence giving a detailed reason why it is considering
undercutting.
Annual report on arms exports and review of the Code's
implementation
Each Member State will circulate to its EU partners an
annual report on its arms exports and its implementation of
the Code. The reports will be discussed at an annual meeting
to identify improvements which could be made to the Code.
The future of the EU Code
A number of EU States have already indicated their intention
to strengthen the Code through the annual review process.
Key issues are likely to be: strengthening the criteria; developing
the mechanisms for preventing undercutting; and ensuring the
annual reports on arms exports are presented to parliaments
and the public.
A co-ordinated approach to arms export controls by the
US and EU
The EU and US together account for 80% of the global
trade in arms, therefore agreement on effective Codes of Conduct
on both sides of the Atlantic would have a significant impact
on arms exports in their own right. Moreover, the adoption
of similar restrictive Codes would enable the EU and US to
argue with one voice in international control fora such as
the Wassenaar Arrangement and UN disarmament bodies. The EU
States are in a strong position to influence the supplier
states of Eastern Europe that are seeking membership of the
EU; similarly the US can influence the second tier supplier
states of Latin America. Crucially, EU-US co-operation on
arms export controls is essential if the arms export control
practices of the other major arms suppliers - Russia and China
- are to be influenced.
Whilst there is room for improvement on the EU Code, the
15 EU governments have taken a welcome first step in the right
direction. It is now vital that this development is consolidated
by the adoption in Congress of the Code of Conduct sponsored
by Senator John Kerry and Representatives Cynthia McKinney
and Dana Rohrabacher.
Updated June 1998
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